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Abstract
The cornerstone of modern International Environmental Law is the 
prohibition of transfrontier pollution, according to  which S tates have the 
responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not 
cause dam age to the environment of other S tates, or of areas beyond national 
jurisdiction. In addition, there is now a substantial body of international treaties 
laying down detailed regimes for various environmental sectors.
Recent international conflicts have raised fundamental questions about 
the relationship between International Environmental Law and armed conflict. 
The notion that the rules of general International Environmental Law continue to 
apply during armed conflict is now well accepted. But the principles which are 
usually cited, remain at a very high level of abstraction.
This thesis examines the extent to which international law has developed 
more detailed rules to  protect the environment in international armed conflict. 
After a discussion of the main legal issues, the thesis concentrates on the 
marine environment, examining the relationship betw een naval warfare on the 
one hand, and multilateral environmental treaties on marine safety and 
prevention of marine pollution on the other.
It concludes that the majority of these treaties do not apply during armed 
conflict, either because war dam age is expressly excluded, or because the 
treaties do not apply to warships. As for the treaties that are in principle 
applicable during armed conflict, the analysis show s that, under international 
law, belligerent and neutral S tates have the legal right to suspend those treaties, 
wholly or partially.
Finally, the author concludes that very few  of the treaties considered take 
the new  law of armed conflict into account, and that there remains a need for 
more detailed rules on environmental standards for military operations.
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Convention) Ramsar, 2 February 1971, in force 21 December 1975; 996 UNTS 245
• Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction 
on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof (1971 Seabed Treaty) 11 February 1971, in 
force 18 May 1972; 955 UNTS 115
• Convention Relating to Civil Liability in the Field of Maritime Carriage of Nuclear Material. Brussels, 17 
December 1971, in force 15 July 1975, Cmnd., 5094; UNEP, Selected Treaties, vol. 1,253
• International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution 
Damage. (1971 Fund Convention) Brussels, 18 December 1971, in force 16 October 1978,11ILM2S4 (1972)
• European Convention on State Immunity and Additional Protocol. Convention (and Protocol) done at Basle, 
16 May 1972, Protocol (1985), in force 11 June 1976, Council of Europe, No. 74; European Treaty Series, No 
74, Strasbourg, 1972; reprinted in ILC, Jurisdictional Immunities, 156
• Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution bv Dumping from Ships and Aircraft (Oslo Dumping 
Convention), Oslo, 15 February 1972, in force 7 April 1974,932 UNTS 3
• Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused bv Space Objects. London/Washington/Moscow, 29 
March 1972 in force 1 September 1972; 961 UNTS 187
• Convention on the Prohibition of the Development Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) 
and Toxin Weapons, and on their Destruction. London/Washington/Moscow, 10 April 1972, in force 26 
March 1975; 1051 UNTS 163
• Agreement for the Prevention of Incidents at Sea (United States-USSR) (INSCEA), Moscow, 22 May 1972, 
11 ILM 11% (1972)
• Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (COLREGS), London, 20 
October 1972, in force 15 July 1977, UKTS11 (1977); 28 UST3459; TIAS No. 8587
• Convention for the Protection of World Cultural and Natural Heritage (World Heritage Convention), Paris, 17 
November 1972, in force 17 December 1975; 117LM1358 (1972)
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• Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution bv Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter. (London 
Dumping Convention), London/Mexico City/Moscow/ Washington DC, 29 December 1972, in force 30 
August 1975,1046 UNTS 120
• Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora. (1973 CITES), 
Washington, 3 March 1973, in force 1 July 1975; 993 UNTS 243
• International Convention for the Prevention of the Pollution bv Ships fMARPOL 73). London, 2 November 
1973, not in force; 12/LM1319,1434(1973)
• Protocol Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Marine Pollution bv Substances other than Oil. 
(1973 Intervention Protocol), London, 2 November 1973, in force 30 March 198313 ILM 605 (1974)
1974-1977
• Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea Area. (Helsinki Convention), 
Helsinki, 22 March 1974, in force 3 May 1980; 13 7ZM546 (1974)
• Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution from Land-Based Sources. Paris, 4 June 1974, in force 6 
May 1978,13ILM352 (1974)
• International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS). 1 November 1974, in force 25 May 1980; 14 
ILM959 (1975)
• Convention for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea Against Pollution. Barcelona, 16 February 1976, in 
force 12 February 1978; 15ILM290 (1976)
• Protocol for the Prevention of Pollution of the Mediterranean Sea bv Dumping from Ships and Aircraft. 
Barcelona, 16 February 1976, in force 12 February 1978,15 ILM300 (1976)
• Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage Resulting from Exploration for and Exploitation of 
Seabed Mineral Resources. London, 1 May 1977, not yet in force, 16 ILM  1450 (1977)
• Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification 
Techniques. (ENMOD), New York, concluded 10 December 1976, opened for signature 18 May 1977, in 
force 5 October 1978,1108 UNTS 151; Schindler & Toman, op. cit., 164.
• Protocol I Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949. and relating to the Protection of 
Victims of International Armed Conflicts. (Additional Protocol I), Geneva, 8 June 1977, in force 7 December 
1978; Schindler & Toman, op. cit., 621
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1979-1982
• Egvpt-Israel: Treaty of Peace. Washington, 26 March 1979,18ILM362 (1979)
• European Convention for the Protection of Animals for Slaughter. Strasbourg, 10 May 1979, in force, 11 June 
1982, UNEP, Selected Treaties, vol. II, 70.
• Protocol Relating to the Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships. (MARPOL 78), London, 17 
February 1978, in force 2 October 1983,17 ILM 246 (1978)
• Kuwait Regional Convention for Co-operation on the Protection of the Marine Environment From Pollution 
(Kuwait Regional Convention), Kuwait, 24 April 1978, in force 1 July 1979,17 ILM 526 (1978)
• Kuwait Protocol concerning Co-operation in Combating Pollution bv Oil and Other Harmful Substances in 
Cases of Emergency. Kuwait, 24 April 1978, in force 1 July 1979,17 ILM 526 (1978)
• Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals. Bonn, 23 June 1979, in force 1 
November 1983; \9 IL M \5  (1980)
• Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution (LRATP), Geneva, 13 November 1979, in force 16 
March 1983; 18 ILM  1442 (1979)
• Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be 
Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects. (Inhumane Weapons Convention), 
Geneva, 10 October 1980, in force 2 December 1983; 19ZLA/1523 (1980); Schindler & Toman, op. cit., 179
• Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR), Canberra, 20 May 1980, 
in force 7 April 1982; 19JZM841 (1980)
• Convention for the Co-operation in the Protection and Development of the Marine and Coastal Environment of 
the West and Central African Region. Abidjan, 23 March 1981, in force 5 August 1984,20ILM146 (1981)
• Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment and Coastal Area of the South-East Pacific. Lima, 12 
November 1981, in force 19 May 1986; UNEP, Selected Treaties, vol. n , 130
• Regional Convention for the Conservation of the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden Environment Jeddah. 14 February 
1982, in force 20 August 1985; UNEP, Selected Treaties, vol. II, 144
• United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Montego Bay. 10 December 1982, in force 16 November 
1994,21 ILM  1261 (1982)
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1983-1986
• Convention for the Protection and Development of the Marine Environment of the Wider Caribbean Region. 
Cartagena de Indias, 24 March 1983, in force 11 October 1986,22 ILM 221 (1983)
• Protocol to the 1969 Civil Liability Convention. 25 May 1984, not yet in force, IMO Doc LEG./Conf.6/66 of 
25 May 1984
• Protocol to the 1971IOPC Convention. 25 May 1984, not yet in force, IMO Doc LEG./Conf.6/67 of 25 May 
1984
• Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Laver. Vienna, 22 March 1985, in force 22 September 1988, 26 
ILM 1529 (1987)
• Convention for the Protection. Management and Development of the Marine and Coastal Environment of the 
Eastern African Region. Nairobi, 21 June 1985, not in force (1995); UNEP, Selected Treaties, vol. n, 324
• Association of South-East Asian Nations Agreement on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources. 
(ASEAN Agreement), Kuala Lumpur, 9 July 1985, not in force (1995), UNEP, Selected Treaties, vol. n, 337
• Convention on the Early Notification of Nuclear Accidents. Vienna, 26 September 1986, in force 27 October 
1986,25 ILM  1370 (1986)
• Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency- Vienna, 26 
September 1986, in force 26 February 1987,25 ILM  1377 (1986)
• Convention for the Protection of the Natural Resources and Environment of the South Pacific Region 
(SPREP), Noumea, 24 November 1986, in force 22 August 1990, 26 ILM  38 (1987); UNEP, Selected 
Treaties, vol. n, 372
• Protocol for die Prevention of Pollution of the South Pacific Region bv Dumping. Noumea, 25 November 
1986, in force 18 August 1990; UNEP, Selected Treaties, vol. II, 381
• Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organisations or between International 
Organisations. Vienna, 21 March 1986, not in force (1997), 25 7ZM543 (1986)
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1987-1989
• European Convention for the Protection of Pet Animals. Strasbourg, 13 November 1987, in force 1 May 
1997), UNEP, Selected Treaties, vol. II, 403.
• Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Laver. Montreal, 16 September 1987, in force 1 January 1989: 
26 ILM  1987,154.
• Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities. (CRAMRA), Wellington, 2 June 
1988, not in yet force; 27 ILM 868 (1988)
• Joint Protocol Relating to the Application of the Vienna Convention and the Paris Conventioa Vienna, 21 
September 1988, in force 27 April 1992, UNEP, Selected Treaties, vol. II., 447
• Basle Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal. 
Basle, 22 March 1989, in force 24 May 1992,28 ILM 657 (1989)
• International Convention on Salvage. London, 28 April 1989, in force 14 July 1996, IMO/LEG/Conf. 7/27
• Agreement on the Prevention of Dangerous Military Activities (DMAA), Moscow, 12 June 1989, in force, 1 
January 1990,28 7ZM877 (1989)
• UN/ECE Convention on Civil Liability for Damage Caused During Carriage of Dangerous Foods bv Road. 
Rail and Inland Navigation Vessels. Geneva, 10 October 1989, not in force, UN doc. ECE/Trans/79
1990-1992
• Protocol Concerning Specially Protected Areas and Wildlife in the Wider Caribbean Region (SPAW 
Protocol), Kingston, 18 January 1990, not in force, Protocol to the 1983 Convention, 1 Ybk IEL (1990); Int’l 
Env’. Rep. 21:3261
• International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness. Response and Co-operation (OPRC Convention. 
London, 30 November 1990, in force 13 May 1995,30 ILM 133 (1991)
• Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty. Madrid, 4 October 1991, not in force (1995); 30 
ILM 1461 (1991)
• Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea Area (Helsinki Convention). 
Helsinki, 9 April 1992, see also May 1980 Convention, UN LOS Bulletin, No. 22, Jan. 1993, at 54
• Convention on the Protection of the Black Sea Against Pollution. Bucharest, 21 April 1992, not in force 
(1995), 31 ILM  1101 (1992)
• United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. (UNFCCC), New York, 9 May 1992, in force 24 
March 1994,317LM849 (1992)
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• Convention on Biological Diversity. Rio de Janeiro, 5 June 1992, in force 29 December 1993, 31 ILM  822 
(1992)
• Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic (Ospar Convention), 
Paris, 22 September 1992, not in force (1995), 32 ILM  1069 (1993)
1993-1997
• Convention on the Prohibition of the Development Production. Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons 
and on their Destruction. (Chemical Weapons Convention), 13 January 1993, in force 29 April 1997, 32 ILM  
800
• Convention on Civil Liability for Damage Resulting From Activities Dangerous to the Environment (1993 
Lugano Convention) Lugano, 21 June 1993, not in force (April 1998), 32 ILM  1228 (1993)
• Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the United Nations Convention on the Law of 
the Sea of 10 December 1982. UNGA Res. 48/263, 29 July 1994, in force 28 July 1996, 33 ILM  1309
• Israel-Jordan: Treaty of Peace. Done at Arava/Araba Crossing Point, 26 October 1994,34 ILM A3 (1995)
• General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Paris, 14 December 1995 (Dayton/Paris 
Peace Agreements), 35 ILM15 (1996)
• Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, concluded 10 September, 1996, opened for signature 24 September 1996,35 
ILM  1439 (1996)
• Convention on Liability and Compensation for Damage in connection with the Carriage of Hazardous and 
Noxious Substances bv Sea (HNS Convention), London, 3 May 1996 35 ILM  1406 (1996)
• Protocol to the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution bv Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter 
(London Convention), London, 7 November 1996,36 ILM I (1997)
• Convention on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses. New York, 21 May 1997, 
36 7ZM700 (1997)
• Protocol to amend the 1963 Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage. Vienna, 12 September 
1997, IAEA, PR 97/21
• Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage. Vienna, 12 September 1997, IAEA, PR 
97/21
□ □□
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Introduction
Historical evidence of genuine concern about the impact of war on the human environment 
can be found since the earliest civilisations. Yet, the history of war is replete with examples of serious 
devastation of the enemy’s land and property.
The relationship between peacetime human activities and the environment is in the stage of 
advanced public debate and scholarly attention, and much progress has been made in recent years, 
regarding the development of appropriate instruments and institutions pertaining to the protection of 
the environment in peacetime.
The cornerstone of modem International Environmental Law is the prohibition of transfrontier 
pollution, according to which States have the responsibility to ensure that activities within their 
jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other States, or to areas beyond 
national jurisdiction. In addition, there is now a substantial body of international treaties laying down 
detailed regimes for various environmental sectors.
Recent international conflicts, such as the 1980/88 Iran-Iraq and the 1990/91 Gulf wars, have 
raised fundamental questions about the relationship between modem International Environmental Law 
and armed conflict. The notion that rules of general International Environmental Law continue to 
apply during armed conflict is now well accepted.
In its 1996 Advisory Opinion on the Legality o f the Threat or Use o f Nuclear Weapons the 
International Court of Justice stressed that ‘the obligations of States to respect and protect the natural 
environment’, applied equally ‘to the actual use of nuclear weapons in armed conflict.’1
However, the international legal principles for the protection of the environment in armed 
conflict which are usually cited, remain at a very high level of abstraction. In the above advisory 
opinion, the Court offered the following broad statement:
1 ICJRep. (1996), 226 at 243, para 32.
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‘...States must take environmental considerations into account when assessing what is necessary and 
proportionate in the pursuit of legitimate military objectives. Respect for the environment is one of the 
elements that go to assessing whether an action is in conformity with the principles of necessity and 
proportionality.’2
Similarly, whilst environmental considerations are increasingly included in military manuals, 
the ensuing principles remain vague. Thus, the ‘Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval 
Operations’ for the US Navy provides that:
‘. . .the commander has an affirmative obligation to avoid unnecessary damage to the environment to the 
extent that it is practicable to do so consistent with mission accomplishment. To that end, and so far as 
military requirements permit, methods or means of warfare should be employed with due regard to the 
protection and preservation of the natural environment Destruction of the natural environment not 
necessitated by mission accomplishment and carried out wantonly is prohibited.’3
This thesis examines the extent to which international law has developed more detailed 
standards to protect the environment in international armed conflict, by concentrating on the law of 
naval warfare on the one hand and multilateral treaties regarding protection of the marine environment 
on the other. The reasons why this study concentrates on the marine environment are as follows.
First, it will be seen that the bulk of the existing multilateral environmental agreements relate 
to the marine environment. They contain among the most detailed norms of current International 
Environmental Law. This contrasts sharply with the law of naval warfare, which consists primarily of 
customary rules of international law. Although there have been unofficial initiatives, leading to the 
1913 Oxford Manual o f Naval War,4 and more recently, to the 1994 San Remo Manual on 
International Law Applicable to Armed Conflict at Sea,5 much of the law of naval warfare is 
uncodified, and in need of update.
Secondly, of all types of armed conflict, naval conflicts are the most likely to affect not only 
the contending States but also States not directly involved in the hostilities. Therefore, conflicts with 
an important naval component may reveal State practice and opinio juris regarding the legal effect of 
maritime treaties for contending and non-contending States.
Thirdly, many of the maritime treaties that will be considered in this study, have antecedents 
that go back to the beginning of this century. This means that they may have been affected by several
2 Ibid., 242, para 30, in fine.
3 NWP 1-14M, para 8.1.3 (1996).
4 Under the auspices of the Institut de Droit International, 26 Ann. IDI(1913), 641-672.
5 Under the auspices of International Institute of Humanitarian Law, published by Cambridge University Press (1995).
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large inter-State conflicts and may point to rules of international law on the operation of maritime 
environmental law during international armed conflict
Finally, many of the modem descendants of the early maritime treaties were concluded under 
the auspices of the International Maritime Organisation, or its predecessor. Institutional memoiy 
greatly increases the likelihood of consistency in the interpretation of certain treaty clauses.
This study is divided into two main parts. In the first part, the author examines the main legal 
questions involved. Chapter One discusses the origins and development of modem International 
Environmental Law; Chapter Two deals with the lex specialise and examines the protection of the 
environment in the law of armed conflict, discussing jus in bello, jus ad bellum and the law of 
neutrality; Chapter Three examines the operation of general International Environmental Law during 
armed conflict.
In the second part, the author examines the legal relationship between naval warfare on the 
one hand and multilateral environmental treaties on marine safety and prevention of marine pollution 
on the other. Chapter Four deals with the exclusion of war damage from the scope of maritime 
conventions; Chapter Five discusses the contingency clauses which appear in some of the treaties and 
which specifically address the possibility of war or armed conflict; Chapter Six deals with the 
exemption of warships from the application of some of the maritime conventions. In Chapter Seven 
the author formulates conclusions on the relationship between naval warfare and the maritime treaties 
discussed, whilst Chapter Eight contains general conclusions on the legal effect of environmental 
treaties during international armed conflict.
□  □ D
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and Duties of States.
Chapter Two:
Protection of the Environment in the Laws of Armed Conflict.
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The Operation of General International Environmental Law During International 
A rm ed Conflict.
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Chapter One 
Modem International Environmental Law and the Principal 
Environmental Rights and Duties o f States
The main objective of this first chapter is to review the salient features of modem (peacetime) 
International Environmental Law. After a discussion of the origins and development of the discipline, 
the author will consider whether it is possible and useful to define the environment. Section two is 
devoted to an examination of the principal rights and duties of States in relation to their use of the 
environment. In section three the territorial scope of the identified environmental rights and duties will 
be analysed. The conclusions to this chapter are contained in the fourth section.
1.1. The Development and Milestones of Modern International 
Environmental Law
1.1.1. The Impact o f UNCHE and UNCED
The term ‘International Environmental Law’ (hereinafter ‘IEL’), will be used throughout this 
study as a shorthand for the corpus of international law relevant to environmental issues. The 
definition by Dr. Bimie and Professor Boyle offers a good starting point to describe the field of 
international law that this study will be concerned with:
‘...the aggregate of all rules and principles aimed at protecting the global environment and controlling 
activities within national jurisdiction that may affect another State’s environment or areas beyond 
national jurisdiction’. 1
1 Bimie & Boyle, International Law & The Environment (1992), 1,9.
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There is some divergence of opinion in the literature about the historic antecedents of modem 
IEL. Professor Caldwell dates the earliest international co-operative efforts inspired by environmental 
concerns back to 1872, when the Swiss Government proposed an international regulatory commission 
to protect migratory birds in Europe. He discusses the growth of environmental concern since the 
second World War, and argues that a first ‘wave of environmentalism’ in the 1960s reached its apex in 
the 1972.2 Dr. Hohmann distinguishes two main periods in the development of IEL: traditional 
environmental law, based on economic considerations, from the beginning of this century to 1972, and 
modem international environmental law, dominated by ecological concerns, from 1972 onwards.3 
Professors Kiss and Shelton regard 1968 as a turning point, for it was then that several international 
organisations began placing environmental protection on their agendas.4
A common denominator in the literature is that modem IEL was formed at the end of the 
1960s, or in the beginning of the 1970s. It was indeed in the early 1960s that a number of scientific 
studies raised the alarm regarding the effects of unchecked economic development on the human 
environment. The works of US marine biologist Rachel Carson (1907-64) are widely credited with 
raising public awareness, particularly her book Silent Spring (1962), in which she questioned the 
widespread use of chemical pesticides. In addition, a series of environmental catastrophes in the 1960s 
underlined the gravity of the increased threats to the environment and to human health. In Japan, the 
Chisso Corporation, which for more than 30 years discharged mercury into the Minimata Bay and 
River, was finally forced into court in 1969. By then the full consequences of the Minimata disease - 
an extreme form of mercury poisoning which caused serious birth defects and ruined the local fishing 
industry - had come to light. In Europe, the ‘black tides’ off the coasts of France and England caused 
by the 1967 Torrey Canyon disaster, were a catalyst in the development of a totally new convention 
apparatus for marine catastrophes.5 In 1968 a diverse group of private and public sector experts 
worried about environmental decline, formed the Club of Rome. Their 1972 report - entitled ‘Limits to 
Growth’-6 quickly became an international best-seller. Grassroots movements of concerned citizens
2 Caldwell, International Environmental Policy (1990), 19,22, 30ff.
3 Hohmann, Praventive Rechtspflichten und -prinzipien des modemen Umweltvdlkerrechts (1992), 2Off., 35jf., 59jf.
4 Kiss & Shelton, International Environmental Law (1991), 33-7.
5 Report of the Home Office, The Torrey Canyon, Cmnd., (1967) 3246; ‘Chronique de faits intemationaux: France, 
Grande Bretagne et Liberia. Affaire du Torrey Canyon’, 71 RGDIP (1967), 1092-1099; Smith, State Responsibility and 
the Marine Environment (1988), 219-20; Dupuy & Remond-Gouilloud, in Dupuy & Vignes, A Handbook On The New 
Law Of The Sea, Vol II. (1991), Chapter 22, 1153-1158; Kiss & Shelton, op. cit., 38; Bimie & Boyle, op. cit., 251; 
Sands, Principles o f International Environmental Law, vol. I (1995), 333ff.\ Gehring & Jachtenfuchs, 4 EJIL (1993), 
97-99.
6 Meadows et. al.
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succeeded in mobilising their governments7 and various international organisations to take on 
environmental problems. By 1972, a wide variety of intergovernmental organisations, both within and 
outside the UN system, and several unofficial bodies had included specific environmental concerns on 
their agendas.8
An early milestone for IEL was the Conference on the Human Environment (UNCHE) 
convened in Stockholm by the UN General Assembly, in 1972. This high profile meeting produced a 
large number of texts, of which the Stockholm Declaration of Principles for the Preservation and 
Enhancement of the Human Environment -adopted by acclamation- and the ambitious Action Plan for 
the Human Environment - which contains 109 Recommendations- are best known.9 The Stockholm 
Declaration, which consists of a Preamble and 26 ‘Principles’, contains provisions not only addressed 
to the traditional subjects of international law - States - but also deals with environmental rights and 
duties of individuals, organisations, local and national governments, and international institutions. It 
has been said of the UNCHE that:
‘In environmentally conscious circles, the calendar starts in 1972, the year of the Stockholm
Conference’10
Since 1972, the International Law Commission (ILC) and unofficial bodies such as the Institut 
de Droit International (hereinafter ‘ Institut *) and the International Law Association (ILA) have made 
significant contributions to the codification and progressive development of aspects of IEL, mainly in 
the areas of water resource law and transboundary air pollution.11 UNCHE is further credited with 
giving impetus to important regional initiatives, such as the development of environmental protection 
rules by the EEC.12 Other regional intergovernmental organisations that have advanced the 
development of modem IEL are the UN Economic Commission for Europe (UN/ECE), the Council of 
Europe and to a lesser extent, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD).13
7 Sohn, 14 Harv. I U ( 1973), 424-5; Caldwell, op. cit., 49.
8 Bimie & Boyle, op. cit., 39-40.
9 UN Doc. A/CONF.48/14 and Con. 1 (1972), 11ILM(1972), 1416; Sohn, 14 Harv. I U (1973), 433-9; Sands, op. cit., 
37; Palmer, G., 86AJIL (1992), 266.
10 ‘Im umweltbewusten Kreisen beginnt die Zeitrechnung im Jahr 1972, dem Jahr der Stockholmer Umweltkonferenz’: 
Hohmann, op. cit., 67, fn. 37.
11 Ibid., 117-40, 140-158, 158-63; Sands, op. cit., 650-2; Boyle, 30 ICLQ (1990), 1-26; Symposium on State 
Responsibility and Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising Out of Acts Not Prohibited by International Law, 16 
NYIL (1985), 3-278.
12 Sands, op. cit., 38-9.
13 Ibid., 87-9; Hohmann, op. cit., 166-80,180-189,190-209.
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Apart from the official recognition of the environment as a subject of general international 
concern, another major outcome of UNCHE was the establishment of the United Nations Environment 
Programme (UNEP).14 From rather modest beginnings UNEP has played an increasingly important 
role in the promotion and development of IEL. For instance, it initiated a successful regional seas 
programme and sponsored the conclusion of agreements on the protection of the ozone layer and 
hazardous waste.15
A further important institution for the development of IEL, is the International Maritime 
Organisation (IMO), established initially in 1948 as the International Maritime Consultative 
Organisation (IMCO). A specialised UN agency concerned with both maritime safety and marine 
pollution, it promotes important environmental treaties for which it often provides secretariat 
functions.
In celebration of the 10th anniversary of the Stockholm Conference, the UN General Assembly 
adopted in 1982 the ‘World Charter for Nature’ with overwhelming support.16 The Charter is aimed at 
setting forth ‘the principles of conservation by which all human conduct affecting nature is to be 
guided and judged’. However, it uses mainly aspirational language and is generally regarded as laying 
down standards of ethical but not legal conduct.17
The 1992 Rio Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), was timed to 
coincide with the 20th anniversary of the Stockholm Conference. Delegates from 178 States and 650 
non-governmental organisations participated.18 In terms of international instruments, the Rio 
Conference adopted two treaties and a set of principles on specific environmental problems19 in 
addition to a general Declaration on Environment and Development consisting of 27 Principles aimed 
at re-affirming and developing the Stockholm Declaration. UNCED also led to a voluminous blueprint 
for action in the 21st century and beyond, entitled Agenda 21.20 It comprises 40 chapters and hundreds
14 UNEP was established as a special fund by the UN General Assembly (Res. 2997 (XXVII) 1972) upon a 
recommendation by UNCHE: Caldwell, op. cit., 71; Sands, op. cit., 71-2; Timoshenko, in Al-Nauimi & Meese, 
International Legal Issues Arising Under the United Nations Decade o f International Law (1995), 154.
15 Kiss & Shelton, op. cit., 45, 59ff, Plant, in Churchill & Freestone, International Law and Global Climate Change 
(1991), 167-8; Bimie & Boyle, op. cit., 41-52; Sands, op. cit., 38; Palmer, G., Z6AJIL (1992), 266, fn. 11.
16 UNGA Res. 37/7, adopted on 28 October 1982, adopted by a vote of 111 in favour, 18 abstentions and one vote 
against (US), 23 /LM(1983), 455.
17 Sands, op. cit., 42-44; Bimie & Boyle, op. cit., 431-2; Hohmann, op. cit., 81-89.
18 Sands, op. cit., 48ff.; Barber & Dickson, in Cooper & Palmer, Just Environments (1995), 124.
19 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change; Convention on Biological Diversity; a set of ‘Non-legally Binding 
Authoritative Statement of Principles for a Global Consensus on the Management, Conservation and Sustainable 
Development of All Types of Forests’: See Sands et. al., Documents in International Environmental Law (1994), vol. 
II A, 246, 845,874; Adede, in Kiss & Burhenne-Guilmin, A Law for the Environment (1994), 16.
20 See chapter 1, Preamble to Agenda 21, para 1.3 in the Report on UNCED, UN Doc A/151/26 (vol. I).
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of programme areas, the implementation of which is the responsibility of governments, with key roles 
for the UN system, other official and non- official, regional and sub-regional organisations, and with 
particular attention to broad public participation.21
Post-UNCED institutions include the UN Commission on Sustainable Development, a UN 
Department for Policy Coordination and Sustainable Development, a High-Level Advisory Board of 
experts on sustainable development, a Global Environmental Facility and an independent, non­
governmental Earth Council22
In 1997 the UN General Assembly convened a special session for the purpose of an overall 
review and appraisal of the implementation of Agenda 21.23 Apart from a programme for the further 
implementation of Agenda 21, a ‘statement of commitment’24 was adopted in which a number of 
positive results were acknowledged, but deep concern was expressed that the overall trends for 
sustainable development25 were worse in 1997 than they were in 1992. Participants hence committed 
themselves to ensure greater measurable progress in achieving sustainable development by 2002.
1.1.2. The Environment as a Concept
There is no commonly agreed definition of the concept ‘environment’ in international law. It 
is a term, as Professor Caldwell writes, which everyone understands but no one is able to define.26 The 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) expressed the same sentiment when it stressed in its 1996 Advisory 
Opinion on the Legality o f the Threat or Use o f Nuclear Weapons that:
‘... the environment is not an abstraction but represents the living space, the quality of life and the very 
health of human beings, including generations unborn.’27
Many writers tend to shun the task of developing an all-purpose definition of the environment 
or borrow heavily from the natural sciences.28 Professors Kiss and Shelton for instance, use the term 
‘biosphere’, and define the environment as:
21 Sands, op. cit., 52ff.
22 Sand, 4 EJIL (1993;, 386-7.
23 Report of the UNGA 19th Special Session (UNGASS), 23-28 June 1997: UN Doc. A/S-19-29,27 June 1997.
24 5 Earth Negotiations Bulletin, No 88 (30 June 1997).
25 See infra 1.2.2. C for the concept of sustainable development.
26 Cited by Bimie & Boyle, op. cit., 3.
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‘.. .any point on a continuum between the entire biosphere and the immediate physical surroundings of a 
person or a group’29
The biosphere is a concept that originated in geological circles at the end of the last century, 
and was adopted by UNESCO in 1966.30 It refers to the relatively thin zone of air, soil and water that is 
capable of supporting life, comprising the earth itself, a sector of several hundred meters above the 
earth, and a sector beneath the earth and the oceans.
There are several important lessons to be drawn from an excursion into the natural sciences. 
In the first place, natural scientists view the term ‘environment’ as an essentially relative and 
potentially infinite concept, pointing to objects, chemical processes or lifeforms surrounding another 
object or lifeform and which stand in relation to it.31 To ecologists there are no limits as to size or 
complexity of the terms ‘environment’ or ‘ecosystem’.32
Moreover, the ‘natural environment’ is probably an outdated concept, for it disregards the 
unique and significant role which humans play in the biosphere.33 A UNEP Working Group of Experts 
on environmental damage arising from military activities suggested that the definition of the 
environment should include natural elements as well as human elements; i.e., not only ‘abiotic and 
biotic components, including air, water, soil, flora, fauna, and the ecosystem formed by their 
interaction’, but also ‘cultural heritage, features of the landscape and environmental amenity’.34
In the decades since UNCHE, scholars from various disciplines have advocated divergent 
philosophies as a basis for environmental policy. In an influential article that was published in 1972 
and quickly popularised as a book, Professor Stone proposed:
‘...that we give legal rights to forests, oceans, rivers and other so-called ‘natural objects’ in the
environment-indeed to the natural environment as a whole’.35
27 ICJ Rep. (1996), 241-2, para 29; see too Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project, judgment of 25 September 1997, ICJ 
General List No. 92, para 112.
28 But see definitions by Meyer and Tolbert in Plant, Environmental Protection and the Law of War (1992), 255-6 & 
257-61.
29 Op. cit., 22.
30 Caldwell, op. cit., 27; Kiss & Shelton, op. cit., 9.
31 Lehnes, Probleme der eindeutigen Emittlung der Ausdehnung, der Dauer und der Schwere einer 
Umweltschddigung, (1993), 22-23, paras 9.1,9.2 (on file with author).
32 Palmer, J., in Cooper & Palmer, op. cit., 27-8.
33 Moroni et al., in Bourdeau et al., Environmental Ethics (1990), 141-54; Robinson, ibid., 263; Palmer, J., op. cit., 28.
34 Report of the Working Group of Experts on Liability and Compensation for Environmental Damage Arising from 
Military Activities [hereinafter: ‘Working Group on Environmental Damage’], UNEP/Env. Law/3/Inf. 1, 15 October 
1996,10, para 42.
35 Stone, 45 SCLR (1972), 456.
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These so-called ‘ecorights1 are radically nature-centred. Their moral ground is the intrinsic 
good or worth of nature.36 In legal terms, a thorough nature-centred morality implies that the 
environment would need to be protected for its own sake, in the absence of identifiable human values, 
rights or interests.37 Ecocentrist ideas have been invoked mainly in US courts, with ambiguous 
results.38 Some legal scholars have expressed sympathy for according ‘rights’ to certain sentient 
species, such as elephants39 and whales.40
Ecocentrist theory holds that no part of the environment can rationally said to be more 
important than another41 However, it leaves a few serious questions unanswered. Should free nature 
be allowed to reign? What about natural objects as pests and viruses or natural phenomena such as 
flooding?42 The theory of interspecies equity is probably an over-reaction to the serious 
mismanagement of the environment by humans. Recognising that humans are part of a ‘biotic 
community’ may be a step in the good direction, but it does not in itself point to guidelines for human 
behaviour.43
The debate between anthropocentrist and ecocentrist positions is reflected in many 
(peacetime) environmental instruments. The 1972 Stockholm Declaration seems anthropocentric 
because of its focus on the protection of nature for the benefit of mankind.44 By contrast, the 1982 
World Charter for Nature is seen as ecocentric, for it emphasises the protection of nature as an end in 
itself:
‘Every form of life is unique, warranting respect regardless of its worth to man... ’.45
However, there is great ambivalence within the environmental community about the ultimate 
reasons for protecting the environment. Many recent environmental campaigns continue to appeal to 
traditional human-centred instincts.46 Furthermore, it can be argued that the newly developed concepts
36 Stone, in Westing, Cultural Norms, War and the Environment (1988), 77-9.
37 Lynch, in Bourdeau et al., op. cit., 160.
38 Stone, 59 SCLR (1985), 4-5.
39 Glennon, 84 AJIL (1990), 1-2.
40 D’Amato & Chopra, 85 AJIL (1991), 23.
41 Cooper, in Cooper & Palmer, Just Environments, 144.
42 Lynch, in Bourdeau et al., op. cit., 161.
43 Moroni et. al., op. cit., 15; Cooper, op. cit., 146.
44 Preambular paragraphs; Sohn, 14 Harv. 777(1973), 436.
45 UNGA Res. 37/7 on a World Charter for Nature, 28 October 1982, 37 UNGAOR, (Supp. No. 51), 17; II A 
Documents in International Environmental Law, 31.
46 Glennon, 84 AJIL (1990), 5-10.
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of inter-generational equity and sustainable development47 are in essence anthropocentric: they refer, 
inter alia, to interests, entitlements or rights of (future generations) of people48 This prevailing 
ambivalence was not resolved by UNCED. On the contrary, it is possible to regard the Rio Declaration 
as a step back in the direction of pure anthropocentrism, for the first principle strikingly propounds 
that:
‘Human beings are at the centre of concerns for sustainable development’.
The Biodiversity Convention that was adopted at the same conference, by contrast, attempts 
to combine both anthropocentric and ecocentric values.49
While the views of animal rights activists and other inter-species equity theorists have drawn 
much attention in recent years, most international legal instruments, apart from a few adopted by the 
Council of Europe,50 have tended to endorse what has been termed an ‘environmentalist’ view. Instead 
of claiming that all species should be protected, however adverse their effect on humans or other 
species, this theoiy stresses that species need to be protected for ecological reasons, as part an 
ecosystem.51
The better view seems to be that all concern for the environment shows anthropocentric 
attributes. Many people value protection of the environment, irrespective of its economic worth to 
mankind. Moreover, the scarcer natural resources become, the more value will be placed on preserving 
what is left52 Human beings have in the last decades become increasingly aware of the possible long­
term effects of environmental degradation on the human population.53 The growing awareness of the 
interrelatedness of all life processes on Earth is another reason for extending protection to previously 
underrated environmental components. Such moderate anthropocentrism should not be viewed as 
necessarily negative. Non-human components will benefit from the ‘reflex-function’ of norms created 
by and for humans.54
47 See infra, 1.2. 2. C.
48 Stone, in Westing, Cultural Norms, War and the Environment (1988), 76-77; D’Amato & Chopra, 85 AJIL (1991), 
23.
49 The Preambular paragraphs recognise both the intrinsic value of biological diversity and its value for humankind.
50 See infra, 1.2.1. C.
51 Bimie & Boyle, op. cit., 423-4.
52 See Stone's example about what people would prefer if asked to choose between an additional 1,000 million persons 
on earth, or an additional 1,000 million trees: in Westing, Cultural Norms, 78.
53 Stone, 45 SCLR (1972), 489.
54 For concept of ‘Reflexwirkung’ see Spieker, Gewohnheitsrechtlicher Schutz der natiirlichen Umwelt im 
intemationalen bewaffheten Konflikt (1992), 184.
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It is nevertheless legitimate to question if it matters in a legal sense that all Nature is 
subordinated to human considerations. Authors such as Professor Stone claim that it does, particularly 
with regard to compensation for environmental damage.55 Furthermore, the subordination of Nature to 
human claims is more apparent in the law of armed conflict, as will be seen later.56
In sum, a scientifically sound, comprehensive, and all-purpose legal definition of the 
environment would have to stress the relative and potentially infinite character of the concept, the 
interrelatedness of all environmental components, the primordial role played by mankind in the 
environment, and possibly also balance anthropocentrist and ecocentrist notions.
Apart from the difficulty to define and restrict the scope of the concept from a legal 
perspective, there are other reasons why there are few all-purpose legal definitions of the environment. 
The first one is historic. IEL started from a sectoral approach, dealing with environmental concerns as 
they arose in relation to specific media and resources, thus obviating the need for a wide definition of 
the environment. At first, international law making in this area was also purely reactive: typically in 
response to a major industrial accident revealing the inadequacy of existing regulations. By contrast, 
some recent treaties allow for preventive actions to be taken in response to emerging scientific 
evidence. At the same time, integrated approaches are being developed for transsectoral environmental 
problems.57
There are an impressive number of bilateral and multilateral treaties on the environment.58 
However, the discipline of IEL is hardly codified. Repeated attempts in the 1980s and the 1990s at 
formulating a comprehensive and binding treaty on the environmental rights and duties of States ended 
in failure.59 There is as yet, no uniform conceptual approach to environmental regulation.60 It is safe to 
state therefore, that the actual content of the environmental rights and duties of States depends
55 Stone, 45 SCLR (1972), 462#
56 Infra, 2.2.
57 Boelaert-Suominen & Cullman, Legal and Institutional Aspects o f Integrated Coastal Area Management in National 
Legislation (1994), 1-7; Kiss & Shelton, op. cit., 307.
58 Between 1980 and 1995, the UNEP multilateral treaty register increased from 102 to 164: Bodansky, 3 Ind. J. 
Global Legal Stud. (1995), 106, fn. 1; There could be more than a 1,000 treaties dealing with environmental 
protection: O’Connell, M., 35 GYIL (1992), 295; Sands counts more than 2,000 bilateral environmental treaties since 
the mid-18th century: op. cit., 106.
59 A first attempt was the 1982 World Charter for Nature, mentioned supra, 1.1.1; A second, the ‘Legal Principles for 
Environmental Protection and Sustainable Development’, annexed to the 1987 Report of the World Commission on 
Environment and Development: Our Common Future (1987); A further failed attempt was the suggested ‘Earth 
Charter’ at the 1992 UNCED Conference: Sand, 4 EJIL (1993), 381-2; A fourth example is the IUCN-proposed 
‘International Covenant on Environment and Development’, launched at the UN Congress on Public International Law, 
New York, 13-17 March 1995 (on file with author).
60 O’Connell, M., 3 Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. (1995), 53.
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significantly on the context and objectives of the treaty instrument at issue, and that it varies according 
to the sector, media, and type of activity under consideration.61 It is therefore neither possible nor 
advisable to search for an all-purpose definition of terms such as environment, pollution or harm, at 
least as far as general (peacetime) IEL is concerned.62
1.2. The Principal Environmental Rights and Duties of States
Whilst IEL is predominantly treaty-based law,63 many writers continue to attach great 
importance to customary international law as an instrument for environmental lawmaking.64 In the 
light of the subject of this work, it is important to determine the content of general or customary IEL.65 
In the first part of this section the most important multilateral environmental agreements will be 
examined; in the second part, general principles and rules.
1.2.1. Principal Multilateral Environmental Agreements
A great number of multilateral environmental agreements have been adopted at the global and 
regional level establishing specific obligations in relation to various environmental sectors. As one 
commentator observes, it seems that for each new environmental problem, a new treaty is negotiated.66 
Some of these receive widespread support and may reflect rules of general or customary international 
law. Given the subject of this work, the following review will mainly focus on the marine 
environment.
61 Pisillo-Mazzeschi, in Francioni & Scovazzi, International Responsibility for Environmental Harm (1991), 17, 34.
62 Spieker, op. cit., 186; Bimie & Boyle, op. cit., 3,102;
63 Bimie & Boyle, ibid., 11.
64 O’Connell, M., 35 GYIL (1992), 303.
65 Brownlie uses the terms ‘general’ and ‘customary’ international law interchangeably: 13 Natural Resources Journal 
(1973), 179.
66 Bodansky, 3 Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. (1995), 106.
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A. Marine Environment
The majority of environmental treaties deal with protection of the marine environment, 
containing among the most highly developed norms in the field of IEL. Although the causes of marine 
pollution are diverse, most treaties deal with the following types of pollution: operational and 
accidental discharges from ships, pollution arising from the exploration and exploitation of the seabed, 
land-based pollution, and deliberate dumping of industrial wastes.67
Marine pollution is a relatively long-standing concern. In 1926 a draft convention on pollution 
from ships, limiting discharges of oil and gas into the sea, was drawn up at an international conference 
convened by the US. It failed to gain acceptance, as did a second draft prepared under the auspices of 
the League of Nations in 1935 to reduce pollution resulting from tanker-cleaning operations.68 It was 
only after the Second World War that agreement was reached on concerted international action. As a 
result, the 1954 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil was adopted 
to prohibit deliberate discharges of oil in specified zones.69 Shortly thereafter, prohibitions related to 
pollution of the sea by oil or pipelines, as well as by radioactive wastes were included in the 1958 UN 
Convention on the High Seas.70 A prohibition on pollution by wastes resulting from oil drilling on the 
continental shelf in was incorporated into the 1958 UN Convention on the Continental Shelf.71
Following the Torrey Canyon accident, IMCO sponsored the adoption in 1969 of two 
conventions, one concerning civil liability for oil pollution damage and the other related to 
intervention on the high seas in cases of oil pollution casualties.72 These were later supplemented by a 
1971 Convention creating an additional fund for compensation for oil pollution damage, and a 1973 
Intervention Protocol for pollution casualties caused by substances other than oil.
Although it was still an ad-hoc approach for specific environmental problems, several 
instruments for the protection of the marine environment were adopted as result of Principle 7 of the 
Declaration73 and of the Action plan74 adopted at the 1972 UNCHE. In its wake a new global treaty
67 Kiss & Shelton, op. cit.,\6\.
68 Ibid., 162; Dupuy & Rimond-Gouilloud, op. cit., 1169.
69 Signed by 31 States; Dupuy & Rimond-Gouilloud, op. cit., 1169.
70 Arts. 24,25.
71 Art. 5.
72 Dupuy & R&nond-Gouilloud, op. cit., 1155-57.
73 It declares that all States shall take all possible steps to prevent pollution of the seas by substances that are liable to 
create hazards to human health, harm living resources and marine life, damage amenities or interfere with other 
legitimate uses of the sea.
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was adopted at an intergovernmental conference in London: the 1972 Convention on the Prevention of 
Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and other Matter, dealing primarily with ocean dumping. One 
year later, the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution by Ships was concluded at 
IMCO headquarters. It has as ambitious objective the complete elimination of all intentional vessel- 
source pollution, and the minimisation of accidental discharges; it lays down detailed rules in six 
annexes dealing with oil, noxious liquid in bulk, harmful substances in packaged form, garbage, 
sewage, and most recently, air pollution.75 It was intended to replace the 1954 Oil Pollution Prevention 
Convention, and was substantially amended and replaced by a 1978 Protocol. Usually referred to as 
‘MARPOL 73/78’ it has been widely ratified76 although the Annexes have received less support77
In 1973 negotiations for the third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea commenced. This 
resulted nine years later in the adoption of an umbrella convention comprising more than 400 articles, 
spread over 17 chapters, and 9 annexes which form an integral part of the convention. The Montego 
Bay Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982 UNCLOS) is regarded as the most comprehensive 
‘environmental’ treaty thus far, recording customary law, introducing many innovative provisions, in 
addition to striking compromises on perennial and newly emerged problems. Intended as a 
comprehensive restatement of almost all aspects of the law of the sea,78 it sets a global framework for 
inter alia, the exploitation and conservation of marine resources and for the protection of the marine 
environment79 It obligates States ‘to protect and preserve the marine environment’ (Art. 192) and 
enacts a framework envisaging all types of pollution of the marine environment, whatever the cause: 
vessel-source, land-based sources, dumping, exploitation of the seabed, and air pollution 
(Part XII, Arts. 192-237). The convention introduces new provisions aimed at preventing pollution 
from the exploration and exploitation of the seabed and its subsoil.80 It also attempts to strike a new 
balance between the powers of flag States and coastal States, the former extending primarily to 
freedom of navigation and fishing, the latter to effective regulation and control. It recognises the
74 Recommendations 86-94 on marine pollution: Kiss & Shelton, op. cit., 164.
75 Annex VI containing Regulations for the Prevention of Air Pollution from Ships was adopted on 26 September 1997 
by the International Conference on Air Pollution Prevention, 15-26 September 1997; IMOFax 17/97 of 26 September 
1997.
76 See IMO/Lloyd’s data of 1/2/98: MARPOL 73/78 (Annex I/H) has been ratified by 104 States representing 93.49 % 
of world tonnage.
77 Sands, op. cit., 327; Status on 31/10/97: between 83 and 100 States, covering 82.02 to 93.47 % of world tonnage.
78 Schachte, 23 ODIL (1992), 60-1.
79 Bimie & Boyle, op. cit., 252-3.
80 Art. 45.
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competence of coastal States to combat pollution in the territorial sea and in the new jurisdictional area 
of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).81
As is well-known, the convention entered into force only on 16 November 1994, one year 
after it had obtained the necessary 60 ratifications,82 and after substantial amendments had been agreed 
in July 1994, regarding Part XI on deep seabed mining.83 Many more Western States, including the 
European Community (EC), have since consented to be bound by the UNCLOS Convention and the 
1994 Agreement.84 As of 12 March 1998, 124 States have ratified the main convention, and 85 the 
1994 Agreement.85 However, most commentators seem to agree that 1982 UNCLOS did not introduce 
any substantially new provisions on the marine environment of the high seas.86 Its provisions are seen 
as the culmination of a number of changes in the international law of the sea that took place earlier. 
One of these is the fundamental principle that pollution can no longer be regarded as an implicit 
freedom of the seas.87 In addition, Part XII of 1982 UNCLOS is largely composed of so-called 
umbrella provisions88 that have received widespread and consistent support in State practice, most 
notably pursuant to many treaties and international rules that implement or complement Part XII.89 
Agenda 21 endorsed the view that this part of UNCLOS reflects customary international law.90
At the same time, a substantial body of regional conventions developed.91 One series of 
regional treaties concerns industrial pollution and land-based activities in the North Sea and the North- 
East Atlantic area. The first of these was the 1969 Bonn Agreement for Co-operation in Dealing with 
Pollution of the North Sea by Oil, concluded in the wake of the Torrey Canyon Incident.
Other agreements covering the northern hemisphere are the 1972 Oslo Dumping Convention 
which applies to the North-East Atlantic, the North Sea and the adjacent Arctic seas, and the 1974 
Paris Convention which deals with land-based pollution in the same area. They were replaced in 1992
81 Art. 220.
82 Press Release UN Office of Legal Affairs, SEA/1396/Rev. 1 of 19 November 1993.
83 Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the Convention, GA Res. 48/263 of 29 July 1994, adopted 
by a vote of 121 in favour, none against and seven abstentions, into force since 28 July 1996; Platzoder, 4 EJIL (1993), 
390-402; Stevenson & Oxman, 88 AJIL (1994), 488; Anderson, 44 ICLQ (1995), 314^; Freestone & Mangone, The 
Law of the Sea Convention: Unfinished Agendas and Future Challenges, 10IJMCL 1995, Special Issue, Number 2.
84 Malanczuk, Akehurst ’s Modem Introduction to International Law (1997), 174.
85 Source: UN Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea.
86 Even the US administration seemed to embrace Part XII dining the 1980s: Schachte, 23 ODIL (1992), 56; Stevenson 
& Oxman, 88 AJIL (1994), 490; Larson, 25 ODIL (1994), 81;
87 Bimie & Boyle, op. cit., 253,255; Kiss & Shelton, op. cit., 165; Dupuy & Remond-Gouilloud, op. cit., 1187-8.
88 Dupuy & Remond-Gouilloud, ibid., 1193; Schachte, 23 ODIL (1992), 61.
89 Anderson, 44 ICLQ (1995), 313,320-1.
90 Agenda 21, paras 17.1,17.22.
91 Bimie & Boyle, op. cit., 260.
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by a single comprehensive agreement: the Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of 
the North-East Atlantic (1992 OSPAR Convention).92 The area is also increasingly covered by 
measures adopted at a series of International North Sea Conferences, and by the growing body of EC 
law.93
Secondly, there are the treaties concluded under UNEP’s Regional Seas/Oceans and Coastal 
Affairs Programme. The programme was inspired by the 1974 Helsinki Convention on the Protection 
of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea Area, in which the littoral States agreed to address all 
forms marine pollution. The 1974 Convention sets stringent standards for dumping at sea, adopts rules 
inspired by MARPOL 1973 for vessel-source pollution, and covers airborne and land-based sources of 
pollution.94 The UNEP programme was launched in 1978, and focuses primarily on developing 
countries of the southern hemisphere. By 1995, it included 13 regional areas, 8 of which were covered 
by binding international instruments;95 the Mediterranean, Persian/Arabian Gulf, Gulf of Guinea, 
South-East Pacific, Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, Caribbean, Indian Ocean and East Africa, and South 
Pacific. For each regional sea a similar flexible and dynamic pattern is followed, which often includes 
the adoption of an Action Plan for the region and a framework convention applicable to the territorial 
sea and the EEZ of the State parties. In the framework convention Parties agree to take appropriate 
measures to prevent, abate and combat pollution and protect and enhance the marine environment, and 
to formulate and adopt protocols on agreed measures, procedures and standards.96 This is followed by 
a series of integrated protocols, in which specific problems are tackled. Many of these cover 
combating oil pollution and other forms of marine pollution in cases of emergency, as well as dumping 
from ships and aircraft; a few include pollution from exploration and exploitation of the continental 
shelf, land-based sources of marine pollution, transboundary movement of hazardous wastes, and 
specially protected areas, hi 1992 UNEP assisted the six Black Sea States with the adoption of a 
similar framework convention and a number of protocols. However, many of the regional sea 
programmes lack the detailed regulations applying to the northern hemisphere, suffer from weak 
participation by States in some regions, and have a poor record of ratification and implementation.97
The legal relationship between all these international instruments may appear complex. As for 
the relationship between 1982 UNCLOS and other treaties, Art. 237 states that Part XII is without
92 Sands, op. cit., 303-5.
93 Bimie & Boyle, op. cit., 261; Sands, op. cit., 303.
94 Bimie & Boyle, op. cit., 261.
95 Sands, op. cit., 297.
96 Ibid., 301.
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prejudice to more specific obligations assumed under earlier or later conventions, provided that these 
are carried out in a manner consistent with the general principles and objectives of 1982 UNCLOS. It 
follows that rights and obligations derived from the 1978 Kuwait Regional Convention and even from 
specialised maritime conventions such as MARPOL 73/78, ‘trump’ UNCLOS provisions provided 
that they are consistent with the general rules of the latter.98 Moreover, many of the regional seas 
conventions contain provisions on their relationship with other international conventions and rules.99
Furthermore, in its provisions on vessel-source pollution, dumping and seabed operations, 
1982 UNCLOS stipulates that States must give effect to international rules and standards, as well as 
recommended practices and procedures, and that they must act through competent international 
organisations or conferences to establish international global and regional rules.100 This phraseology 
may imply that 1982 UNCLOS aims at incorporating conventions such as the 1972 London Dumping 
Convention, MARPOL 73/78 and possibly other specialised treaties.101
The International Maritime Organisation is regarded as the competent international 
organisation referred to in many of the UNCLOS provisions regarding the regulation of vessel-source 
pollution.102 It sponsors internationally recognised common standards for the regulation of shipping 
safely and environmental protection by coastal and flag States. The resulting treaties are regarded as an 
essential albeit indirect means of reducing marine pollution.103 Apart from the IMCO Conventions 
mentioned earlier, this study will discuss the 1966 International Convention on Load Lines, the 1972 
Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, the 1974 Safety of Life 
at Sea Convention, the 1989 International Salvage Convention, the 1990 Oil Pollution Preparedness, 
Response and Cooperation Convention concluded in the wake of the Exxon Valdez disaster, and the 
1996 International Convention on Liability and Compensation for Damage in Connection with 
Hazardous and Noxious Substances by Sea.
97 Bimie & Boyle, op. cit., 262; Sands, op. cit., 301.
98 Heintschel von Heinegg & Donner, 37 GYIL (1994), 311; Walker, in Grunawalt, et. al., Protection of the 
Environment During Armed Conflict (1996), 189.
99 E.g., Art. 3, 1976 Convention for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea Against Pollution; Art. 3, 1985 
Convention for the Protection, Management and Development of the Marine and Coastal Environment of the Eastern 
African Region; Art. 4, 1986 Convention for the Protection of the Natural Resources and Environment of the South 
Pacific Region.
100 Arts. 208,210,211.
101 See literature cited by Bimie & Boyle, op. cit., 256, fn. 16.
102 Anderson, 44 ICLQ (1995), 321; Bimie & Boyle, op. cit., 54.
103 Bimie & Boyle, op. cit., 266; Dupuy & Remond-Gouilloud, op. cit., 1183; Walker, op. cit., 207, fii. 33; Heintschel 
von Heinegg & Donner, 37 GYIL (1994), 310; Schachte, 23 ODIL (1992), 62-3.
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B. Freshwater Resources
The body of international conventional rules on watercourses and other freshwater resources 
is extensive.104 However, many are contained in treaties with a more general purpose, such as those 
regulating boundary matters between States.105 There are very few agreements devoted exclusively to 
the protection of waters against pollution. In addition, although there are many examples of regional 
co-operation, there are no specific regional regimes, apart from the area covered by EC law.
Any discussion of global rules on the protection of freshwater resources will have to include 
the Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, adopted in 
1997 by the UN General Assembly,106 on the basis of a draft prepared by the ILC over a period of 
more than 20 years.107 Its objective is to ensure the utilization, development, conservation, 
management and protection of international watercourses and the promotion of sustainable utilisation 
thereof for present and future generations.
As is the case for many recent international instruments, the 1997 Watercourse Convention is 
a framework agreement. It contains various general principles for the utilisation of international 
watercourses: equitable and reasonable utilisation and participation, the obligation not to cause 
significant harm, a general obligation to co-operate and to regularly exchange data and information, 
and the principle that in the absence of agreement or custom to the contraiy no use of an international 
watercourse enjoys inherent priority over other uses.108 The convention also lays down detailed 
obligations for States to exchange information and consult each other, and if necessary, to negotiate on 
the possible effects of planned measures regarding the watercourse.109 It has several specific 
environmental protection provisions. Accordingly, watercourse States need to ‘protect and preserve 
the ecosystems of international watercourses’,110 prevent, reduce and control the pollution of 
international watercourses,111 prevent introduction of alien or new species, and take all measures with
104 For a definition of ‘watercourse’ see e.g., Art. 2 (a) and (b) of the 1997 International Watercourse Convention 
mentioned below and ILC Report (1994), UN Doc. A/49/10,200.
105 Kiss & Shelton, op. cit., 208.
106 UN Doc. A/51/869, 11 April 1997, 51st session, Report of the 6th Committee.
107 ILC Report (1994), UN Doc. A/49/10,210.
108 Arts. 5-10.
109 Arts. 11-19.
110 Art. 20.
111 Art. 21.
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respect to an international watercourse that are necessary to protect and preserve the marine 
environment taking into account generally accepted international rules and standards.112 Finally, there 
are provisions on emergency situations,113 an article on armed conflict,114 and an annex on arbitration.
A detailed examination of the extent to which this convention codifies customary 
international law, and which provisions should be regarded as innovative, is beyond the scope of this 
work. In the literature, the following principles and rules are generally regarded as reflecting 
customary international law: the principle of common, equitable and reasonable utilisation of shared 
water resources,115 endorsed by the ICJ in the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project case,116 the obligation to 
prevent (serious) harm to other States, and several principles of transboundary environmental co­
operation.117 Furthermore, there is important international case law relating to international 
watercourses, some of which will be examined below.118
It is noteworthy that there is little support for the view that pollution of international 
watercourse would be unlawful per se. Instead, the modem trend is to require States to regulate and 
control river pollution, whilst prohibiting only certain discharges and distinguishing between old and 
new sources.119 Pollution is only unlawful if it causes (serious) harm to other (riparian) States. For 
instance, Art. 7 of the 1997 International Watercourse Convention stipulates firstly, that watercourse 
States need to take all appropriate measures to prevent the causing of significant harm to other 
watercourse States; and secondly, should significant harm nevertheless occur, that they need to take all 
appropriate measures in consultation with the affected State, to eliminate or mitigate harm and where 
appropriate, discuss compensation.120 The DLC does not view the causing of significant harm as 
necessarily unlawful per se, but regards equitable utilisation as the overriding guiding principle.121
114 Art. 29.
115 Bimie & Boyle, op. cit., 219-222; Kiss & Shelton, op. cit., 208; See too ILC Report by McCaffrey, Yearbook ILC 
(1986), vol. II, pt. 1, 103-5, 110$; Schwebel, ibid., (1982), pt 1,15ff\ For States’ views see ILC Report (1987), UN 
Doc. A/42/10, 70 & and ILC Report (1994), UN Doc. A/49/10,222-30.
1,6 Judgment of 25 September 1997, ICJ General List No. 92, para 97, citing Art. 5 para 2 of the 1997 International 
Watercourse Convention in full.
117 Bimie & Boyle, op. cit., 219-242.
118 River Oder Case, PCU, (1929), Ser. A, No 23; Diversion o f Water from the Meuse Case, PCU, (1937) Ser. A/B, No 
70; Lac Lanoux arbitration, 24 ILR (1957), 101; Gut Dam Arbitration, 8 ILM (1968), 118; Gabcikovo-Nagymaros 
Project, Judgment of 25 September 1997, ICJ General List No. 92.
119 Bimie & Boyle, op. cit., 225; Kiss & Shelton, op. cit., 208; Lammers, Pollution of International Watercourses 
(1984), 124-7; but see Sands, op. cit., 347 who suggests that this may be changing.
120 On the controversy surrounding this article see McCaffrey & Sinjela, 92 AJIL (1998), 100-102.
121 ILC Report (1994), UN Doc. A/49/10,236.
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This includes cases of pollution, pursuant to Art. 21(2) of the convention and the ILC’s commentary 
thereon.122 As a result, even significant harm may have to be tolerated by a watercourse State.123
Nevertheless, the 1997 Convention also contains environmental protection provisions which 
are not concerned with other riparian States: Art. 20 on the obligation to protect and preserve the 
ecosystems of international watercourses; Art. 22 on the introduction of alien or new species, and Art. 
23 on the protection and preservation of the marine environment. Although the threshold of harm in 
Arts. 20 and 23 is not specified,124 none of these provisions set absolute standards, for they are subject 
to the general principle of equitable utilisation.125 Whatever their current legal status,126 it is clear that 
the benefits of these provisions will extend beyond the interests of riparian States.127 The inclusion of 
measures aimed at protecting environmental resources per se is an emerging trend in IEL, which as 
will be seen below, is developing rules transcending the traditional question of transfrontier 
pollution.128
C. Biodiversity
The body of international rules concerning biological diversity is formed by rules adopted at 
the local, national, bilateral, sub-regional, regional and global level. Biodiversity is a recently 
developed term, and is usually understood as comprising three notions: genetic diversity, species 
diversity and ecosystem diversity.129 It covers the older terminology ‘wildlife’ or ‘living’ natural 
resources, which were distinguished from non-living natural resources by the fact that they are 
renewable if conserved and destructible if not.130
There are important differences between marine and terrestrial regimes. Marine biodiversity is 
often considered common property or shared resources and particularly vulnerable to over­
exploitation. In response, international law tends to stress obligations of conservation and equitable 
utilisation. Important provisions on marine life can be found in conventions which deal with fisheries
122 Ibid., 291.
123 McCaffrey & Sinjela, 92 AJIL (1998), 101.
124 The requirement of significant harm is only included in Art. 22; the threshold of harm of Arts. 20 and 23 may be 
lower: ILC Report (1994), UN Doc. A/49/10,293.
125 ILC Report (1994), UN Doc. A/49/10,282,298,299.
126 Ibid., 283-9; See too Kiss & Shelton, op. cit., 20.
127 McCaffrey & Sinjela, 92 AJIL (1998), 103-4.
128 Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (1990), 233-4; Kiss & Shelton, op. cit., 203.
129 For a definition of these terms see 1992 Biodiversity Convention, Art. 2.
130 Bimie & Boyle, op. cit., 418.
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conservation such as the 1946 International Whaling Convention,131 or with an even broader purpose, 
such as 1982 UNCLOS.132 International regulation of terrestrial biodiversity is generally more difficult 
because it requires limiting the principle of States’ permanent sovereignty over their natural resources. 
To justify such interference, international treaties resort sometimes to concepts as ‘common concern’, 
‘common heritage’ and even ‘animal rights’.133
Until recently, wildlife conservation implied a very partial ad-hoc approach consisting of 
targeting wildlife species identified as threatened with extinction. Proper conservation of biodiversity, 
which implies maintaining viable populations of species is now generally thought of as requiring 
complex sustainable and flexible strategies which include plants, animals, micro-organisms and the 
non-living elements of the environment on which they depend.134
The most important multilateral treaties aimed at habitat preservation are the 1971 Convention 
on Wetlands of International Importance (Ramsar Convention) and the 1972 Convention for the 
Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage (World Heritage Convention). Important 
treaties which focus on species protection are the 1973 Convention on International Trade in 
Endangered Species (CITES) and the 1979 Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals 
(Bonn Convention). Finally, the 1992 Biodiversity Convention aims at setting an overall framework 
for this area of the law.
The purpose of the 1971 Ramsar Convention is the conservation and the enhancement of a 
particular type of habitat important for waterfowl.135 Without prejudice to their sovereign rights, State 
parties must designate at least one wetland of international significance in terms of ecology, botany, 
zoology, limnology and hydrology, for inclusion in a List of Wetlands of International Importance.136 
The deletion or restriction of fisted wetlands is permitted on grounds of ‘urgent national interest’, but 
must take into consideration the ‘international responsibilities for the conservation, management and 
wise use of migratory stocks of waterfowl’137 and Parties need to compensate, as far as possible, for 
any loss of wetland resources, e.g., by creating additional nature reserves.138 Parties are also under a 
number of general obligations: to promote the conservation of fisted wetlands, and as far as possible,
131 Sands, op. cit., 433-37.
132 Ibid., 422-432; Van Dyke, in Freestone & Mangone, op. cit., 219-227.
133 Bimie & Boyle, op. cit., 418-9.
134 Ibid., 419-445.
135 For a definition see Ramsar Convention, Art. 1.
136 Art. 2. (2), (3), (4).
137 Art. 2(6).
138 Art. 4 (2).
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the ‘wise use’ of wetlands on their territory’, to establish nature reserves, to endeavour to increase 
waterfowl populations, and to exchange information at the earliest possible time on changes in the 
ecological character of listed wetlands. 139 Because of their general nature, the provisions of the 
Ramsar Convention are considered weak and have given rise to problems of interpretation.140 
Nevertheless, by 29 March 1998, the convention had 106 Parties and protected 903 wetland sites.141
The World Heritage Convention - adopted in 1972 under UNESCO auspices - also works on 
the basis of recording sites. Although its provisions are more stringent than the Ramsar Convention, it 
has more Parties.142 The convention’s guidelines for the identification of natural heritage are based on 
physical characteristics of outstanding universal value.143 Each State party needs to identify cultural 
and natural heritage sites on its territory,144 but listing is subject to a decision by the World Heritage 
Committee, which may also consider financial implications.145 Apart from the main inventories of 
national and cultural heritage,146 a list of special ‘World Heritage in Danger’ is maintained for sites 
threatened by serious and specific dangers, such as the outbreak or threat of armed conflict.147 As a 
result of the latter type of threat, the Old City of Dubrovnik in Croatia, the Virunga Natural Park and 
the Okapi Wildlife Reserve in the Democratic Republic of the Congo were included in this special 
list.148
Each State party needs to adopt a national programme for the protection of its natural and 
cultural heritage.149 In addition, State parties ‘recognise that such heritage constitutes a world heritage 
for whose protection it is the duty of the international community as a whole to co-operate and to lend 
their assistance thereto’.150 Importantly, State parties undertake ‘not to take any deliberate measures 
which might damage directly or indirectly the cultural and natural heritage situated on the territory of 
other parties to the convention’.151 The convention further establishes an Intergovernmental Committee
139 Art. 3(1), (2), Art. 4(1), (2). (4).
140 Bimie & Boyle, op. cit., 465.
141 Source: The Ramsar Convention Bureau.
142 More than 150 to date, source: UNESCO World Heritage Centre, 1 February 1998.
143 Defined in Art. 2.
144 Art. 3.
145 Bimie & Boyle, op. cit., 469.
146 Art. 11 (1); By December 1997 the World Heritage List included 418 cultural sites, 114 natural sites & 20 mixed 
properties in 112 States; Source: UNESCO World Heritage Centre, 1 February 1998.
147 Art. 11(4).
148 Source: UNESCO World Heritage Centre, 1 February 1998.
149 Arts. 4,5.
150 Art. 6(1), (2).
151 Art. 6 (3).
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and a Fund for the protection of the heritage in question, and procedures under which State parties can 
request international assistance.152
By 1 June 1997, a total of 169 States had become Parties to the 1992 Convention on 
Biological Diversity.153 Under this agreement, which applies expressly both within the limits of 
national jurisdiction and beyond,154 Parties undertake a number of general obligations. In accordance 
with their particular conditions and capabilities, they need to develop national strategies, plans or 
programmes for the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity and integrate, ‘as far as possible 
and as appropriate’ these strategies into other relevant sectoral and cross-sectoral plans.155 
Furthermore, each Party shall ‘as far as possible and as appropriate’ engage in identification of 
biodiversity and in monitoring,156 adopt in situ and ex situ conservation measures,157 use components 
of biological diversity in a sustainable manner,158 adopt incentive measures,159 establish programmes 
for research and training,160 engage in public education and awareness,161 introduce environmental 
impact assessment procedures for proposed projects and take measures to minimise adverse impacts.162 
In respect of areas beyond national jurisdiction and on other matters of general interest, Parties 
undertake to co-operate ‘as far as possible and as appropriate’ either directly or through international 
organisations.163
The convention also contains a number of other provisions that have led some States, most 
notably the US, to decide initially against signing the convention:164 Art. 19 on the handling of 
biotechnology and the distribution of its benefits and Arts. 20 and 21 on financial resources.165 
Furthermore, A rt 22 (1) stipulates that the convention shall not affect rights and obligations of any 
Contracting Party deriving from any existing international agreement, ‘except where the exercise of 
those rights and obligations would cause a serious damage or threat to biological diversity’.166 In the
152 Parts m, IV and V.
153 Source: Biodiversity Convention Secretariat.
154 Art. 4.
155 Art. 6.
156 Art. 7.
157 Arts. 8 & 9.
158 Art. 10.
159 Art. 11.
160 Art. 12.
161 Art. 13.
162 Art. 14.
163 Art. 5.
164 US Declaration, 22 May 1992,21ILM(1992), 848; but the US has signed since: Malanczuk, op. cit., 249.
165 Sands, op. cit., 386-7.
166 The provision was controversial during the preparatory stages and attracted various interpretative statements as soon 
as it was adopted: Chandler, 4 Col. JIEL & P (1993), 148-50.
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Gabdkovo-Nagymaros Project case Hungary relied, inter alia, on this provision to justify suspension 
and termination of a bilateral treaty concluded in 1977.167 Whilst Hungary called this a jus cogens type 
of claim,168 the ICJ has rejected this argument implicitly.169 Moreover, it should be noted that Art. 22 
(2) gives pre-eminence to the law of the sea with respect to marine biodiversity, thus casting doubt on 
the alleged peremptory character of the entire provision.170
Of particular note are a series of conventions adopted through the Council of Europe, and 
certain EC regulations. They constitute to date the only international instruments which protect 
animals from suffering and are inspired -though not exclusively- by ecocentrist and even animal-rights 
theories. These include the 1968 Convention for the Protection of Animals during International 
Transport, the 1979 Convention for the Protection of Animals for Slaughter, and the 1987 Convention 
for the Protection of Pet Animals.
In conclusion, there is an overwhelming number of treaties on wildlife protection, ranging 
from the local to the global level, addressing a great variety of situations and methods. They have 
attracted wide differences in international support and are not always implemented and enforced in 
satisfactory ways.171 Some authors claim that most States accept the need to co-operate in the 
protection of living resources, to act in good faith as good neighbours, and that they have to arrange 
some form of equitable use of shared living resources. There is also considerable agreement on certain 
conservation strategies and principles. Beyond that, it remains controversial whether general 
international law requires States to take appropriate steps to protect endangered land-based species.172 
As for marine biodiversity, it has been argued that the consensus underlying the relevant provisions of 
1982 UNCLOS and subsequent practice173 show that States have accepted the general obligation to 
conserve marine species, but some authors question the effectiveness of the regime.174
167 Written Pleading, HC-M, para 4.23.
168 Oral Pleading for Hungary, (Mr. Sands), CR 97/12,67, para 10.
169 The Court noted neither party claimed that new peremptory norms of environmental law had emerged since 1977: 
Gabdkovo-Nagymaros Project, judgment of 25 September 1997, ICJ General List No. 92, para 112.
170 The underlying motive was the concern that the Biodiversity Convention might be used to upset the delicate balance 
achieved by the customary law of the sea regarding marine resources: Chandler, 4 Col. JIEL & P (1993), 151-3.
171 Sands, op. cit., 449-452.
172 Bimie & Boyle, op. cit., 487-9.
173 Ibid., 516-538; Sands, op. cit., 422.
174 Bimie & Boyle, op. cit., 538.
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D. Air quality, the Atmosphere and Climate Change
The treaty regime in regard to air quality, the atmosphere and climate change is of recent 
origin, and consists of one specific regional and two global framework agreements. There are mainly 
three problems that have inhibited the development of a proper legal regime. First, the degradation of 
the atmosphere and the likelihood of ensuing climate change, as well as its causes, long remained a 
subject of debate among scientists.175 Secondly, the legal status of the atmosphere in international law 
is unsettled, 176 for it is a fluctuating and dynamic airmass, which partly overlaps with the airspace 
above States territory, and which lies partly beyond national airspace, without forming part of Outer 
Space.177 Thirdly, control of transboundaiy air pollution requires both developing and developed States 
to make difficult choices and sacrifices in terms of economic and industrial policy. It is for the latter 
reason that until the mid-1980s many States refused to agree to firm measures unless there was clear 
scientific evidence of harm. Despite these problems, by 1997 the great majority of States had ratified 
the two global framework agreements including the attached protocols.
Over thirty countries in the Northern Hemisphere, both from Western and Eastern Europe as 
well as Canada and the US, are parties to the Geneva Convention on Long-Range Transboundaiy Air 
Pollution (LRTAP), concluded in 1979 under UN/ECE auspices in response to the growing problem 
of acid rain. The convention provides a framework for co-operation and development of pollution 
control measures, although the language of many of its commitments is weak.178 Parties undertake to 
protect Man and his environment against air pollution and, as far as possible, endeavour to limit, 
gradually reduce and prevent air pollution.179 They agree to exchange information and to review their 
policies, scientific activities and technical measures aimed combating pollution,180 to engage in 
consultations at an early stage in cases of actual or significant risk of long-range transboundaiy air 
pollution,181 and to notify major changes in policy or industrial development likely to cause significant
175 Second Assessment, Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change of December 1995, summarised in 
UN Climate Change Bulletin, Issue 10,2nd quarter 1996.
176 Boyle, in Churchill & Freestone, op. cit., Iff. & 13; for the view that State duties towards prevention of climate 
change, acid rain and depletion of the ozone layer are erga omnes and jus cogens: Hohmann, op. cit., 214-16.
177 Bimie & Boyle, op. cit., 390-1.
178 Ibid., 399; Sands, op. cit., 249;
179 Art.2.
180 Arts. 3 & 4.
181 Art. 5.
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changes in long-range air pollution.182 The convention is supplemented by four protocols.183 Despite its 
many weaknesses the LRATP Convention is considered a qualified success.184
The Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer was concluded in 1985 under 
UNEP auspices. The convention primarily requests that Parties take appropriate measures to protect 
human health and the environment against adverse effects resulting or likely to result from human 
activities which modify or are likely to modify the ozone layer.185 To this end, and in accordance with 
the means at their disposal and their capabilities, Parties agree to co-operate in harmonising policies, 
and in formulating agreed measures, procedures and standards for the implementation of the 
convention. 186 Like the LRTAP Convention, the Vienna Convention is a compromise between 
demands by some States for firm commitments and requests by others for further study of the 
problem.187 Its significance lies in the fact that it is concerned with the global environment, that it 
recognises the impact of ozone depletion on climate change,188 and the importance of ecosystems 
independent of their utility to Man.189 It also alludes to the need for precautionary measures, i.e., for 
preventive action even in the absence of firm proof of harm.190
The Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer - agreed in 1987 
following new and alarming scientific evidence - is considered more important than the convention 
itself: it sets firm targets for reducing and eliminating consumption and production of a number of 
ozone-depleting substances, and has the elimination of (all) ozone-depleting substances as its final 
objective.191
Amendments and adjustments adopted in 1990 and 1992 brought the timetables forward and 
added new controlled substances. As a result, production and consumption of ozone-depleting 
substances such as chlorofluorocarbons (CFC’s) and halons were to be totally phased out by 1 January 
1996. While the Montreal Protocol initially allowed for delayed compliance by developing States, the 
latter were subsequently given financial and technical incentives to accelerate their compliance.192
82 Art. 8(b).
83 Sands, op. cit., 248-255.
84 Bimie & Boyle, op. cit., 402.
85 Art. 2 (1)
86 Art, 2(1), (2).
87 Bimie & Boyle, op. cit., 405.
88 Preamble.
89 Art. 1(2).
90 Preamble.
91 Preamble.
92 Art. 5; Sands, op. cit., 268-9.
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Furthermore, the protocol controversially bans trade in controlled substances with non-parties,193 and 
contains innovative flexible institutional provisions.194 It entered into force on January 1st, 1989, by 
when 29 countries and the EEC representing approximately 82 percent of world consumption had 
ratified it. By 25 February 1997,161 States ratified the convention and the protocol.195
The 1992 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change acknowledges in its preamble that 
climate change and its adverse effects are a ‘common concern of humankind’. By 28 Februaiy 1998, it 
counted 174 State parties.196 While the convention recognises that climate change occurs naturally, its 
objective is to prevent ‘dangerous anthropogenic interference’ with the climate system.197 Guiding 
principles are set out in Art. 3. These are: (1) the protection of the climate system for the benefit of 
present and future generations of humankind, on the basis of equity and in accordance with the 
common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities of developed and developing 
States; (2) the specific needs of developing country Parties; (3) the need to take precautionary 
measures; (4) the need for sustainable development; and (5) the different socio-economic contexts.
The convention contains a number of general commitments, comparable to the Vienna 
Convention: inter alia, development of national programmes, environmental impact assessment, 
international co-operation, consultation, information exchange and reporting.198 Although the 
stringency of the relevant provisions has been a matter of debate,199 specific commitments were agreed 
to stabilise greenhouse gases in the atmosphere at a safe level, and to limit emissions of these by 
developing countries in accordance with soft targets and timetables.200 In December 1997, the 
Conference of the Parties adopted a first (Kyoto) protocol, containing legally binding emissions targets 
for developed countries for the post-2000 period.201
193 Art. 4; Bimie & Boyle, op. cit., 408-9.
194 Bimie & Boyle, 409-10.
195 Source: Ozone Secretariat at UNEP.
196 Source: UNFCCC Secretariat.
197 Art. 2.
198 Arts. 4,12.
199 Sands, op. cit., 276-8; Malanczuk, op. cit., 248.
200 Art. 4(2).
201 Press Release UNFCCC Secretariat, 16 March 1998.
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E. Conclusion
The newest treaty regimes on marine pollution, freshwater resources, biodiversity, and 
protection of the atmosphere show that IEL is moving away from the sectoral and ad hoc approaches 
of the 1960s and 1970s. Increasingly, more complex environmental challenges are addressed in which 
difficult scientific, economic and political questions are intertwined. In response, innovative legal and 
institutional devices have been developed: e.g., the framework approach whereby the regulation for a 
specific environmental sector is specified in a dynamic sequence of protocols to the base treaty; or a 
commitment by the Parties to make use of the ‘best available technology’, or to accept standards and 
thresholds negotiated internationally at expert level, or to accept lists of toxic or hazardous substances 
according to variable criteria of acceptability of harm.202
For reasons of space, the above overview has primarily been concerned with the regulation of 
specific environmental media and resources, concentrating on the marine environment. It has not dealt 
with the special treaty regimes of certain international areas as Outer Space and Antarctica, nor with 
the emerging body of treaties on specific products or particular activities, such as hazardous 
substances, nuclear energy, biotechnology, environmental impact assessment and accident 
preparedness and response.203 Nevertheless, many of the latter treaties will be addressed throughout 
this work.
202 Sand, 4 EJIL (1993), 380; Bimie & Boyle, op. cit., 93, chapters 11 & 12.
203 On these issues see Bimie & Boyle, op. cit., chapters 8,9,10; Sands, op. cit., chapters 11,12,13.
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1.2.2. General Principles and Rules
What I propose to examine in this section are the general environmental rights and obligations 
of States that flow from principles and rules purportedly common to all environmental sectors.
A. Principle 21 of UNCHE
There is widespread agreement that the cornerstone of modem EEL is formed by two 
important rules addressed to States, enunciated by Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration:
‘States have, in accordance with the Charter of die United Nations and die principles of international law, 
the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own environmental policies, and the 
responsibyityto_aisure that the activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the 
environment of other States or of areas beyondthelimits of national jurisdiction.’
The first part of this provision captures one of the basic tenets of international law, and applies 
it to the environment: it is the sovereign right of States to control and regulate the exploitation of 
resources within their territory. This proclamation finds its origin in numerous General Assembly 
resolutions and international instruments dealing with the right to self-determination of States. In 
accordance with these, self-determination includes of necessity ‘permanent sovereignty over their 
natural wealth and resources’.204 The second element of the principle places an important limit on the 
seemingly broad interpretation of State sovereignty over their resources. It balances States’ rights over 
their own environment with the responsibility towards the environment of other States and areas 
beyond national jurisdiction.
The Stockholm Declaration is a non-binding text, but Principle 21 is regarded as customary 
international law. In fact, many believe that it reflected existing international law at the time of its 
formulation, in 1972.205 Indeed, the second (limiting) element of Principle 21, which prohibits 
transfrontier pollution, is generally regarded as descending from general concepts of the rights and
204 E.g., UNGA Res. 1803 (XVII) on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, 14 December 1962, 17 UN 
GAOR (Supp. No. 17), 15, para 1; see Sohn, 14 Harv. ILJ (1973), 485-7; Kiss & Shelton, op. cit., 129; In the 1985 
Case concerning East Timor, the ICJ acknowledged the erga omnes character of the right to self-determination: ICJ 
Rep. (1995), 102, para 29.
205 Sohn, 14 Harv. /L/(1973), 485-93; O’Connell, M., 35 GYIL (1992), 305; Bimie & Boyle, op. cit., 90-1; Sands, op 
cit. 191.
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duties of States. It derives in the first place from the general principle of international law- applied by 
Huber in the 1928 Island o f Palmas case-206 that every State must respect the sovereignty and 
territorial integrity of other States.
The prohibition of transfrontier pollution is also based on the doctrine which prohibits abuse 
of rights207 and the general principle of law of good neighbourliness: sic utere tuo ut alienum non 
laedas (“ so use your own property that you do not injure the property of another”).208
In addition, the prohibition of transfrontier pollution is generally regarded as firmly rooted in 
the conclusions or obiter dicta of certain long-standing and well-known judicial precedents. First and 
foremost among these is the Trail Smelter award rendered on 16 April 1938 by the US-Canada 
International Joint Commission. One of the first judicial decisions to deal with transboundaiy air 
pollution, it concerned a long running dispute over damage to crops, pasture, land, trees and 
agriculture on US territory caused by sulphur dioxide emissions from a smelting plant in Canada. 
Relying on the Palmas case award the tribunal held in an oft-quoted passage that:
‘..mo State has the right to use or permit the use of its territory in such a maimer as to cause injury by 
fumes in or to the territory of another or the properties or persons therein, when the case is of serious 
consequence and the injury is established by clear and convincing evidence...’209
It should be noted though, that the precedential value of this statement was somewhat 
diminished since Canada had previously acknowledged responsibility for the damage in the arbitral 
compromis. The main task of the tribunal was to assess and measure the damage, and to determine a 
means of redress, but not to determine legal responsibility.
Other legal antecedents for Principle 21 can arguably be found in the Corfu Channel case, the 
Lac Lanoux arbitration, and the Gut Dam Claims arbitration. In the first of these the ICJ was requested 
to consider inter alia, an incident in which war vessels belonging to the UK were struck by mines 
while passing through the Corfu Channel, a strait in Albanian waters used for international navigation. 
Albania knew that the strait was mined, but failed to prevent or remedy the situation and did not notify 
other States of the danger. In a famous obiter dictum the ICJ held that every State is under the 
obligation:
‘..not to allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other States’.210
206 2 RIAA, 829, 839.
207 Kiss & Shelton, op. cit., 120-1.
208 Shearer, in Grunawalt, et. al., op. cit., 549.
209 3 RIAA, 1965.
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The Lac Lanoux arbitration (1957) concerned a dispute between France and Spain over a 
proposal by the former to permit the construction of a barrage on an international waterway on its 
territory. Spain claimed infringement of her rights as a downstream State because the project would 
involve diversion of upstream waters, and argued that France should obtain Spain’s prior 
authorisation. The tribunal, while holding that the proposed works did not infringe Spanish rights, 
stated nevertheless that:
‘...there is a principle which prohibits the upstream State from altering the waters of a river in such a j  
fashion as seriously to prejudice the downstream State...’211 J
Much the same principles were at issue in the Gut Dam claims arbitration. With US 
permission Canada had embarked in 1903 on the ill-fated construction of a dam on the St. Lawrence 
Seaway. Over the years the dam would cause extensive erosion and flooding on both Canadian and US 
territory. The resulting claims for damages by the US would fester until 1965, when the Lake Ontario 
Claims Tribunal was established to resolve the matter. The tribunal retied heavily on the prior 
authorisation of the project by the US but also on the acknowledgement of responsibility by Canada. It 
declared Canada liable, inter alia, for the injuries sustained by US citizens without, however, finding 
fault or negligence on its part.212
The principles identified in the ‘Trail Smelter’ case also received support from the practice of 
States before 1972. In 1966 Austria lodged a strongly worded diplomatic protest over damage caused 
by mines laid close to the Austrian border, accusing Hungary of:
‘...violating tile uncontested international legal principle according to which measures taken in the 
territoiy of one State must not endanger the lives, health and property of citizens of another State’213
In another incident prior to 1972 UNCHE, Canadian beaches were polluted by an accidental 
oil spill of 12,000 gallons of crude oil into the sea at Cherry Point, in the State of Washington. Turning 
the tables on the US, the Canadian government pointed to the ‘principle established in the Trail
210 Merits, ICJ Rep. (1949), 22.
211 24 ILR, 129 para 13; The tribunal clarified that pollution of waters, changed chemical composition, a change in jj 
water temperature, or inability to make restitution of waters resulting from the use by one State of international waters | ; 
within its borders could violate the rights of the affected State: ibid., 123-4, para 6.
212 Discussed in ILC, 47th session, Geneva, 2 May- 21 July 1995, Survey of Liability Regimes Relevant to the Topic of 
International Liability for Injurious Consequences arising out o f acts not prohibited by International Law [hereinafter 
1995 ILC Survey], UN Doc. A/CN.4/471 of 23 June 1995, paras 181-2; Sands, op. cit, 360-61; Handl, 2 EPIL (1981), 
126.
213 1995 ILC Survey, para 184.
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Smelter arbitration’, claiming that it had been accepted by a considerable number of States and 
expressing hope that it would be accepted at UNCHE as ‘a fundamental rule of international 
environmental law’.214
The formula of principle 21 has since UNCHE been repeated - often verbatim - in numerous 
binding215 and non-binding international instruments.216 Therefore, unlike for some of the other 
principles which will be discussed below, the majority of the current specialist doctrine has little 
difficulty with the customary law status of Principle 21.217
In connection with the requests by the World Health Organisation and the UN General 
Assembly for an advisory opinion regarding the Legality o f Nuclear Weapons, several States had 
sought to minimise the importance of Principle 21 by stressing that it formed part of a non-binding 
text.218 Their opponents maintained that the Principle formed part of customary international law.219 In 
reply to these submissions the ICJ held that:
‘The existence of the general obligation of States to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction and 
control respect the environment of other States or of areas beyond national control is now part of the 
corpus of international law relating to the environment’.220
Whilst the Court had already recognised in an earlier case that States are under the obligation 
to ‘respect and protect the natural environment’,221 the above statement is significant for it was made 
by the Court in a legal opinion on armed conflict and the use of nuclear weapons. The ICJ believes that 
even in these extreme circumstances the environmental obligations in question continue to be binding 
upon States. Nevertheless, the Court’s formulation does not correspond verbatim to the wording of
214 Ibid., para 192.
215 E.g., 1979 LRATP Convention, preamble; 1982 UNCLOS, Art. 194 (2); 1992 Biodiversity Convention, Art. 3; 
1992 Framework Convention on Climate Change, preamble.
216 E.g, UN Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, 12 December 1974, UNGA Res. 3281; 1982 World 
Charter for Nature; Rio Declaration, Principle 2, see further infra, 1.2.3. C.
217 O’Connell, M., 35 GYIL (1992), 303-9; Sohn, 14 Harv. ZL/(1973), 485-93; Palmer, G., 86 AJIL (1992), 267-8; 
Kiss & Shelton, op. cit., 106-7, 129#!; Sands, op. cit., 191-4; Chamey, in Francioni & Scovazzi, op. cit., 162-3; See 
too the assessment made by the ILC of Principle 21 in its work on International Liability, ELC Report (1994), UN Doc. 
A/49/10,389-90.
218 Written Statements by US, WHO Request (June 1994), 15-6; UNGA Request, (June 1995), 38-9; UK (June 1995), 
69, para. 3.109; France (June 1995), 39, para. 26.
219 Written Statements by Nauru (I), WHO Request (September 1994), 44; by Solomon Islands, WHO Request (June
1994), 83, paras 4.17-.19; Solomon Islands (June 1995), 64-5, paras 4.83-.87; Solomon Islands, UNGA Request (June
1995), 84-6, paras 4.17-.19; Egypt, UNGA Request (June 1995), 17, (September 1995), 30, 32, paras 70, 75; Oral 
Statements (WHO and UNGA requests), Solomon Islands (Mr. Sands), CR 95/32, 72, para 21; Iran, CR 95/26, 42-3, 
para 64.
220 ICJ Rep. (1996), 241-2, para 29.
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Principle 21. While the latter deals with the obligation to avoid damage to the environment of other 
States or of areas beyond national control, the Court uses a more general formula stressing the 
obligation to ensure respect for these environments. Whether this distinction will be perceived as 
significant, remains to be assessed. In any event, the Court repeated its view on the matter in its recent 
decision on the Gabdkovo-Nagymaros Project case.222
B. Corollary Principles
The ‘acquis’ of customary IEL, as laid down in the second part of Principle 21, entails several 
corollary duties for States. In the first place there exists a duty, variously described as the ‘no-harm’ 
principle’ or the principle of ‘harm prevention’,223 or the ‘principle of preventive action’,224 according 
to which States are obliged to prevent environmental harm before it occurs, and reduce and control 
pollution and environmental harm when it occurs. While the prior customary rule obligated States to 
make reparation for actual transboundary harm, the harm prevention principle demands that States 
first and foremost, take suitable preventive measures, e.g., through national legislation, to protect the 
environment.
Secondly, there is the ‘principle of co-operation’,226 sometimes referred to as the principle of 
‘transboundaiy co-operation in cases of environmental risk’,227 or more generally as the principle of 
‘good neighbourliness’ and ‘international co-operation’.228 The duty of international co-operation can 
be said to underlie all international (environmental) law. Pursuant to this requirement, States need to 
co-operate in mitigating environmental risks and emergencies. This is now understood as entailing 
several procedural duties such as the requirement to notify other States and to consult with other States 
in cases of transboundaiy risk of environmental damage, and particularly in the case of accidents and 
emergencies likely to cause transboundaiy harm.229 It may also entail specific commitments such as the
221 Request for an Examination of the Situation in Accordance with Paragraph 63 of the Court’s judgment of 20 
December 1974 in the Nuclear Tests Case (New Zealand v. France) [hereinafter Request for an Examination of the 
Situation], Order, 22 September 1995, ICJ Rep. (1995), 306, para 64.
222 ICJ, Gabcikavo-Nagymaros Project, judgment of 25 September 1997, General List No. 92, para 53.
223 Bimie & Boyle, op. cit., 89,91,100.
224 Sands, op. cit., 194-197.
225 While Bimie & Boyle argued in 1992 that the duty of harm prevention was ‘beyond serious argument’ {op. cit., 89), 
O’Connell, M., wrote in the same year that this was an emerging principle: 35 GYIL (1992), 293, 303.
226 Plant, Environmental Protection, 19.
227 Bimie & Boyle, op. cit., 102-9.
228 Sands, op. cit., 197-8.
229 Kiss & Shelton, op. cit., 131-41.
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duly to conduct an environmental impact assessment (EIA), and the duty to exchange information.230 
The principle of co-operation and its corollary principles of prior consultation based on adequate 
information are particularly firmly established in the law of international watercourses.231
However, it should be noted that the universality and the scope of these procedural 
requirements is not beyond controversy.232 The purported duty to conduct an EIA has been invoked 
before the ICJ in two recent cases. In 1995 New Zealand filed a request for an Examination o f the 
Situation in Accordance with Paragraph 63 o f the Court’s 1974 Judgement in the Nuclear Tests case, 
accompanied by a request for provisional measures. The basis of New Zealand’s petition was that a 
series of nuclear tests planned by France would lead to the same sort of radioactive contamination that 
had been brought before the Court in 1973. New Zealand claimed inter cdia, that it was unlawful for 
France to conduct further underground nuclear tests before undertaking an EIA ‘according to accepted 
international standards’, and that unless such an assessment established that the tests would not give 
rise, directly or indirectly, to radioactive contamination of the marine environment, the rights under 
international law of New Zealand, as well as the rights of other States, would be violated. The Court 
was also requested to order France to conduct such an EIA, and that unless this process established 
that the tests would not give rise to radioactive contamination of the marine environment, to order 
France to refrain from conducting the disputed tests.233
In its order of September 22, 1995, the Court dismissed New Zealand’s action without 
entering into the merits of these claims. It held that whilst the 1974 case dealt with atmospheric nuclear 
tests, the case at hand concerned underground nuclear tests, and that it followed that the latter could 
not be linked to the former.234 Nevertheless, in his dissenting opinion Judge Weeramantry argued that 
the ‘principle of continuing environmental impact assessment’ was gathering strength and 
international acceptance, and that it had reached ‘the level of general recognition at which the ICJ 
should take notice of it’.235 Likewise, in his dissenting opinion Judge Palmer claimed that EIA was a
230 Sands, op. cit., 198.
231 Bimie & Boyle, op. cit., 102-3, 234-242; Arts. 12-19 of the 1997 International Watercourse Convention; see too 
Hungarian submissions, Gabdkovo-Nagymaros Project case, HM, 203-4, paras 6. 70-.71,211-13, paras 7.06-.16,223- 
27, paras 7.57-.65.
232 Bimie & Boyle, op. cit., 102-109; Harlow & McGregor, in Grunawalt et al., op. cit., 317; Smith, op. cit., 80-82; For 
the view that the procedural principles of co-operation inherent in Principle 21 are jus cogens: Hohmann, op. cit., 255.
233 ICJ Rep. (1995), 290-1, paras 5-8.
234 Ibid., 304-6, paras 56-66.
235 Ibid., 344.
59
C h a p t e r  O n e : I n t e r n a t i o n a l  E n v i r o n m e n t a l  L a w
process to comply with the international legal duty to establish that a planned activity does not involve 
unacceptable environmental risks.236
In the 1997 Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project case Slovakia claimed that the purpose of an EIA 
was merely to provide decision-makers with information on potential environmental impacts, and that 
it was still in the process of development- even in Europe.237 Hungary, by contrast, called it a 
procedural norm that by 1989 become ‘an accepted means’ for ensuring that projects of the disputed 
type did not cause ‘untoward environmental damage’.238 In its judgement, the Court did not dwell on 
the issue of EIA directly. But having observed that the disputed project’s impact upon, and its 
implications for the environment were a key issue, the Court held that in order to evaluate its 
environmental risks, ‘current standards must be taken into consideration’.239
C. Contribution of the Rio Declaration
The Rio Declaration reaffirmed and developed - albeit in qualified terms - Principle 21 of the 
Stockholm Declaration. Principle 2 of the 1992 Declaration reads:
‘States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of international law, 
the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own environmental and developmental 
policies, and die responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause 
damage to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. ’
The difference between Principle 21 and Principle 2 is that while according to the former 
States have the sovereign right to exploit their own resources according to their own environmental 
policies, the Rio Declaration adds the phrase ‘pursuant to their own developmental policies’.240 
Whether this addition strengthened or weakened the earlier formulation, is unsettled.241 Several 
international instruments adopted at the Rio Conference and others thereafter, have kept to the earlier 
formula of Principle 21,242 thereby casting doubt on the general acceptance and therefore on the legal 
status of its Rio update.
236 Ibid., 410, para 87.
237 Oral Pleadings (Prof. McCaffrey) CR 97/9,38-9.
238 Written Pleadings, HC-M, 195, para 4.24; Oral Pleadings (Reply, Mr Sands) CR 97/12,68-9.
239 Judgment, para 140; See too Sep. Op. Weeramantry who argues that this wording implies that an EIA must be conducted.
240 The theme of (sustainable) development or ‘environment and development* permeates the entire Rio Declaration, 
for it is mentioned in many of its Principles.
241 Sands, op. cit., 50; Sand, 4 EJIL (1993), 382.
242 Biodiversity Convention, Art. 3; Forest Principles, 2 (a).
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Although the Stockholm Declaration also addressed development issues,243 the Rio 
Declaration will be remembered for elevating, amongst others, the principle of sustainable 
development to a fundamental concept of environmental policy. The need for ‘sustainable 
development’ was one of the centrepieces of the 1987 report produced by the World Commission on 
Environment and Development (WCED), also known as the ‘Brunddand Commission’.244 In this 
report, entitled Our Common Future, WCED synthesised and defined sustainable development as:
‘...development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future 
generations to meet their own needs’. 245
In the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project case both Hungaiy and Slovakia claimed to be 
concerned with ensuring sustainable development. The former called it concept that only emerged as a 
legal term in 1987, following the WCED report, and given formal and widespread legal recognition by 
the 1992 Rio Declaration.246 Slovakia suggested that the principle was devoid of legal status247 and that 
all it entailed was a new approach to reconciling economic development with environmental 
protection.248 In its judgement the Court gave no more than a moral boost to the concept of sustainable 
development when commenting on mankind’s constant interference with nature, it explained that the 
need:
‘...to reconcile economic development with protection of the environment is aptly expressed in the 
concept of sustainable development.. .’249
There are other important principles of public policy which have been put in relief on a global 
level with respect to all environmental sectors in the Rio Declaration, among which: inter-generational 
equity,250 public participation at the relevant level,251 the precautionary approach,252 a qualified version
243 Preamble and Principles 8 & 11: Sohn, 14 Harv. ILJ{1973), 464-66,469; Kiss & Shelton, op. cit., 48; Sand, 4 EJIL 
(1993), 382.
244 Established by UNGA Res. 38/161 of 19 December 1983, with as mandate to critically examine environment and 
development issues and to formulate realistic proposals for their solution; The WCED report was submitted to the 
UNGA in 1987, (UN Doc. A/42/427) through the Governing Council of UNEP, and published later under the title Our 
Common Future (1987).
245 Our Common Future, Chapter 2,43; On the origin of this notion see Bimie & Boyle, op. cit., 4; Sands, op. cit., 199; 
Hohmann, op. cit., 20.
246 Written Pleadings, HC-M, 196-7, para 4.25; HR, 21, para 1.39; 24-5, paras 1.45-.48.
247 Written Pleadings SC- M, 257-65, paras 9.53-.66.
248 Oral Pleadings (Prof. McCaffrey) CR 97/9,29.
249 Judgment, para 140; see too Sep. Op. Weeramantry who argues at length that the concept of sustainable development 
has normative value and forms part of modem international law.
250 Principle 3.
251 Principle 10.
252 Principle 15.
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of the polluter pays principle,253 and the principle of common but differentiated responsibility of 
developed and developing States.254 All of these principles had previously received recognition to 
varying degrees through adoption in declarations of principles, programmes of action, and even in 
some international treaties. On this basis the polluter pays principle is regarded as regional custom, 
because of the strong support it has received in most OECD and EC countries.255
Furthermore, a case is sometimes made that the precautionary principle constitutes (emerging) 
customary law.256 However, it is doubtful whether the principle forms part of present international 
law.257 First, there seems to be no uniform understanding of its meaning beyond the basic premise that 
it reflects a ‘better safe than sorry approach’ to counter the belief that States are not bound to act until 
there is clear and convincing scientific proof of actual or threatened harm to the environment.258 Three 
possible interpretations of the precautionary principle are advocated. At its most restricted, it 
represents a more developed form of the preventive principle: States are to act carefully and with 
foresight in taking decisions concerning activities that may have adverse environmental 
consequences259 A wider interpretation is that it lowers the threshold of proof, requiring State action in 
the face of foreseeable harm, even if there is no 100 % scientific certainty.260 The most radical 
construction implies a complete reversal of the burden of proof: it would become impermissible for a 
State to carry out an activity unless it can be shown that this will not lead to unacceptable harm to the
• 961environment.
Secondly, it is significant that after much debate, the UNCED delegates decided to settle for 
the term precautionary approach instead of principle, thereby casting doubt on its legal status. They 
nevertheless agreed on a formulation in line with the above view regarding the lowering of the burden 
of proof. Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration reads:
253 Principle 16.
254 Principle 7.
253 For a background and critical discussion of all these principles see Agora: ‘What Obligation Does Our Generation 
Owe to the Next An Approach to Global Environmental Responsibility’, 84 AJIL (1990), 190-212 with contributions 
by D1 Amato, 190-98; Brown Weiss, 198-207, Gundling, 207-212; see also Freestone, in Churchill & Freestone, op. 
cit., 21-39; Rehbinder, in Kiss & Burhenne-Guilmin, op. cit., 93-111; Smets, 97 RGDIP (1993), 339-363; Bodansky, 
in 85 ASIL Proceedings (1991), 413-417; Boyle, in Francioni & Scovazzi, op. cit., 368-70, 474^; Hohmann, op. cit., 
192$; Bimie & Boyle, op. cit., 95-98, 109-111 & 211-212; Sands, op. cit., 208-216.
256 Cameron & Abouchar, in Freestone & Hey, The Precautionary Principle and International Law (1996), 30^
257 Freestone & Hey, ibid., 14; Tinker, ibid., 53-71.
258 Bimie & Boyle, op. cit., 97; Cameron & Abouchar, op. cit., 30.
259 Kiss, in Freestone & Hey, op. cit., 27; Bimie & Boyle, op. cit., 95-6; Sands, op. cit., 212.
260 Freestone & Hey, op. cit., 13; Bimie & Boyle, op. cit., 95-6.
261 Bimie & Boyle, ibid., 97-8.
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‘In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely applied by States 
according to their capabilities. Where there are threats of serious irreversible damage, lack of full 
scientific certainty shall not be used as reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent 
environmental degradation.’
The precautionary principle has been relied on in two recent cases brought before the ICJ. In 
her 1995 request for an Examination o f the Situation, New Zealand invoked the most radical 
interpretation of the principle, arguing that it required France to cany out an EIA as a precondition for 
undertaking nuclear tests, and to demonstrate that there was no risk associated with them.262 The Court 
did not enter into the merits of this assertion, but in their dissenting opinions Judges Weeramantry and 
Palmer maintained that the principle constituted emerging customary law.263
hi the 1997 Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project case, Hungary claimed that the precautionary 
principle formed part of customary international law and that it had evolved into an erga omnes 
obligation of prevention of damage, precluding her from performing a treaty concluded in 1977 with 
Czechoslovakia.264 Given the ‘scientific uncertainty’, but ‘with credible risks and damages’, and with 
‘valid concerns over vital interests’, Hungary maintained that in the light of ‘the preventive and 
precautionary approach’, her fears for future damage constituted the ‘grave and imminent peril’ 
required for the state of necessity under international law.265 Slovakia urged more caution with respect 
to the legal status of the principle, emphasising that it was never intended to disrupt treaty relations, 
and entailed at most a lowering of the threshold of proof in the face of foreseeable serious or 
irreversible damage.266
In its judgement the Court noted first, that neither Party claimed that new peremptory norms 
of environmental law had emerged since 1977.267 The Court may thus have accepted Slovakia’s 
argument that the precautionary approach/principle, even if it reflects customary international law, 
does not prevail over treaty obligations. Furthermore, it rejected Hungary’s assertion that the many 
uncertainties regarding the ecological impact of putting in place the disputed barrage system, however 
serious they might have been, fulfilled the objective requirements of a ‘state of (ecological) necessity’
262 ICJ Rep. (1995), 290,298-9, paras 5, 34, 35.
263 Weeramantry, ibid., 342; Palmer, ibid., 412, para 91.
264 Written Pleadings HM, 200-3, paras 6.63-.69; ICJ judgment, 25 September 1997, General List No. 92, para 97.
265 Oral Pleadings (Reply, Mr Sands) CR 97/12,78-9.
266 Written Pleadings SC-M, 271-77, paras 9.80-.94; Oral Pleadings (Prof. McCaffrey) CR 97/9,34-7.
267 At para 112.
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under international law.268 The Court did not accept that in environmental matters the standard of proof 
in international law regarding the foreseeability of harm or damage should be lowered.
In conclusion, it should be noted that the majority of the specialist doctrine is cautious about
\
the legal status of the principles (apart perhaps from Principle 2 insofar as it affirms Principle 21) 
enunciated in the Rio Declaration. They are neither general principles of law, nor are they considered j 
to be universal principles of customary international environmental law. Some may be no more than I 
expressions of desirable public policy, others may be binding only as a matter of treaty law while still 
others may constitute emerging international law. On the whole, whether they give rise to actionable 
obligations of a general nature is open to question.269 The uncertain legal status of the principles of the 
Rio Declaration was confirmed in a document prepared for the 1997 UN General Assembly Special 
Session.270
It was seen earlier that the international community has repeatedly failed to agree on a 
uniform set of legal principles of environmental protection.271 It may therefore not come as a surprise 
that the above review shows that there are very few general principles and rules that cover all 
environmental sectors. The only undisputed set of rules that may be said to have achieved such a status 
are the obligations reflected in Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration, and in particular, the 
prohibition of transfrontier pollution.
D. The Prohibition of Transfrontier Pollution in State Practice
The next step is to look at the implementation of the prohibition of transfrontier pollution in 
State practice. A traditional indicator of the extent to which States implement international law is to 
examine what happens when the law is violated.272 According to the law of State responsibility,
‘Every internationally wrongful act of a State entails the international responsibility of that State.’273
268 At para. 54.
269 Sands, op. cit., 184.
270 UN Doc. E/CN. 17/1997/8,10 February 1997, Commission on Sustainable Development, 5th Sess., 7-25 April 1997.
271 Supra, 1.1.2.
272 There are of course other indicators, such as voluntary compliance, national implementation, and dispute settlement.
273 This rule forms the cornerstone of the ILC’s work on State Responsibility: Draft Articles on State Responsibility, 
General Principles, Art. 1, adopted in 1973 at its 25th session, Yearbook ILC, (1979), vol. n, pt 2, Report on 31st 
session, 91.
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Furthermore, in accordance with the well-known holding of the Chorzow Factory (Indemnity) 
case, the consequence of State responsibility is State liability, meaning the duty to make reparation:
‘It is a principle of international law, and even a general conception of law, that any breach of an 
engagement involves an obligation to make reparation....’274
Although the body of multilateral environmental agreements is growing, it is clear that not 
eveiy instance of environmental harm will be covered by a specialised treaty.275 In addition, even if 
there is a relevant treaty, it is often the case that the author State is not a party to it, or that the treaty 
places no binding obligation on the State to prevent such damage.276 In suchinstances, the customary 
principles of IEL should provide a safety net. The law of State responsibility covers both hypotheses: 
States must make reparation, including the payment of compensation, for damage caused by any 
wrongful act, regardless of the source of the obligation (treaty or custom).277
In application of the above, State practice should indicate that breach of any of the identified 
‘environmental’ obligations entails the responsibility of the author State, as well as its duty to make 
reparation. Yet it seems that States are extremely reluctant to recognise responsibility for 
transboundary harm on the basis of the above rules of customary international environmental law.278 
States have even been surprisingly reticent about pursuing claims inter se for particular grievous 
instances of transfrontier damage.279
Following the April 1986 accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power-station in the Ukraine, 
radioactive air-pollution was caused over the territory of some twenty countries, with noticeable 
impacts across the whole of Europe from southern Italy to northern Scotland and Scandinavia. 
Although several European States -including the UK and the FRG- reserved their right to do so, none 
has presented a claim to the former USSR for the serious transboundary nuclear contamination caused 
by the accident.280
The implementation of the above principles of customary international law is equally hesitant 
in treaty practice. The 1979 LRTAP Convention famously contains a footnote stating that it ‘does not
274 PCIJ, (1928), Ser. A., No 17, p. 29; see also SS Wimbledon Case, PCIJ, (1923), Ser. A, No 1, p. 3.
275 Most international environmental agreements are said to deal either with unusual or unimportant problems or issues 
for which a technological solution is at hand: McManus, in 87 Asil Proceedings (1993), 388.
276 O’Connell, M., 3 Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. (1995), 54.
277 Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project case, ICJ Judgment of 25 September 1997, ICJ General List No. 92, para 47, citing 
earlier case law; see too Rainbow Warrior Arbitration (1990), 82 ILR, 499 at 550-1, para 75.
278 Conforti, in Francioni & Scovazzi, op. cit., 179-80; Spinedi, ibid., 11 ff.
279 But this situation is not unique to IEL: Boisson de Chazoumes, 99 RGDIP (1995), 41ff.
280 Palmer, J., op. cit., 28-30; Sands, op. cit., pp. 642-4.
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contain a rule on state liability as to damage’. Traditionally, States have been willing to consider 
environmental damage liability regimes only on a case-by-case basis, and only when it proved 
indispensable for the economic viability of a specific risk creating activity, such as the nuclear industry 
and maritime transport of oil.281 This ad-hoc approach was set aside only recently in a regional 
instrument, the 1993 Council of Europe Convention on Civil Liability for Damage Resulting from 
Activities Dangerous to the Environment (Lugano Convention). Significantly though, this treaty 
proves remarkably unsuccessful. Although it requires only three ratifications for its entry into force, by 
April 1998 not a single State has done so.282
Furthermore, State intervention in the area of environmental damage has rarely resulted in the 
establishment of a compensation regime based on State liability. There is only one treaty that 
establishes clear rules of State liability in case of environmental damage: the 1972 Convention on 
International Liability for Damages Caused by Space Objects (Space Objects Liability Convention) 
which stipulates unlimited or ‘absolute’ international State liability for damage caused on the surface 
of the earth or to aircraft in flight283 This is, however, a unique treaty that deals with highly sensitive 
political and military matters. Its conclusion should not be taken as proof that States are generally 
willing to accept liability for environmental damage.284
In the overwhelming majority of cases, State intervention has resulted in the setting up of a 
regime of ‘civil liability’. A ‘civil liability’ regime is one in which liability for environmental damage 
is channelled to private operators or other sections of the industry, leaving the issue of State liability 
frequently unanswered, except when States themselves act as private operators. Good examples of this 
are the conventions concluded in the aftermath of the Torrey Canyon disaster. In accordance with the 
1969 Civil Liability Convention and the 1971 Fund Convention, liability for maritime transport of oil 
is currently borne entirely by the profit gaining industry.285 The most ambitious example of a pure civil 
liability regime, in terms of scope of activities, is the above-mentioned 1993 Lugano Convention.
International negotiations have less frequently led to mixed State/civil liability regimes.286 
This is the case of the nuclear industry, where States have agreed to complement private operator
281 Gehring & Jachtenfuchs, 4 EJIL (1993), 97-101; See infra, 4.2.1., 4.2.2.
282 Source: Council of Europe.
283 Art. H.
284 Gehring & Jachtenfuchs, 4 EJIL (1993), 102-3.
285 See infra, 4.2.2.
286 Rosas, in Bring & Mahmoudi, Current International Law Issues: Nordic Perspectives (1994), 161- 82.
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liability in response to industry demands.287 It is noteworthy though, that many of these conventional 
mixed regimes have either not entered into force or have, at best, a marginal relevance in practice, 
because of the limited number of contracting Parties.288
It is safe to state that there are still many difficulties in translating States’ environmental 
obligations -i.e., State responsibility- into principles and standards of liability.289 This is partly due to 
many fundamental legal and technical problems that remain unresolved.290 Thus, it is still a matter of 
serious controversy whether State liability arises only upon breach of a ‘primary obligation’ of States 
or whether liability is contingent upon the causing of damage, irrespective of breach of a primary 
obligation.291 Another unresolved issue relates to the nature of this primary obligation: is it a standard 
of due diligence that should be required from States or, instead, an absolute duty to prevent damage? If 
possible defences are allowed, the options for standards of care with respect to State environmental 
obligations include: (a) a fault-based standard covering both intention or negligence; (b) strict liability, 
which is a prima facie responsibility allowing for various qualifications and defences and (c) absolute 
liability, which does not allow for any exculpation.292
Finally, a large volume of literature is devoted to the threshold question.293 As recognised by 
the above-mentioned Working Group on environmental damage arising from military activities, 
defining ‘environmental damage’ remains a complex issue, and requires a two-state approach: defining 
the environment, and then determining what constitutes compensable damage.294
A recent EC Commission Green Paper on Environmental Liability has identified a whole 
range of possibilities for the determination of the level at which environmental damage triggers 
liability.295 Treaty practice296 case law297 and doctrine298 have suggested that environmental damage
287 See infra, 4.2.1.
288 Rosas, ibid., 165; Bimie & Boyle, op. cit., 192-3.
289 Leigh, 14 AYIL (1992), 135; Sands, 30 Harv. I U (1989), 404#; Boisson de Chazoumes, 99 RGDIP (1995), 46-47, 
50-51.
290 Principle 13 of the 1992 Rio Declaration expresses clear frustration at the lack of progress in this area since 
UNCHE; See too Art. 14 (2) of the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity which calls for further studies on the 
issues of liability and redress: Chandler, 4 Col. JIEL & P (1993), 160.
291 As to the validity of this distinction see: Leigh, 14 AYIL (1992), 140, fn. 69; O'Connell, M., 35 GYIL (1992), 308-9; 
Boyle, 30ICLQ (1990), 1; Akehurst 16 NYIL, (1985), p. 3; Combacau & Alland, 16 NYIL (1985), 81.
292 Sands, op. cit., 637.
293 Pisillo-Mazzeschi, op. cit., 35; Tomuschat, op. cit., 48-49; Boyle, 60 BYIL (1990), 257#
294 UNEP/Env. Law/3/hif. 1,15 October 1996,5-6, para 21.
295 Green Paper on Remedying Environmental Damage (Com (93) 47 Final), 14 May 1993; Sands, op. cit., 635.
296 See the standards mentioned supra, 1.2.1.
297 See the test of ‘more than merely nominal harm or damage’ suggested by Australia in the Nuclear Tests case, ICJ 
Rep. (1974), 525-6; discussed by Sands, op. cit., 245-6; the same test reappeared in State submissions regarding the 
Legality o f Nuclear Weapons: Written Statements by Solomon Islands, WHO Request (June 1994), 80-2, paras 4.12-
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must be ‘significant’, ‘substantial’, or possibly ‘appreciable’. Even if there are no agreed international 
standards, State practice seems to indicate that the threshold for liability involves a relatively high level 
of environmental damage.299
1.3. The Territorial Scope of the Prohibition of Transfrontier Pollution
1.3.1. Bilateralism - a t the Root o f IEL
Traditionally, international law was a separate legal system with special rules aimed only at 
relations between States.300 Similarly, early IEL was premised on an inter-State bilateral focus, and 
concerned primarily with transfrontier pollution caused by activities in the territory or under the 
jurisdiction of one State, affecting an area under the jurisdiction of another State.301 The origins of this 
cross-border approach seem to lie with the customary principle of ‘good neighbourliness’ which is in 
turn based on the above-mentioned general legal principle ‘sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas ’. 
Gradually the requirement of ‘neighbourliness’ was widened to include a criterion of adjacency or at 
least of geographical proximity. However, seen against the background of the development of 
international law as a whole,302 it is no surprise that DEL continues to contain the firmest rules when 
dealing with concerns of environmental harm between two States or with shared national resources, 
such as international watercourses.303
Still, understanding of the laws and mechanisms of nature and of the effects of poDution have 
grown considerably in the last decades. As already noted earlier,304 rules dealing with the environment 
in general, irrespective of where natural resources are located, are emerging.
.15; UNGA Request (June 1995), 82-3, paras 4.12-15; and in the Gabdkovo-Nagymaros Project case: Written 
Pleadings for Hungary, HR, 26, paras 1.52-.54; Oral Pleadings for Slovakia (Prof. Crawford), CR 97/9, 30-1.
298 Bimie & Boyle, op. dt., 98; Sands, op. dt., 635-6; According to the 1994 ILC Report on international watercourses 
(ILC Report (1994), UN Doc. A/49/10, 211-12), ‘significant’ means that it can be established by objective evidence, 
that it must not be trivial, but does not mean that it rises to the level ‘substantial’; this interpretation has been noted by 
the UNGA 6th Committee: UN Doc. A/51/869,11 April 1997.
299 Sands, op. dt., 636.
300 Schermers, in Delissen & Tanja, Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict-Challenges Ahead (1991), 584.
301 Hohmann, op. dt., 239-46.
302 Cassese, International Law in a Divided World (1986), 9-32.
303 For a concurring view in relation to the marine environment: Smith, op. dt., 67-8.
304 Supra, 1.2.1. B, D & E.
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1.3.2. International Areas and Principle 21
Currently, the high seas and the seabed as well as the maritime subsoil beyond national 
jurisdiction (or the ‘ Area’ according to 1982 UNCLOS), the air column above all these, in addition to 
Outer Space, and Antarctica and even the ozone layer are areas variously designated in the literature 
as: ‘the commons’ or ‘global commons’,305 ‘common space areas’,306 common spaces’,307 international 
commons’, 308 ‘international areas’,309 ‘ internationalised spaces,310 ‘res communis’, or ‘common 
amenities’.311 One can only agree with Professor Brownlie that not too much importance should be 
attached to terminology, for none of these concepts is capable of conveying precisely what the legal 
status of a particular area is.312 In the present study the general term ‘international areas’ will be used 
as a shorthand for all areas that are considered to be beyond national jurisdiction, in addition to 
Antarctica.313
Taking the locus of damage as criterion, three hypotheses should be discussed in relation to 
international areas; first, damage may be caused to the environment of other States by activities of one 
or more States conducted in areas beyond national jurisdiction; second, activities of one or more States 
in areas beyond national jurisdiction may cause damage to rights or interests of other States in these 
areas; third, damage may be caused to the environment of areas lying beyond national jurisdiction 
through activities of one or more States - conducted within or outside their jurisdiction- without any 
immediate noticeable effects for third States.
As mentioned above, the ‘harm prevention’ component of Principle 21 does not merely 
include ‘the environment of other States’, but also ‘areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction’: 
there is no suggestion of a territorial or any other spatial limitation to the conduct to which this
305 Our Common Future (1987), Chapter 10, 261; Bimie & Boyle, op. cit., 154; Leigh, 14 AYIL (1992), 135; Johnson, 
in Bourdeau et al., op. cit., 174.
306 Slinn, in Churchill & Freestone, op. cit., 83.
307 Chamey, in Francioni & Scovazzi, op. cit., 161.
308 Caldwell, op. cit., 251 ff.
309 Hannikainen, Peremptory Norms (Jus Cogens) in International Law (1988), 521-2; Lefeber, 21 NYIL (1990), 89.
310 Dupuy, Droit International Public (1993), 511.
311 Brownlie, Principles, 151,178,265,252.
312 Ibid., 178.
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obligation applies. Furthermore, by focusing not only on activities within a State’s jurisdiction, but 
also to activities within State control, the Principle covers activities by persons or ships under State 
control, wherever they may act.314
Under present international law therefore, a State’s obligation to prevent environmental harm 
( to other States315) applies in any locus over which it possesses a measure of legal authority, including 
in international areas.316 It follows that States are no longer free to pollute or degrade international 
areas and that they are obliged to take suitable preventive measures to protect these environments.317
However, the above deduction contains two important qualifications: the requirement of 
‘harm’ on the one hand and the rights or interests of ‘other States’ on the other hand. This means that 
only two of the above hypotheses are covered by the international areas provision of Principle 21: 
extraterritorial activities by a State (or its nationals), causing damage to the environment or territory of 
another State (or its nationals), and damage to interests or rights that other States (or their nationals) 
have in international areas caused by extraterritorial activities under the jurisdiction or control of 
another State.
Indeed, while damage or injury is not considered a constitutive element in the general law of 
State responsibility,318 State practice indicates that with respect to extra-territorial activities, proof of 
material injury to States’ rights or interests is required. This is especially the case when the pollution 
generating conduct is not governed by a specific rule of international law.319
The above qualifications have important consequences, for environmental harm that cannot be 
construed as direct, material damage to States’ rights or interests, is rarely remedied. In the Nuclear 
Tests cases neither Australia nor New Zealand sought reparation for proven damage, but they asked 
the Court to order France to stop atmospheric and other tests in the Pacific. There was evidence of 
radioactive fallout but no proof of harm. Australia argued inter alia, that the nuclear fallout on its 
territory constituted a violation of its sovereignty, that it could be potentially dangerous for the country 
and its citizens, and that the interference with ships and aircraft on the high seas by radio-active fallout
313 Note that several States lay claim on this region, but that these were ‘frozen’ by the 1959 Antarctic Treaty; Lefeber, 
21 NYIL (1990), 88#; Joyner, in Freestone & Mangone, op. cit., 309.
314 Sohn, 14 Harv. ZL/(1973), 493; ILC Report (1982), UN Doc. A/37/10,180.
315 See infra, this subheading, on the issue of protection of the environment ‘as such’.
316 Tomuschat, op. cit., 40,44//; Smith, op. cit., 80.
317 Hohmann, op. cit., 88; Bimie & Boyle, op. cit., 91-92; Chamey, in Francioni & Scovazzi, op. cit., 149.
318 Chamey, ibid., 155; Smith, op. cit., 7-8; Higgins, Problems and Process (1994), 163.
319 Handl, 69 AJ1L (1975), 58#; Sands, op. cit., 150.
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constituted infringements of the freedom of the high seas.320 New Zealand’s claim was more broadly 
cast: she also invoked ‘the rights of all members of the international community’ to be free from 
nuclear tests giving rise to radioactive fallout and the right to be preserved from ‘unjustified artificial 
radioactive contamination of the terrestrial, maritime and aerial environment’.321 Although the merits 
of these claims were never addressed by the Court, there is scepticism in the literature about whether 
such claims can succeed in the absence of proof of direct, material damage to State’s territories.322
The scarce international case law that exists on environmental damage in international areas 
deals almost exclusively with the transboundaiy effects to the environment ‘belonging’ to States, or 
with damage which, though arguably sustained by the environment as such, has been invariably 
reduced to damage to property or economic rights of States or their nationals.323 In addition, this sort of 
inter-State claim tends to be resolved ‘out of court’ via diplomatic channels. All too frequently this 
involves protracted and secretive bargaining in which legal principles play only a minor role. There are 
a few instances where States have made ex-gratia payments or taken remedial measures without, 
however, recognising liability for damage sustained within and aiguably also by resources of 
international areas: e.g., the 1954 Diago Fukuru M anf24 and the 1966 Palomares325 incidents.
As seen above, the Space Objects Liability Convention is the only treaty to contain a clear 
regime of State liability for damage sustained inter alia, ‘on the surface of the earth’.326 But while the 
latter expression conceivably covers international areas as well, the definition of damage retained by 
the treaty does not seem to cover damage to the environment as such.327 Thus far the Space Objects 
Liability Convention has been invoked in one case. When in 1979 the Soviet Cosmos 954 satellite
320 Nuclear Tests Case (Australia v. France), Interim Protection, Order of 22 June 1973, ICJ Rep. (1973), 103, paras 
22 & 27.
321 Nuclear Tests Case (New Zealand v. France), Interim Protection, Order of 22 June 1973, ICJ Rep. (1973), 139; For 
a discussion of the differences between the New Zealand and the Australian applications see Request for an 
Examination o f the Situation, Order of 22 September 1995, ICJ Rep. (1995), Diss. Op. Palmer, 384-5, para 10.
322 Handl, 69 AJIL (1975), 50-76; Bimie & Boyle, op. cit., 100.
323 But see the Pacific Fur Seal Arbitration award of 1893 (UK v. US) and the Patmos case, discussed by Sands, op. 
cit., 415-9,663-4.
324 Settlement of Japanese Claims for Personal and Property Damages Resulting from Nuclear Tests in the Marshall 
Islands in 1954, done January 4, 1955; Whiteman, 4 Digest of International Law, 565-7, 569-571; Leigh, 14 AYIL 
(1992), 136; Van Dyke, 24 ODIL (1993), 413; du Pontavice, in OECD, Legal Aspects of Transfrontier Pollution 
(1977), 430.
325 ILC, Survey o f State Practice relevant to international liability for injurious consequences arising out of acts not 
prohibited by international law, prepared by the Secretariat, A/CN.4/384, Documents of the 37th session, Yearbook 
ILC, (1985), vol. II, pt 2, 108, paras 522-24; Szulc, The Bombs of Palomares (1967), 117#!, 165, 197; du Pontavice, 
op. cit., 435; Rousseau, 74 RGDIP (1970), 1062.
326 States are absolutely liable for damage caused by their space objects on the surface of the earth or to aircraft in flight 
(Art. II), whereas for damage caused ‘elsewhere than on the surface of the earth’ to a space object or to persons or 
property on board, liability is fault -based (ID).
327 See definition of damage in Art. I (a).
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crashed in a remote area of Canada, the latter presented a claim for more than $ 6 million dollars to the 
USSR. While expressly invoking the principles of the aforementioned convention, Canada did not 
claim compensation for physical, environmental or property damage, but only for part of the cost of 
locating, removing and testing the debris and for subsequent cleanup efforts.328 hi a diplomatic ] 
settlement reached in 1981 the USSR agreed to pay a lump sum of only $ 3 million, and never 
expressly recognised liability.329
Significantly, in 1991 several ILC members raised the issue of whether damage to the ‘global 
commons’ should be addressed by the commission in its work on international liability. But a decision 
on this was deferred, and the ILC’s 1994 report proclaims firm adherence to the strict bilateral 
transboundary conception of the study.330
Yet, the duty to protect the environment as such, irrespective of locus, appears to be addressed 
by a growing number of multilateral international instruments, which phrase States’ environmental 
rights and duties in general terms without territorial or spatial references.331 What these instruments 
show, at a minimum, is that the balance between State sovereignty and the environment is probably 
changing in favour of the latter. This expanding international interest in environmental resources, 
wherever situated, is supported by the growing scientific evidence of the integrity and the unity of the 
environment.332 The growing evidence of the interrelatedness of all life processes is legally significant. 
For if the earth’s biosphere represents a single indivisible system characterised by the interrelation of 
its various functional and ecological subsystems, the disruption of any one of these subsystems 
promotes the breakdown and destabilization of another.333
In the present international legal constellation in which States continue to remain prime 
actors, the key to protecting the environment beyond the limits of national jurisdiction lies in giving 
‘third States’ legal standing to enforce protection and preservation of this environment. In this context, 
the question of erga omnes obligations and the actio popularis need to be discussed. In the 1966 South 
West Africa case the World Court rejected the notion of actio popularis, thereby dismissing the claim
328 The total cost of the operation to Canada was approximately $ 14 million: Van Dyke, 24 ODIL (1993), 414. ,
329 Canada, Claim against the USSR for Damage Caused by Soviet Cosmos 954,23 January 1979,18ILM (1979), 899- v 
908; Protocol between the Government of Canada and the Government of the Union o f the Soviet Republics, done 2 
April 1981,20 ILM(1981), 689; Sands, op. cit., 647-8; Leigh, 14 AYIL (1992), 136.
330 Yearbook ILC, (1991), vol. H part 2,108 at 117-18; ILC Report (1994), UN Doc. A/49/10,391,398-9.
331 E.g., 1968 African Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources, Art. 2; 1982 World Charter 
for Nature, first principle; 1982 UNCLOS, Art. 192; 1985 Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, 
Art. 2(1); 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity, Art. 6 (a); 1997 Convention on the Law of Non-Navigational Uses 
of International Watercourses, Arts 20,23.
332 Almond, in Cooper & Palmer, op. cit., 3; Stone, 45 SCLR (1972), 499-500 and 59 SCLR (1985), 1-154.
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that any member of a community had a right to take legal action in vindication of a public interest.334 
This judgement was widely criticised in the literature and a few years on, the ICJ acknowledged in the 
Barcelona Traction case that there existed:
‘...obligations of a State towards the international community as a whole, which by their very 
nature....are the concern of all States. In view of the importance of he rights involved, all States can be 
held to have a legal interest in their protection; they are obligations erga omnes’.335
While this oft-quoted passage is only an obiter dictum, it was hailed as a clear progression 
from the uncompromising stance expressed in the South West Africa case. The types of obligations 
mentioned by the Court in the Barcelona Traction case were the outlawing of acts of aggression in 
international law and human rights.
In the 1973/74 Nuclear Tests cases it was argued by both Australia and New Zealand that 
such obligations erga omnes exist in addition with regard to the preservation of the high seas marine 
environment.336 As seen above, their petition was not only based on the alleged violation of their 
States’ sovereignty, but on the infringements of the principle of the freedom of the high seas, and on 
the violation of ‘the rights of all members of the international community’ to be free from nuclear 
tests.337 Unfortunately, the merits of these claims were never addressed by the Court338 although 
several justices supported an examination of these claims suggesting that the notions of erga omnes 
obligations and actio popularis are closely linked.339
As seen earlier, in 1995 New Zealand filed a request with the ICJ based on paragraph 63 of 
the Court’s 1974 judgement in its case against France. Here again, New Zealand asserted that it had 
legal standing to enforce not only its own but also other States’ rights in the marine environment.340 
Although New Zealand’s application found favour with three judges,341 the majority of the Court held 
that the 1974 and 1995 cases were substantially different.342
333 Handl, 69 AJIL (1975), 53.
334 Second Phase, ICJ Rep. (1966), 47.
335 Second Application, ICJ Rep. (1970), 32.
336 Interim Protection, (Australia v. France), ICJ Rep. (1973), p. 99 at para 22; (New Zealand v. France), ibid., p. 135 at 
para 23.
337 (Australia v. France), ibid., p. 99 at para 22; (New Zealand v. France) ibid., p. 135 at para 23.
338 The Court found that France unilaterally undertook to stop the tests and that Applicants had therefore reached their 
objective: (Australia v. France), Jurisdiction, ICJ Rep. (1974), p. 253 at para 52.
339 (Australia v. France), Jurisdiction, Joint Diss. Op. Onyeama, Dillard, Jimenez de Arechaga & Waldock, ICJ. Rep. 
(1974), p. 312 at para 117; identical Joint Diss. Op. (New Zealand v. France), ibid., p. 457 at para 52.
340 ICJ Rep. (1995), 291, para 6.
341 Diss. Op. Weeramantry, Koroma & Palmer: ibid., 317$ 363.$ 381 ff.
3A2Ibid., 306, para 63.
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In his treatise on State Responsibility and the Marine Environment Dr. Smith suggests an 
interesting way out of the actio popularis impasse.343 He argues that international law need not go as 
far as recognising an actio popularis; it would suffice to better identify the legal rights and interests of 
all States in the preservation of the marine environment. The author proposes a distinction between 
multilateral and bilateral erga omnes obligations. He asserts that while no individual State has a right 
or interest in human rights cases other than as a member of the international community, the high seas 
marine environment presents a different case: the legal interest of each State in the obligation to 
prevent injury to this area, would lie within the ‘subset of duties owed to each state, and not just to the 
personified community’.
But even if the need for an actio popularis could be avoided through recognition of ‘bilateral’ 
erga omnes obligations, enforcement before international tribunals may remain problematic. This is 
especially the case when the author State refuses consent to jurisdiction. In 1995 Portugal brought a 
case against Australia concerning a 1989 treaty between Australia and Indonesia regarding the 
exploitation of the continental shelf of the so-called ‘Timor Gap’. No case was brought against 
Indonesia since the latter had not consented to the ICJ’s jurisdiction. In its application Portugal sought 
to overcome this obstacle by claiming inter alia, that in taking measures to apply the Timor Gap treaty, 
Australia had violated the rights of the people of East Timor to self-determination.344 Portugal 
maintained that Australia thus breached rights erga omnes and that accordingly it had jus standi to 
require Australia, individually, to respect them regardless of whether or not another State (i.e., 
Indonesia) had conducted itself in a similarly unlawful manner.345
In its judgment of 30 June 1995, the ICJ characterised Portugal’s assertion that the right of 
peoples to self-determination has an erga omnes as ‘irreproachable’.346 It found, however, that it could 
not decide on Australia’s conduct without first deciding why Indonesia could not lawfully have 
concluded the Timor Gap treaty.347 It recalled in this respect that one of the fundamental principles of 
its Statute (Art. 36 (2)) was that it cannot decide a dispute between States without the consent of those
343 Smith, op. cit., 97-99.
344 Even Australia acknowledged the erga omnes character of the right of self-determination: Rejoinder, para 78, cited 
inDiss. Op. Weeramantry, ICJ Rep. (1995), 172.
345 ICJ Rep. (1995), 102, para 28.
346 Ibid., para 29.
347 Ibid., para 28.
74
C h a p t e r  O n e : In t e r n a t i o n a l  E n v i r o n m e n t a l  l a w
States to its jurisdiction,348 confirming that this applied even if the obligations involved had an erga 
omnes character.349
The effect of this holding is undoubtedly, as Judge Weeramantry wrote, to inhibit the 
‘practical operation of the erga omnes doctrine.’350 Judge Ranjeva regretted that the Court had avoided 
the many questions raised by the existence of positive objective law such as rights opposable erga 
omnes and jus cogens. He wondered whether the effect of the Court’s judgement was not to limit the 
domain of the Court’s jurisdiction ratione materiae solely to disputes involving subjective rights.351
The same problem was broached by Judge Weeramantry in to the Gabdkovo-Nagymaros 
Project case. After having observed that the dispute in question involved only issues inter partes, he 
speculated that the Court may in the future be faced with environmental litigation that raises erga 
omnes issues of sufficient importance. He stressed that the Court’s current inter partes adversarial 
procedures may need to be reconsidered ‘if ever a case should arise of the imminence of serious or 
catastrophic environmental danger, especially to parties other than the immediate litigants’.352
A step towards better recognition of the interests of the international community regarding the 
environment was taken by the ILC when it proposed to include serious instances of pollution in its list 
of ‘international crimes’ committed by States:
‘...a serious breach of an international obligation of essential importance for the safeguarding and
preservation of the human environment such as those prohibiting massive pollution of the atmosphere or
of the seas’353
The term ‘massive’ denotes a very high threshold, beyond the terms ‘significant’ or 
‘substantial’ mentioned above. However, the reaction of States to these proposals was rather negative. 
Not only is there much controversy about the notion of ‘State criminality’ as such,354 many 
governments and scholars seem to regard the ILC proposals on massive pollution at most as a prospect 
de lege ferendaP5 Probably for much the same reasons, the ILC’s proposal to include the ‘wilful
34iIbid., 101, para 26.
349 Ibid., 102 para 29; Burchill, 2 Journal of Armed Conflict Law (1997), 1-22.
350Diss. Op. Weeramantry, ICJ Rep. (1995), p. 139 at 172.
351 Sep. Op. Ranjeva, Ibid., 131-132.
352 Sep. Op., ICJ Judgment of 25 September 1997, ICJ General List No. 92.
353 ILC Report (1976), UN Doc. A/31/10, 266; Draft Articles on State Responsibility so far adopted by the 
International Law Commission, Art. 19.1 (d), Yearbook ILC, (1980), vol. n, pt 1,30.
354 ILC Report (1994), UN Doc. A/49/10,330-39 & 358.
355 Hannikainen, op. cit., 287-88; Hohmann, op. cit., 152; Bimie & Boyle, op. cit., 209-210; Higgins, op. cit., 165-8; 
Malanczuk, op. cit., 60; See too: Institut Discussions on transboundary air pollution: Henkin, 60 Ann.IDI(1984), T. I., 
236#, 237 & 246 and of Lachs, Rudolf, Seidl-Hohenveldem, 62 Ann.IDI (1986), T. I, 270# 273, 281 & 288; ILC 
Report (1994), UN Doc., A/49/10,338.
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causing or ordering’ of ‘widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment’ as a 
separate crime into its draft for a Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind,356 
encountered resistance and was eventually dropped.357
It is sometimes claimed that certain environmental norms have achieved the status of jus 
cogens. This peremptory character has been attached to the prohibition of ‘serious damage or threat to 
biological diversity’, following A rt 22 (1) of the Biodiversity Convention,358 to ‘the basic principles’ 
of 1982 UNCLOS, following Art. 311 (3),359 to the ‘procedural principles of co-operation’ inherent in 
Principle 21, and to the prevention of climate change, acid rain and depletion of the ozone layer.360 
Furthermore, the ILC regards the category of international crimes of States as much broader than the 
list of peremptory obligations, viewing the prohibition against ‘massive pollution of the atmosphere or 
the seas’ as peremptory.361 Even States that refuse to regard violation of this norm as an international 
State crime, may not oppose its jus cogens character.
Leaving the other requirements of the concept aside, it should be noted that an obligation can 
only be peremptory if no derogation is allowed.362 One of the circumstances that needs to be examined 
with regard to environmental norms is armed conflict: if a State may deviate from such a norm on the 
basis of self-defence or military necessity, the norm would be derogable under certain circumstances, 
thus refuting its alleged ‘peremptory’ status.
In conclusion to this subheading it seems safe to state that the extent to which international 
law currently imposes on States an obligation of conservation and sustainable development with 
respect to the environment in general, and the question to whom such a duty would be owed, remain 
controversial.363
356 Art. 26, Draft Code on Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind, Yearbook ILC, (1991), vol. II, pt 2, 97; 
see too Art. 22 (d), ibid.
357 Following a report by a special working group, it was finally decided to retain only the proposal to include wilful 
and severe damage to the environment in the list of war crimes: see Art. 20 (g), Final Draft of the Code Report of the 
ILC on its 48th session, (1996), vol. n, pt 2, chapter n, A (Introduction), paragraphs 41 to 44; B (Articles with 
commentary), paragraph 15.
358 In the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project case, see supra, 1.2.1. C.
359 This provision prohibits Parties from concluding inter se agreements derogating from ‘the basic principles’ of the 
convention; Hannikainen, op. cit., 524.
360 Hohmann, op. cit., 214-16,255.
361 ILC Report (1976), UN Doc. A/31/10,260-1,287; Hannikainen, op. cit., 288-9,693.
362 But see Hannikainen, op. cit., 248-265.
363 Bimie & Boyle, op. cit., 122; but see Kiss & Shelton, op. cit., 144//!
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1.3.3. Damage to a State's Own Environment
Another question that needs to be addressed is whether international legal responsibility 
attaches to damage caused by a State to its own environment when there are no immediate deleterious 
effects for other States, nor for areas beyond national jurisdiction. Can the preventive obligations 
implicit in Principle 21 be held to apply to the environment contained within States? Here the first 
element of that Principle poses a serious stumbling block: it holds that State sovereignty, one of the 
basic tenets of international law, confers on each State the independent right to control and regulate its 
natural resources. A further problem arises upon examination of the second element of Principle 21, 
which mentions only ‘other States’ and international areas as protected spheres; this phrase cannot be 
stretched to include international legal responsibility for environmental resources within a State’s own 
territory. The ILC made this much clear in 1982 when it held that State liability does not exist when 
both the activity causing harm and the injury itself occur in the territory of the same State.364 Even the 
most recent update of Principle 21, i.e., Principle 2 of the 1992 Rio Declaration, reflects the orthodox 
view regarding responsibility for damage to a State’s own environment365
Nonetheless, it was seen above that international interest in the preservation of the 
environment, wherever it may be situated, is growing. International concern for the environment that 
lies within a State’s own borders may be justified on scientific grounds. Because of the ecological 
unity of the global environment, any act of pollution, even if it does not immediately threaten the 
environment of other States or international areas, can have several systemic consequences: for 
instance, it may reduce the overall assimilative capacity of the global environment and may affect 
migratory species.366 Seen in this way, any act of pollution or even any failure to take preventive action 
by a State with regard to its own natural resources, creates risks for the entire world community and 
can potentially affect rights and interests of all States in the environment. It is for those reasons that 
some have proposed to add a further element to Principle 21 Stockholm/Principle 2 Rio according to 
which States would have the obligation:
‘.. .to protect and preserve he environment within the limits of their national jurisdiction’367
364 ILC Report (1982), UN Doc. A/37/10,186; see too ILC Report (1994), UN Doc. A/49/10, 391,388-9.
365 But see Sands, op. cit., 194.
366 Smith, op. cit., 103.
367 IUCN Draft Covenant on Environment and Development of March 1995 (on file with author), Article 11 (1) (a).
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A second avenue to justify international interest in the environmental resources contained 
within a State is a human rights approach. The 1972 Stockholm Declaration already mentions in its 
very first preambular paragraph that there is link between human rights and environmental protection:
‘Both aspects of man’s environment, the natural and the man-made, are essential to his well-being and to 
the enjoyment of basic human rights- even the right to life itself
The first Principle of the Declaration then goes on to state:
‘Man has the fundamental right to freedom, equality and adequate conditions of life, in an environment 
of a quality that permits a life of dignity and well-being’.
However, the travaux preparatoires of the Declaration indicate that the question of an 
environmental human right was contentious and that the wording of the preamble and of Principle 1 
was the result of a compromise.368 This explains perhaps the continuing disagreement on the meaning 
of Principle l.369 Principle 1 of the 1992 Rio Declaration can be seen as continuing the doctrinal 
controversy about the existence of a human right to environment, for it proclaims that human beings:
‘.. .are entitled to a healthy and productive life in harmony with nature’.
The literature remains divided on the status of an environmental human right. 370 The fact 
remains that apart from general proclamations,371 the practical and procedural implementation of this 
purported human right to a decent environment in international law has been rather hesitant; for 
example, despite the fact that the constitutions of more than 60 nations grant citizens a right to a decent 
environment, thus far no minimum standard of environmental quality to which individuals would be 
entitled, has emerged.372
368 Sohn, 14 Harv. 7L/(1973), 423,429,434,436,439,451-2 & 455.
369 Handl, 69 AJIL (1975), 54, fit. 28; Smith, op. cit., 101; Caldwell, op. cit., 65; Kiss & Shelton, op. cit., 21-23,25-27, 
29; Hohmann, op. cit., 61, 253-4; Bimie & Boyle, op. cit., 191-93; Ksentini, Special Rapporteur to ECOSOC on 
Human Rights and the Environment, Final Report, 46th session, E/CN.4/Sub. 2/1994/9, para. 31, pp. 10-11, (6 July 
1994); Gormley, Human Rights and Environment (1976), 1.
370 Kiss, 2 Revue Universelle des Droits de L ’Homme (1990), 446; Desgagnd, 89 AJIL (1995), 263-294; Sands, op. cit., 
220-230; Hohmann, op. cit., 61,142; Sands, op. cit., 50.
371 E.g., The 1981 African Charter on Human Rights and People’s Rights, of June 27, 1981, OAU Doc. 
CAB/LEG/67/3/Rev. 5 (1981), 28 7ZA/(1982), 58, Art. 24; San Salvador Additional Protocol of November 14,1988 to 
the American Convention on Human Rights, 2877/1/(1989), 156; Art. 11.
372 Kiss & Shelton, op. cit., 22-23; Sands, op. cit., 224; Ksentini, Final Report, op. cit., 59-60, para 240, Annex El on 
‘Developments in National Legislation and Practices, 81-90, and on municipal case law, 92-93.
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At the far end of the spectrum of this debate stands Judge Weeramantry of the ICJ. In his 
separate opinion to the Gabdkovo-Nagymaros Project case he argued that:
‘Environmental rights are human rights. Treaties that affect human rights cannot be applied in such a
manner as to constitute a denial of human rights at the time of their application’
The link between IEL and human rights was also debated in connection with the requests for 
an advisory opinion from the ICJ on the Legality o f Nuclear Weapons. Proponents of the illegality of 
these weapons argued that their threat or use would violate, inter alia, ‘the Human Right to 
Environment’.373 In its Opinion on the General Assembly request the ICJ may have accepted at least a 
general link between human rights and the environment insofar as it observed, as mentioned before, 
that the environment represents ‘the living space, the quality of life and the very health of human 
beings, including generations unborn.’ 374
Still, it should be realised that the human rights approach to environmental protection may 
have its drawbacks. Environmental protection requires more than the piecemeal approach that can be 
offered through the rather individualistic approach of human rights litigation.375 On the other hand, 
those writers who believe that a right to a decent environment has already been added to the catalogue 
of human rights, will more easily accept that the balance between State sovereignty and environmental 
integrity is changing in favour of the latter.
373 Written Statements by Costa Rica, WHO Request (July 1994), 7-9; (I) Nauru, WHO Request (September 1994), 48- 
51; Malaysia, WHO Request (September 1994), 10-11; Samoa, WHO Request (September 1994), 3; Solomon Islands, 
WHO Request (June 1994), 86-7, para 4.24; by Solomon Islands UNGA Request, (June 1995), 91-2, paras 4.32-.35.
374 ICJ Rep. (1996), 241-2, para 29; see too Gabdkovo-Nagymaros Project, judgment of 25 September 1997, ICJ 
General List No. 92, para 112.
375 Desgagne, S9AJIL (1995), 293-4.
79
C h a p t e r  O n e : In t e r n a t i o n a l  E n v i r o n m e n t a l  L a w
1.4. Conclusions To Chapter One
Public concern about the impact of human activities on the environment rapidly found its way 
into international fora at the end of the 1960s. The ensuing discipline of modem international 
environmental law (IEL) has moved from an inter-State focus, based on transfrontier pollution, onto 
dealing with the environment situated beyond national jurisdiction, and more recently, with the 
environment in general, irrespective of locus.
IEL is primarily treaty-based law. An impressive number of agreements establish detailed 
obligations for States in regard to separate environmental components such as the marine environment, 
freshwater resources, and wildlife. Since the 1980s several instruments have been concluded to deal 
with problems across several environmental sectors in a comprehensive manner. In addition, new 
treaty techniques have been developed for tackling complex scientific issues such as loss of 
biodiversity, ozone depletion and climate change.
Although there are principles, rules and techniques common to many environmental sectors, 
there exists as yet, no international common law of the environment. Nevertheless, it was argued in 
this chapter that Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration can be regarded as the cornerstone of 
modem IEL. Its first element holds that States have the sovereign right to exploit their natural 
resources according to their own environmental policies; its second element that activities under the 
jurisdiction or control of States, both within and outside their own territory, are subject to the 
prohibition of transfrontier pollution, the implications and limits of which have been discussed above.
Although Principle 21 is regarded as reflecting customary international law, it was seen that 
States are generally reluctant to recognise or pursue claims inter se of State Responsibility based on 
breach of the Principle. Furthermore, there is controversy on the standard of care required from States 
as well as uncertainty regarding the level of prohibited damage, although the latter is probably 
relatively high.
Two other problems that have been discussed in this chapter relate to environmental damage 
caused in international areas and within a State’s own jurisdiction. International interest in these 
environments can be justified on scientific grounds. However, State practice indicates that 
environmental damage in international areas will rarely be remedied or compensated unless there is
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proof of damage to other States’ legal rights or interests. In addition, the principle of State sovereignty 
inhibits outside interference when environmental damage remains confined within State borders. 
Furthermore, it is still a matter of controversy whether there exists at present a human right to a decent 
environment, and whether this offers appropriate means of ensuring environmental protection.
In conclusion, its seems appropriate to quote and slightly amend an observation made 
Professor Shearer in 1996:
‘Probably the only clearly established customary law principle of the natural environment is that no State 
may conduct activities, or permit the conduct of activities, on its territory or in international areas that 
cause harm to the territory of another State, if that harm is of serious consequence and is established by 
clear and convincing evidence’.376
n n n
376 Shearer, in Grunawalt, et. al., op. cit., 549; The terms added by this author are ‘or in international areas’.
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Chapter Two 
Protection of the Environment in the Laws of Armed Conflict
2.1. Introduction.
This chapter will review the environmental implications of the lex specialis, i.e., the laws of 
armed conflict, applicable to the marine environment. Space permits only brief comments on many 
relevant issues. In particular, only international armed conflict will be addressed, whilst disarmament 
law and weapons of mass destruction will not be dealt with in detail. Since the law of neutrality raises 
issues of general peacetime (including environmental) law, some of the issues raised in this chapter 
will also arise in the next.
In contrast to the relatively recent origins of IEL, the laws of armed conflict are of much older 
vintage.1 Mankind has long sought to restrain war through law, by prescribing both when war is 
permissible and what is permissible in war if and when it has begun.
The contemporary law of armed conflict still encompasses this classical dichotomy. Any use 
of armed force in international relations is subject to a two-tier scrutiny of rules regulating the resort to 
armed force (jus ad bellwn) on the one hand, and rules governing the use of armed force (jus in bello) 
on the other.2 The former is aimed at preventing the outbreak of armed conflict while the purpose of 
the latter is to moderate or humanise armed conflict. This difference in legal objective leads to a 
crucial difference: jus ad bellum allows the international community to pass judgement on the merits 
of resort to armed force and necessarily distinguishes between victims and aggressors. By contrast, jus 
in bello applies equally to all parties to an armed conflict, regardless of the legality of their actions 
under jus ad bellum.3 However, the theoretical independence of these disciplines and the equality of all 
belligerents under jus in bello have recently come under scrutiny.
1 Best, in Delissen & Tanja, op. cit., 6 and in Westing, Cultural Norms, 18-29.
2 On the origin of these terms see Kolb, ICRC Review (1997), No 320, 553-562.
3 Oppenheim, International Law. A Treatise. Vol. II. Disputes, War and Neutrality, (1952), 217-18; Brownlie, 
International Law and the Use of Force by States (1963), 406-7.
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While jus ad bellum and jus in bello chiefly regulate relations between belligerents, 
relationships between belligerents and third States that do not wish to become involved in the conflict 
are governed by the customary law of neutrality. However, since positions of neutrality vis-a-vis 
unlawful uses of force are incompatible with the UN Charter, the international law on the relations 
between belligerents and third States is unsettled.
Warfare, as Kalshoven observed, cannot fail to damage the natural environment, and it is 
therefore important to know what damage must be deemed to be unacceptable.4 This century many 
conflicts, in Europe and elsewhere, led to serious and probably long-lasting environmental 
destruction.5 Even if not all damage was inflicted intentionally, history shows that belligerents have 
never shied away from attempting to secure military advantage by using the forces of nature.6 
Therefore, the problem of environmental damage during warfare is hardly new, and rules aiming at 
controlling the impact of warfare on the human environment can be found from the earliest 
civilisations. Thus, ancient norms prohibited the wanton destruction of forests, orchards, fruit trees and 
vines, or the poisoning of wells, springs and rivers.7
If environmental damage during warfare is a perennial problem, the extent and depth of public 
concern about it is a relatively recent phenomenon.8
The destructive potential of means of warfare increased dramatically after World War n, 
through the advent of nuclear weapons. In 1956 the ICRC unsuccessfully proposed express 
humanitarian legal provisions for these weapons.9 Today, even Nuclear Powers do not dispute that 
their use is governed by the laws of armed conflict.10 They continue to insist however, that these and 
other ‘weapons of mass destruction’ are best dealt with in arms control fora.11
4 Kalshoven, 9 NYIL (1978), 130; see too Bothe, et. al., New Rules for Victims of Armed Conflicts (1982), 346.
5 Lumsden, in War and Environment (1981), 38-57 (1981); Westing, ibid., 58-73 and in Environmental Hazards of 
War (1990), 1-10.
6 Keegan, A History o f Warfare (1993), 6-9, 106-115, 265-266; Best, in Westing, Cultural Norms, 24-5; McCoubrey, 
in Pilot Study on Defence Environmental Expectations (1995), 236-7; Momtaz, 37 AFDI (1991), 204, 206; Witteler, 
Die Regelungen der Neuen Vertrage des humanitaren Volkerrechtss und des Rechts de Rustungsbegrenzungmit 
direktem Umweltbezug, (1993), 49-54.
7 Best, in Westing, Cultural Norms, 18; Roberts, in Grunawalt, et al., op. cit., 225; Spieker, op. cit., 189-199; Witteler, 
op. cit., 151-156.
8 Plant, Environmental Protection, 17; Roberts, in Grunawalt, et al., op. cit., 225.
9 Sandoz, ICRC Review (1997), No 316,6-8; Bugnion, ICRC Review (1995), No. 305,217-8.
10 See State submissions in relation to the Advisory Opinion on Nuclear Weapons (UNGA Request): USSR, Written 
Statement, 18; US, Written Statement, 21; UK, Written Statement, 21; and see Opinion, ICJ Rep. (1996), 266, para 105 
2 D; Cassese, International Law, 265.
11 Menon, 30 RDMDG (1991), 253-301; Best, War and Law Since 1945 (1994), 204.
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The Second Indochina War (1961-1975), (‘ Vietnam War % coincided with the surge of 
environmental awareness in the 1970s. Initially, public criticism focused primarily on the 
unprecedented scale of the use of herbicides by the US and its South Vietnamese allies.12 Soon 
however, the finger was pointed at the combined effect of the vast array of so-called conventional 
weapons and techniques used by the US; it was alleged that they had long-term or even irreversible 
effects on the environment13 While most of the environmental damage caused during the two World 
Wars is said to have been ‘collateral’ in nature, during the Vietnam War, the environment itself 
allegedly became a major target of the US military.14
Towards the end of the 1960s claims surfaced that the US had also experimented with 
weather modification (rainmaking) for military purposes.15 Appeals were launched for the outlawing 
of this new crime of ‘ecocide’ in international law.16 As will be seen later, the 1972 Stockholm 
Conference dealt only half-heartedly with the matter of environmental damage during armed conflict.17 
By contrast, the Vietnam War was pivotal for the development of the environmental jus in bello.
Aspects of the ‘Vietnam’ legacy were dealt with by the Geneva Disarmament Conference, 
which adopted the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention and the 1977 Convention on the Prohibition 
of Military or Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques. Subsequently, the 
Geneva Diplomatic Conference tasked with reviewing and developing humanitarian law (hereinafter 
‘ 1974-77 GDC’) adopted general principles and a threshold for the protection of the environment in 
international armed conflict. Protection of the environment was also dealt with by the 1980 ‘Inhumane 
Weapons Convention’,18 a treaty containing elements of jus in bello and disarmament law. Finally,
12 Meyrowitz, 13 AFDI(1967), 189-190; Witteler, op. cit., 62-72; Robinson, in War and Environment, 19jf\ Moore, in 
Falk, The Vietnam War and International Law (1976), vol. IV, 181ff.
13 Witteler, op. cit., 61-82; Westing, in War and Environment, 66-68.
14 McCoubrey, in Pilot Study, 236.
15 Infra, 2.2.4.
16 Westing, in War and Environment, 66-8 and in Falk, The Vietnam War, 284-6; Falk, ibid., 286-303; Blix, in War 
and Environment, 123-33; SIPRI, Ecological Consequences o f the Second Indochina War (1976), 55-56, references fn. 
4; Spieker, op. cit., 276-84; Witteler, op. cit., 72-78.
11 Infra, 3.3.1.
18 The Convention has four attached protocols on specific weapons and methods of warfare; The first three protocols 
were agreed together with the main Convention: Protocol (I) on Non-detectable Fragments; Protocol (II) on 
Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps, and other Devices; Protocol (HI) on Prohibitions or 
Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons; the fourth one, Protocol (IV), on Blinding Laser Weapons was agreed 
on 13 October 1995 at the first Review Conference of the 1980 Convention; see Doswald-Beck, ICRC Review (1996), 
No 312,272-299.
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with the adoption in 1993 of the Chemical Weapons Convention, the use of herbicides in armed 
conflict has been further circumscribed.19
Recent conflicts have highlighted the role of oil in armed conflict. However, oil fields, oil 
installations and oil tankers have always been a prime target for belligerents.20 During World War I, 
British and Romanian Forces destroyed oil fields in Rumania in order to deny them to the Axis 
Powers.21 The destruction of the German oil production capacity was a key factor in the outcome of 
World Warfl.22
The systematic destruction of Egyptian oil fields by Israel in the 1967 conflict prompted Arab 
nations to propose during the 1974-77 GDC, that attacks upon such installations be forbidden.23 This 
initiative failed and oil installations and oil tankers were again heavily targeted by belligerents in the 
1980/88 Iran-Iraq War. In spite of the intensity of the ‘Tanker War’24 there are no reports of 
significant pollution resulting from the attacks on tankers25 By contrast, repeated Iraqi attacks 
throughout 1983 on the Iranian Nowruz oil field led to major environmental damage in the Gulf 
region.26 Unlike the Vietnam War, however, it did not lead to new treaty provisions aimed at protecting 
the environment. Nonetheless, the Nowruz incident did inspire the first academic study on the subject 
of the operation of IEL during armed conflict27
Another conflict of major importance for the subject of environmental damage during warfare 
is the 1990/91 Gulf conflict. Two of its more enduring images were the seemingly apocalyptic effects 
generated by the burning of some 600 oil wells on Kuwaiti land,28 and the release of millions of barrels
19 Art. II (2) defines toxic chemicals as ‘Any chemical which through its chemical action on life processes can cause 
death, temporary incapacitation or permanent harm to humans or animals'', David, Principes de Droit Des Conflits 
Armes (1994), 285#; Krutzch, & Trapp, A Commentary on the Chemical Weapons Convention (1994), 543#; 
McCoubrey, in Fox & Meyer, Effecting Compliance (1993), 127.
20 Russo, in Dekker & Post, The Gulf War o f1980-1988 (1988), 187-193; Wallach, 41ICLQ (1992), 287-310.
21 Roberts, in Grunawalt, et al., op. cit., 225; Interestingly, some of these oil installations belonged to a subsidiary of an 
US company: Hyde, International Law (1947), 957.
22 Hinsley, British Intelligence in the Second World War (1994), chapter 36 on the Allied oil offensive.
23 Kalshoven, in Dekker & Post, op. cit., 106-7; Momtaz, 37 AFDI( 1991), 216; Sandoz, et al., Commentary on the 
Additional Protocols (1987), 668-9.
24 Infra, 3.1.1.
25 Walker, in Grunawalt. et al, op. cit., 185.
26 Infra, 3.1.2.
27 Bothe et al., Protection of the Environment in Times of Armed Conflict, SJ/110/85 (on file with author) [hereinafter 
‘EC Experts Report’]; Infra, 3.1.2.
28 According to the Kuwait Oil Co, out of a total of 914 operational wells in Kuwait, 798 well-heads had been 
detonated by the Iraqi forces, of which 603 were on fire, 45 were gushing oil but not on fire, and a further 150 were 
damaged; The capping took 8 months: UNCC, Well Blowout Control Claim (1996), 36 ILM (1997), 1289 at paras 36- 
7.
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of crude oil, which created one of the largest oil spills in history.29 As a result, massive damage was 
caused in the region to coastal marshlands, wildlife, coastal flora, fishing, offshore oil operations, and 
the tourist industry.30 The Saudi-Arabian coast was affected along a stretch of more than 400 
kilometres, and there were impacts on the Kuwaiti, Iraqi and Iranian coasts.31 The atmospheric 
pollution caused by the burning oil wells did not have the apocalyptic effects predicted at first, 
although it was noticeable far beyond the battlefield.32 Whether there are any long-lasting impacts on 
human health and the environment of the region as a consequence of these actions is still a matter of 
debate.33
\ / AThere is little doubt that Iraq orchestrated both aforementioned disasters34 for military j j
?!
purposes which are hitherto unconfirmed, but generally regarded as highly questionable.35 It transpired 
later that some 34 oil wells were accidentally set ablaze by Coalition attacks, while the oil spill was at 
least partly caused by intentional or unintentional Coalition actions.36
Echoing the charges made during the Vietnam War, the Iraqi actions were heavily criticised 
and called a ‘crime against the environment’.37 Some asserted that the conflict showed that a new 
treaty was needed for the protection of the environment.38 In the months following the 1990/91 Gulf 
conflict a number of international meetings were held at which the adequacy of the environmental
29 Estimates of the size of the spill vary between 30 to 16 million barrels, i.e., between 30 to 40 times larger than the 
heavily publicised 1989 Exxon Valdez Oil spill in Alaska; Price & Robinson, The 1991 Gulf War Coastal and Marine 
Environmental Consequences, 27 Marine Pollution Bulletin (special issue), (1993), viii; Gerges, ibid., 308; Tawfiq & 
Olsen, ibid., 335; Literathy, ibid., 356; Walker, op. cit., 186; IMO, Final Report o f the Persian Gulf Oil Pollution 
Disaster Fund, (1993), [hereinafter ‘EMO Report’], 1.
30 Roberts, in Grunawalt, et al., 248; Walker, ibid., 186; Arkin et al., On Impact (1991), 62-66; Feliciano, 14 Houston 
JIL (1992), 487.
31 See January and February 1991 issues of XIV Oil Spill Intelligence Report [hereinafter OSIR]; Price & Robinson, 
op. cit.; UNEP Governing Council, 17th session, Nairobi, 10-21 May 1992, UNEP/GC. 17/ Inf.9, 2 February 1993, 
item 7 on the UN Interagency Plan of Action adopted in March 1991 in Geneva and UNEP’s findings in regard to the 
causes of pollution.
32 Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, and the northern shores of the Black sea; Arkin, et al., 
op. cit., 67-70; Feliciano, 14 Houston JIL (1992), 493-4.
33 McCoubrey, in Pilot Study, 238; Momtaz, 37 AFDI( 1991), 211; Walker, op. cit., 187; Low & Hodgkinson, 35 VJIL 
(1995), 408-12.
34 Note though that in the 1996 Well Blowout Control Claim before the UNCC, Iraq denied (in vain) responsibility for 
the oil-well fires: 3 6 ILM (1997), 1289 at paras 42-45; infra, 2.4.2.C.
35 Plant, 7 IJECL (1992), 217-231; Zedalis, 24 VJTL (1991), 711-55 and 23 RBDI (1992), 323-49; Arkin, et al., op 
cit., 139-142; Roberts in Grunawalt, et al., op. cit., 261-2; McCoubrey, in Pilot Study, 238; Schmitt, 36 RDMDG 
(1997), 15-6; Lijnzaad & Tanja, 40 NILR (1993), 196.
36 UNEP Governing Council, 17th session, op. cit., 6; US (Secretary of the Army), Report on Iraqi War Crimes (Desert 
Shield/Desert Storm), 8 January 1992, circulated as UN Doc. S/25441, 19 March 1993, 13, 15-18, 46; Feliciano, 14 
Houston JIL (1992), 485, 490; Arkin, in Grunawalt, et al., op. cit., 116-121; see too UNCC, Well Blowout Control 
Claim (1996), 3 6 ILM (1997), 1289 at para 85.
37 Szasz, in 85 Asil Proceedings (1991), 219; Momtaz, 37 AFDI (1991), 204-5; Roberts, in Grunawalt, op. cit., 249; 
Heintshel v. Heinegg & Donner, 37 GYIL (1994), 291-2; For a thorough review of positions by States and international 
organisations see Spieker, op. cit., 424-59.
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aspects of mainly jus in bello were evaluated.39 The relationship between military activities, including 
armed conflict, and the environment was also briefly addressed at 1992 UNCED in Rio.40
In addition, the matter was placed on the agenda of the UN General Assembly, which adopted 
Resolution 47/37 (1992) on the subject41 At the request of the Assembly, the ICRC submitted two 
reports in which it reviewed the existing yws in bello provisions on the protection of the environment, 
as well as proposals for their reform, and suggested a series of outstanding problems for consideration 
by the UN Sixth (Legal) Committee. The ICRC also drafted a model set of instructions to the military, 
entitled Guidelines for Military Manuals and Instructions on the Protection o f the Environment in 
Time o f Armed Conflict42
2.2. Jus in Bello and Environmental Protection
In sharp contrast to the relative simplicity of jus ad bellum, jus in bello may appear as a 
daunting list of successive and ever more elaborate treaty instruments that reflect the many attempts by 
the international community to restrain the worst excesses of past armed conflicts.43 Many argue that 
the overriding majority of these provisions are peremptory (jus cogens) under international law.44 In 
its recent Advisory Opinion on the Legality o f Nuclear Weapons, the ICJ took note of this argument
38 Plant, Environmental Protection, 37; Witteler, op. cit., 480-501; Simonds, 29 SJIL (1992), 10-215; Lavieille, 4 
Revue Juridique de VEnvironnement (1992), 434-37.
39 Bouvier, ICRC Review (1992), No 285, 554-56; Tarasofsky, 24 NYIL (1993), 18, fn. 1; Gasser, 89 AJIL (1995), 637- 
641; Schmitt, 36 RDMDG (1997), 16-18; See too the summary of official views in Plant, Environmental Protection, 
13-37.
40 Infra, 3.3.1.
41 GA Res. 47/37 (Nov. 25,1992), adopted without a vote; Lijnzaad & Tanja, 40 NILR (1993), 190-2.
42 UN Docs. A/47/328, 31 July 1992 and A/48/269, 29 July 1993, entitled Protection of the Environment in Times of 
Armed Conflict, which includes a set of basic rules for the military; See too ICRC statement at UNGA, 19th Special 
Session, 23-27 June 1997, ‘Five Years after Rio’, (on file with author).
43 For an historical overview see: Greenwood, in Fleck, The Handbook o f Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflicts 
(1995), 12-23; For treaty texts see inter alia, Schindler & Toman, The Laws of Armed Conflict (1988); Roberts & 
Guelff, Documents on the Laws of War (1982); On the definition of International Humanitarian Law, including the 
traditional but now outdated distinction between Hague and Geneva Law: Greenwood, in Fleck, op. cit., 9-10; 
McCoubrey, in Meyer, Armed Conflict and the New Law: Aspects o f the 1977 Geneva Protocols and the 1981 
Weapons Convention (1989), 45-6; Doswald-Beck, ICRC Review (1997), No 317, 35# On the distinction between 
(International) humanitarian law and human rights law see Partsch, 4 EPIL (1982), 216-7; Hannikainen, et al., 
Implementing humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts (1992), 1-3; Hampson, in Meyer, op. cit., 55-80 and 1 
Int.L. & Armed Conflict Comm., Pt. 1, (1994), 32#; Mullerson, 2 JACL (1997), 109 at 113-125.
44 Hannikainen, op. cit., 291; David, Principes, 86 92; Levrat, in Kalshoven & Sandoz, Implementation of 
International Humanitarian Law (1989), 266; Condorelli & Boisson de Chazoumes, in Swinarski, Studies and Essays 
on International Humanitarian Law and Red Cross Principles in Honour of Jean Pictet (1984), 17-20; Kwakwa, The 
International Law of Armed Conflict (1992), 150.
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but found that there was no need for it to address this issue.45 Nonetheless, the Court observed that the 
great majority of these provisions had already become customary law, that they reflected the most 
universally recognized humanitarian principles, and that they constituted ‘intransgressible’ norms.46
It should be noted that the overriding majority of jus in bello treaty provisions deal either with 
armed conflict on land or with the effects of armed conflict on land. There are very few treaties in 
force concluded especially for armed conflict at sea, and almost none for aerial warfare 47 Thus, there 
is no naval equivalent for the 1907 Hague Convention (TV) and Regulations respecting the Laws and 
Customs of War on Land.48 There have been several unsuccessful attempts at codification, inter alia 
by the Institut, which published the 1913 Oxford Manual o f Naval War.49 The most recent attempt at 
restatement of relevant law was done under the auspices of the International Institute of Humanitarian 
Law, which prepared the 1994 San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts 
at Sea (‘ 1994 San Remo Manual’).50
Because the law of armed conflict differs according to the location of the conflict, the 
protective cover of certain rules may make little sense from an environmental perspective. On the other 
hand, precisely because environmental damage knows no borders, it will be seen below that non- 
terrestrial environments and natural resources may be protected through provisions in instruments 
dealing with armed conflict on land.
2.2.1. Underlying Principles of the Law of Armed Conflict
There seems to be a wide consensus internationally on the identity and content of a few 
cardinal customary principles of the law of armed conflict. The most basic foundation is the principle, 
expressed in Art. 22 of the Regulations attached to the 1907 Hague Convention (IV) on Land Warfare 
and elsewhere,51 that:
‘The right of belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited. ’
45 ICJ Rep. (1996), 257-8, paras 79, 82 & 83.
46 Ibid., para 79 in fine.
47 McCoubrey, 2 Int.L. & Armed Conflict Comm., Pt. 1, (1995), 23; Greenwood, in Fleck, op. cit., 11.
48 Van Hegelsom, in Heintschel v. Heinegg, Methods and Means of Combat in Naval Warfare (1992), 5-6.
49 Oxford, 9 August 1913, 26 Ann.IDI{1913), 641-672; Verri, in Ronzitti, The Law of Naval Warfare (1988), 329-41.
50 San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea, published in bookform (1995); 
Doswald-Beck, ICRC Review (1995), No. 309, 583-594.
51 Most recently in Additional Protocol I, Art. 35 (1).
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Although there are slight variations in expression and content, the current principles of the law 
of armed conflict are usually summarised as the principles of discrimination, proportionality, necessity 
and humanity.52 The principle of discrimination demands that weapons and tactics clearly distinguish 
between military and non-military targets. Proportionality requires that the degree of force used be 
proportional to the adversary’s actions or to the anticipated military value of the belligerent’s own 
actions. Necessity demands that the degree of force used be reasonably necessary to the attainment of 
the military objective and finally, humanity, that no weapon or tactic should be employed if it causes 
unnecessary suffering to its victims.
Although they may not carry the same weight in all types of warfare, current doctrine accepts 
that these principles are universal.53 In its 1996 Advisory Opinion on the Legality o f Nuclear Weapons, 
the ICJ confirmed that many of these were among the cardinal principles constituting the fabric of 
humanitarian law.54
Since they place limitations on the means and methods of warfare, the principles of 
discrimination, proportionality, necessity and humanity are relevant for the protection of the 
environment in armed conflict This is also the view of the ICRC, who suggested that they be included 
into military manuals as guidelines for environmental protection.55
However, these are general and abstract principles which leave much discretion to the military 
commander56 and were formulated with the protection of humans - i.e., combatants and/or civilians - in 
mind. As for the principle of discrimination, although contrary views are sometimes expressed,57 there 
is no State practice to support the view that the natural environment may never constitute a military 
objective. The UK declared in relation to Additional Protocol I of 1977 that:
a specific area o f land may be a military objective i f  because o f its location or other reasons
specified in the Article, its total or partial destruction... offers a definite military advantage...,58
52 Falk, in Plant, Environmental Protection, 84-5.
53 For naval warfare see: San Remo Manual, 15-16, Part HI, Section I, Basic Rules and Section n, Precautions in
Attack; Heintschel v. Heinegg, in Fleck, op. cit., 418; Shearer, in Grunawalt, et. al., op. cit., 547-8.
54 The ICJ considered the principle of distinction and of unnecessary suffering as cardinal principles of IHL, and in 
subsidiary order, the principle that States do not have unlimited freedom of choice of means in the weapons they use; 
the Court also cited the Martens Clause, and the principle of neutrality: ICJ Rep. (1996), 256-61, paras 77-89.
55 Guideline H (4); See too Gasser, 89 AJIL (1995), 637-8.
56 Falk, in Plant, Environmental Protection, 16.
57 Zemmali, La Protection de VEnvironnement en Periode de Conflit Arme dans les Normes Humanitaires et L ’Action 
du CICR, (undated paper by ICRC legal officer, on file with author), 5-8.
58 Declaration, (f), in relation to Art. 52, made upon signature, 12 December 1977, 1125 UNTS 432-433; Bothe, 34
GYIL (1991), 55, fii. 4; Schindler & Toman, op. cit., 717; Statement, (j) in relation to Art. 52, made upon ratification, 
Letter of 28 January 1998 sent to Swiss Government; Source: ICRC.
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Italy,59 the Netherlands60 and New Zealand61 all filed similar reservations. Similarly, there is 
evidence from the travawc preparatoires of Additional Protocol I that the practice of ‘interdiction fire’, 
namely targeting of an area where enemy troops are about to pass, even when enemy troops are not yet 
there, is considered legal.62 For instance, the US reserves the right to bombard certain geographic 
targets like mountain passes.63
The customary principle of proportionality was historically a norm developed to protect 
combatants, but since World War I, protection of the civilian population from excessive losses has 
gradually become the dominant concern.64 It is now generally accepted that the proportionality rule 
serves to protect the environment as well65 The decisive question, however, is what kind of damage 
can be considered excessive. Unfortunately, the customary rule of proportionality does not include any 
concrete guidelines to this effect. Many consider that the definition of disproportionate collateral 
damage to the environment is one of the more pressing contemporary questions.66
The customary law principle of humanity is undeniably a norm directed at humans, i.e., 
primarily combatants, although some scholars consider the civilian population included.67 The indirect 
environmental benefits can nevertheless be important, particularly when the application of the 
principle leads to the ban of certain inhumane weapons.
As for the principle of necessity, it has long been accepted that actions involving punitive or 
vindictive destruction not serving a useful military purpose, are impermissible. The prohibition of 
deliberate or wanton destruction of civilian property and inhabited areas is one of the oldest rules of 
warfare, and has been recorded in one form or another in many jus in bello instruments 68 A provision 
to this effect has been included in the 1907 Hague Regulations and the 1949 Geneva Conventions.
59 Declaration of 27 February 1986, upon ratification; Source: ICRC; Schindler & Toman, op. cit., 713.
60 Declaration, (6), of 26 June 1987 upon ratification; Source: ICRC; Schindler & Toman, op. cit., 714.
61 Declaration, (4), of 8 February 1988 upon ratification; Source: ICRC.
62 Bothe, et al., New Rules, 308.
63 Arkin et al., op. cit., 122, citing NWP 9, Supplement 8.2-8.3.
64 Gardam, %1 AJIL (1993), 394-403.
65 Bothe, 34 GYIL (1991), 55-6; Abijola, in Al-Nauimi & Meese, op. cit., 87-8.
66 Authors cited by Plant, Environmental Protection, 17.
67 Schmitt, 36 RDMDG (1997), 25-6.
68 E.g., Lieber Code, Art. 16; Hague Regulations, Art. 23 (g); The Nuremberg Charter, Art. 6 (b); For the grave breach 
provisions of the Geneva Conventions see immediately below.
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Art. 23 (g) of the 1907 Regulations forbids destruction or seizure of the enemy’s property 
unless ‘imperatively demanded by the necessities of war’. Evidently, the environmental merits are 
limited because of the terms ‘enemy’ and ‘property’.69
The Geneva Conventions of 1949 contain an identically worded provision according to which 
the ‘extensive’ destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity and carried 
out unlawfully and wantonly qualify as a grave breach.70 Although the norm forms part of the 
enforcement measures, its significance cannot be underestimated. The grave breach provision has a 
wide scope, for it is not is not limited to a specific category of property, nor to any particular period in 
the course of armed conflict. However, the destruction involved needs to be extensive for it to be 
qualified as a grave breach, and malicious intent needs to be proved.71
The prohibition of wanton devastation has received such wide acceptance, that some regard it 
as peremptory, at least insofar as international armed conflicts are concerned.72 However, the historical 
context of the norm indicates that is intended to cover those parts of the human environment that can 
be considered real and tangible property, such as villages, towns, districts, and agricultural areas. Parts 
of the environment which may be affected by armed conflict but which do not ‘belong’ to any of the 
parties involved, would not be covered by the norm. This excludes migratory species to which a State 
does not retain exclusive property rights, as well as natural resources in international areas.73
Nevertheless, since the 1990/91 Gulf War the prohibition of wanton devastation has often 
been invoked in a broader context, in relation to the environment in general.74 This is the position 
taken by the UN General Assembly in Res. 47/7375 and by the ICRC guidelines.76 In its 1996 Advisory 
Opinion on Nuclear Weapons the ICJ may have confirmed this position. Citing the above mentioned 
resolution the Court affirmed that:
‘.. .destruction of the environment, not justified by military necessity and carried out wantonly, is clearly
contrary to existing international law.’77
69 Low & Hodgkinson, 35 VJIL (1995), 437-441; Lijnzaad & Tanja, 40 NILR (1993), 176.
70 Art. 50 of the GC I, Art. 51 of GC H and Art. 147 of GCIV.
71 Infra, 2.2.6.
72 Hannikainen, op. cit., 713.
73 Low & Hodginkson, 35 VJIL (1995), 437-441.
74 E.g., Ottawa Conference, conclusion 5; Heintshel v. Heinegg & Donner, 37 GYIL (1994), 292.
75 GA Res. 47/73 (November 25,1992), Preamble.
76 Guidelines HI (8) and (9).
77 ICJ Rep. (1996), 242, para 32.
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It is unclear, however, what threshold of environmental damage this wider norm may involve. 
The ELC has proposed that the use of means and methods of warfare with the intent to cause 
environmental damage, when not justified by military necessity, be classified as a crime against peace 
and security of mankind.78 However, the suggested threshold has been set at a very high level. The war 
crime needs to have been committed ‘in a systematic manner or on a large scale’. In addition, the level 
of environmental damage was taken from Additional Protocol I of 1977 and should therefore be 
regarded as extremely high.79 Furthermore, the suggested provision has been cast in openly 
anthropocentric terms.
By setting close to 600 oil wells alight and by deliberately causing a catastrophic oil spill in 
the 1990/91 Gulf conflict, Iraq is widely regarded as having violated at least the customary prohibition 
on wanton devastation. As mentioned before, to this day the reasons for these actions remain unclear; 
they may have served military purposes, but they were largely unsuccessful. However, State practice 
and courts have in the past required a very high standard of proof for the war crime of devastation 
beyond military necessity.80 After World War 13, several German generals were charged with the war 
crime of wanton devastation of villages and cities. In the face of advancing Soviet troops, they had 
issued orders for scorched earth policies in Northern Norway and the USSR. General Jodi was found 
guilty of such practices by the main Nuremberg Tribunal.81 However, in the trial of US v. Von Leeb 
seven commanders were cleared by the US Military Tribunal. It held that ‘a great deal of latitude must 
be accorded’ to military commanders and that ‘devastation beyond military necessity’ in these 
situations requires ‘detailed proof of an operational and tactical nature’.82
In the case of US v. List (Hostages case) German general Rendulic was charged with wanton 
devastation in the Norwegian Province of Finnmark. Although he admitted his actions, he argued that 
they were taken in the belief that Russian forces were in hot pursuit of his retreating units. The court 
acquitted the defendant on the grounds that the defendant may have erred in believing that there was 
military necessity for this destruction and devastation, but that he was guilty of no criminal act.83 This
78 Art. 20 (g), Final Draft of the Code, ILC Report (1996), UN Doc. A/51/10, vol. II, pt 2, chapter n, A (Introduction), 
paragraphs 41 to 44; B (Articles with commentary), para 15.
79 Infra, 2.2.5.B, 2.2.6.
80 See World War I State practice discussed by Zedalis, 24 VJTL (1991), 735-37.
81 The Trial o f German Major War Criminals, Nuremberg Military Tribunal, (1950), Part 22, 517; Roberts in 
Grunawalt, et. al., op. cit., 236.
82 11 Trials o f War Criminals Before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 18 795 
(1950), 2; Zedalis, 24 VJTL (1991), 736; Roberts, in Grunawalt, et. al., op. cit., 236-7; Feliciano, 14 Houston JIL 
(1992), 514-6.
83 11 Trials o f War Criminals Before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 18 795 
(1950), 1295-97: Zedalis, 24 VJTL (1991), 736; Roberts, in Grunawalt, et. al., op. cit., 236-7.
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judgement was extremely controversial in Norway, for there was evidence that the general had enough 
information to decide against the need for a scorched earth policy.84 Nevertheless, what became known 
as the ‘Rendulic’ rule has since been adopted as an important guideline on ‘hindsight’ by some 
military forces. It has been invoked in defence of two controversial air-raids made by the US Air Force 
during the 1991 Desert Storm to excuse possible reliance on information which with hindsight, proved 
insufficient.85
In conclusion, the environmental benefits of the application of the underlying principles of jus 
in bello is not unqualified. Nevertheless, as Professor Roberts points out, taken together, the 
underlying principles of the law of armed conflict strongly point to the conclusion that actions 
resulting in massive environmental destruction, especially where they do not serve a clear and 
important military purpose, would be questionable on many grounds.86
In addition, the principles may provide a safety net in conflicts such as the 1990/91 Gulf War, 
where few of the participants were party to jus in bello treaties containing norms specifically directed 
at the environment.87
2.2 .2 . The Martens Clause
The Martens clause finds its origins in a paragraph inserted in the preamble to Hague 
Conventions (TV) of 1899 and 1907. It has since been inserted in one form or another as a separate 
article in many jus in bello conventions after World War n.88 It states that if a particular rule is not 
expressly found in treaty law, belligerents (and recently also civilians) remain under the protection of 
customary law, the principles of humanity and the dictates of public conscience.
It is generally accepted that the clause serves as a powerful reminder of the role of customary 
international law, and that it warns that even if an issue is not addressed by a specific treaty provision,
84 Best, War and Law, 328-30.
85 DeSaussure, 37 Air Force LR (1994), 41 at 64-5 on the attacks on the ‘Baby milk factory’ and the Amariya complex.
86 Roberts, in Grunawalt, et. al., op. cit., 228.
87 Roberts, ibid., 237-241.
88 1949 GC (I), Art. 63; 1949 GC (II), Art. 62; 1949 GC (HI), Art. 142; 1949 GC (IV), Art. 158; 1977 API, Art. 1(2), 
1977 AP2, preamble; 1980 Inhumane Weapons Convention, preamble; Pustogarov, ICRC Review (1996), No 312, 
300-314; Tycehurst, ICRC Review, (1997), No 317,125#
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it may still be regulated by international law.89 However, there is disagreement on the significance of 
the terms ‘principles of humanity and dictates of public conscience’. It is debated whether this formula 
refers to separate sources of (legal) rules governing belligerent conduct, or whether it only offers moral 
guidelines.90
The possible interpretations of the Martens clause were extensively dealt with in submissions 
of States in connection with the WHO and UN General Assembly requests for an advisory opinion on 
the legality of nuclear weapons. Among the proponents of their legality, the Russian Federation argued 
that the clause was redundant,91 whilst the UK held the view that the clause was a mere reminder of 
the existence of customary law92 States opposing these views argued that, even if not expressly 
prohibited by a treaty norm, nuclear weapons were forbidden because their use violates the principles 
of humanity and public conscience.93
In its 1996 Advisory Opinion on the General Assembly request, the ICJ refuted the Russian 
position, and affirmed the importance of the Martens Clause explicitly by holding that its ‘continuing 
existence and applicability cannot be doubted’, and that it reflected customary law predating 
Additional Protocol I. However, the Court would not be drawn any further on the meaning of this 
clause other than observing that it has proved to be an effective means of addressing the rapid 
evolution of military technology, and that the fact that certain weapons were not specifically dealt with 
by the 1974-77 GDC does not permit any legal conclusions relating to substantive issues raised by the 
use of such weapons.94
Although the Martens clause is undoubtedly anthropocentric, it has been argued that:
‘The customary laws o f war, in reflecting the dictates o f public conscience, now include a requirement to 
avoid unnecessary damage to the environment \95
Insofar as the underlying principles of the law of armed conflict already amount to a 
prohibition of unjustifiable damage to the environment, this interpretation of the Martens clause adds
89 Sandoz, et al., op. cit., 38-9; San Remo Manual, General Provision 2, Commentary, 74.
90 Doswald-Beck, ICRC Review (1997), No 317, 35#; Tycehurst, ibid., 125#
91 Written Statement, UNGA Request, (June 1995), 11-14.
92 Written Statement, WHO Request, (September 1994), 84.
93 Written Statements by Solomon Islands, WHO Request, (June 1995), 61-2, 4.77-.80; Nauru, WHO Request (June 
1995), first part, 6-7, second part, 32-34.
94 ICJ Rep. (1996), 259-60, paras 84, 87; In their dissenting opinions, Judges Shahabuddeen (ibid., 405-11) and 
Koroma (ibid., 564#) argued extensively that the Martens Clause has separate normative status leading to a ban on the 
use of Nuclear Weapons.
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little new to its protection.96 The statement may nevertheless serve to emphasise that since 
environmental degradation is now undeniably of major public concern, it would be unacceptable for 
the military to neglect these values during armed conflict.97
2.2 .3 . Treaty Provisions Until 1977
Until the mid-1970s the conventional jus in bello did not mention the environment by name 
although it contained a series of norms with environmental implications. One can distinguish five 
types of such norms: (1) provisions aimed at civilians, since these imply protection of the environment 
on which the civilians depend; (2) provisions prohibiting unnecessary destruction of civilian property; 
(3) prohibitions of attacks on certain objectives and areas; (4) prohibitions and restrictions on the use 
of certain weapons and (5) prohibitions and restrictions on certain methods of war.98 The analysis 
below will be restricted to norms which are most relevant for the rest of this study.
A. Treatment of Private. Semi-public and Public Property
Apart from rules on wanton devastation of property, which were discussed above, both the 
1907 Hague Regulations and the 1949 Geneva Conventions contain rules for the treatment of private, 
semi-public and public property during belligerent occupation.
The 1907 Hague Regulations on Land Warfare reflect customary law, and constitute the 
principal source for the status of property during belligerent occupation.99 The four Geneva 
Conventions are in many respects the most important source of international humanitarian law. They
95 Ottawa Conference of Experts, cited by Lijnzaad & Tanja, 40 NILR (1993), 184; Plant, Environmental Protection, 
17.
96 Lijnzaad & Tanja, 40 NILR (1993), 184-5.
97 See too, ICJ Rep. (1996), 241-2, paras 28, 30; Kritsiotis, 1JACL (1996), 111
98 Following Roberts, in Grunawalt, et. al., op. cit., 229.
99 Recognised by the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, judgement 30 Sept.-l October 1946, Off Doc., vol. 
1,267; Schindler, in Ronzitti, op. cit., 215,211; confirmed by the ICJ, Advisory Opinion, Legality of the Threat or Use 
of Nuclear Weapons, ICJ Rep, (1996), 258, para 81.
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have achieved virtually universal participation of all States, consistently attracting more adherents than 
the UN Charter.100
According to Arts. 46 and 56 of the 1907 Hague Rules, private and municipal property as well 
as holdings of religious, cultural, educational and scientific institutions are immune from interference 
by the occupier. The latter is furthermore obligated by Art. 43 - unless absolutely prevented - to respect 
the national laws in force in the occupied territory. On the basis of Art. 46, an occupier would not be 
allowed to take possession of privately owned natural resources, such as forests. A case can also be 
made that officially established nature reserves, regardless of ownership structure, are given immunity 
by Arts. 43 and 56. This may apply to habitats listed e.g., under the 1971 Ramsar Convention on 
Wetlands of International Importance and to sites designated under the 1972 UNESCO Convention for 
the Protection of World Cultural and Natural Heritage.101
Pursuant to Art. 55, the occupying State may take possession of government real estate 
holdings, but is obligated to respect the rules of usufruct when administering these. Art. 55 reads:
‘The occupying State shall be regarded only as administrator and usufructuary of public buildings, real 
estate, forests, and agricultural estates belonging to the hostile State, and situated in the occupied country. 
It must safeguard the capital of these properties, and administer them in accordance with the rules of 
usufruct’
By its very language, Art. 55 seems capable of being read as protecting large portions of the 
human environment, including in particular, agricultural lands and forests.102 The old Hague rule can 
be seen as an early expression of the duty to use natural resources in sustainable ways. An application 
of this principle is the Polish Forests case in which a number of former German civilian administrators 
were convicted of war crimes committed during the occupation of Poland. They were found to have 
caused:
. .the wholesale cutting of Polish Timber to an extent far in excess of what was necessary to preserve 
the timber resources of the country.’103
100 Status as at 22 January 1998: Number of Parties to the 1949 GCs: 188; Number UN Members: 185. (Source: 
ICRC); Opinion is divided on their customary law status: see e.g., David, Principes, 176; Meron, 81 AJIL (1987), 348- 
370; Pellet, 96 RGDIP (1992), 34-5; Doswald-Beck, ICRC Review (1997), No 317, 35-6; see too ICJ, Advisory 
Opinion, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, ICJ Rep (1996), 258, para 81, in which the Court cites an 
opinion according to which the GCs reflect customary law.
101 Supra, 1.2. l.C.
102 Greenspan, The Modem Law of Land Warfare (1958), 288.
103 United Nations War Crimes Commission decision discussed by Plant, Environmental Protection, 21; Roberts, in 
Grunawalt, et. al., op. cit. 236.
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The status of certain property during belligerent occupation is regulated also by Art. 53 of the 
fourth Geneva (civilians) Convention, which stipulates that:
‘Any destruction by the Occupying Power of real or personal property belonging individually or 
collectively to private persons, or to the State, or to other public authorities, or to social or to cooperative 
organizations, is prohibited, except where such destruction is rendered absolutely necessary by military 
operations.’
The travaux preparatoires show that the principal goal of this provision was to protect all 
private or public property of immediate ‘domestic’ value to citizens, but not public property with a 
general military value such as airfields and bridges. The difficulty lies in identifying what kinds of 
state-owned property mainly serve the needs of the individuals. In the opinion of one commentator, the 
Kuwaiti Oil Fields which were destroyed by Iraq in the closing stages of the 1990/91 Gulf Conflict do 
not qualify as a such.104 Furthermore, it has been argued that the provision was only intended to apply 
during uncontested military occupation.105
Unlike Arts. 46 and 56 of the Hague Regulations, Art. 53 of Geneva Convention (IV) allows 
destruction when ‘rendered absolutely necessary by military operations’. Since forests and nature 
reserves arguably rarely serve immediate domestic civilian needs, A rt 53 does not diminish the 
protection wfiich private ecological property and nature reserves derive from the Hague Regulations.
There are several limitations inherent in the above provisions that may adversely affect their 
relevance for environmental protection. By requiring that natural resources ‘belong’ to the occupied 
State, parts of the natural environment which cannot be considered property of a particular State are 
excluded.106
It is important to note also that the above provisions do not apply during combat. Since 1907 
the status of cultural property during hostilities has been addressed in several instruments, none of 
which extend firm protection to natural sites. Thus, the 1954 Hague Convention on Cultural Property 
and its protocol protect a broad range of objects from destruction, damage and pillage, but its 
provisions and subsequent State practice indicate that it applies only to built environs containing large
104 Zedalis, 24 VJTL (1991), 718-23.
105 Zedalis, ibid., 724-33.
106 Low & Hodgkinson, 35 VJIL (1995), 437-441.
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amounts of cultural property. During a recent review of the convention a suggestion to include natural 
sites was rejected as impractical and counterproductive.107
During the 1974-77 GDC it was confirmed that States do not want to commit themselves to 
any protection for natural sites in armed conflict. Art. 53 of 1977 Additional Protocol I prohibits acts 
of hostility against historic monuments, works of art or places of worship which constitute the cultural 
or spiritual heritage of peoples. Although this formulation is not exclusively concerned with the man- 
made or built environment, and may conceivably include natural sites, the travaux preparatoires of the 
provision make it clear that a proposal to protect any and all places of worship was rejected for reasons 
of practicality, and that there has to be more than local fame about protected places.108
In addition, at least two proposals were tabled to protect specially designated nature 
reserves.109 One of these proposals read as follows:
‘Nature reserves with adequate markings and boundaries declared as such to the adversary shall be
protected and respected except when such reserves are used specifically for military purposes’110
None of these proposals were retained, and consequently, there is as yet, no jus in bello 
instrument that protects nature reserves during combat111
The absence of any such restriction makes it unsurprising that military hostilities took place in 
the Kuwaiti National Forest during the 1991 Desert Storm campaign,112 and that the Sava Wetlands in 
Croatia, which had been included in UNESCO’s Biosphere programme, were disturbed during the 
recent conflict in Yugoslavia.113
107 Boylan, Review o f the Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event o f Armed Conflict (1993), 
UNESCO, CLT-93/WS/12; Cldment, in Al-Nauimi & Meese, op. cit., 143.
108 Sandoz et al., op. cit., 647.
109 Witteler, op. cit., 321-322.
110 Art. 48 ter, CDDH/m/GT/35, p. 5,
111 On more recent proposals to create demilitarised nature reserves: David, Principes, 257.
112 Schwarzkopf, It Doesn't Take A Hero (1993), 529.
113 Schneider-Jacoby, in Proceedings of ‘ Effects of War on the Environment', 43 Kemija u Industriji (1994), 151-59.
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B. Provisions for Naval Warfare
The Hague Regulations apply only to land warfare, and there is no equivalent instrument for 
armed conflict at sea. Consequently, while the more traditional type of terrestrial nature reserve may 
be immune under the regulations, the same cannot be said to apply to more novel types: those with a 
land-ward and a sea-ward component, or those entirely located at sea.114 Arguably, it would appear 
illogical to extend immunity to terrestrial components of nature reserves, but not to coastal or marine 
components. However, insofar as reliance has to be placed on the ‘pre-ecological’ 1907 Hague 
Regulations, firm legal ground is lacking. This is a fortiori the case for marine sanctuaries.
There is, a fortiori, no legal immunity for marine sanctuaries during armed conflict. During 
the discussions in preparation for the 1994 San Remo Manual it became clear that no consensus could 
be reached on the creation of a legal obligation in this respect. Nevertheless, the manual encourages 
belligerent States to conclude special agreements not to conduct hostile actions in marine areas 
containing:
‘(a) rare or fragile ecosystems; or
(b) the habitat of depleted, threatened or endangered species or other forms of marine life.’ 115
and to make use of lists such as those maintained inter alia, under the World Heritage 
Convention.116
Finally, it is undeniable that mines laid at sea have the potential to affect the freedom of 
navigation of many States, whether belligerent or neutral, and that unrecovered and unexploded mines 
may lead to serious pollution incidents after the end of naval conflicts.117 Apart from the 1971 Seabed 
Arms Control Treaty,118 and Protocol II of the 1980 ‘Inhumane’ Weapons Convention,119 the only 
international legislation governing the problem of mine warfare at sea is contained in Hague 
Convention (VHI) Relative to the Laying of Automatic Contact Mines.120 The material scope of the
114 For examples of coastal, marine and estuarine protected areas see Boelaert-Suominen & Cullinan, op. cit., 93-96.
115 San Remo Manual, Rule 11.
116 Ibid., 82-3.
117 Plant, in Fox & Meyer, Effecting Compliance (1993), 161.
118 This treaty provides for a partial demilitarisation of the seabed, limited to weapons of mass destruction: Ronzitti, op. 
cit., 595, and Commentary by Migliorino, who writes that the treaty applies in peace and in war, ibid, 620-1; confirmed 
by Heintschel v. Heinegg, in Fleck, op. cit., 445.
119 Art. 1 of which refers inter alia to ‘mines laid to interdict beaches’; But this Convention applies only to land 
warfare: Heintschel v. Heinegg, ibid., 445-6.
120 Levie in Ronzitti, op. cit, 140.
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latter is limited to automatic submarine contact mines and torpedoes. It contains neither a general 
prohibition nor a specific geographical limitation of the use of such devices, and is regarded as one of 
the least successful texts to emerge from the 1907 Peace Conference.121 Because of the unrestricted 
mine warfare of the two World Wars and the technical development of naval mines, its continued legal 
relevance became a matter of dispute.122 Still, it is said to reflect customary law for the use of
• • 123automatic contact mines.
The 1994 San Remo Manual suggests a series of much needed improvements to the legal 
regime of all types of mine warfare at sea, drawing inter alia, on principles of the 1980 ‘Inhumane’ 
Weapons Convention for mine warfare on land.124 The suggested rules include, for example, the 
interdiction to use free-floating mines, unless (a) they are directed against a military objective and
(b)they become harmless within an hour after loss of control over them;125 the obligation for 
belligerents to record the location where they have laid mines;126 and after the cessation of hostilities, 
to do their utmost to remove or render harmless the mines they have laid.127
2.2.4. The 1977 ENMOD Convention
The ENMOD Convention (hereinafter ‘ENMOD’) was concluded against the backdrop of the 
Vietnam war, which involved massive use of herbicides as well as allegations of attempted weather 
modification for military purposes.128 In 1972 the US formally renounced the use of climate 
modification techniques as a matter of policy,129 and agreed to negotiate a treaty to this effect with the 
USSR130 The treaty was eventually concluded under the auspices of the Conference of the Committee 
of Disarmament, and adopted by General Assembly Resolution GA Res. 31/72.131
21 Levie, ibid., 140.
22 Ibid., 140; Heintschel v. Heinegg, in Fleck, op. cit., 444.
23 Heintschel v. Heinegg, in Fleck, op. cit., 444; San Remo Manual, 169.
24 San Remo Manual, Rules 80-92, Commentary, 169-76.
25 Rule 81, Commentary, 171.
26 Rule 84, Commentary, 172.
27 Rule 90, Commentary, 174.
28 Supra, 2.1.
29 Schmitt, 36 RDMDG (1997), 36.
30 Witteler, op. cit., 194-199; Lijnzaad & Tanja, 40 NILR (1993), 186.
31 UN Doc. A/31/39,10 December 1976; Witteler, op. cit., 199-203.
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Art. I of the ENMOD reads:
‘Each State Party to this Convention undertakes not to engage in military or any other hostile use of 
environmental modification techniques having widespread, long-lasting or severe effects as the means of 
destruction, damage or injury to any other State Party.’
Art. II provides the following clarification:
‘The term ‘environmental modification techniques’ refers to any technique for changing - through the 
deliberate manipulation of natural processes - the dynamics, composition or structure of the Earth, 
including its biota, lithosphere, hydrosphere and atmosphere, or of outer space.’
The Disarmament Conference transmitted a series of common understandings of various 
articles to the General Assembly.132 These were not formally annexed to the convention, and although 
they probably reflect the drafters’ intentions, their legal status is ambiguous.133
The understanding to Art. I includes a non-exhaustive list of examples such as:
‘. . .earthquakes, tsunamis, an upset in the ecological balance of a region, changes in weather patterns, 
changes in climate patterns, changes in ocean currents, changes in the state of the ozone layer, and 
changes in the state of the atmosphere.’134
There is, as yet, no proof that the US did engage in weather modification in Vietnam.135 
Furthermore, whether the types of geophysical warfare the ENMOD drafters had in mind are realistic 
is a matter of debate.136 On the other hand, weather modification is currently being used for peaceful 
purposes,137 and the convention encourages development and testing of these techniques for peaceful
138purposes.
Furthermore, ENMOD may now be applicable to a broader range of situations than originally 
intended. After the 1990/91 Gulf War it became controversial whether the setting alight of Kuwaiti oil 
wells and the engineering of the Gulf War oil spill came within the ambit of the convention. Some
132 UN Doc. CCD/520,3 September 1976, Annex A.
133 Tarasofsky, 24 NYIL (1993), 46; Witteler, op. cit., 230-4; but see Roberts, Grunawalt, et. al., op. cit., 232.
134 Sandoz, et.al., op. cit, 415.
135 McCoubrey, in Pilot Study, 241; Witteler, op. cit., 80-81.
136 Verwey, in Grunawalt, et. al., op. cit., 565; Heintschel v. Heinegg & Donner, 37 GYIL (1994), 283; Witteler: op. 
cit., 94-127,148-9.
137 Especially weather manipulation: Witteler, op. cit., 112-4; Abijola, op. cit., 81; see too ‘The Rainmaker’, broadcast 
5th March 1998, by BBC Horizon.
138 Art. ffl.
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claimed that these deliberate acts, although they were ‘low-tech’, induced proscribed environmental 
modification of natural processes.139 Others objected that ENMOD was intended to ban only advanced 
technological techniques aimed at changing the ‘dynamics, composition and structure of the Earth’. 
During the Second Review Conference of ENMOD, held in September 1992, State parties failed to 
solve this controversy. They agreed only to study the possibility of clarifying the scope of ENMOD 
with the aim of prohibiting also low-tech environmental modification.
Surprisingly however,140 the final conference declaration, adopted by consensus, declares that 
the ‘military or any other hostile use of herbicides’ is an environmental modification technique within 
the ambit of the convention.141 This can only be explained by the fact that the US government had 
already earlier acknowledged that the use of herbicides was covered by ENMOD.142 In addition, by 
1992, a general consensus was emerging within the UN Disarmament Conference that the use of 
herbicides in armed conflict should be banned by the Chemical Weapons Convention.143
These recent developments notwithstanding, ENMOD is generally considered of limited 
value for the protection of the environment in armed conflict.144 It is a disarmament treaty that does not 
outlaw environmental damage as such, but prohibits certain uses of the forces of nature as weapons in 
armed conflict. Furthermore, it is debated whether ENMOD requires the actual causing of such 
damage.145
In addition, the threshold of prohibited damage in ENMOD is high, although not as high as 
for the provisions of Additional Protocol I which will be discussed further below. Art. 1 of ENMOD 
uses the terms ‘widespread, long-lasting or severe effects’, and it is important to note that because of 
the disjunctive ‘or’, these are meant to be alternatives. A technique meeting any of the threshold 
criteria will be prohibited. The common understanding of this article gives the following 
interpretation:
(a) widespread: encompassing an area of several hundred square kilometres;
139 Goldblat, 22 Bulletin of Peace Proposals (1991), 401-2; Szasz, in 85 Asil Proceedings (1991), 216; Witteler, op. 
cit., 239.
140 If the opening of valves and the setting of alight of oil wells is too low-tech, use of herbicides should be too:
Tarasofsky, 24 NYIL (1993), 45, fa. 130; Low & Hodgkinson, 35 VJIL (1995), 432-3.
141 Third para of Article II, Final Declaration, Second Review Conference of the ENMOD Parties, 17 Disarmament 
Yearbook 1992,2A2ff.
142 During the ENMOD Ratification Hearings before the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations: Goldblat, 13 
Bulletin o f Peace Proposals (1982), 129.
143 17 Disarmament Yearbook 1992, 222>ff.
144 See literature cited by Heintschel v. Heinegg & Donner, 37 GYIL (1994), 283.
145 Witteler, op. cit., 287; Schmitt, 36 RDMDG (1997), 36; Verwey, in Grunawalt, et. al., op. cit., 564; Heintschel v.
Heinegg & Donner, 37 GYIL (1994), 285.
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(b) long-lasting: lasting for a period of months, or approximately a season;
(c) severe: involving serious or significant disruption or harm to human life, natural and 
economic resources or other assets;146
The term ‘widespread’ is meant as an absolute standard, which may exceed the surface area of 
some States.147 Suggestions that a relative standard, taking into account States’ surface areas would be 
fairer for small nations were rejected during the negotiations.148
Many consider it likely that the environmental damage caused by the 1991 oil well fires and 
the oil slick - assuming that they were environmental modification techniques - crossed at least one of 
the ENMOD thresholds.149 However, neither Iraq nor several coalition States were a party to the 
convention at the relevant time.150 ENMOD broke undoubtedly new ground in 1977, and by 1992 it 
counted only 55 parties. It is unlikely to reflect customaiy law.151
Furthermore, the wording of Art. I is so strained that some doubt whether ENMOD was 
intended to cover the concept of environmental damage at all.152 Importantly, environmental damage 
as such is not outlawed, only the use of certain techniques which may cause destruction, damage or 
injury to State parties. This formulation excludes application of ENMOD not only to non-parties, but 
also to the environment lying beyond the national jurisdiction of State parties. This means that 
ordinarily, environmental damage caused by environmental modification techniques on the high seas 
will not be covered, unless damage of the forbidden threshold is caused to the land or sea areas 
covered by a State party’s sovereignty.153
A final observation is that the convention’s remedial measures have never been used and that 
its enforcement mechanisms are regarded as unsatisfactory.154
146 UN Doc. CCD/530,3 September 1976, Annex A.
147 E.g., Nauru 20 km2; Bermuda 53 km2, San Marino 62 km2, Maldives 298 km2.
148 Witteler, op. cit., 254-5.
149 Goldblat, 22 Bulletin of Peace Proposals (1991), 401-2; Plant, in Fox & Meyer, op. cit., 168; Lijnzaad & Tanja, 40 
NILR (1993), 195-6; Low & Hodginkson, 35 VJIL (1995), 434.
150 Although Iraq was a signatory; Roberts, in Grunawalt, et al., op. cit., 240-241.
131 Feliciano, 14 Houston JIL (1992), 501; Lijnzaad & Tanja regard it as a typical superpower disarmament treaty 
which does not bind developing countries: 40 NILR (1993), 189.
132 Verwey, in Grunawalt, et. al., op. cit., 564.
133 Heintschel v. Heinegg & Donner, 27 GYIL (1994), 294-5.
134 An action must be brought by the complaining State (Art. V(3)); the Convention’s Consultative Committee of 
Experts (Art. V(2), and Annex) is considered powerless; Art. V leaves enforcement to the Security Council which is 
partly composed of non-parties; Simonds, 29 SJIL (1992), 187; Sanchez Rodriguez, in Ronzitti, op. cit., 666-68.
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2.2 .5 . Additional Protocol I
Protocol I Additional to the four Geneva Conventions was concluded shortly after ENMOD. 
It regulates primarily international armed conflict on land, but includes the effects of other types of 
armed conflict on land under certain conditions.155 By 22 January 1998 Additional Protocol I had 149 
State parties.156 Nevertheless, this protocol remains controversial. The US, for example, has major 
objections to the status which it gives to liberation movements, and disagrees with other provisions 
which she sees as unduly restricting military operations. These include the provisions on the natural
• 157environment.
Additional Protocol I contains several articles dealing with protection of the environment. Of 
these, two deal explicitly with protection of the natural environment, the others with separate 
components of the human environment: agricultural areas, cultural and religious property and 
industrial installations. Following the 1990/91 Gulf conflict, literature on the legal significance of these 
provisions has abounded.158
A. Articles 53. 54 and 56
Art. 53 of Additional Protocol I, which was already mentioned above, deals with the 
protection in armed conflict of historic monuments, works of art or places of worship which constitute 
the cultural or spiritual heritage of peoples. The travaux preparatoires show that the term ‘peoples’ 
was used intentionally to convey a broad purpose. It is noteworthy that Art. 53 prohibits attacks against 
certain monuments even if the health and survival of the population are not affected.159
Art. 54 of Additional Protocol I forbids warfare by starvation and deals with the protection of 
objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population such as ‘foodstuffs, agricultural areas 
for the production of foodstuffs, crops, livestock, drinking water installations and supplies and 
irrigation works’. However, the article permits important exceptions. The first one (paragraph 3) 
relates to objects which are either used solely by the military or in direct support of military action.
155 Infra, 2.2.5. B.
156 Source: ICRC.
157 Matheson, 2 Am. U.J. Inti L & Policy (1987), 419-431; Sofaer, ibid.,462-471; Roberts, in Grunawalt, et. al., op. cit., 
237-239.
158 E.g., Plant, Environmental Protection", Spieker, op. cit.; Witteler, op. cit.
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The second exception (paragraph 5) allows Parties to engage in scorched earth policies on their own 
territory under the following conditions:
‘In recognition of the vital requirements of any Party to the conflict in the defence of its national territory 
against invasion, derogation from the prohibitions contained in paragraph 2 may be made by a Party to 
the conflict within such territory under its own control where required by imperative military necessity.’
This is an important exception. It was argued above that States are under no firm international 
legal obligation to protect the environment within their own borders.160 Even if some might disagree 
with the general principle, Art 54(5) proves that at least in international armed conflict, States may 
resort to extensive destruction of their own territories under certain conditions.161
Another provision with environmental implications is Art. 56 which forbids attacks on ‘works 
or installations containing dangerous forces namely dams, dykes and nuclear electrical generating 
stations’, even if in principle, they constitute military targets. Paragraph 2 of the article defines the 
conditions under which this special immunity might cease: in general, the protection may cease only 
when the works or installations are used in regular, significant and direct support of military 
operations, and if the attack is the only feasible way to terminate such support.
It is important to observe that the enumeration of dangerous installations in this provision is 
meant to be exhaustive. In particular, as mentioned before, a proposal that oil installations be given 
special immunity as well, failed.162 States are nevertheless encouraged to conclude further agreements 
providing additional protection for objects containing dangerous forces.163
Finally, the provision is unlikely to reflect customary international law.164 This is confirmed 
by the 1997 International Watercourse Convention. Although Art. 29 states that watercourse 
installations remain under the protection of the laws of armed conflict, it omits to mention Art. 56 by 
name.165 During the adoption of the treaty by the General Assembly it was stressed that:
‘Just as article 29 does not alter or amend existing law, it does not purport to extend the applicability o f 
any instrument to States not parties to that instrument’} 66
159 Heintschel v. Heinegg & Donner, 37 GYIL (1994), 284-5.
160 Supra, 1.3.3.
161 In addition, Art. 54 as a whole broke new ground in 1977; Sandoz, et al., op. cit., 652.
162 Supra, 2.1.
163 Art. 56 (4).
164 Roberts, in Grunawalt, et. al., op. cit., 235; Greenwood in Delissen & Tanja, op. cit., 102-3,105,108 & 110, and in 
Rowe, op. cit., 63-88; see too extensive reservation made by the UK upon ratification: Letter of 28 January 1998 sent 
to Swiss Government; Source: ICRC.
165 Final treaty text, adopted on 21 May 1997 by the GA; UN Doc. A/51/869, 11 April 1997, Report of the 6th 
Committee.
166 UN Doc. A/51/869,11 April 1997, Agenda item 144.
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B. Articles 35(3) and 55
The 1974-77 GDC was preceded by two preparatory expert meetings convened by the ICRC. 
During the last of these, in 1972, calls were made for the inclusion of provisions on the protection of 
the environment.167 For reasons that are unclear, the ICRC decided to retain none of these proposals. 
Yet, at the 1974-77 GDC several delegations brought the issue up from the very beginning.168 
However, differences of opinion emerged quickly. Some delegates believed that the protection of the 
environment in time of war was an end in itself, others considered the continued survival of the 
civilian population to be its purpose.169 Various proposals were formulated, many of which went 
through several stages of deliberations at the Conference.170 In the end no agreement was reached on a 
definition of the environment, nor on a single course of action. An official Working Group came up 
with two proposals for a provision on the ‘natural’ environment. The Conference accepted both, and as 
a consequence, the text of Additional Protocol I contains two provisions on the natural environment, 
each with their own rationale and scope.
The first provision, A rt 35(3), appears under the heading ‘Basic Rules’ and deals with means 
and methods of warfare. It states that:
‘It is prohibited to employ methods or means of warfare which are intended, or may be expected, to 
cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment’
The second provision, Art. 55, appears in Part IV on the Protection of the Civilian Population 
and reads:
‘(1) Care shall be taken in warfare to protect the natural environment against widespread, long-term and 
severe damage. This protection includes a prohibition of the use of methods or means of warfare which 
are intended or may be expected to cause such damage to the natural environment and thereby to 
prejudice the health and survival of the population;
(2) Attacks against the natural environment by way of reprisals are prohibited ’
167 These were made mainly by East-European States: Witteler, op. cit., 306-8.
168 Herczegh, in Swinarski, op. cit.,126-121’, Sandoz, et al, op. cit., 412.
169 Bothe, et al., New Rules, 345.
170 For a discussion see: Witteler, op. cit., 304-27; Herczegh, in Swinarski, op. cit., 125ff.; Kiss, ibid., 181#
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These provisions are not a model of clarity. Their scope and contents, mutual relationship as 
well the link, if any, with the strikingly similarly worded provision of the 1977 ENMOD Convention 
are hotly debated.171
Neither of the provisions defines the term ‘natural environment’. The ‘Biotope’ group which 
elaborated the proposal thought its meaning to be self-evident, but this is disproved by the comments 
which the provisions elicited even during the conference. The ICRC commentary to the provisions 
claims that the term ‘natural environment’ should be interpreted broadly, covering inter alia, objects 
indispensable to the survival of the civilian population, mentioned in Art. 54.172 Support for this 
position can be found in the travawc preparatoires. These show that an Australian proposal according 
to which a State’s own territory would be exempted from the prohibition (later) contained in Art. 55, 
was dropped.173 What this means is that Art. 55 sets a limit to the defensive scorched earth policies 
permitted by Art. 54(5).174
The literature is divided on the meaning of the terms ‘natural environment’ in Arts. 35(3) 
and 55. Some believe that both provisions share the same objective, but disagree on its content.175 The 
majority of writers, however, argue that Art. 35(3) aims at protecting the environment per se and that 
Art. 55 protects the environment for the sake of the health and survival of the population.176
In view of the above controversies, it is perhaps not surprising to note that doctrinal opinion is 
divided also on the ultimate scope of the articles. Unlike ENMOD, Arts. 35(3) and 55 Additional 
Protocol I do not require that the (actual or threatened) damage causes injury to a State party. 
However, does this omission mean that the environment of all States is covered by the provision, 
regardless of whether they are parties to the convention and regardless of their status in the conflict?
Dr. Fisher regards Art. 35(3) as a rule acknowledging the impact of modem warfare on non­
belligerent countries.177 Professor Lagoni writes that the article has three purposes: to protect the 
environment as such; to protect the civilian population from long-term and severe damage and to
171 The 1974-77 GDC took undoubtedly inspiration from the ENMOD formula: Herczegh, in Swinarski et al., op. cit., 
730.
172 Sandoz, et al., op cit., 662.
173 Proposal for Art. 49 bis (1), 19 March 1974, CDDH/m/60, discussed by Witteler, op. cit., 313, 315.
174 David, Principes, 254.
175 Feliciano, 14 Houston JIL (1992), 508; Kiss in Swinarski et al., op. cit., 186 & 190; Witteler, op. cit., 372,437.
176 Heintschel v. Heinegg, 37 GYIL (1994), 284-5; Herczegh, in Swinarski et al., op. cit., 729; Rritsiotis, 1 JACL 
(1996), 110; Lavieille, 4 Revue Juridique de VEnvironnement (1992), 424; Lijnzaad & Tanja, 40 NILR (1993), 180- 
181; Sandoz, et al., op. cit., 663; Simonds, 29 SJIL (1992), 172; Tarasofsky, 24 NYIL (1993), 50.
177 In Heintschel v. Heinegg, The Military Objective and the Principle of Distinction in the Law of Naval Warfare 
(1991), 99.
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protect the territory of States not parties to the conflict from ‘widespread’ damage to the 
environment.178 Others reject such views on the ground that Additional Protocol I intends to regulate 
international armed conflict only between State parties.179
The legal effect of Art. 35(3) and 55 for areas beyond belligerents’ territory- third States and 
international areas - is a complex matter. It cannot be resolved without determining: (a) what level of 
protection exists for these areas under general (peacetime) international law; (b) what threshold of 
environmental damage is intended by Arts. 35(3) and 55; (c) whether Arts. 35(3) and 55 were 
innovative at the time of their adoption; and (d) what their current legal status is.
While the relationship between belligerent States and third States will be further dealt with 
below,180 some of the above questions can be answered briefly. As to question (a), it was argued 
earlier that under general international law, States are under a duty not to cause ‘severe’ damage to the 
territory of other States or of areas beyond national jurisdiction, and that there is no firm obligation 
with regard to the environment within a State’s own borders.181
As for (b), it is generally assumed that Arts. 35(3) and 55 only cover very significant damage. 
Although the terms used in Additional Protocol I resemble those of ENMOD, the threshold indicated 
by the two instruments is fundamentally different.182 Unlike in ENMOD, the adjectives ‘widespread, 
long-term, and severe’ used in Additional Protocol I are joined by the word ‘and’, meaning that it is a 
triple, cumulative standard that needs to be fulfilled.
There are no ‘understandings’ comparable to ENMOD for the threshold adjectives of 
Additional Protocol I, although some indications can be found in the conference records. Some of 
these suggest that while the duration of the term ‘long-lasting’ in ENMOD was a few months, the 
adjective ‘long-term’ in Additional Protocol I would need to be measured in decades, rather than 
months, and that ordinary battlefield damage of the kind caused to France in World War I is not 
covered. However, some delegates argued that it was not possible to say with certainty what period of 
time might be involved.183 There was no explicit clarification of the terms ‘widespread’ or ‘severe’,
178 In Heintschel v. Heinegg, Methods and Means o f Combat in Naval Warfare (1992), 115-116.
179 Witteler, op. cit., 336-7,345.
180 Infra, 2.4.
181 Supra, 1.2.2,1.3.
182 For an exhaustive comparison of the thresholds of ENMOD and API see Witteler, op. cit., 250-264, 376-407.
183 Ibid., 394-5.
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although it was suggested that the term ‘health’ should be thought of as referring to congenital defects, 
degenerations or deformities and as excluding temporary or short-term effects.184
Given these suggestions, it has been argued that Arts. 35(3) and 55 do not impose any 
significant limitation on combatants waging conventional warfare, and that they are:
‘.. .primarily directed at high level policy decision makers and would affect such unconventional means 
o f warfare as the massive use o f  herbicides or chemical agents which could produce widespread, long­
term, and severe damage to the natural environment’. 185
As for questions (c) and (d), at the time of their formulation Arts. 35(3) and 55 were regarded 
as innovative. States like the US186 and France,187 and many scholars,188 continue to believe that they 
bind only State parties. In its 1996 Advisory Opinion on the Legality o f Nuclear Weapons, the ICJ 
rather enigmatically stated that these provisions provide additional protection to the environment and 
‘are powerful constraints for all States having subscribed to these provisions’,189 thereby apparently 
suggesting that they do not reflect customary law.
The question of the relationship between existing customary international law and Art. 35(3) 
and 55 is essential, and depends chiefly on the level of environmental damage permitted by the latter 
provisions. Some authors argue that because of their high threshold, they do not add much by way of 
protection to customary rules of the law of armed conflict.190 However, another interpretation is 
possible. If the threshold set by Art. 35(3) and 55 is innovative, it may entail a more permissive rule 
than the customary principles of the law of armed conflict. Rather than improving on the customary 
protection, the 1977 additions of jus in bello may lead to an erosion of the customary requirements of 
proportionality and necessity in relation to the environment191
184 Sandoz, et al., op. cit., 663-4.
185 Bothe et al., et al., New Rules, 22; see too Tarasofsky, 24 NYIL, 51-2; Lijnzaad & Tanja, 40 NILR (1993), 180; 
Lavieille, 4 Revue Juridique de VEnvironnement (1992), 423.
186 DOD, Report to Congress on the Conduct o f the Persian Gulf War- Appendix on the Role of the Law of War, 31 
ILM (1992), 626-7 (reversing a position taken earlier in the interim report, July 1991,12-6); see too Department of the 
Navy, Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations (NWP 1-14 M), para 8.1.3 (1996), cited in the 
introduction and further below in this subheading; Heintshel v. Heinegg & Donner, 37 GYIL (1994), 290, fn. 30.
187 See infra for Declaration made upon signing the 1980 UN Weapons Convention on 10 April 1980; Heintschel v. 
Heinegg & Donner, 37 GYIL (1994), 290, fe. 30.
188 See in extenso: Spieker, op. cit., 462pp; Oeter, in Fleck, op. cit., 118; Greenwood, in Rowe, The Gulf War 1990-91 
in International and English Law (1993), 86-87; Roberts, ibid., 126; contra: Daems & Paye, in Entre les Lignes 
(1991), 129; David, 20 RBDI(1987), 165-169; David, Principes, 358; Harlow & McGregor, in Grunawalt, et. al., op. 
cit., 318.
189 ICJ Rep. (1996), 242, para 31.
190 Bothe, 34 GYIL (1994), 56; Doswald-Beck, ICRC Review (1997), No. 316,35#
191 Lijnzaad & Tanja, 40 NILR (1993), 180-182.
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As the above analysis has indicated, a strong case can be made that the intended threshold of 
Arts. 35(3) and 55 is much higher than the peacetime standard of ‘severe’. This raises the question of 
what standard applies in armed conflict to third States and international areas. This issue will be 
further addressed in the next chapter,192 but it seems prima facie unacceptable that belligerents would 
be entitled to inflict environmental damage leading to congenital diseases in third States. Given their 
high threshold, the provisions of Additional Protocol I cannot lower the protection which the latter 
derive from general international law. Therefore, the view that these provisions should not be 
considered applicable to third States appears convincing.
Another question is whether the provisions would nonetheless cover third States that become 
party to the protocol. Would such States accept that they will have no cause for complaint, unless the 
damage caused within their territory is of the severity envisaged in Arts. 35(3) and 55: i.e., unless it 
lasts for decades, covers wide areas and leads to birth defects? It would be hard to believe that States 
would accept such a consequence voluntarily. The better view seems to be that Arts. 35(3) and 55 only 
cover belligerent States, but not third States, regardless of whether the latter have become party to the 
protocol or not.
This leaves the case of international areas. It was seen earlier that under current international 
law, environmental damage in these areas is only actionable in case severe injury is caused to legal 
rights or interests of States. In addition, whilst there may be an emerging duty to protect the 
environment as such, international enforcement of these obligations and the requisite legal standing are 
problematic.193 Consequently, a State’s ability to bring a claim for environmental damage arising from 
military activities in international areas, turns on demonstrating a legal interest in this environment and 
an entitlement to that effect.194
The international area of most importance to this study is the high seas. However, pursuant to 
Art. 49(3), Section IV of Additional Protocol I applies primarily to land warfare; it may apply to air 
and sea warfare if the civilian population, individual civilians and civilian objects on land are affected. 
Therefore, while Art. 35(3) applies theoretically unabridged, Art. 55(1) and (2) will only apply to
192 Infra, 3.3.3.
193 Supra, 1.3.2.
194 As recognised by the UNEP Working Group on Environmental Damage, UNEP/Env. Law/3/Inf. 1, 15 October 
1996, 8, paras 32-3; see further infra, 3.3.3.
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naval conflicts insofar as civilians or civilian objects are affected. The above controversy surrounding 
the anthropocentric nature of Art. 55 is therefore superfluous for naval conflict.195
Art. 55 may apply to the destruction of an oil tanker and a fortiori, of a nuclear-powered 
vessel at sea provided that the civilian population on land is affected. Such consequences are 
conceivable when the destruction happens in the territorial seas,196 or in the Exclusive Economic 
Zones of States, but are less likely further away from the coasts, and particularly on the high seas. By 
contrast, assuming that the purpose of Art. 35(3) is to protect the environment per se, the provision 
may be relevant for the entire marine environment, irrespective of benefits to mankind.
However, the high triple standard needs to be satisfied for both Arts. 35(3) and 55. Precisely 
because there are few conventional means and methods of warfare which would cause or may be 
expected to cause environmental damage of the severity, duration and spatial dimensions envisaged, 
the environmental provisions of Additional Protocol I are regarded as of little relevance for naval 
conflict.197 The discussions leading up to the 1994 San Remo Manual confirm that there is a great deal 
of uncertainty regarding the relevance of the environmental provisions of the new jus in bello for naval 
warfare. Significantly, the provision included in the Manual does not employ any of the terminology of 
the Protocol (or of ENMOD), but refers to the underlying principles of the law of armed conflict and 
uses a ‘due regard’ clause borrowed from the peacetime law of the sea:
‘Methods and means of warfare should be employed with due regard for the natural environment taking 
into account the relevant rules of international law. Damage to or destruction of the natural environment 
not justified by military necessity and carried out wantonly is prohibited.’198
Similarly, in the US Navy ‘Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations’, ‘due 
regard’ language has been adopted, but no reference is made to either Additional Protocol I or 
ENMOD.
‘.. .the commander has an affirmative obligation to avoid unnecessary damage to the environment to the 
extent that it is practicable to do so consistent with mission accomplishment To that end, and so far as 
military requirements permit, methods or means of warfare should be employed with due regard to the 
protection and preservation of the natural environment. Destruction of the natural environment not ) 
necessitated by mission accomplishment and carried out wantonly is prohibited. Therefore, a commander / 
should consider the environmental damage which will result from an attack on a legitimate military" 
objective as one of the factors during targeting analysis.’199
195 Heintschel v. Heinegg & Donner, 37 GYIL (1994), 285.
196 Bothe, 34 GYIL (1991), 58.
197 Heintschel v. Heinegg & Donner, 37 GYIL (1994), 288-9.
198 Rule 44, Commentary, 119-120.
199 NWP 1-14M, para 8.1.3 on Environmental Considerations.
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Finally, a word needs to be said about the environmental provisions of the 1980 ‘Inhumane’ 
Weapons Convention. The preamble of the Convention ‘recalls’ that it is prohibited to employ:
‘.. .methods or means of warfare which are intended, or may be expected, to cause widespread, long-term
and severe damage to the natural environment’.
Leaving aside the unsettled status of Art. 35(3) of Additional Protocol I, it is worth observing 
that the reminder is placed in the preamble of the 1980 Convention only. Nonetheless, France attached 
an express reservation pursuant to which she regards Art. 35(3) as binding only on States parties to 
Additional Protocol I.200
Furthermore, Art. 2(4) of the third protocol of the 1980 Convention on incendiary weapons, 
prohibits attacks on:
‘...forests and other types of plant cover, unless they are used to cover, conceal or camouflage
combatants or other military objectives or are themselves military objectives’.
It should be noted that this protocol covers only weapons primarily designed to set fire to 
objects, not those where fire is incidental or consequential.201 Moreover, the exception of military 
necessity in Art. 2(4) seems so encompassing that it is doubtful whether the provision affords any 
serious protection to vegetation. The instances in which ‘forests and other types of plant cover’ are not 
used during armed conflict ‘to cover, conceal or camouflage combatants or other military objectives or 
are themselves military objectives’ must be rare.
For these reasons, the 1980 Convention does not contribute significantly to the protection of 
the environment in armed conflict.
200 Upon signing the convention on 10 April 1980; Source: ICRC and Multilateral Treaties deposited with the 
Secretary-General, 1992.
201 Green, The Contemporary Law of Armed Conflict (1993), 49-50.
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2.2.6. Responsibility and Liability for Violations of Environmental Jus in Bello
Breach of jus in bello obligations may entail State responsibility or individual criminal 
responsibility, or both.202 First, State parties are required to take measures necessary for the 
suppression of all violations of the laws and customs of war.203 Secondly, State parties are required to 
enact effective penal legislation to punish grave breaches, to search for the perpetrators, and to either 
try or extradite them.204 There are also provisions of the Hague Conventions which are expressly 
addressed to State parties, breach of which will engage their responsibility.205
Even if certain jus in bello provisions are not specifically addressed to States, their 
responsibility might still be engaged. Since armed forces are to be regarded as organs of a State, their 
conduct will be attributable to the latter if they act in official capacity206 This is simply an application 
of the general mechanisms of State responsibility. Case law has interpreted this principle broadly. 
States have been held responsible for acts which were ultra vires provided that the soldiers acted at 
least apparently in capacity.207
However, the law of armed conflict may depart from the general principles of State 
responsibility in regard to unofficial private acts which a State was not negligent in failing to prevent. 
Arguably, the text and the drafting history of Art. 3 of Hague Convention (IV) of 1907 and of Art. 91 
of Additional Protocol I imply that a State may be held liable for violations by soldiers acting outside 
the scope of their official duties.208 Thus, in Eis et al. (1959) the US Foreign Claims Settlement 
Commission imputed the widespread pillage and destruction of neutral property by Imperial Russian 
soldiers in 1915, to the Soviet government.209
Although there have been several occasions in which States paid compensation for damage 
caused by their armed forces, particularly to third (neutral) third States, there is no indication that the
202 McCoubrey, 1 JACL (1996), 125; Meron, 89 AJIL (1995), 562.
203 Meron, ibid., 569; Hampson, in Rowe, op. cit., 242-3.
204 GC I, Art. 49; GC H, Art. 50, GC m , Art. 129, G C IV , Art. 146.
205 E.g., HR Arts. 3 & 4.
206 Kalshoven, 4 0 ICLQ (1991), 827; Greenwood, in Grunawalt, et. al., op. cit. 399.
207 Greenwood, ibid., 401.
208 Greenwood, ibid., 400- 3; Kalshoven, 40 ICLQ (1991), 837-8.
209 3 0 ILR, 116.
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articles in question have ever been relied on explicitly.210 State responsibility has on the whole, played 
a minor  role in the enforcement of jus in bello.
As for individual criminal responsibility, whilst all violations of jus in bello may be j'~~) 
characterised as ‘war crimes’ in the sense of an internationally recognised wrong, only certain/ 
violations of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 qualify as grave breach. These are specified grave 
violations of jus in bello committed wilfully, or at least intentionally and against different groups of 
protected people by each convention. The perpetrators of grave breaches must be tried, and any State 
may assert ‘universal’ jurisdiction to do so. The Geneva Conventions require proceedings to be 
brought both against those who commit grave breaches and those who order their commission.211
Additional Protocol I has extended the concept of grave breaches to certain acts forming part
010 01^  of the conduct of hostilities, and to wilful omissions, although the latter aspect was probably
already customary law.214 The latter protocol introduces also a new concept - ‘serious violations’ of
the Geneva Conventions and the Protocol - for which the International Fact-Finding Commission may
be competent, and which should also be made punishable by belligerents.215
Whilst States have the obligation to prosecute or extradite perpetrators of grave breaches, 
States arguably have the right to assert universal jurisdiction also in respect of other, ‘nongrave’ 
breaches.216
Applied to the environmental jus in bello provisions discussed above, it should be noted first 
that breaches of the customary principles of the laws of armed conflict as well as violations of the 
Hague Conventions, however serious, will not amount to grave breaches or serious violations. Only 
violations of the Geneva Conventions or Additional Protocol I can qualify as such.217
As mentioned above, the Geneva Conventions contain an identically worded provision 
according to which the ‘extensive’ destruction and appropriation of property protected under the
210 Kalshoven, 40 ICLQ (1991), 836-7; Greenwood, in Grunawalt, et. al., op. cit., 403; David, Principes, 525-8.
211 Hampson, in Rowe, op. cit., 242-3.
212 Art. 11 (4) and Art. 85.
213 Arts. 86-7.
214 Hampson, in Rowe, op. cit., 246.
215 Art. 90 (2) (c ) (I); Hampson, in Rowe, op. cit., 243-4,256; and in Fox & Meyer, op. cit., 74-81.
216 Meron, 89 AJIL (1995), 570, 571-70, fit. 93.
217 Decision in Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, 2 October 1995, ICTY No IT-94-I-AR72, 35 ILM (1996) 32, at paras 71, 
80; Mullerson, 2 JACL (1997), 109-133.
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relevant conventions, not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly 
qualify as a grave breach.218
Pursuant to Art. 85(3)(b) and (c) of Additional Protocol I certain wilful violations of Arts. 54 
and 56 qualify as grave breaches provided that inter cdia, death or serious injury of civilians was 
caused and that there was knowledge that this would be the result. By contrast, Art. 85(4)(d) does not 
require such an anthropocentric aim for grave breaches committed against certain elements of cultural 
and spiritual heritage define protected by Art. 53.
Although violations of Arts. 35(3) and 55 may amount to war crimes- in the sense of a 
violation of the laws of war219- they are not included in the fist of grave breaches in Art. 85 of the 
Protocol. This is perceived as a lacuna in the literature, and the ILC seeks to remedy this, by 
suggesting to include into a Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind the war crime 
of:
‘Using methods or means of warfare not justified by military necessity with the intent to cause wide­
spread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment and thereby to prejudice the health and 
survival of the population and such damage occurs’222
Whilst the ILC characterises its proposal as based on Arts. 35 and 55 of Additional Protocol I, 
there are substantial differences. First, only crimes committed ‘in a systematic manner or on a large 
scale’ will so qualify. Second, unlike Arts. 35(3) and 55, 223 the ILC proposal covers only intentional 
damage. Third, while the threshold of environmental damage was taken from Arts. 35(3) and 55, the 
ILC has couched its proposal in even more openly anthropocentric terms than Art. 55(1). Fourth, the 
ILC proposal introduces a questionable defence of military necessity224 In view of the controversies 
surrounding the existing provisions of Additional Protocol I, one may well wonder whether the ILC 
proposal will not add to the confusion in this area.
218 GC (I), Art. 50; GC (II), Art. 52; GC (TV), Art. 147.
219 Green, in Grunawalt, et. al., op. cit., 428; but see McCoubrey, 1 JACL (1996), 131.
220 The matter was raised during the GDC, but a proposal to this effect was not retained; CDDH/m/GT/35, p. 5, 
proposed Art. 48 bis; Lijnzaad & Tanja, 40 NILR (1993), 181; Witteler, op. cit., 315, 318.
221 Szasz, in Grunawalt, et. al., op. cit., 283; Bothe, 34 GYIL (1991), 58; Simonds, 29 SJIL (1992), 200-201.
222 Art. 20 (g), Final Draft o f  the Code, ILC Report (1996), UN Doc. A/51/10, vol. II, p t 2, chapter II, A  (Introduction), 
paragraphs 41 to 44; B (Articles w ith commentary), paragraph 15.
223 Which include the phrase ‘which may be expected’,
224 Allain & Jones, 8 EJIL (1997), 100-117.
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2.2.7. Conclusions on Jus in Bei/o
The traditional ‘Hague’ and ‘Geneva’ treaty law contains provisions that may offer either 
indirect protection to the environment and its components through provisions aimed at civilians, or 
direct protection for those environmental resources that can be qualified as real or personal property. 
Particularly after the 1990/91 Gulf War the merit of these provisions for environmental protection 
purposes has been rediscovered. There is however, controversy on their value. Some authors point out 
that most of these older jus in bello provisions were enacted in a ‘pre-ecological’ frame of mind, that 
they are very anthropocentric in scope, protecting primarily combatants and civilians or their property, 
that they leave too much discretion to the military commander, and place excessive reliance on the 
good faith of the belligerent.225 Others claim that these old provisions have been grossly 
underestimated with respect to their environmental value. They point out that the traditional provisions 
of the Hague and Geneva law have been more widely accepted than the new ‘environmental’ jus in 
bello provisions adopted since the mid-1970s 226
In addition, it was seen that the provisions of both ENMOD and Additional Protocol I were 
written with the Vietnam legacy in mind. It has been forcefully argued that they no longer correspond 
to modem concepts of IEL, because of their narrow focus on environmental damage.227 An even more 
damning judgement comes from ecologists. They argue that failing further legal directives expressed 
in relative terms, they find it impossible to determine whether environmental damage was caused on 
the basis of the threshold provisions of Additional Protocol I. The reason is that natural scientists may 
be able to measure change in ecological processes, but in order to establish whether this fulfils the 
legal concept of ‘damage’, baseline data are needed as well as legal directives as to what constitutes 
‘excessive’ change.228 This may partly explain the disagreement as to whether any of the damage 
caused by the oil spills and fires in the 1990/91 Gulf War technically crossed the threshold of 
Additional Protocol I.229
Therefore, the protective merits of the new ‘environmental’ jus in bello, and particularly of 
the provisions which mention the natural environment by name, remain debatable. The more j 
significant limitations on the causing of environmental damage in international armed conflict will still j
225 Lijnzaad & Tanja, 40 NILR (1993), 176; Verwey, in Grunawalt, et. al., op. cit., 566.
226 Roberts, ibid., 237 ,242; McCoubrey, in Pilot Study, 243.
227 Bothe, 34 GYIL (1991), 58.
228 Lehnes, op. cit., 32pp. (on file with author).
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derive primarily from the underlying principles of the law of armed conflict and from the traditional 
Hague and Geneva law.
It is now unlikely that the many international efforts aimed at re-evaluating the environmental 
jus in bello after the 1990/91 Gw^Conflict will lead to the negotiation of new treaty provisions dealing 
with environmental protection during armed conflict. However, the many studies published since 1991 
may, in time, lead to a clarification and possibly even further development of the environmental jus in 
bello. In addition, it has been forcefully demonstrated that wider adherence by States, subsequent 
national implementation, as well as strict observance of the existing body of jus in bello provisions 
would yield tangible benefits for the environment. An example of improved national implementation is 
that there has been a marked increase in the number of military manuals and other types of 
publications that include environmental protection provisions.230
2.3. Modern Jus ad Bellum and Environmental Protection
The modem jus ad bellum consists primarily of the provisions of the UN Charter. Under the 
collective security system that came into force with UN, war and the use of force have become, in the 
words of Kelsen, either a delict or a sanction: a delict, if waged in violation of the law; a sanction, if 
carried out in its defence or enforcement.231 As is clear from the preamble, the drafters of the UN 
Charter were determined ‘to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war’. To achieve this 
end, Art. 2(4) of the Charter replaces the much abused term ‘war’ with the more objective threshold of 
‘threat or use of force’:
‘All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the 
territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any manner inconsistent with the Purposes 
of the United Nations. ’
229 Momtaz, 37 AFDI (1991), 209-11; Feliciano, 14 Houston JIL (1992), 505; Lijnzaad & Tanja, 40 NILR (1993), 195; 
David, Principes, 256; Low & Hodgkinson, 35 VJIL (1995), 430, in. 176.
230 See, for example, ICRC Guidelines, mentioned supra, 1.2; 1994 San Remo Manual, paras 11, 13 (c), 34 and 44; 
German M anual on Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflicts, August 1992, paras 401, 403, 479, 1020; US Navy, NWP 
1-14M, para 8.1.3; Schmitt, 36 RDMDG (1997), 1 9 #
231 Kelsen cited by Rumpf, 27 GYIL (1984) 441.
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Moreover, exceptions to Art. 2(4) are narrowly circumscribed: the right to use armed force is 
bestowed on States individually or collectively, but only when acting in self-defence, and until the 
Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security under 
Chapter VII of the Charter.232
The Security Council’s actions under Chapter VII are conditional on the determination of the 
existence of three events - threat to peace, breach of peace or act of aggression - after which it can 
make either a recommendation or a binding decision pursuant to Art. 39. The measures which the 
Security Council can decide upon accordingly are ‘measures not involving the use of force’ (Art. 41) 
and ‘action by air, sea, or land forces’ (Art. 42). Art. 48 provides that Chapter VII actions shall be 
taken by all UN members or by some of them, as determined by the Council, whilst Arts. 52 and 53 of 
the Charter provide that regional organisations may undertake enforcement actions with Security 
Council authorisation.
The fundamental nature of the change brought about by the UN Charter cannot be over­
emphasised. The ILC has since long suggested that the prohibition to use armed force in international 
relations is peremptory {jus cogens),233 and the ICJ is widely regarded as having subscribed to this view 
in the 1986 Nicaragua case.234 In addition, the ‘the outlawing of acts of aggression’, was mentioned as 
a prime example of an obligation erga omnes by the ICJ in the 1970 Barcelona Traction case.235 The 
norm expressed in Art. 2(4) of the Charter is considered binding even by the few States which are not 
yet members of the main UN organisation, most notably Switzerland.236
Furthermore, in the ILC’s draft on State responsibility, the (aggressive) use of armed force in 
violation of the UN Charter is qualified as an international crime,237 which in contrast to traditional 
State-to-State wrongs, entails legal consequences not only for the offending and injured States, but for 
all States of the international community238
232 Arts. 53 (1) and 107 o f  the Charter regarding the former enemy States (now all U N  members), are generally 
regarded as ‘extinguished’: Greenspan, op. cit., 28; The legality o f  use o f  armed force in other cases than those 
mentioned in the text, such as humanitarian intervention, rescue o f  nationals abroad, and anticipatory self-defence, 
remains controversial: Brownlie, in Cassese, The Current Legal Regulation o f the Use of Force (1986), 497'jf; 
Hannikainen, op. cit., 335-40; Gardam, 87 AJIL (1993), 391, fn. 2; Greenwood, 9 Rev.Int.Stud. (1983), 222.
233 The ILC has linked the prohibition o f  aggressive war with jus cogens on three occasions, in its work on the law o f  
treaties and on State Responsibility: Hannikainen, op. cit., 163, 185,188-9,284-7.
234 ICJ Rep. (1986), 100,190; Czaplinski, 38 ICLQ (1989), 162; B im ie & Boyle, op. cit., 129.
235 ICJ Rep. (1970), 32; The observations made by earlier by the ICJ in the Barcelona Traction case in regard to erga 
omnes obligations are usually regarded as examples o f jus cogens.
236 Czaplinski, 38 ICLQ (1989), 156#
237 Art. 19 ,(2 ) and (3)(a); Yearbook ILC (1979), vol. U, p t 2, 92; ILC Report (1980), UN Doc. A/35/10, 90-93.
238 Christenson, in Lillich, The United Nations Compensation Commission (1995), 311,312.
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While the ILC’s proposal to distinguish between two types of international State wrongs - 
crimes and delicts- has attracted great controversy,239 most sceptics acknowledge that there may be 
different categories of violations of primary obligations in international law, which should entail 
different consequences based on the seriousness of the international wrong. Furthermore, even the 
most passionate critics appear less reticent to label the use of force by a State in violation of Art. 2(4) 
of the UN Charter, as a theoretical or potential State crime.240
A third indicator of the importance of Art. 2(4) of the UN Charter is the ILC’s Draft Code of 
Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind; it proposes universal criminal jurisdiction for the 
individual who commits an act of aggression under international law.241
A fourth indicator is the notion of state complicity in international law. Although it has been 
highlighted only recently,242 the prohibition for a State to deliver aid or assistance for the commission 
of an international wrong by another State is regarded as customary law.243 The majority of 
acknowledged cases of State complicity relate to the violation of the prohibition to use armed force in 
international relations, such as States permitting the use of their territory for the commission of an act 
of aggression,244 or which have political and other dealings with States that have committed violations 
of international law,245 or which provide material aid in the form of money or goods to a State enabling 
die latter to commit aggression.246
239 Brownlie, System of the Law o f Nations: State Responsibility (1983), vol. I, 32-33; Dekker, in Dekker & Post, op. 
cit., 252-3; David, ibid., 269-271; de Hoogh, 42 AJPIL (1991), 189$ Higgins, op. cit., 165-168 and literature cited 
therein; Annacker, 46 AJPIL (1994), 135$ Hannikainen, op. cit., 182.
240 Hannikainen, op. cit., 326; Dekker, in Dekker & Post, op. cit., 253-261 and in particular, 254-255; Comments by 
David, ibid., 271; Brownlie, International Law, 150-4, and specifically, 153; Gilbert, 39 ILCQ, (1990), 363; see too 
Dupuy, P., Droit International Public (1993), 349.
241 Art. 16, ILC Report (1996), UN Doc. A/51/10, para 46; see too Arts. 25, 26 and 27 of the Draft Statute for an 
International Criminal Court, adopted by the ILC at its 46th session in 1994: Press Release, L/2684 of 25 July 1994.
242 Yearbook ILC (1978), vol. II, pt. 2,103; Yearbook ILC (1979), vol. II, pt 2,93.
243 Quigley, 57 BYIL (1987), 77-131, and specifically 95-104; Lauterpacht, 7 ICLQ (1958), 551; Brownlie, State 
Responsibility, vol. 1 ,191; Graefrath, & Oeser, 29 Staat und Recht (1980), 446-8.
244 Art. 3(f) of the 1974 UN GA Definition of Aggression qualifies the situation in which a State permits another to use 
its territory to commit an act of aggression against another State as an act of aggression in itself: Quigley, 57 BYIL 
(1987), 83-86.
245 Brownlie, International Law, 418-9, 324; This type of ‘political’ complicity was referred to by the ICJ in its 
Advisory Opinion on Namibia, ICJ Rep. (1971), 5-58, which refers to Art. 25 of the UN Charter and to ‘general 
international law’.
246 Quigley, 57 BYIL (1987), 87-95; Vagts, 91AJIL (1997), 473.
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2.3 .1 . Limitation o f the Resort to Armed Force
By limiting resort to armed force in international relations, jus ad bellum aims at reducing the 
incidence of armed conflict and consequently environmental damage as well. Logically therefore, jus 
ad bellum, insofar as it is aimed at keeping or restoring international peace and security, must be seen 
as an integral part of the international legal protection of the environment. Conversely however, since 
the UN Charter does not outlaw all instances of use of armed force in international relations, 
environmental destruction will in some cases be the inevitable consequence of lawful use of force 
under the UN Charter.
Still, the view that environmental protection is subject to jus ad bellum is (no longer) 
universally shared. In particular, before the start of Desert Storm, it was feared in some circles that 
armed intervention in this oil rich Gulf region would lead to apocalyptic environmental damage. This 
prospect was then used to urge governments to desist from using any armed force at all, even if it 
meant that the illegal occupation and annexation of Kuwait would not be reversed.247 In addition, the 
actual environmental legacy of Desert Storm has convinced some scholars that the idea of using armed 
force, however just its cause, should be abandoned altogether if such widespread damage to the theatre 
of armed conflict cannot be avoided248 What these reactions imply is that States are under an 
obligation to protect the environment from very serious (or possibly catastrophic) damage at all cost, 
even if this means setting aside provisions of the UN Charter. A similar but more restricted argument 
was recently made before the ICJ in regard to the advisory requests on the Legality o f Nuclear 
Weapons249
However, it is doubtful whether this view reflects current majority thinking. Principle 24 of 
the 1992 Rio Declaration, agreed one and a half years after Desert Storm, declares that Warfare is 
inherently destructive of sustainable development’. However, it does not set a threshold of 
environmental damage above which use of armed force should be abandoned. Instead, States are urged 
to:
‘. .. respect international law providing protection for the environment in times of armed conflict and co­
operate in its further development, as necessary’.
247 Roberts, in Grunawalt et al. op. cit., 243-4.
248 Graefrath & Mohr, 43 AJPIL (1992), 132.
249 Written Statement, Solomon Islands, WHO Request, (June 1995), 69, para 4.96.
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Furthermore, whilst the ICJ expressly endorsed Principle 24, it rejected the view that 
environmental obligations could override a State’s right to use armed force in self-defence under 
international law.250
2.3 .2 . Rules on the Continuation o f Armed Force
There is a strong current of opinion according to which modem jus ad bellum is much more 
than a branch of the law of peace; it is said to contain not only rules on the lawfulness of the initial use 
of force, but also on its continuation, thereby regulating the conduct of armed forces.251 In this view, an 
initial use of armed force, even if in principle lawful, will continue to remain so only on condition that 
the principles of necessity, reasonabless and proportionality are complied with, in addition to any 
directives issued by the Security Council252 While not universally accepted 253 the ICJ seemed to have 
endorsed this view by noting in the Nicaragua case that:
‘.. .whether the response to the attack is lawful depends on observance of the criteria of the necessity and 
the proportionality of the measures taken in self-defence.,254
The ICJ’s Advisory Opinion on the Legality o f Nuclear Weapons has been hailed as a further 
confirmation of this view, not only with regard to the use of armed force within the context of self- 
defense in general,255 but also in a specific environmental context. Indeed, the Court held that:
‘States must take environmental considerations into account when assessing what is necessary and 
proportionate in the pursuit of legitimate military objectives.’ 256
If this interpretation is correct, the UN Charter may imply that variable limits are set on the 
region of war.257 Under traditional law, the region of war comprised all areas under jurisdiction of the
250 ICJ Rep. (1996), 241-242, paras 29-30; Infra, 3.2.
251 Gardam, 87 AJIL (1993), 391-413; Greenwood, 9 Rev.Int.Slud. (1983), 221-5; Kwakwa, op. cit., 1-5.
252 These requirements can be traced back to the Caroline incident, which dealt with a situation of self-defence, but is 
now regarded as relevant for all cases of armed force under the Charter, including actions under Chapter VII and VIII; 
Brownlie, International Law, 42-43.
253 E.g. views expressed during the preparation of the San Remo Manual, Rules 3-6, Commentary, 75-8.
254 ICJ Rep. (1986), 103, para. 194.
255 Doswald-Beck, ICRC Review (1997), No. 316,35-55; Greenwood, ibid., 65-75.
256 ICJ Rep. (1996), 242, para 30.
257 Note that while State practice shows a tendency to confine naval operations to areas close to the belligerent coasts, it 
is difficult to say whether this is dictated by legal conviction or by practical limitations: Ronzitti, op. cit., 5.
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belligerents - land territory, territorial waters and internal waters and the superjacent air column above 
these - in addition to the high seas.258 Under current international law, the region of war has not only 
been modified by the various jurisdictional zones introduced by the new law of the sea; 259 Modem jus 
ad bellum limits participants to those parts where use of armed force is both necessary and 
proportionate.260 As Professor Greenwood writes:
‘The traditional assumption that the outbreak of war between two States necessarily involved hostilities
between their armed forces wherever they meet, can no longer be regarded as valid’.261
The 1994 San Remo Manual contains three provisions in which this view is adopted for 
armed conflict at sea, although many of these proved controversial.262
2.3 .3 . Liability for Environmental Damage as a Result o f Lawful Use o f Armed 
Force
As seen earlier,263 one of the ongoing debates within IEL concerns the following question: 
whether causation of (severe) environmental damage is always an international wrong in itself or 
whether environmental damage should in some cases be considered an unfortunate by-product of a 
lawful activity, for which a separate regime of liability is necessary. The ILC has taken the latter view, 
having since 1978 worked on a regime for die ‘International Liability for Injurious Consequences 
Arising out of Acts not Prohibited by International Law’.
The ILC’s model seems well-suited for armed conflict, for it is incontrovertible that under the J 
laws of armed conflict environmental damage will be caused as a result of State activities which may 1 
be either lawful or unlawful. Thus, when a State resorts to use of armed force in self-defence, keeps its 
response within the requirements of Art. 51 of the UN Charter, and complies with all relevant
258 The ‘region of war’ is a term of art, introduced by Oppenheim, and refers to ‘that part of the surface of the earth in 
which the belligerents my prepare and execute hostilities against each other’; ‘Theatre’ or ‘area’ of warfare are 
concepts used to indicate the sites where warfare actually takes place: Oppenheim, op. cit., 236-47.
259 Heintschel v. Heinegg, in Fleck, op. cit., 409-415; Oxman, 24 VJIL (1984), 811; San Remo Manual, Rules 14-37, 
Commentary, 93-111.
260 Langdon, in Heintschel v. Heinegg, The Military Objective, 86-88; Gardam, 87 AJIL (1993), 391-413.
261 Greenwood, 9 Rev.Int.Stud. (1983), 223-224.
262 Section II, Rules 3-6, Commentary, 75-78.
263 Supra, 1.2.2.D, in fine.
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requirements of jus in bello, the environmental damage caused by this act will be a by-product of what 
is in essence a lawful activity: use of armed force in self-defence.
This is in line with the ICJ’s advisory opinion on the Legality o f Nuclear Weapons, where it 
was held that obligations to protect the environment could not deprive a State of its right of self- 
defence under international law.264 Unfortunately, the work of the ILC on State liability for lawful 
activities contains an exemption based on national security, as well as for armed conflict.265
2.3 .4 . Liability for Environmental Damage Based on Breaches o f Jus ad Bellum
Any breach of international law by a State engages its international responsibility as well as 
its liability, that is, the duty to make reparation.266 Since a breach of jus ad bellum is a breach of 
international law, the responsible State’s liability should be engaged for any damage caused in 
consequence. Although international claims on the basis of violation of jus ad bellum have been rare, 
there is no doubt about the general principle.267 Therefore, a State guilty of aggression or of any other 
violation of the rules of international law on the use of force, is bound to make reparation for all losses 
caused by such violation, including environmental damage.268 On the assumption that a breach of jus 
ad bellum amounts to an international crime of State, consistent with the ILC’s theory of State 
Responsibility, it entails legal consequences that go beyond the mere duty to compensate the victim 
State(s).269
One of the most notable instances after World War II in which a State has been held 
responsible and liable for breaching jus ad bellum took place after the 1990/91 Gulf War. Once 
hostilities ceased, the Security Council proceeded with the imposition of cease-fire conditions on Iraq, 
pursuant to the Security Council Resolution 687 (1991) of 3 April 1991. This ‘cease-fire resolution’ 
comprises 43 paragraphs and subjects Iraq to a strict regime of obligations, commands, controls, and
264 ICJ Rep. (1996), 242, para 30.
265 ILC Report (1994), UN Doc. A/49/10, Chapter V, 381-2, proposed Art. J (‘ exceptions’) & p. 386, draft article 17 
(‘national security and industrial secrets’); see generally: Tomuschat, op. cit., 37$ see too Szasz, in Grunawalt, et. al., 
op. cit., 286. fn. 31.
266 Supra, 1.2.2.D
267 Brownlie, International Law, 147; Greenwood, in Grunawalt, et. al., op. cit., 403-4.
268 Crook, 87 AJIL (1993), 144,146.
269 Christenson, in Lillich, op. cit., 312-4.
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‘reparations’. Some have likened it to the Versailles Peace Treaty,270 others to the trusteeship system 
of the UN Charter 271
The resolution is significant for it establishes Iraq’s liability for all direct losses caused by its 
breach of jus ad bellwn, including environmental damage. In a clause reminiscent of the Versailles 
‘War Guilt’ Clause, Art. 16 determines Iraq’s liability under international law following its illegal 
invasion and occupation of Kuwait:
‘Iraq...is liable, under international law, for any direct loss, damage, including environmental damage and
the depletion of natural resources, or injury to foreign Governments, nationals and corporations, as a
result of Iraq’s unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait’
In addition, the Resolution establishes a fund to pay for the compensation claims and a UN 
Compensation Commission (‘UNCC’) charged with assessing the claims and administering the fund.
Although the military tribunals of World War II already considered forms of war damage 
which may have environmental implications,272 Resolution 687 is unique in that environmental 
damage is expressly and prominently dealt with in the context of war reparations. While some view 
this as innovation by customary law superseding treaty law,273others regard it as no more than an 
application of the general principles of State responsibility and liability.274
The claims for environmental damage will present the UNCC with many technical and 
juridical difficulties. However, many of these problems will not be unlike those encountered in non­
war related disasters: identification of the exact source of the damage, establishment of the causal 
relationship between cause and effect, assessment of the magnitude of the damage, and quantification 
of damages. Since ‘standing’ to bring environmental claims has been given not only to governments 
but also to international organisations, it was argued that damage to international areas or to the 
environment ‘as such’ might be compensated.275 However, a UNEP working group concluded in 1996 
that claims in relation to international areas were hypothetical since there were no high seas areas in
270 Schachter, 85 AJIL (1991), 452,456; Bedennan, in Lillich, op. cit., 257,261-4.
271 Eitel, 35 GYIL (1992), 188.
272 Scorched Earth and Polish Forests cases, supra, 2.2.1. & 2.2.3.A.
273 In regard to the Advisory Opinion on Nuclear Weapons, Solomon Islands, Oral Submissions (Mr. Sands), CR 
95/32, 71, para 19.
274 Crook, 87 AJIL (1993), 147
275 Plant, 7 UECL (1992), 221; Low & Hodgkinson, 35 VJIL (1995), 455.
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the Persian gulf and the available evidence did not disclose measurable damage to international
276areas.
It is important to note also that since Iraq’s liability has been based on breach of jus ad bellum, 
many of the distinctions and limitations inherent in the application of provisions of jus in bello to 
environmental damage, will not be relevant.277
2.3 .5 . Final Observations on Environmental Implications o f Jus ad Bellum
However impressive the above may seem, cases of State liability for illegal use of armed force 
in international relations remain rare, particularly if one looks at the incidence of the breaches. An 
obvious reason is that the UN collective security system rarely produces authoritative judgements on 
violations of jus ad bellum, which makes the identification of the guilty party controversial.
A further fundamental reason is that the imposition of damages for breaches of jus ad bellum 
following armed conflict, is usually a one-sided affair. Most conspicuously, the exaction of war 
reparations after the first and Second World War placed the vanquished State(s) at the mercy of the 
victor State(s), often in disregard of violations of jus ad bellum}11
A final and no less fundamental reason is linked with one of the paradoxes of the law of 
armed conflict, namely the duty to discriminate between legal and illegal uses of force under jus ad 
bellum, coupled with the equality of all parties before jus in bello. International law has thus far failed 
to reconcile liability for breaches of jus ad bellum with liability for breaches of jus in bello279 One 
school of thought argues that it is counter-productive to punish a violator of jus ad bellum for acts done 
pursuant to jus in bello 280 A second school holds that an aggressor State should be held liable for all 
damage caused as a consequence of its aggression, even if some actions were allowed by jus in bello, 
and even if some of the damage was caused by its adversaries, provided that the latter complied with
276 UNEP Working Group on Environmental Damage, UNEP/Env. Law/3/Inf. 1,15 October 1996, 8, para 33.
277 Ibid., 4, para 16; Greenwood, in Grunawalt, et. al., op. cit., 407.
278 Bishop, International Law (1971), 795.
279 Fox, in Rowe, op. cit., 281-5; Boelaert-Suominen, 50 ZoR (1996), 298-310.
280 Hampson, in Rowe, op. cit., 250-1.
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jus in bello.2*1 The third school believes that the aggressor should compensate even damage caused by 
unlawful acts of the victim State.282
The work of the UNCC thus far shows that it applies the second view, with this proviso: it has 
thus far not been called upon to examine whether the damage caused by Coalition military actions 
complied with the laws of armed conflict. The UNCC relies heavily on the finding that Iraq has 
breached jus ad bellum, and that she has accepted liability pursuant to the terms of the cease-fire 
resolution.283 In furtherance of express policy clarifications to this effect, the UNCC refuses to give 
Iraq ‘credit’ for actions which were lawful under jus in bello. This is evident from decisions of 
principle taken by the UNCC according to which Iraq is liable for any loss suffered as a result of 
‘military operations or threat of military action by either side’.284
These principles were applied in the first environmental award, rendered by the UNCC on 18 
December 1996.285 The Well Blowout Control Claim concerned damages sought by Kuwait Oil 
Company for the costs incurred in planning and executing the work of extinguishing the well-head
\ ’
fires that were burning upon the withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait. Although the UNCC expert t 
panel admitted that part of the damage for which compensation was sought ‘may be a result of the j 
allied bombing’, it held that the bulk of the damage was done by Iraq and that the latter was in any (* 
event liable for damage caused by either side in the conflict.286
281 Greenwood, in Grunawalt, et. at., op. cit., 409; Fox, in Rowe, op. cit., 284; Domb, 23 IYHR (1993), 107; Cottereau, 
37 AFDI (1991), 107.
282 David, 20 RBDI(1987), 100; Principes, 71-2.
283 Boelaert-Suominen, 50 ZoR (1996), 225-316.
284 Decision 7, para 6 (a) and 21 (a) of the Governing Council, S/AC.26/1991/7/Rev. 1, 31 ILM (1992), 1045; See too 
Decision 9 of the Governing Council, 6 March 1992, S/AC26/1992/9, para 12.
285 36 ILM(1997), 1289.
286 Ibid., paras 85-6.
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2.4. Environmental Implications of the Law of Neutrality
2.4 .1 . Pre-Charter Neutrality Law
A. Neutral Duties
Under the ideal pre-charter model, States (about to be) involved in armed conflict were 
expected to issue declarations so as to create a state of war between themselves, whereas third States 
were to issue declarations of neutrality.287 The advantages of the legal concept of the ‘state of war’ was 
that it marked the moment at which the national and international rules applicable during peace were 
replaced by those applicable during war.288
The existence of a state of war did not have any consequences for the legal relationships 
among non-participating States, for these remained governed by the law of peace. It had consequences, 
however, for the legal relationships between neutral States and belligerent States. Although in 
principle governed by the law of peace, they became subject to the requirements of the law of 
neutrality. Neutral States were required to comply with a series of classic neutral duties:289
The duty of non-involvement, non-interference or abstention: Trade by neutrals with 
belligerents is permitted but special rules apply to the supply of war material. Over land, neutral 
governments need to abstain from supplying war material to belligerent; over sea, neutral governments 
are expected to prevent all public and private trade in war materials with belligerents;
The duty of prevention: A neutral Power is obligated to use all means at its disposal to prevent 
violations by belligerents of its neutrality. This encompasses a duty to prevent the violation of its 
territorial integrity by belligerents, to prevent the use of its tenitoiy, waters or airspace by either 
belligerent, and the prevention of the commission of acts of hostility within its jurisdiction. It also
287 For a concise historical overview see Bothe, in Fleck, op. cit., 487; but see The Wirpi (1941), Ann.Dig. (1943-45), 
300-302; Cobbett, Leading Cases on International Law with Notes (1924), vol. II, 407-8.
288 Cobbett, op. cit., 11-14, 400-402; McNair & Watts, The Legal Effects of War (1966), 2-6; Greenwood, 36 ICLQ 
(1987), 284; Post, 25 NYIL (1994), 87-88.
289 For a review of the traditional neutrality law see: Castren, The Present Law of War and Neutrality (1954), 421-58 
on neutrality in general, 458-92 on neutrality in land war, 492-587 on neutrality in maritime warfare, 587-601 on 
neutrality in air warfare; Schindler, in Ronzitti, op. cit, 215-22, in Delissen & Tanja, op. cit., 367-86; Gioia, & Ronzitti,
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implies that a neutral Power has the duty to use force, as necessary, to prevent or punish such 
violations of neutrality;
The duty of impartiality and non-discrimination: Any conditions, restrictions or prohibitions 
issued by a neutral Power, for instance in regard to admission into its ports, need to be applied in a 
non-discriminatoiy manner to all belligerents;
B. Protection to Neutrals offered by Pre-Charter Law
Provided that third States complied with their neutral duties, belligerent States were to respect 
their choice not to become a participant. It was only in certain well-defined respects that neutral States 
had to tolerate certain consequences of the existence of armed conflict between belligerent States. The 
former had to prove that they complied with neutral duties, which meant that they had to subject 
themselves to constant monitoring. They might also be requested to adjust their trade relations with 
certain belligerents to comply with their duties in respect of war material.290
The advantage of this regime for neutral States were obvious. They were entitled to remain 
outside the conflict, and to maintain economic relations with belligerents subject to adjustments and 
measures of control, particularly at sea.291 Neutrality law was a means of limiting the scope of 
international conflicts by declaring neutral States’ territory, waters and airspace, in principle, off- 
limits to belligerents.
What the environmental implications of the regime of neutrality might be will now be 
examined in more detail. The law of neutrality was a flexible regime; its implications for neutral and 
belligerent States depended on the particular circumstances. Only part of the customary law of 
neutrality has been codified in formal instruments.292 Amongst these, the 1907 Hague Convention (V) 
on the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in Case of War on Land is regarded as 
reflecting customary international law. Art. 1 provides that:
‘The territory of neutral Powers is inviolable’.
in Dekker & Post, op. cit., 221-242; Bring, in Bring & Mahmoudi, op. cit., 28-9; Bothe, in Fleck, op. cit., 485-515; 
Vagts, 91 AJIL (1997), 466-475.
290 Ogley, The Theory and Practice o f Neutrality in the Twentieth Century (1970), 147-149 (Switzerland), 156-157 
(Sweden).
291 Zeeman, van Panhuys et al., International Law in the Netherlands (1980), vol. ID, 352.
292 Bothe, in Fleck, op. cit., 485-7.
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The convention does not define the term ‘inviolable’. The conference records indicate that the 
provision was added to stress that neutral States do not only have the many duties listed in the 
convention, but that these flow from inhibitions of a general character that apply in the first place to 
belligerents. A rt 1 was seen as introducing the acts from winch belligerents must abstain.293 However, 
its exact scope is not clear, and two interpretations are possible. The narrow one views Art. 1 as the 
counterpart of the many duties incumbent on neutral States, which relate primarily to proving, 
enforcing and defending their neutrality and impartiality. The second one is more expansive, and 
confers on neutral territory immunity from interference by belligerents.294
The 1907 Hague Convention (XIII) concerning the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in 
Naval War does not contain a provision comparable to Art. 1 of Hague Convention (V), but it has two 
provisions on belligerent duties in the territorial waters of neutral states. Art. 1 of Hague 
Convention (XIII) obligates belligerents:
‘. . .to respect the sovereign rights of neutral Powers, and to abstain in neutral territory or neutral waters, 
from any act which would, if knowingly permitted by any Power, constitute a violation of neutrality’
Art. 2 stipulates that:
‘.. .any act of hostility, including capture and the exercise of the right of search, committed by belligerent 
warships in the territorial waters of a neutral Power, constitutes a violation of neutrality and is strictly 
forbidden’
The conference records indicate that both articles were inserted to stress the general duty of 
belligerents to respect the sovereignty of neutral States, indicating that the principle was the same as 
Art. 1 of the Hague Convention (V) for land warfare295 Particularly enlightening are the following 
passages from the report to the Third Commission on the rights and duties of neutral powers in naval 
war:
‘The starting-point of the regulations ought to be the sovereignty of the neutral State, which cannot be 
affected by the mere fact that a war exists in which it does not intend to participate. Its sovereignty should 
be respected by the belligerents, who cannot implicate it in the war or molest it with acts of hostility. At 
the same time neutrals cannot exercise their liberty as in time of peace; they ought not to ignore the 
existence of war.’296
293 Second Commission, Third Meeting: Scott, The Proceedings o f the Hague Peace Conferences. The Conference of 
1907, (1921), Vol. m , 48-49.
294 EC Experts Report, mentioned supra, 2.1, para 4.4.1.
295 Third Commission, Eight Meeting, Annex, in Scott, op. cit., 492.
296 Ibid., 491.
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and:
‘The principle which it is proper to affirm at the outset is the obligation incumbent upon belligerents to 
respect the sovereign rights of neutral States. This obligation is not a consequence of the war any more 
than the right of the State to inviolability of its territory is a consequence of its neutrality. The obligation 
and the right are inherent in the very existence of States... ’ 297
When read together, the clarifications provided by the travaux of both Hague Conventions 
strongly suggest that the articles in question were a reference to the general principles of State 
sovereignty and the duty of belligerents to respect these whilst engaged in warfare.
There is no comparable formal instrument for Aerial Warfare, although in 1923, a 
commission of jurists drafted the influential Hague Rules of Air Warfare.298 Art. 39 of these rules 
provides:
‘Belligerent aircraft are bound to respect the rights of neutral powers and to abstain within the jurisdiction 
of a neutral state from the commission of any act which it is the duty of that state to prevent ’
Art. 40 stipulates that:
‘The airspace of a neutral state is inviolable.’
Again, these provisions embrace both elements: a duty for belligerents to respect the 
sovereign rights of neutral States, and the narrower issue of impartiality.
There are many examples of State practice related to incidents during World War I and n, in 
which belligerents paid compensation for unlawful entry of neutral territory and destruction of neutral 
property. The 1938 Naulilaa case is one of the rare judicial cases to deal with unlawful acts of warfare 
committed by a belligerent (Germany) on neutral (Portuguese) territory.299 Most neutral States’ claims 
were settled only after protracted negotiations, ending either in diplomatic settlements, in formal 
treaties or the set-up of mixed tribunals. Thus, the USSR paid the Swedish government 40,000 
Swedish kroner because of an aerial attack upon Pajala during the First Finnish War.300 In 1949 the US
297 Ibid., 492.
298 Greenwood in Fleck, op. cit., 21.
299 2 RIAA (1949), 1011-1033; 1035-1077.
300 Whiteman, 11 Digest of International Law, 207.
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and Portugal reached an overall financial settlement for four incidents in which the former bombed the 
Portuguese territory of Macao.301
The overwhelming majority of documented cases concern Switzerland, which was a neutral in 
both world wars, and suffered from countless incursions by belligerents, not all apparently in error.302 
The most serious of these incidents concerned a full scale raid by the US Army on the Swiss territory 
of Shaflhausen on April 1, 1944, as a result of which 37 persons were killed and 50 gravely injured. 
The settlement of Swiss claims for compensation took several years.303
Three incidents merit special attention because of their potential environmental relevance.
In 1948 the Vatican presented the US with claims totalling $ 1.5 million for damage done to 
property of Vatican City, the neutrality of which the Allied had agreed to respect. The settlement of the 
claims took several years, and was finalised in 1956. The claim related to damage done to the papal 
residence of Castelgandolfo, which lies outside Vatican City south of Rome. It appears that the 
property had been damaged by air raids on legitimate targets in close proximity thereto. This example 
of State practice is remarkable for two reasons: firstly, compensation was paid by a former belligerent 
for transfrontier collateral damage caused to neutral property; secondly, the damage was caused by 
lawful military activities on enemy belligerent territory bordering or surrounding neutral territory.
A comparable example are the cases known as ‘Femschaden’, for which Switzerland tried to 
obtain compensation During World War II there were several instances in which Swiss border towns 
suffered destruction through shockwaves caused by bombing campaigns on belligerent territory.304
A further example with obvious environmental relevance were the consequences for 
Switzerland of the destruction of the Kembs Waterworks on October 7,1944 by the Royal Air Force. 
In the 24 hours following the busting of this German dam, the banked headwaters of the Rhine had 
dropped so much that riverboats in the Swiss harbour of Basle were damaged and grounded in the 
mud.305
What the above cases of State practice show is that belligerent States have in the past 
acknowledged liability for damage to neutral States, caused by lawful acts of war executed in the
301 Ibid., 209.
302 Bonjour, La Neutralite Suisse (1979), 128-129,173; Vagts, 91 AJIL (1997), 468.
303 Vagts, ibid., 468; Whiteman, op. cit., 208;
304 Jaccard, 87 Zeitschrift des Bemischen Juristen Vereins (1951), 231-232; Note that some claims were considered too 
remote for compensation: EC Experts Report, mentioned supra 2.1, para 4.4.5.
305 Jaccard, 87 Zeitschrift des Bemischen Juristen Vereins (1951), 231 fn. 1; Brickhill, The Dambusters (1983), 237-8.
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territory of enemy belligerent States. Whereas cases of transborder war damage caused e.g., by 
Germany to Switzerland, might have been solved on the basis of the principle of good neighbourliness 
between States, it was clear that this principle was hardly applicable in cases of air raids by the US and 
UK on German territory.
After World War I the Swiss Federal authorities examined the principles underlying their 
claims for war damage caused by belligerents. In a written opinion Burckhardt confirmed that they 
were not based on any special privileges Switzerland would be entitled to because of her perpetually 
neutral status, and that they were no more than the exercise of rights to which any State is entitled.306
C. Introduction to Contemporary Environmental Significance
The contemporary relevance of the principle of neutrality for environmental purposes is, as 
will be seen further, a matter of debate.307 The following observations seem nevertheless in order. The 
law (or principle) of neutrality is sometimes said to offer immunity to the territory and the environment 
of neutral States, and by analogy to international areas.308 Such arguments were also advanced before 
the IC J by States opposing the legality of nuclear weapons.309
These arguments, however, suffer from three difficulties. First, the traditional law of neutrality 
did not offer genuine immunity to neutral States from acts of warfare. The analysis conducted above310 
shows that the basis for the protection of neutral States in armed conflict was the duty of belligerents 
to respect other States’ sovereignty (and territorial integrity). Respect for other States’ sovereignty is a 
dynamic concept in international law: it may have a different content today compared with 1907. It is 
not so much a duty especially developed for armed conflict, but the expression of a general principle, 
applicable in peace and in war.
In this sense, armed conflict is but one example of a situation in which States are obligated to 
respect the sovereignty of third States. It may be that one is bound to find fewer peacetime cases in 
which State A causes damage to State B through activities executed in State C. Even so, under general
306 Guggenheim, Repertoire Suisse de Droit International Public (1975), vol. IV. 2291-2292.
307 Infra, 3.3.3.
308 EC Experts Report, mentioned supra, 2.1, para 6.1.1.
309 Written Submissions by Nauru, WHO Request, pt 2 (June 1995), 26-27, para 5.6; UNGA Request (September 
1995), 16-7, para 3.4; Egypt, UNGA Request (September 1995), 31-33.
310 Supra, 2.4.I.B.
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(peacetime) environmental law, these cases do not present any special problems of principle: military 
activities conducted by State A outside its jurisdiction are to be considered as being under State’s A 
control, and are therefore covered by Principle 21.
The second difficulty relates to international areas. The protection offered to neutral States 
under the traditional law of neutrality did not deal with environmental damage as such caused in 
international areas. The obvious reason is that the high seas - the only international area of historic 
relevance - formed part of the legitimate region of war by reason of customary law. The interface 
between the modem of law of die sea and the law of armed conflict will be further addressed below.311 
Yet, it seems prima facie questionable to apply the pre-ecological principle of neutrality, whatever its 
contents, by analogy to modern-day international areas.
The third difficulty relates to the incompatibility of neutrality with certain obligations arising 
from the UN Charter, which will now be discussed.
2.4.2. Post-Charter Neutrality Law
A. Influence of the UN Charter and Decline of the State of War
Under current international law, the legal relationship between belligerent States and third 
States is highly unsettled. There are two interrelated factors that led to this state of affairs: the 
influence of the UN Charter on the law of neutrality and the decline of the legal concept of the state of 
war in international relations.
The law of neutrality was developed in an era when resort to armed force was not in itself 
illegal, i.e., when war was regarded as a mere duel between States, to be treated in the same chivalrous 
and distant manner with which the matter was once viewed by domestic law.312 However, under the 
collective security systems that were developed during this century, inter-State use of armed force is 
no longer a ‘neutral’ activity: it is either legal or illegal. Provided that the Charter’s collective security
311 Infra, 3.1.1.
312 Wright, 47 AJIL (1953), 369.
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system works, no State should be left in doubt about the lawfulness of the position of each participant 
to the conflict. Positions of neutrality in the face of unlawful uses of force in international relations are 
logically and ideologically incompatible with the Charter.313
However, the Charter does not contain guidelines for when the collective security machinery 
is not operative or when it is blocked. During the 1980/88 Iran-Iraq War, the Security Council 
refrained from expressly identifying the initial aggressor, and was only able to adopt a binding 
decision on the conflict as a whole, seven years into the war.314 This contrasts sharply with the alacrity 
displayed by the Council in August 1990: a few hours after Iraq invaded Kuwait, the Council passed a 
resolution condemning the invasion and demanding an immediate withdrawal.315
Assuming that the Security Council does not perform its role of arbiter, that the General 
Assembly does not step in and that IC J is not seized of the matter either, there will be no binding or 
authoritative decision on the rights or wrongs of the use of force. As a result, States not involved in the 
conflict are left to their own devices; in these circumstances, it is commonly argued that the traditional 
body of neutrality law resumes importance.
At the same time, the significance of the state of war in international relations has declined. 
The decline is partly due to the outlawing of war by the UN Charter, although examinations of pre- 
Charter State practice have shown that non-war hostilities were quite common.316
Still, it has been demonstrated that a state of war is relevant in contemporary law and State 
practice.317 Many States continue to regard the creation of a legal state of war as a possibility. In 
addition, when a State currently decides to treat a particular conflict as ‘war’, whether involving use of 
armed force or not, it implies hostile intent, or extensive war aims - the ‘animus belligerandi’- and may 
now be qualified as a threat to use force in the sense of Art.2(4) of the UN Charter. This may influence 
the body of non-hostile relations between belligerents, and may entail consequences for relations 
between belligerents and third States.318 A state of war, as will be seen in the next chapter, has further
313 Lauterpacht, 23 BYIL 1946, 39#; Castren, op. cit. 433-5; Comments by Henkin, 19 ODIL (1988), 309# & 321; 
Green, The Contemporary Law, 321.
314 UN SC Res. 598 (1987); Weller, in Dekker & Post, op. cit., 71-90.
315 UN SC Res. 660 (1990).
316 Greenwood, 36ICLQ (1987), 284#, Post, 25 NYIL (1994), 88-89; Brownlie, International Law, 384-391.
317 McNair & Watts, op. cit., 5-6; Greenwood, 36 ICLQ (1987), 283#; Voelckel, 37 AFDI{1991), 7-24.
318 McNair & Watts, op. cit., 34-54; Greenwood, 36 ICLQ (1987), 294; Hudson, in Rowe, op. cit., 333-47.
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considerable implications for constitutional and municipal law, and is usually taken as a firm directive 
to municipal courts of the countries involved in the conflict.319
Some writers claim that whereas a legal state of war was once required to bring the law of 
neutrality into operation, today, the existence of armed conflict is sufficient.320 But this is not bome out 
by State practice. In the absence of general recognition that a certain conflict amounts to war, third 
States cannot be forced to accept positions of neutrality. This means that neutrality is invoked 
primarily in conflicts with a certain intensity.321 However, State practice indicates also that overt 
declarations of neutrality by third States are rare, and that there is much uncertainty about the validity 
of any appeal to or application of neutrality law by non-participating States.322
This may be illustrated by the attitudes of third States in the 1980/88 Ircm-Iraq and the 
1990/91 Gw^conflicts.
The first is often cited as a paradigm of a classic inter-State armed conflict during which the 
UN Charter system failed, as a result of which traditional neutrality law was revived. However, on 
closer examination this conflict shows that third States have felt free to select a panoply of positions 
vaiying from: (a) strict traditional neutrality; (b) a position variously termed ‘qualified’ neutrality, 
‘benevolent’ neutrality or ‘non-belligerency’, in which third States side with one of the parties to the 
conflict, discriminating against the State considered to be the aggressor, but without physically 
participating in the hostilities; or (c) a new form of impartiality and non-discrimination between 
belligerents, whereby no formal position is adopted and assistance is delivered to all sides.323
Most surprising of all examples is the picture of third States’ attitudes during the 1990/91 Gulf 
War. In spite of the clear identification of the aggressor by the Security Council, Iran and India 
officially proclaimed their neutrality.324 In addition, two UN Member States (Israel and Jordan) 
became more or less actively involved as non-belligerents on opposite sides of the conflict,325 whilst
319 Infra, 3.4.2.B.
320 Heintschel v. Heinegg & Donner, 37 GYIL (1994), 296.
321 Greenwood, 36 ICLQ (1987), 297-301; Schindler, in Ronzitti, op. cit., 212; David, Principes, 95; Oeter, Neutralitat 
und Wajfenhandel (1992); 256; Bothe, in Fleck, op. cit., 490-491.
322 Greenwood, 36 ICLQ (1987), 297$; Chinkin, Third Parties in International Law (1993), 311; Norton, 17 Harv. 
ZZa/(1976), 309-11; Brownlie, International Law, 401-3.
323 Ronzitti, op. cit., 7-10; Mehr, 20 Ocean Development and International Law, 105, (1989); De Guttry & Ronzitti, 
The Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988) and the Law of Naval Warfare (1993); Politakis, 35 GYIL (1992), 466$" and 25 ODIL 
(1994), 5#
324 Robert, in Entre les Lignes (1991), 91-9; Torrelli, 96 RGDIP (1992), 27-28, fii. 54.
325 DOD Interim Report to Congress, Conduct o f the Persian Gulf War, My 1991, section 12-7/8, and DOD Final 
Report to Congress, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, April 1992, Appendix on the Role of the Law of War, 31 ILM 
(1992) 638-640.
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two permanently neutral States (Austria and Switzerland) dropped their traditional stance of 
neutrality.326
B. Current Significance of Neutrality Law
Depending on the frequency with which the UN collective security system will work in the 
future, the law of neutrality may or may not retain some of its earlier importance. It is beyond doubt, 
however, that the Hague law on neutrality is in serious need of update and that such a restatement will 
have to reflect the more marginal position which neutrality occupies in contemporary international 
law.
Neutrality still has a place under the Charter, but subject to the provisions of contemporary 
international law. Unlike the putative ban on aggression contained in the Covenant of the League of 
Nations, the ban on the use of force in international relations is no longer inseparably linked to the 
effectiveness of the Security Council.327 This follows clearly from the celebrated statement by the ICJ 
in its very first judgement, the Corfu Charnel Case:
‘The Court can only regard the alleged right of intervention as the manifestation of a policy of force, such 
as has, in the past, given rise to most serious abuses and such as cannot, 'whatever be the present defects 
in international organization, find a place in international law...’. 328 (italics added)
The principle that the non-use of force is not dependent on the functioning of the collective 
security system was confirmed by the ICJ in the Nicaragua Case.329
This means that whilst a third State may assume the status of a neutral, she may be obligated 
to participate to varying degrees in economic and military enforcement measures based e.g., on Arts. 
25,41,42,43,48 and 103 of the UN Charter expressed in a binding resolution of the Security Council 
under Chapter VII. The latter will override many duties of traditional neutrality law. When the 
Security Council has identified one or more parties to a conflict as responsible for unlawful resort to 
force, third States are obligated to discriminate between belligerents. They are forbidden from assisting
326 For Austria see: Loibl & Brandstetter, 43 AJPIL (1992), 73-79; Landau, 46 Studia Diplomatica (1993), 70; Bring in 
Bring & Mahmoudi, op. cit., 38; For Switzerland see: Schindler, 44 AJPIL, (1992), 110; Bring, op. cit., 37-8; Thiirer, 
30 Archiv des Volkerrechts (1992), 63-85.
327 White, 1 Int. L. & Armed Conflict Comm. (1994), Pt. 1,16.
328 ICJ Rep. (1949), 35.
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the aggressor, but may lend assistance to the victim State. When the Security Council has taken 
preventive and enforcement action under Chapter VII of the Charter, third States may not rely on 
neutrality law to justify conduct incompatible with their duties as UN Members under e.g., Arts. 25 
and 103 of the Charter.330
C. Environmental Implications
To examine the relevance of the contemporary principle or law of neutrality for the protection 
of the environment during armed conflict, several hypotheses need to be discussed. In the examples 
below environmental damage is caused to a ‘third State’, modelled on the Iranian position during the 
1990/91 GulfconQkX: a UN Member State desirous of remaining outside the conflict.
In case A, the damage results from lawful military operations by a victim State exercising its 
right to self-defence; in case B, from unlawful military operations by the initial victim State; in case C, 
damage is caused by an identified aggressor State; in case D, by participants in an armed conflict in 
which the UN fail to identify the aggressor State.
The first hypothesis may have occurred in the 1990/91 GulfWzu. As UN Members, both Iran 
and Jordan were obligated to accept and execute decisions taken by the Security Council under 
Chapter VH, which included the authorisation given to Coalition States to use armed force against 
Iraq. Therefore, neither Iran nor Jordan could claim complete freedom from the effects of Coalition 
military actions to the same extent as they would be entitled under the traditional law of neutrality. An 
Iranian complaint about Coalition intrusions and environmental damage caused by Coalition States 
could not succeed on the basis of the traditional law of neutrality.
Although firm legal ground is lacking, it could be argued that as UN Members both countries 
could be expected to tolerate environmental damage caused on their territory by lawful actions of 
Coalition members. It was argued above that under present international law, environmental damage 
may occur as a by-product of lawful military activities, i.e., use of force that remains within the ambit 
of both the modem jus ad bellum and jus in bello.331
329 Merits, ICJ Rep. (1986),121, para 235.
330 San Remo Manual, Section in, Rules 7-8, Commentary, 79-80.
331 Supra, 2.3.3.
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Even if ‘third’ States as Iran and Jordan could not claim compensation on the basis of 
traditional neutrality law, there might be other paths that could be pursued. Following the imposition 
of economic sanctions actions against Iraq and occupied Kuwait,332 the Security Council established a 
sanctions committee. This was entrusted inter alia, with examining pursuant to Art. 50 of the UN 
Charter, requests from States that claimed to experience severe economic difficulties as a result of the 
embargo. In a parallel move the US administration established die ‘Brady’ Committee, which provided 
compensation to the most affected States.333 Although there is under present international law no firm 
legal basis, one could envisage a similar show of solidarity vis-a-vis States affected by military 
operations authorised by the Security Council.
A second avenue is the compensation scheme which the UN currently operates for peace­
keeping operations.334 Arguably, damage caused to neighbouring countries by lawful enforcement 
operations sanctioned by the Security Council should merit equal attention.
A third possibility is that UN Members who engage in UN- sanctioned operations and thereby 
cause environmental damage to third States, agree to compensate the latter, but recover ultimately 
from the aggressor State(s).335 This possibility will be examined further below.
Case B deals with environmental damage caused as a result of a violation of the laws of armed 
conflict - jus ad bellum or jus in bello - by the victim State and/or States that come to its rescue. Under 
the modem collective security system of the UN, the solution of case B is bound to be difficult, since it 
may involve controversy over the ultimate responsibility for enforcement actions that, although 
authorised by the Security Council, are legally not conducted by the UN itself. Nevertheless, a case 
can be made that the legality of the act causing damage should be immaterial for questions of 
compensation related to any UN authorised ‘peace’ operation. Arguably, the UN compensation 
scheme for peace-keeping operations should be extended to include environmental damage caused to 
‘third’ States during all UN- sanctioned peace-enforcement operations. The question of whether the 
UN can recover any moneys paid out from the peace-enforcing State(s) that transgressed the law, 
should not be of concern to the third State that suffered the environmental damage.
However, there is an alternative to the solution of both hypotheses A and B. Arguably, all 
damage caused to the territory of ‘third’ States results from a breach of jus ad bellum by the aggressor
332 SC Res. 661(1990), 2 December 1990;
333 Dupuy, P., 95 RGDIP (1991), 633.
334 Burger, in Grunawalt, et. al., op. cit., 340-1; Bourloyannis-Vrailas, 44 ICLQ (1995), 586, fii. 132
335 Szasz, ibid., 310.
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State and should hence be compensated by the latter. This alternative will be dealt with together with 
the next hypothesis.
The third hypothesis covers damage caused to a ‘third State’ by an aggressor State. The 
former is in principle entitled to compensation for all damage caused as a consequence of the jus ad 
bellum breach by the aggressor State. In this respect the legal relationship between the third State and 
the unlawful aggressor State resembles the principles on which compensation was payable under the 
traditional law of neutrality. This principle has been expressed in Art. 16 of Resolution 678 (1991), 
discussed above.336
However, it was seen above that the UNCC has adopted a wide interpretation of this 
provision. As a consequence, Iraq is liable not only for damage caused by Iraqi military operations that 
violated jus in bello, but also for those in compliance with jus in bello, and in addition for damage 
caused as a consequence of Coalition military operations. It was seen too that according to a more 
extreme view, Iraq could be held liable for damage caused by Coalition actions in violation of the laws 
of armed conflict.337 However, the latter view is open to challenge on two grounds: arguably, an illegal 
act by the Coalition would break the chain of causation between the unlawfiil Iraqi invasion and the 
subsequent damage; moreover, it would conflict with the principle of ex injuria jus non oritur.
In fact, the UNCC has not excluded Iranian claims despite the government’s assertion of 
neutrality in the 1990/91 Gw^conflict. From the point of view of Iranian citizens, this solution has to 
be applauded. There is no reason why any environmental damage caused to Iran as a direct result of 
the conflict, should not be considered by the UNCC as well.
Hypothesis D concerns cases that occur more frequently, but because of the uncertainty 
surrounding the legitimacy of positions of neutrality under the UN Charter, the solution is veiy 
unclear. Theoretically one could argue with e.g., Switzerland,338 that all States of the international 
community are under a duty to comply with the implications of the prohibition of the use of force 
under the UN Charter. Each State would hence be under an independent duty to identify the aggressor 
State, to refuse co-operation with the latter, and to discriminate in favour of the victim State.
Such duties would be incumbent on all States of the world community because of the jus 
cogens character of jus ad bellum, the legal force of which does not depend on the effectiveness of the
336 Supra, 2.3.4.
337 Supra, 2.3.5.
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Security Council. However, the State practice discussed above shows that in the absence of a firm 
directions from the Security Council, third States feel free to adopt a panoply of attitudes to 
belligerents. Space does not permit to go into detail about possible consequences which these varied 
attitudes may entail for environmental protection.
2.4.3. Conclusions on Neutrality Law
The present state of the law of neutrality is unsettled. Whilst there is no doubt about its 
continued importance, the determination of its exact contents presents many legal and conceptual 
difficulties. The above analysis has shown that it does not offer a universally reliable nor 
comprehensive legal foundation for the protection of the environment in armed conflict. Support for 
this contention may be found in the 1996 Advisory Opinion on Nuclear Weapons in which the ICJ 
admitted the existence of the ‘principle of neutrality’ and called it of fundamental character. However, 
the Court strongly suggested that its content was controversial and that it was subject to the relevant 
provisions of the UN Charter.339
nnn
338 See reasons given by the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs for its co-operation with the UN embargo 
against Iraq and Kuwait: Torrelli, 96 RGDIP (1992), 25 fh. 50.
339 ICJ Rep. (1996), 260-1, paras 88-90.
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Chapter Three
The Operation o f General International Environmental Law During 
International Armed Conflict
The main purpose of this chapter is to examine whether International Environmental Law 
(TFT.) continues to operate during international armed conflict, and if so, to what extent. The author 
will analyse the main legal principles involved, and propose a methodology to determine the legal 
effect of multilateral environmental agreements during international armed conflict.
This chapter is divided into five sections. The first section discusses instances of recent State 
practice, ending with State submissions before the ICJ in connection with the advisory requests on the 
Legality o f Nuclear Weapons. Section two deals with the relationship between general (peacetime) 
international law and the laws of armed conflict. Section three analyses the relationship between 
Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration and armed conflict. Section four deals with the relationship 
between multilateral environmental agreements and armed conflict. Section five contains the 
conclusions to this chapter and introduces the cases studies to be conducted in the second part of this 
study.
3.1. State Practice regarding IEL in Armed Conflict
Since IEL is a relatively young discipline, questions related to its applicability during 
international armed conflict have arisen only rarely. This section will examine the principal instances 
of State practice in this regard.
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3.1.1. The Tanker War and the Law o f the Sea
In mid-September 1980, Iraqi forces seized a disputed area from Iran, escalating a centuries 
old dispute over the Shaft- Al- Arab} During the ensuing eight years of war, third State shipping, and, 
in particular, oil tankers, fell victim to attacks from both belligerents in a campaign allegedly started in 
earnest by Iraq in 1984.2 In what came to be called the ‘Tanker War’, merchant ships suspected of 
sustaining the enemy’s war effort were attacked in and outside war zones proclaimed by both parties, 
very often without prior warning.3 Iran and Iraq also laid naval mines that were set adrift or came loose 
from their moorings, damaging third State ships.4 It is estimated that Iran and Iraq attacked more than 
400 merchant ships, 31 of which sank and 50 of which were declared total losses.
The Security Council passed four resolutions condemning the attacks on third State ships.5 It 
is reasonable to assume that much environmental damage was caused as a result of these attacks, but 
this aspect did not receive any media attention, and there are no scientific or legal assessments 
available.6
The Tanker War took place shortly after the conclusion of the 1982 UNCLOS convention. As 
seen earlier, UNCLOS is one of the most comprehensive environmental treaties concluded thus far.7 It 
lays down the obligation of all States ‘to protect and preserve the marine environment’ (Art. 192), 
confirms Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration (Art. 194 (2)), and enacts a framework envisaging 
all types of pollution of the marine environment, whatever the cause: vessel-source, land-based 
sources, dumping, exploitation of the seabed, and air pollution (Part XII).
To what extent the environmental obligations of belligerents, as recorded and developed in 
1982 UNCLOS, continued to operate during the Iran-fraq conflict is a complex question. The first 
hurdle is that since the convention was not yet in force, the customary status of many of its provisions 
was hotly debated in the beginning of the 1980s. Iran for instance, formally stated that it regarded the
1 Amin, 6 Marine Policy (1982), 193-94.
2 Saifi, in Malek, International Mediation and the Gulf War (1991), 38\jf:, Gioia, in De Guttry & Ronzitti, op. cit., 5%ff.
3 Gioia, op. cit.,12jf.\ Momtaz, ibid., 20ff.; Leckow, 37 ICLQ (1988), 629-44; Bothe, in Dekker & Post, op. cit., 210, 
and Comments by Bos, ibid., 218.
4 Nordquist & Wachenfeld, 31 GYIL (1988), 151.
5 540 (1983); 552 (1984); 582 (1986) and 598 (1987); see Ronzitti, in The Law of Naval Warfare (1988), 8 and further 
below in this subheading.
6 Walker, op. cit., 186-7.
7 Supra, 1.2.1. A.
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rights concerning transit passage and the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) as ‘contractual’ in nature, 
and therefore not available to non- parties such as the US and the UK.8
The second problem is that during the UNCLOS negotiations, State delegates had honoured a 
long tradition of reticence about discussing militaiy uses of the seas.9 As a result, the term ‘military 
activities’ appears only once in the Convention, in the provision listing the optional exceptions from 
the compulsory third party dispute settlement system.10 But this does not mean that the Convention 
does not regulate military activities at all. On the contrary, some authors contend that what motivated 
major military powers throughout the negotiations was precisely their concern to preserve the freedom 
to conduct military activities.11 To what extent this goal was achieved remains a matter of controversy, 
and requires detailed assessment article by article.
f
The uncertainty surrounding the regulation of military activit^ activities under the convention 
applies a fortiori, to questions of armed conflict. It is noteworthy that the ELC had stressed in regard to 
its first draft on the law of the sea - which ultimately led to the 1958 Law of the Sea Conventions - that 
it was only concerned with ‘the law of peace’.12 Many authors believe that like its predecessor treaties, 
1982 UNCLOS was drafted mainly for peacetime.13 But this presumption does not resolve the 
difficulties, for the Convention contains no provisions on its continuation, modification or abrogation 
in time of war or armed conflict
The tactical silence of the final treaty text on military uses of the seas in peace and war, has 
made it a document that can be invoked to support opposing theories. One example is the clause that 
seems to form a leitmotiv of the new law of the sea: in a few well-known provisions, the Convention 
rules that the high seas, the EEZ and the Area - that is the seabed and ocean floor and subsoil thereof 
beyond the limits of national jurisdiction - are reserved for peaceful purposes or uses.14 These clauses 
gave birth to two diametrically opposed positions: one asserting an outright prohibition of military 
activities (at least in the Area) and the other claiming that the ‘peaceful purposes/uses’ clause merely
8 Lowe, 10 Marine Policy (1986), 181; Nordquist & Wachenfeld, 31 GYIL (1988), 153-9; Politakis, 25 ODIL (1994) 
34; Leckow, 37 ICLQ (1988), 638; Chamey, 35 VJIL (1995), 385; On 6 October 1994, the 1982 Convention and the 
1994 Agreement amending Part XI were forwarded to the US Senate for ratification: Chamey, ibid., 380.
9 de Mur alt, 32 NILR (1985), 79-81.
10 Art. 298, (1) (b).
11 Oxman, 24 VJIL (1984), 810, 861-3; Schachte, 23 ODIL (1992), 55-69.
12 ILC, 8th session, Yearbook ILC, (1956), vol. II, pt 2, pp. 253, 256; UN Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1956/Add. 1; Baxter, 
The Law of International Waterways (1964), 204.
13 Oxman, 24 VJIL (1984), 811; Halkiopoulos, in Dupuy & Vignes, op. cit., vol. II, Chapter 24; Lowe, 12 Marine 
Policy (1988), 289.
14 Arts. 58(2), 88, 301.
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forbids actions in violation of Art. 2(4) of the UN Charter. The latter position, which undoubtedly 
coincides more with the opinio juris and State practice, has since gained the upper hand.15
Third States were divided on the many legal issues that arose during the 1980/88 Iran-Iraq 
conflict, including on the relationships between belligerents and States not directly involved in the 
conflict. Significantly though, the exercise of traditional belligerent rights was tolerated to a certain 
extent. Thus, Iran resorted to measures of economic warfare and several States accepted that she could 
exercise the right to visit and search third State merchant shipping.16
Although paralysed by cold-war rivalry, the Security Council managed to pass several 
resolutions on the conflict. In some of these, the Council stressed the importance of freedom 
navigation in the Gulf, and the protection of oil supplies from the region. In the light of what has been 
said above on the uncertain relationship between the law of the sea and military uses, it is noteworthy 
that the Council often invoked the law of the sea, and even appeared to suggest that freedom of 
navigation needed to prevail over belligerent activities.17
3.1 .2 . The 1983 Nowruz Oil Spill, the 1978 Kuwait Regional Convention and 
1982 UNCLOS
In 1983, a major incident would draw the world’s attention to another aspect of the conflict: 
its devastating impact on the environment. Late February or early March 1983, Iraqi bombers hit an 
already leaking Iranian offshore oil installation in the Nowruz field, about 60 Km from the Kharg 
Island oil port, destroying an unspecified number of Iranian oil tankers and oil installations, as well as 
six other wells nearby.18 The fire raged for weeks, and when the well blew out, 7,000 to 10,000 barrels
15 UN Department for Disarmament Affairs, The Naval Arms Race (1986), UN Doc. A/40/535,47-8, para 188; Rauch, 
28 GYIL (1985), 229-67; Tsarev, 12 Marine Policy (1988), 153-59; Vukas, in Dupuy & Vignes, op. cit., Vol. II, 
Chapter 23, 1235-38; Van Dyke, 15 Marine Policy (1991), 160-1; Heintschel von Heinegg & Donner, 37 GYIL (1994), 
305; Heintschel von Heinegg, in Fleck, op. cit., 414.
16 Lowe, 10 Marine Policy (1986), 183; Boczek, 20 ODIL (1990), 239-71; Heintschel von Heinegg, 30 CYIL (1992), 
102-5; For official positions see: Menefee, in De Guttry & Ronzitti, op. cit., 99-132 (US); Lowe, ibid., 241-253 (UK); 
Venturini, ibid., 523-529 (Security Council).
17 SC Res. 540 (1983), UN Doc. S/Res/540, paras 3 & 5; Res. 552 (1984), UN Doc. S/Res/552, 5th, fi^and 7th 
preambular paras, and operational paras 2 & 5; see Venturini, in De Guttry & Ronzitti, op. cit., 524-6; Ronzitti, in The 
Law of Naval Warfare (1988), 8.
18 The initial leak was caused by a well blow-out on 4 February 1983; Iraq would soon aggravate the spill by bombing 
the Nowruz oil field regularly: VI OSIR, No. 9 (11 March 1983), 1; No 10 (18 March 1983), 1; No 11 (25 March 
1983), 4-5.
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a day leaked into the Gulf. The spill has been ranked, among the three largest recorded in human 
history.19 It threatened Bahraini, Qatari and Saudi desalination plants, and affected other areas beyond 
belligerent jurisdiction. For instance, fish imports into the UAE were stopped because of oil 
contamination of fishing grounds.
The Nowruz Oil Spill became a turning point in the history of legal thinking about ‘war’ and 
the environment. Firstly, it is one of the few instances of documented State practice with respect to the 
effect of an ongoing inter-State armed conflict on the continued application of an international 
environmental treaty. The treaty at issue was the 1978 Kuwait Regional Convention for Co-operation 
on the Protection of the Marine Environment from Pollution (hereinafter ‘Kuwait Regional 
Convention’), to which both belligerents and many of the affected countries in the region were party.20 
It contains a provision, Art. IX (a) on ‘pollution emergencies’, which obligates all Parties to take 
individually and/or jointly’:
‘. . .all necessary measures,... to deal with pollution emergencies in the Sea Area, whatever the cause o f 
such emergencies, and to reduce or eliminate damage resulting therefrom’, (italics added).
Whether this and other provisions of the Convention remained relevant during the conflict 
will be discussed later in more detail. For now, it suffices to mention the following points. Several 
attempts were made both within and outside the Convention’s institutions to work out a temporary and 
partial cease-fire between belligerents in order to implement the Kuwait Regional Convention, stop the 
spillage, and remedy the ensuing environmental damage 21 These negotiations failed. Iraq continued 
bombing the source of the spill and made its position clear in letters addressed to the UN Secretary 
General. In these, Iraq rejected not only calls for a partial cease-fire so as to allow repairs to the wells, 
22 but asserted also that:
19 VIIOSIR, No 6 (10 February 1984), 1; Estimates of the total amount spilled vary from 1/2 to 6 million barrels: Price, 
in Price & Robinson, op. cit., 18; Literathy, ibid., 356.
20 ROPME was established by Arts. XV ff. of the Kuwait Regional Convention For Co-operation on the Protection of 
the Marine Environment From Pollution, done at Kuwait on 24 April 1978, concluded between Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, 
Kuwait, Oman, Qatar the UAE and Saudi Arabia: Kiss, Selected Multilateral Treaties in the Field o f the Environment 
(hereinafter ‘UNEP Compendium’), vol. I, (1983), 486.
21 Mann-Borgese, in Dupuy, R., The Future of the International Law of the Environment (1985), 106; VI OSIR, No 10 
(18 March 1983), 1; No 14 (15 April 1983), 1; No. 16 (29 April 1983), 1; No 21, 3 June 1983,1.
22 Letter of 5 May 1983 (UN Doc. S/15752), in which Iraq explained firstly, that part of the spill was due to a collision 
between a tanker and Nowruz 3 well, in which Iraq had no part and for which Iran failed to contact ROPME, and 
secondly, that Iran is to blame for rejecting all Iraqi peace proposals, and that as long as the war lasts, these types of 
damage are likely to continue to occur.
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‘...the provisions o f  the Kuwait Regional Convention on Cooperation for the Protection o f the Marine 
Environment from Pollution and the protocol annexed thereto have no effect in cases o f armed 
conflict.’ 23
There is no record of any official State reactions to this position. The Security Council chose 
not to condemn Iraq explicitly, but instead issued a disappointingly vague call to:
‘.. .both parties to refrain from any action that may endanger peace and security as well as marine life in 
the region of the Gulf 24
Following this incident, the EC commission asked five scholars to study the problem of the 
protection of the environment in times of armed conflict. Their 1985 report is - as far as is known - the 
first academic paper on the subject.25
The experts concluded that Principle 21, as confirmed by Art. 192 UNCLOS, applies in 
armed conflict between belligerents and third States, and by analogy to international areas. They 
maintained that armed conflict gives belligerents no right to deviate from treaty rules protecting the 
territorial integrity and the environment of third States. They pointed out that violation of 
environmental obligations may bring into play the rules of international law on the responsibility of 
States regardless of where the damage arose.
As for treaty relations between belligerents, the EC experts stated, inter alia, that the mere 
occurrence of armed conflict does not put an end ipso facto to their treaty obligations in regard to the 
protection of the environment; that parties to such conventions have the obligation to ensure that the 
rules on the protection of the environment are respected to the greatest extent possible and that in cases 
of environmental emergency all parties, including belligerents, need to co-operate in its prevention and 
accept offers of assistance. Finally, the expats believed that the ICRC or any other impartial 
humanitarian organisation can offer its services in this regard.26
23 Letter of 23 December 1983, UN Doc. S/16238: De Guttry & Ronzitti, op. cit., 89-90.
24 Para 5 of SC Res. 540 (1983), supra.
25 Bothe et ah, Protection of the Environment in Times of Armed Conflict, SJ/110/85 (on file with author), [hereinafter 
‘EC Experts Report’]; as yet unpublished, but it has passed into the public domain judging from the frequent references 
made to it: e.g., David, 20 RBDI (1987), 165; Plant, Environmental Protection, 5, fh. 6; Spieker, op. cit., 415; Gioia, 
op. cit., 77-78; Heintschel v. Heinegg & Donner, 37 GYIL (1994), 291, fn. 33.
26 EC Experts Report, Conclusions.
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Although intended to assist in the consideration of possible initiatives at the international 
level,27 the report does not appear to have led to any such actions, either by the EC or by any of its 
Member States.
Despite the obvious merit of many of its conclusions, the report has several weaknesses. First, 
it is important to note that it glosses over the fundamental changes which the UN Charter brought 
about in jus ad bellum and neutrality law.28 Because the study was done in 1984-5, the experts could 
perhaps be forgiven for thinking that the Security Council would never intervene in the Iran-Iraq 
conflict under Chapter VII of the Charter.29 However, it is submitted that the failings of the UN 
collective security system do not justify assessing the situation exclusively -as the report does- on the 
basis of neutrality law laid down before the first World War, nor using Switzerland as the only 
example of a ‘neutral’ third State.30 Even in cases of Security Council gridlock the Charter’s principles 
remain valid.31 Furthermore, in the post-Charter era it would be an oversimplification to equate third 
States’ attitudes to inter-State armed conflict with the type of neutrality practised by Switzerland in the 
first half of this century.32
Secondly, with respect to the issues raised by the Nowruz Oil Spill, the EC report asserts that 
since the Kuwait Regional Convention was negotiated for a region where tensions were known to 
exist, the phrase ‘whatever the cause of such emergencies’ (Art. IX) must be taken to include instances 
of environmental damage caused during armed conflict.33 This assertion as well as the rest of the 
conclusions of this seminal report will be evaluated later in this study.34
Thirdly, it was seen earlier that following Art. 237 of UNCLOS, regional conventions such as 
the 1978 Kuwait Convention pre-empt UNCLOS provided that their provisions are consistent with its 
general rules.35 However, since it predates the latter, the Kuwait Convention does not contain a 
provision comparable to Art. 192 (nor to Art. 194) of UNCLOS enunciating comprehensive and 
unqualified duties towards the marine environment.
27 Ibid., Introduction, in fine.
28 The report simply observes that the Security Council has rarely exercised its powers with respect to breach of the 
peace: EC Experts Report, para 4.1.
29 The Security Council only took binding measures under Chapter VII in 1987: UN Doc. S/RES/598 (1987) of 2 July 
1987.
30 EC Experts Report, paras 4.4.1., 4.4.2,4.3,4.4.5.
31 Supra, 2.4.2 B.
32 Supra, 2.4.2 A.
33 Para 3.
34 Infra, 3.3.3., 3.4.1., 7.4.3.
35 Supra, 1.2.1 A.; Heintschel v. Heinegg & Donner, 37 GYIL (1994), 311; Walker, op. cit., 189.
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Whilst acknowledging that the general obligation for States to protect the marine environment 
may only be emerging customary law, the EC experts asserted nonetheless that this principle applies to 
the environment of neutral States.36 Many naval lawyers doubt, however, whether the environmental 
provisions of UNCLOS can be transported in unqualified form to situations of armed conflict. One of 
the treaty’s negotiators, Professor Oxman, points out that Art. 192 was the principled foundation for a 
much more detailed body of rules that followed it, explicating its meaning and effect. He believes that 
applying it to armed conflict in unqualified form amounts to taking the provisions out of context, 
ignoring the lex specialis character of the laws of armed conflict as well as the fact that UNCLOS was 
not intended to regulate the latter.37 His views were confirmed by the naval specialists who drafted the 
1994 San Remo Manual. As mentioned earlier, whilst they agreed that States are under a general duty 
to protect the marine environment, they could not agree on creating corollary legal obligations during 
armed conflict.38
3.1.3. Operation 'Praying Mantis', Customary Law and the Kuwait Regional 
Convention
An examination of the legal effects of armed conflict on environmental treaties can only 
provide a partial answer to the problem of environmental protection during armed conflict. As 
demonstrated in the previous Chapter, a great part of the analysis will have to be devoted to the 
lawfulness of the use of force, both from the perspective ofjus in bello and jus ad bellum. Moreover, 
international armed conflict often creates situations that are beyond the immediate reach of the law of 
treaties, for the simple reason that not all States involved in the conflict may be bound by the same 
treaties. This can be illustrated with ‘Operation Praying Mantis’, the US code-name for a military 
operation carried out against Iran during the 1980/88 Iran-Iraq War, which forms part of the Oil 
Platforms case currently pending before the ICJ.39
It is common knowledge that the US, whilst officially proclaiming its neutrality in that Gulf 
conflict, was nevertheless heavily involved in armed confrontation against Iran. In an effort to deter 
Iran from attacking third State merchant shipping, the US decided in April 1988 to attack an Iranian
36 EC Experts Report, paras 1.2 & 5.3.1, conclusion 4; see too Feliciano, 14 Houston JIL (1992), 494-98.
37 In Grunawalt, et. al., op. cit., 577-8.
38 Supra, 2.2.3.B.
39 Case concerning Oil Platforms, ICJ General List No. 90.
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frigate and three offshore gas/oil separation platforms belonging to Iran. It later emerged that the US 
servicemen were instructed to avoid civilian casualties, collateral damage and ‘adverse environmental 
damage’ to every possible degree. Seen from a US perspective, Operation Praying Mantis was carried 
out according to plan, although Iran claimed that there were several civilian casualties.40
It is not clear whether any significant environmental damage was caused.41 But since the 
operation involved destruction of gas/oil separation platforms, there was at least a risk of serious 
marine pollution. If the US raid had caused a serious oil spill, the ascription of legal responsibility 
would defy easy analysis. Whilst Iran and Iraq were undisputedly the main belligerents of the conflict, 
the US’s claim to neutrality status is more tenuous, certainly as far as Operation Praying Mantis is 
concerned. Iran and Iraq are both Parties to the 1978 Kuwait Regional Convention, which deals with 
pollution emergencies, but which does not contain an explicit clause to deal with emergencies created
by or during armed conflict. In addition, in the above hypothesis, the pollution emergency in question
k .t I
would have been created by a State which does not only denied involvement in the conflict between 
Iran and Iraq, but which is not a party to the 1978 treaty.42
3.1.4. The 1991 Gulf War Oil Spill and the 1990 OPRC Convention
It was seen earlier that the 1991 Gulf War oil spill was largely - though not exclusively- 
caused by deliberate Iraqi actions: the opening valves at Iraqi and Kuwaiti oil terminals, and the 
dumping of oil from five Iraqi tankers.43 These actions were not only highly questionable from a jus in 
bello point of view,44 Iraq was also identified early on as having unlawfully resorted to the use of 
armed force in the first place.45
Whilst the exact size of the oil slick is debated, it is generally regarded as the largest ever 
recorded in human history. It destroyed marine flora and fauna, including migratory species of birds, 
and interrupted food chains for all forms of life in the Gulf. It ruined fishing grounds for many
40 Politakis, 25 ODIL (1994), 35-37.
41 Walker, op. cit., 186; Iran has thus far not presented detailed reparations claims to the ICJ: Preliminary Objection, 
judgement, 12 December 1996, para 9; It is as yet unclear whether she will introduce claims regarding environmental 
damage.
42 The US contends though, that there was a separate conflict between the US and Iran: ICJ General List No. 90, 
Preliminary Objection, judgement, 12 December 1996, para 18; Counter-Claim Order, 10 March 1998, paras 4, 25.
43 Supra, 2.1.
44 Supra, 2.2.1, 2.2.4., 2.2.5.B.
45 Supra, 2.3.4., 2.3.5, 2.4.2.C.
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countries in the region, and made beaches unsuitable for the tourist industry. The oil slick caused 
serious pollution of the Kuwaiti and Saudi Arabian coasts, and seriously threatened the latter’s 
desalinisation plants and offshore oil operations.46
In sharp contrast to the hands-off approach during the 1980/88 Iran-Iraq conflict, the 1991 
Gulf War oil spill elicited a massive world-wide response. Already during the hostilities, local teams in 
Saudi Arabia managed to save strategic installations from impending disaster 47 After the cessation of 
hostilities, an enormous environmental assessment and remediation effort got underway, involving an 
impressive number of local, regional, bilateral and multilateral organisations.48
More important for this study is the evidence that States and international organisations 
resorted to international institutional mechanisms agreed for ‘peacetime’ 49 Because of its territorial 
competence in the region, the instruments and institutions agreed under the 1978 Kuwait Regional 
Convention were an obvious candidate for the provision of emergency relief. Unfortunately, its Marine 
Emergency Mutual Aid Centre in Bahrain was not able to participate, having been incapacitated by a 
prolonged lack of funding. Nonetheless, another regional mechanism, the Gulf Area Oil Companies 
Mutual Aid Organisation, contributed successfully with equipment and services.50
The singular most impressive case was die IMO-led early implementation of the 1990 
International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Co-operation (OPRC 
Convention) and associated resolutions. The OPRC Convention had been signed barely two months 
earlier, and was not yet in force. Although the Convention was apparently concluded with accidental 
oil-spills in mind,51 the IMO considered the Gulf War oil spill to be of the ‘severity’ envisaged in 
Art. 7, justifying requests for assistance from government agencies in the countries threatened by the 
spill.52 The early implementation of this convention, five years before its official entry into force, 
provides together with the Nowruz Oil Spill one of the rare instances of State practice on the legal 
relationship between armed conflict and environmental treaty law. An evaluation of this case will 
follow later in this work.53
46 Roberts, in Grunawalt, et. al. op. cit., 248; Walker, ibid., 186.
47 Roberts, ibid.,. 254; Tawfiq & Olsen, op. cit., 337 on Saudi Aramco; but see Arkin, et. al., op. cit., 70 who criticise 
the delay in the Saudi response;
48 Gerges, in Price & Robinson, op. cit., 307; Krupp, & Jones, ibid., 315- 23; Alam, ibid., 359.
49 Note that most of the international relief effort took place after cessation; Infra, 7.4.2.
50 Tawfiq & Olsen, op. cit., 343; XIV OSIR, No. 6 (7 February 1991), 3.
51 Infra, 7.4.2.
52 IMO Report, mentioned supra, 2.1.
53 Infra, 7.4.2.
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3.1 .5 . State Submissions in the Advisory Opinions on Nuclear Weapons
In their submissions to the ICJ on the Legality of Nuclear Weapons, States were 
fundamentally divided on the question of the continued relevance of IEL during armed conflict.
Of the States opposing the legality of nuclear weapons, the Solomon Islands presented the 
most elaborate case in favour of the persistence of environmental obligations during armed conflict. 
To support their conclusions on the illegality of nuclear weapons, they argued that the use of these 
weapons was forbidden by current IEL.54 Their detailed contentions can be summarised as follows:
First, regarding the operation of international law in general during armed conflict, they 
submitted that: (1) State obligations arising from customary principles and treaty law apply in peace 
and in war, unless expressly mentioned otherwise; (2) Hence, multilateral treaties that contain no 
provisions expressly excluding their application in times of war, apply in times of war; (3) Multilateral 
treaties are not ipso facto terminated by the outbreak of armed conflict; (4) Belligerent parties can only 
suspend or terminate treaties in their relation with other belligerents; they are not allowed to do so in 
relation to neutral States;
Secondly, applied to IEL, it followed according the Solomon Islands that: (1) Principle 21 of 
the Stockholm Declaration, as reaffirmed by the Rio Declaration, continues to apply during armed 
conflict; (2) Multilateral environmental agreements continue to apply in times of armed conflict, 
unless expressly provided otherwise; (3) Several important environmental instruments establishing 
detailed regimes for various environmental sectors - i.e., freshwater resources, the marine environment, 
biodiversity, climate system and the ozone layer - continue to apply during armed conflict, since they 
phrase State duties in unconditional and general terms and contain no provision to the contrary; 
(4) The latter agreements have become widely supported and may reflect rules of customary 
international law; they establish obligations of such essential importance to the safeguarding and 
preservation of the human environment that their violation is an international crime; (5) Environmental 
agreements may only be suspended between belligerents during armed conflict; (6) Environmental 
agreements may not be suspended by belligerents vis-a-vis third States.55
54 Solomon Islands, Written Observations WHO Request (June 1994), 82-95; UNGA request (September 1995), 10-11; 
Oral Pleadings (Mr. Sands), CR/95,14 November 1995,71-3, paras 20-1.
55 See in more detail, infra, 3.4.1,3.4.3.
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Third, the Solomon Islands contended that since any use of nuclear weapons would violate 
environmental obligations arising from international custom and treaty law, their use was forbidden by 
current IEL. This amounts to a claim that IEL is not only concerned with States’ peacetime activities, 
but that it also regulates belligerent activities during armed conflict.
Neither the Court itself, nor States opposing the tenor of the advisory requests provided a frill 
answer to all of the above principled arguments. As will be seen below in the following two sections,56 
the Court accepted the opponents’ submission that the legal questions raised by the request from the 
UN General Assembly deserved a narrow answer, primarily limited to the worst-case scenario of the 
use of nuclear weapons.
3.2. The Relationship between Peacetime Law and the Law of Armed Conflict in 
General
Since IEL is primarily treaty-based law, a large portion of this study will be devoted to 
examining whether - and if so, how - multilateral environmental agreements apply during armed 
conflict. However, this question cannot be answered without exploring first the place of IEL and the 
laws of armed conflict in the international legal order.
It was once believed that the distinction between war and peace was so sharp that as soon as 
war had begun, the rules valid in peacetime were replaced by those of the laws of war.57 Even if not all 
wars were formally declared, there was little discussion that the rules prevailing during war were 
fundamentally different from those in peacetime. The relationship between the law of war and the law 
of peace was one of leges specicdis superseding the rest of international law.58 To complete this ideal 
picture, Grotius wrote ‘inter bellum et pacem nihil est medium’: there is no intermediate state between 
peace and war.59
However, since there were often hostilities without formal recognition of war, the delimitation 
between war and peace in State practice was not as clear as the theory implied.60 The traditional legal
56 Infra, 3.2. in fine and 3.4.1.
57 Post, 25 NYIL (1994), 90; Lalive (Arbitrator) in Dalmia Cement Ltd. V National Bank o f Pakistan (1976), 67 ILR, 
611 at 62, para 57 citing English law.
58 Post, 25 NYIL (1994), 90.
59 For a UK application see Janson v. Driefontein Consolidated Gold Mines (1902), AC 484.
60 Greenwood, 36ICLQ (1987), 284-7.
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dichotomy between war and peace was challenged by authors such as Schwarzenberger, who 
introduced the notion of status mixtus in international law.61 During a status mixtus, third States would 
be free to decide for themselves whether they wished to regulate their relations with belligerents in 
accordance with the law of peace or the law of war. Although much written about, the theory was 
controversial and has never been accepted in international law. Moreover, it did not solve the question 
of the delimitation between war and peace, but added a third state to be demarcated.62
It was seen in the previous chapter that the importance of the state of war has declined.63 
Particularly after World War II there has been a shift away from the traditional concept of war as a 
phenomenon characterised by the formal commencement of hostilities. Instead, in many instances use 
of armed force is limited in scale, or develops only gradually into a full-blown international conflict. 
Such hostilities may resemble traditional wars, but the contending parties may resist this label because 
of its incompatibility with the UN Charter.64
The disappearance of the dichotomy between war and peace raises the question of whether 
there is now a new dichotomy between armed conflict and ‘no armed conflict’ and what its 
implications are for general international law.
Whilst military lawyers have continued to maintain that the relationship between general 
international law, including environmental law, and the laws of armed conflict was one of lex 
generalis/lex specialist this assumption has in recent decades come under scrutiny, both from human 
rights and environmental legal perspective.
Since World War II the impact of humanitarian law and the development of human rights law 
has been such that there is now a core body of fundamental norms for the protection of the human 
person, which demands respect from States in peace and in war or in situations of armed conflict and 
of no armed conflict. This has been recognised by the ICJ in the Corfu Channel and in the Nicaragua 
cases, in which the Court stressed the exacting nature of certain elementaiy considerations of 
humanity, applicable in peace and war.66
61 Schwarzenberger & Brown, A Manual of International Law (1976), 151-2; McNair & Watts, op. cit., 2-3; Post, 25 
NYIL (1994), 92-93.
62 Post, ibid., 93.
63 Supra, 2.4.2.A.
64 Delbruck, 4 EPIL, (1982), 313; McNair & Watts, op. cit., 18-19.
65 Green, 29 CYIL (1991), 226; Shearer, in Grunawalt, et. al., op. cit., 550.
66 Corfu Channel Case, ICJ Rep. (1949), 22; Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (merits), 
ICJ Rep. (1986), 112, para 215.
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Similarly, as seen in the first section of this study, since the 1980s it has been argued more 
often that States’ rights and duties with respect to the environment continue to operate during armed 
conflict. In this view, armed conflict offers no excuse for States to deviate from important duties 
towards the environment arising from general international law.
These assertions have come to a head in States’ written and oral submissions to the ICJ 
regarding the requests for an advisory opinion on the legality o f nuclear weapons. Many States 
opposing the legality of nuclear weapons argued that there exists a principle of ‘environmental 
security’ which outlaws the threat or use of these weapons of mass destruction. They asserted that 
general international law prohibits a State from carrying out or authorising activities which damage 
human health and the environment and that international obligations for the protection of human 
health, the environment and human rights apply during armed conflict.67
None of proponents of the legality of nuclear weapons invoked the lex generalis/lex specialis 
argument explicitly, although this was implied by their assertions that the principal purpose of 
environmental treaties and norms was to protect the environment in time of peace. Thus, the US 
argued that none of the environmental instruments referred to was negotiated with the intention that it 
would be applicable to nuclear weapons.68 In addition she warned that if the ICJ were to decide that 
the use of nuclear weapons was prohibited or restricted by international environmental agreements or 
principles, very serious damage could be done to international co-operation and the development of 
legal norms in this area.69 The UK submitted that the real issue before the Court was whether any rules 
of human rights or environmental protection could be construed as prohibiting the use or threat of use 
of nuclear weapons when carried out by way of legitimate self-defence.70
In its advisory opinion on the General Assembly request the ICJ took note of the arguments 
advanced by the two camps.71 Accepting the UK submission it judged that:
‘.. .the issue is not whether the treaties relating to the protection of the environment are or not applicable 
during an armed conflict, but rather whether the obligations stemming from these treaties were intended 
to be obligations of total restraint during military conflict.’72
67 See Written Statements by Mexico, WHO Request (June 1994), 9-11; Samoa, WHO Request (September 1994), 3; 
Malaysia, WHO Request (September 1994), 10-11; (June 1995), 27-29; India, WHO Request (June 1995), 12-3; 
Nauru, (Memorial I), WHO Request (September 1994), 36-45; (part II), WHO Request, (June 1995), 27-28; Solomon 
Islands, UNGA Request (June 1995), 77-97, paras 4.1-.49; (September 1995), 10, para 3.112; Egypt, UNGA Request 
(June 1995), 17-8; Egypt, UNGA Request, (September 1995), 29-31; Nauru, (September 1995), 26 -27.
68 Written Statements by US, WHO Request (June 1995), 10-14; UNGA Request (June 1995), 34-42.
69 Written Statements by US, WHO Request (June 1995), 18-9; UNGA Request (June 1995), 42.
70 Written Statement, UNGA Request (June 1995), 64, para 3.89.
71 ICJ Rep. (1996), 241-2, paras 27-8.
72 Ibid., 242, para 30.
154
C h a p t e r  Th r e e : Th e  L e x  G e n e r a u s
The Court further held:
‘. . .that the most directly relevant applicable law governing the question of which it was seized, is that 
relating to the use of force enshrined in the United Nations Charter and the law applicable in armed 
conflict which regulates the conduct of hostilities, together with any specific treaties on nuclear weapons 
that the Court might determine to be relevant.’73
The answer given by the Court transcends the issue of the worst-case scenario of the use of 
nuclear weapons, for the opinion indicates that the law of armed conflict operates as lex specicdis with 
respect to questions of interpretation related to human rights instruments and environmental 
obligations arising from general international law. This follows directly from the Court’s analysis of 
the human right to life in armed conflict, which preceded its examination of environmental obligations. 
The Court observed that, in principle, the right not arbitrarily to be deprived of one’s life applies also 
in hostilities, but that the test of what is an arbitrary deprivation of life, needs to be determined by:
‘.. .the applicable lex specialis, namely, the law applicable in armed conflict which is designed to regulate 
the conduct of hostilities.’74
The Court then turned to environmental law. It accepted that States are under a general 
obligation to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction and control respect the environment of other 
States or of areas beyond national control.75 However, it rejected the view that this would entail an 
obligation of total restraint in armed conflict or a ban on the use of force in self-defence.76
The above does not mean that the Court regards environmental law as irrelevant in armed 
conflict. On the contrary, as was seen earlier,77 it has firmly laid to rest any suggestion that the duty to 
protect the environment would be of concern to States only in times of peace:
‘States must take environmental considerations into account when assessing what is necessary and ] 
proportionate in the pursuit of legitimate military objectives. Respect for the environment is one of the / 
eteffients that go to assessing whether an action is in conformity with the principles of necessity and 1 
proportionality.’78
73 Ibid., 243, para 34.
74 Ibid., 240, para 25.
75 Ibid., 241-2, para 29.
76 Ibid., 242, para 30.
77 Supra, 1.2.2. A, 2.2.1., 2.2.5.B, 2.3.2.
78 Ibid., 242, para 30, in fine.
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The Court also recalled its recent Order in the Request for an Examination o f the Situation 
Case, in which it concluded that it was ‘without prejudice to the obligations of States to respect and 
protect the natural environment’.79 In the advisory opinion the Court stressed that:
‘Although that statement was made in the context of nuclear testing, it naturally also applies to the actual 
use of nuclear weapons in armed conflict’80
However, the opinion remains vague about how exactly environmental concerns might inform 
the law of armed conflict. As seen in the previous chapter, the advisory opinion has been understood 
as confirming that the requirements of necessity and proportionality apply to use of armed force both 
from the perspective ofjus ad bellum and jus in bello.81
The paragraphs in which the ICJ discusses the need to take environmental aspects into 
consideration during belligerent activities touches on both disciplines.82 Whether the explicit reference 
to the principles of necessity and proportionality in this context includes both jus ad bellum and jus in 
bello is less clear.83 As for jus in bello, the opinion suggests that the new environmental jus in bello 
provisions of Additional Protocol I do not constitute customary law, and that limitations on the causing 
of environmental damage in armed conflict derive primarily from the abstract principles of the law of 
armed conflict discussed in the previous chapter.84
In conclusion, the inference to be drawn from this advisory opinion is that whilst certain State 
obligations towards the environment continue to apply during armed conflict, they cannot be used to 
override the law of armed conflict, and certainly not rights derived from jus ad bellum.
Accordingly, even ‘massive pollution of the atmosphere and the seas’, which the ILC has 
termed an international crime,85 could theoretically be justified in armed conflict provided that inter 
alia, the customary requirements of necessity and proportionally are complied with.
The implications for the worst-case scenario of use of nuclear weapons are debated. As seen 
before, the majority opinion has been understood by many to imply, or at least, leave open the 
possibility that the use of nuclear weapons would inevitably violate jus in bello, but that their use
79 Order of 22 September 1995,1.C.J. Rep. (1995), 306, para. 64; Supra, 1.2.2. A.
80 ICJ Rep. (1996), 243, para 32.
81 Supra, 2.3.2.
82 ICJ Rep. (1996), 242, paras 30-31.
83 Doswald-Beck, ICRC Review (1997), No. 316, 35-55.
84 Greenwood, ibid., 35-55; Supra, 221,225.
85 ILC Report (1976), UN Doc. A/31/10,266; Draft Articles on State Responsibility so far adopted by the International 
Law Commission, Part I, Art. 19.1 (d), Yearbook ILC, (1980), vol. II, 30; Supra, 1.3.2.
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would nevertheless be justified in extreme cases of self-defence.86 In his dissenting opinion Judge 
Schwebel used the 1990/91 Gulf conflict to illustrate circumstances in which the threat of the use of 
nuclear weapons might have been justified. He acknowledged though, that the consequences of their 
use would have been ‘catastrophic’, not only for the coalition forces and populations, but also for the 
principles of collective security and for the United Nations.87
3.3. The Relationship between Principle 21 and International Armed Conflict
3.3.1. Armed Conflict, UNCHE and UNCED
The Court’s view on the relationship between general international law and the laws of armed 
conflict is supported by an analysis of the relationship between Principle 21 and armed conflict.
The starting point of this analysis is that Principle 21 has a general tenor, and that it can be 
understood as embracing all types of State ‘activities’, including military activities. As seen above, it 
was recently argued before the ICJ that Principle 21 applies in peace and in war.88 More specifically it 
was asserted that:
‘...use of the word control indicates that the obligation extends to activities carried out by States,
through, for example, submarines, vessels or aircraft which might launch a nuclear weapon from an area
beyond its national jurisdiction.’89
Accordingly, Principle 21 was said to apply to the use of nuclear weapons in war or other 
armed conflict.90
It is true that normally the actions of a State’s armed forces should be regarded as within its 
jurisdiction or control; hence, State military actions are subject to die requirement not to cause severe 
damage to other States or areas beyond national jurisdiction. But does this include armed conflict?
86 The dispositif 2 E, ICJ Rep. (1996), 266, as interpreted by several Judges: Sep. Op. Fleischhaer, ibid., 308; Diss. 
Ops., by Shahbuddeen, ibid., 377-8,426; by Koroma, ibid., 560; by Higgins, ibid., 590, para 29.
87 Diss. Op. Schwebel, ICJ Rep. (1996), 328.
88 Solomon Islands, Written Statement, WHO Request (June 1994), para 4.17; Oral Pleading (Mr. Sands), CR/95, 14 
November 1995,71-2, para 20.
89 Solomon Islands, Written Statement, WHO Request (June 1994), 83, para 4.17.
90 Ibid., 84-5, para 4.20.
157
C h a p t e r  Th r e e : Th e  L e x  G e n e r a l /s
In the previous chapter it was explained in detail how as a result of the Vietnam conflict 
environmental concerns increasingly informed the development of environmental jus in bello and 
disarmament law from the 1970s onwards.91 Principle 21 was formulated at the 1972 Stockholm 
Conference (UNCHE). This widely attended international environmental conference was held against 
the background of the Vietnam conflict which brought allegations that the US had engaged in a policy 
of deliberately targeting the environment, sometimes termed ‘ecocide’. It may hence seem peculiar that 
the impact of war on the environment was kept off the agenda. The reason is that the issue was 
considered politically sensitive: it was feared by the organisers that broaching the problem would be 
interpreted as direct criticism of the ongoing US military operations. This did not prevent the then 
Swedish Prime Minister Palme, from sharply denouncing the omission in his opening statement at the 
Conference.92
Nevertheless, the environmental aspects of Vietnam were not totally ignored. Not only were 
they discussed at a rival parallel conference held simultaneously in Stockholm,93 during the official 
UN conference Tanzania attempted to break the silence by proposing the condemnation o f:
‘. . .the use of chemical and biological agents in wars of aggression the use of which degrade man and his
• 94en v iro n m en t.
This initiative failed and the only principle of the Stockholm Declaration to deal with armed 
conflict - albeit implicitly - is Principle 26. Far from condemning environmental disruption for military 
purposes, it places most of the issues raised by Vietnam in the politically less sensitive context of 
disarmament negotiations and the use of weapons of mass destruction:
‘Man and his environment must be spared the effects of nuclear weapons and all other means of mass 
destruction. States must strive to reach prompt agreement, in the relevant international organs, on the 
elimination and complete destruction of such weapons’.95
Twenty years later at UNCED, held in Rio in June 1992, history appeared to repeat itself. It 
was seen in the previous Chapter, that in the months following the 1990/91 Gulf conflict, the adequacy 
of existing law with respect to protection of the environment during armed conflict became the subject 
of world-wide debate.96 Most of these early debates centred on the adequacy of the environmental jus
91 Supra, 2.1.
92 Cited by Blix, in War and Environment, 122.
93 Falk, in Plant, Environmental Protection, 86.
94 Sohn, 14 Harv. 7L/(1973), 509.
95 Sohn, ibid., 508-11; Blix, op. cit., 122-23.
96 Supra, 2.1.
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in bello, although questions were raised regarding the possible contribution of general IEL on the 
subject. In a reaction to the environmental legacy of the 1990/91 conflict, the EC had introduced 
the condemnation of ‘ecological crimes’ for inclusion in UNCED’s agenda. Since the conference was 
tasked with reviewing and updating the Stockholm Declaration, it was offered an excellent opportunity 
to state that Principle 21 would be applicable during armed conflict as well. But following debates in 
the UN General Assembly and a preparatory committee, the main UNCED Committee side-stepped 
the issue. Although a paragraph was inserted into Agenda 21, it uses only exhortatory language, which 
adds little of substance:
‘Measures in accordance with international law should be considered to address, in times of armed 
conflict, large-scale destruction of die environment that cannot be justified under international law. The 
General Assembly and its Sixth Committee are die appropriate forums to deal with the subject The 
specific competence and the role of the International Committee of the Red Cross should be taken into 
account’.97
More importantly, by mandating the General Assembly’s Sixth Committee and particularly 
the ICRC, to study the issue further, UNCED’s handling of the matter strongly suggests that the issue 
was a problem for the laws of armed conflict, and not for general IEL.
The only principle of the Rio Declaration to deal with armed conflict is Principle 24, which
reads:
‘Warfare is inherently destructive of sustainable development States should therefore respect 
international law providing protection for die environment in times of aimed conflict and co-operate in its 
further development as necessary’.
The weakness of these recommendations is apparent from the fact that during the 1997 UN 
special session (UNGASS) the subject of military activities or armed conflict was, as far as can be 
judged from the available documentation, not discussed.98
To conclude, the travaux preparatoires of the Stockholm and Rio declarations show that 
delegates to these widely attended environmental conferences - UNCHE and UNCED - thought that 
the subject of protection of the environment during armed conflict needed to be addressed in 
specialised forums dealing with the lex specialis, that is, the laws of armed conflict and disarmament 
negotiations.
97 Paragraph 39.6 of Agenda 21; Sand, 4 EJIL (1993), 384.
98 Supra, 1.1.1; but see ICRC statement at UNGASS, 23-27 June 1997, mentioned supra, 1.2.
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However, since historical antecedents are not necessarily decisive, the question of the 
relationship between Principle 21 and armed conflict merits further attention. Offensive or defensive 
operations in the course of armed conflict may be subject to Principle 21, if not because of the general 
tenor of the Principle, perhaps by analogy to peacetime activities. A proper evaluation of this 
hypothesis requires an examination of the nature of armed conflict and of its impact on the 
environment; What are the parallels, if any, with States’ peacetime activities?
3.3.2. Hostile Military Activities compared to Peacetime Military Activities
It is difficult to escape the conclusion that State activities during armed conflict differ 
fundamentally from State activities in peacetime.
Whilst the prohibition of transfrontier pollution has since 1972 evolved to include activities 
within States’ control, the most common case to which Principle 21 applies in peacetime, is that of 
activities within a State’s territory or jurisdiction causing transboundary pollution to another State’s 
territory or jurisdiction. By contrast, hostile military activity is either directed at, or takes place in areas 
that he per definition beyond a State’s jurisdiction: either in international areas or within opponents’ 
territory or jurisdiction.
Moreover, the nature of hostile activity seems hardly reconcilable with the first premise of 
Principle 21 which obligates States to take all reasonable measures to prevent, reduce and control 
transboundary pollution." Rather than preventing the occurrence of transfrontier damage, belligerent 
activities imply the deliberate infliction of harm directed at other States. This is recognised by the law 
of armed conflict which acknowledges in the view of one commentator:
‘... that intentional destruction of life and property is a necessary aspect of the conduct of hostilities,
and that collateral damage and injury - even to noncombatants, civilian property and the natural
environment - are an inevitable (though regrettable) consequence. ,10°
These negative environmental consequences set use of armed force apart from State activities 
in peacetime: armed conflict implies necessarily that the environment will be targeted and destroyed - 
often intentionally. In legal terms, therefore, armed conflict is distinct from all other human activities, 
even from those that are routinely regarded as ‘(ultra-) hazardous’, such as activities relating to the
99 Supra, 1.2.2 A.
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nuclear energy sector. According to the ILC, (ultra-) hazardous (peacetime) activity is one with a low 
probability for catastrophic damage.101 By contrast, State activities in the course of armed conflict 
appear to cany a high probability of all kinds of environmental damage: from the negligible to the 
catastrophic.
General environmental law has evolved from principles such as good neighbourliness and 
respect for other States’ sovereignty and territorial integrity;102 the hypothesis of damage deliberately 
inflicted on other States seems entirely anathema to it. Therefore, at least between belligerents, hostile 
military activity is a direct negation of Principle 21.103
There remains of course the question, already broached in the previous chapter, whether the 
principle remains valid for relationships between belligerents and third States, and how the principle 
might apply in armed conflict in international areas.
3.3 .3 . Neutrality and Principle 21
According to a view primarily held in environmental circles, Principle 21 remains valid in 
armed conflict for relationships between belligerents and neutrals and for relationships between 
belligerents and international areas. This was also explicitly argued in the recent requests for an 
advisory opinion on the legality of nuclear weapons.104
In the literature several grounds are offered for these contentions. The argument seems based 
on a presumed legal dichotomy between belligerents and neutrals and on the lex generalis/lex specialis 
rule. Accordingly, whilst it is admitted that armed conflict changes the law applicable between 
belligerents, it is argued that belligerents and neutrals remain governed by the law of peace, including 
Principle 21, which is then applied by analogy to international areas.105 In addition, it is argued that 
there is no principle under customary law according to which neutral States would have to tolerate 
damage to their territories caused by belligerent activity.106
100 Matheson, 91AJIL (1997), 423.
101 ILC Report (1994), UN Doc. A/49/10, Chapter V, 400.
102 Supra, I.2.2.A.
103 Shearer, in Grunawalt, et al., op. cit., 550.
104 Solomon Islands, Written Statement, WHO Request, (June 1994), 95, para 4.45.
105 EC Experts Report, conclusions 2 & 4; Plant, in Fox & Meyer, op. cit., 164; Tarasofsky, 24 NYIL (1993), 69.
106 Bothe, 34 GYIL (1991), 59; Heintschel v. Heinegg & Donner, 37 GYIL (1994), 297-8.
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Such abstract conclusions seem fraught with difficulties on various grounds. First, any theory 
that relies in one way or another on a strict division between war and peace on the one hand, and a 
further dichotomy between belligerent and neutral States on the other, is problematic. It was seen 
earlier that under the modem jus ad bellum it has become much harder to distinguish between neutral 
and belligerent or co-belligerent States. What is more, positions of complete neutrality are, strictly 
speaking, incompatible with the UN Charter’s principles.107 Therefore, a scheme based on a 
dichotomy between belligerent and neutral States may at the very least, prove of little use in cases 
where the neutrality of third States, i.e., of those not directly involved in the hostilities, is controversial 
or contested.
Secondly, it was seen earlier that whilst there is no longer a strict division between the law of 
peace and the law of war, the ICJ has taken the view in its 1996 Advisory Opinion on Nuclear 
Weapons that the lex generalis/lex specialis rule continues to govern questions relating to conduct of 
belligerent activities.108 However, the Court was extremely reluctant to draw any firm conclusions on 
the implications of the use of nuclear weapons in regard to third States.
The Court held that neutrality was a principle of fundamental character applicable in armed 
conflict, but added that its content was debated and that its application was subject to the relevant 
provisions of the UN Charter.109 The latter remark supports the view that reliance on the principle of 
neutrality is at least debatable in cases where the Security Council takes binding decisions obligating 
UN Members to discriminate between aggressor and victim States. This conclusion is further 
underscored by the fact that the Court stressed that it could not lose sight:
‘...o f the fundamental right of every State to survival, and thus its right to resort to self-defence, in
accordance with Article 51 of the Charter, when its survival is at stake.’110
As for the application of the principle of neutrality to the use of nuclear weapons, the ICJ 
noted that some States argued that their effects cannot be contained within the territories of the 
contending States,111 whilst others States objected that this was not necessarily the case.112 The Court 
held that it did not have sufficient elements at its disposal to determine the validity of the latter view.113
107 Supra, 2.4.2 A, 2.4.2.B.
108 Supra, 3.2.
109 ICJ Rep. (1996), 261, para 89.
110 Ibid., 263, para 96.
111 Ibid., 262, para 93.
112 UK, Written Statement, WHO Request (September 1994), 92, para 44; UNGA Request (June 1995), 58, para 3.78; 
Advisory Opinion, ICJ Rep. (1996), 262, para 94.
113 Ibid., 262-3, paras 94,97.
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This part of the judgement could be construed as indicating that - had the Court found that 
there was sufficient evidence that the effects of nuclear weapons can never be contained within the 
‘territories of the contending States’- it might have found their use contrary to the principle of 
neutrality.
However, such a conclusion is not necessarily warranted. First, by insisting on the 
fundamental right of every State to survival, the Court has left open the controversial possibility that 
resort to such weapons might be justified regardless of compatibility with the principles ofjus in bello. 
Secondly, even if this interpretation of the judgement is not accepted it is clear that the opinion does 
not indicate what level of environmental protection non-contending States might derive from the 
principle of neutrality in armed conflict. According to the Principal Deputy Legal Adviser of the US 
State Department, the opinion leads to the proposition that a lawful exercise of self-defence under 
Art. 51 -one which meets the requirements of necessity and proportionality- would not violate 
neutrality; hence there would be no absolute prohibition on attacks that would cause collateral damage 
in a neutral State.114
Thirdly, the advisory opinion does not address the issue of environmental damage in relation 
to international areas. It was argued earlier that the traditional law of neutrality was premised on 
respect for the territorial sovereignty of States, and that it cannot be construed to confer any type of 
‘immunity’ from belligerent interference to international areas.115 In addition, it should not be 
overlooked that under general international law, the application of Principle 21 to international areas 
or to the environment per se is heavily qualified. Whilst the duty to protect the environment per se 
might be an emerging principle of customary international law, State practice indicates that it is 
primarily other States’ rights and interests in these environments that are protected.116
In conclusion, resort to a legal dichotomy between war and peace, the lex generalis/lex 
specialis rule, the principle of neutrality or an analogy between peacetime and belligerent military 
activities does not offer a sufficiently firm, nor a universal legal basis for the protection of 
environments beyond the jurisdiction of the contending States during armed conflict.
114 Matheson, 91AJIL (1997), 427-8.
115 Supra, 2.4.l.C.
n* Supra, 1.3.2.
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3.4. The Relationship between Multilateral Environmental Agreements and 
International Armed Conflict
3.4 .1 . Introduction
It was seen earlier that IEL is primarily treaty-based law.117 Although treaty law cannot 
entirely be divorced from customary international law, it forms to a great extent a self-contained 
source of international law and merits separate analysis.118
The purpose of this section is to examine whether multilateral environmental agreements 
continue to apply during armed conflict, and if so to what extent. The resolution of this question must 
be sought in an analysis of the relationship between multilateral environmental agreements and armed 
conflict, and requires answers to the following fundamental questions: Can these agreements be said to 
apply at all to belligerent activities during international armed conflict? If so, do contracting parties 
have the legal right to terminate or suspend the operation of such agreements during the conflict?
One school of thought opposes the continued relevance of multilateral environmental 
agreements during armed conflict on the grounds that: (a) these agreements are not applicable to 
belligerent activities or (b) that even if they may be said to apply, contracting parties have the legal 
right to terminate or suspend the operation of these agreements during armed conflict.119
Advocates of the continued relevance of multilateral environmental agreements during armed 
conflict would argue that: (a) these agreements apply to all State activities, even in armed conflict; and 
(b) that armed conflict is not a sufficient ground to terminate or suspend the operation of these 
agreements.120
Apart from these positions at opposite ends of the spectrum, there are a variety of compromise 
positions possible. For instance, some adherents to the first school of thought concede that these 
agreements may apply during armed conflict, but that armed conflict is a sufficient ground in itself for
117 Supra, 1.2.1.
118 Note that the Solomon Islands argued that most global and regional environmental treaties had become part of 
general (customary) international law: Advisory Opinion on the Legality of Nuclear Weapons, Written Statement, 
WHO Request (June 1994), para 4.21-4.32, and specifically para 4.22.
119 E.g., State submissions, supra, 3.2.
120 E.g., State submissions, supra, 3.1.5.
164
C h a p t e r  Th r e e : Th e  L e x  G e n e r a u s
belligerents to suspend or terminate the agreements between themselves. Others assert that the 
question is simply not relevant since environmental treaties rarely deal with the kind of damage caused 
during warfare.121 It is also argued that belligerents may suspend the operation of such agreements if 
incompatible with armed conflict, but only between themselves, and that in any case, the suspension of 
such agreements will not affect obligations which are binding on States regardless of treaty law.
It was seen earlier that there exists State practice on the legal effect of armed conflict on 
multilateral environmental agreements, but that it raises more questions than it answers.122
As for legal doctrine, it was seen that the EC Expert report written during the 1980/88 Iran- 
Iraq conflict was the first legal study devoted to the subject. Following the 1990/91 Gulf conflict, the 
need to study the issue of the legal effect of armed conflict on multilateral environmental treaties has 
been raised regularly.123 However, the scope of most of the studies conducted thus far is severely 
restricted. Not only do they concentrate primarily on the environmental treaties directly affected by 
these conflicts, almost invariably, reliance is placed on pre-Charter law and legal doctrine.124 The 
suggestions made by an ICRC Committee of Experts to study all major environmental treaties with a 
view to ascertaining whether they continue to apply in times of war, has thus far not been followed.125
Unsurprisingly therefore, in their recent submissions before the ICJ, States were sharply 
divided on these questions. Both proponents and opponents of the legality of nuclear weapons 
admitted that the vast majority of environmental treaties are silent on the question of their effect during 
war and armed conflict,126 but they drew opposing conclusions from this fact. The Solomon Islands 
argued that this silence proves that they are designed to ensure environmental protection at all times, in 
peace and war, unless expressly excluded.127 It was further argued on their behalf that the outbreak of 
war or other armed conflict does not automatically suspend or terminate the operation of those treaties
121 Heintschel v. Heinegg & Donner, 37 GYIL (1994), 311.
122 Supra, 3.1.1- 3.1.4.
123 E.g., ICRC Report UN Doc. A/48/269, para 110 and by countless authors, inter alia, Szasz in Grunawalt, et. al., op. 
cit., 281; Verwey, ibid., 568-9; Meron, ibid., 355-6.
124 Feliciano, 14 Houston JIL (1992), 494-98; Low & Hodginkson, 35 VJIL (1995), 442-47; Prescott, 7 EILR (1993), 
197-231; Simonds, 29 SJIL (1992), 188-198; Sharp, 137 Mil. LR (1992), summer issue, 22-28.
125 Meron, in Grunawalt, et. al., op. cit., 355.
126 Written Statements by Solomon Islands, WHO Request (June 1994), 92, para 4.35; UNGA Request (June 1995), 94, 
para 4.38; US, WHO Request (June 1995), 11; UNGA Request (June 1995), 34; UK, UNGA Request (June 1995), 68, 
para 3.110.
127 Solomon Islands, Written Statements, WHO Request (June 1994), 93, para 4.37; UNGA Request (20 June 1995), 
95,4.40.
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and that in any event, such treaties continue to apply where they are in force between one or more 
parties to a conflict and third States.128
The US and the UK replied that the nature and the scope of these agreements, and the 
intention of the drafters cannot be construed as an implied prohibition on the threat or use of nuclear 
weapons.129 In addition, the Court itself held that whether such treaties were applicable or not in armed 
conflict, was not relevant to the legal question before it.130
In view of the above, it seems necessary to broaden the inquiry and examine the relationship 
between armed conflict and treaties in general.
3.4 .2 . The Relationship betw een International Armed Conflict and Treaties in 
Genera!
The question of the continued relevance or validity of treaties during armed conflict is a 
subject that is regularly described as one of the problem areas in international law.131 In the 1929 case 
of Kamuth v. United States the US Supreme Court made an observation which many scholars would 
still find true today:
‘The effect of war upon treaties is a subject in respect of which there are widely divergent opinions.. .The 
authorities, as well as the practice of nations, present a great contrariety of views. The law of the subject 
is still in the making, and, in attempting to formulate principles at all approaching generality, courts must 
proceed with a good deal of caution’.132
In spite of various attempts at codification, which will be discussed below,133 there are no 
international treaties in force which explicitly regulate this subject. In what follows, evidence of State 
practice and opinio juris will be discussed, followed by an analysis of case law and a review of the 
doctrine on the legal effects of armed conflict on treaties in general. This section of the chapter ends
128 Solomon Islands, Written Statements, WHO Request (June 1994), 94-5, paras 4.41-4.44; UNGA Request (June 
1995), 96-7, paras 4.44-.47.
129 Written Statements by US, WHO Request (June 1995), 10-14; UNGA Request (June 1995), 34-42; UK, UNGA 
Request (June 1995), 69-70, para 3.11 l-.l 12.
130 ICJ Rep. (1996), para 30.
131 Brownlie, Principles, 616-7; Post, 25 NYIL (1994), 103; Broms, 59 Ann.IDI (1981), T. I., 241; Verwey in 
Grunawalt, et. al., op. cit., 568.
132 279 U.S. 231; Gamer, in Harvard Research in International Law, Part III, Law o f Treaties, Supplement to 29 AJIL, 
(1935), 1183/f [hereinafter ‘Harvard Research’].
133 Infra, 3.4.2. C & D.
166
C h a p t e r  Th r e e : Th e  L e x  G e n e r a u s
with a methodological proposal for the examination of the relationship between multilateral 
environmental agreements and armed conflict.
A. State Practice and Opinio Juris
At the Outbreak o f Hostilities
Under the traditional model, premised on a legal dichotomy between war and peace, questions 
regarding the continued operation of treaties between belligerents did not arise. At the outbreak of 
armed conflict belligerent States issued declarations of war according to which all treaties with 
belligerents were abrogated. Thus, in 1911 Turkey declared war on Italy and proclaimed that all of her 
treaties with Italy were thereby at an end.134 This was still the official French position at the outbreak 
of World War n.135 In its declaration of war against Japan the French Government announced the 
abrogation of all conventions with the former.136
At the end of the war, the fate of pre-war treaties was decided by subsequent peace treaties. 
Thus, Art. II of die Definitive Treaty of Peace between Great Britain and France signed at Paris in 
1783, ‘renewed and confirmed’ the treaties which had existed previous to the war.137
A US author commented in 1958 that in ‘modem’ wars such proclamations are not ordinarily 
made.138 However, even if modem armed conflicts are less fiequentiy characterised by the formal 
commencement of hostilities, treaty relations between contending States may still be affected as a 
result of official government policy. It was argued before that the legal concept of a state of war 
remains significant despite the outlawry of war by the collective security systems of die 20th century. 
Moreover, many countries continue to regard the creation of a formal state of war as a possibility.139
A formal declaration of war has considerable consequences for domestic law. For example, in 
the US and the UK, Trading with the Enemy acts come into operation. The opponent belligerent
134 McIntyre, Legal Effect of World War Hon Treaties of the United States (1958), 37.
135 Rank, 38 Cornell LQ (1953), 321
136 Journal Officiel, October 14,1945.
137 Cited in ‘La Bretagne’ (1986), 82ILR, 590 at 603-4, para 7.
138 McIntyre, op. cit., 38.
139 Supra, 2.4.2.A.
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becomes an enemy, and all those living and trading in that country enemy aliens. Most obligations and 
transactions involving enemy aliens will be nullified and may become criminal. The 1939 UK Trading 
with the Enemy Act introduces a stringent regime of prohibitions and controls, and proceedings 
involving enemy aliens become subject to serious constraints.140 In the US, war suspends the right of 
enemy plaintiffs to bring court proceedings.141
Absent a formal declaration of war, such effects do not come into operation automatically, but 
may be brought into operation by specific measures. Thus, in the 1982 Falklands/Malvinas conflict the 
UK broke off diplomatic relations with Argentina, froze Argentinean assets, prohibited imports from 
the latter and ceased export credit guarantees. A similar course was followed by the UK following the 
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990. In its immediate aftermath the UK brought a series of statutory 
instruments into operation to give effect to UN and EC sanctions aimed at depriving Iraq of any 
financial and economic benefits and to induce it to change course.142
At the Conclusion of  Peace Treaties
From the above it follows that government opinion and State practice on the effect of 
hostilities on pre-war treaties may be derived not only from declarations and documents at the 
outbreak of hostilities, but also from clauses included in subsequent peace treaties.143 Nevertheless, 
there are several obstacles. The terms of some peace treaties are biased in favour of victorious States, 
even at the expense of third States.144 Furthermore, the language used by many treaties is at best, 
inconclusive as to the question which concerns us here: namely the legal effect of pre-war treaties 
during the conflict. For instance, the Versailles Peace Treaty (and its counterparts145) includes 
elaborate provisions for the fate of multilateral and bilateral treaties. As to the former category, 
Arts. 282 to 288 contain detailed provisions for specially named multilateral conventions. Art. 282 
enumerates 26 conventions of an economic and technical character that ‘shall be applied’ as between 
the Alfred Powers and Germany; Arts. 283 to 286 deal with multilateral conventions in the area of 
postal communications, telegraphic conventions and intellectual property that will be applied between
140 Hudson, in Rowe, op. cit., 333.
141 Industrial Commission of Ohio v. Rotar (1931), Ann. Dig. (1931-32), 437-8; Peters et al., v. McKay (1951), 18 
ILR,1,474-93; Kunstsammlungen zu Weimar v. Elicofon, (1981), 94ILR, 172-173,198.
142 Hudson, in Rowe, op. cit., 333,338.
143 Broms, 59 Ann.IDI (1981), T.I, 231; On the effect of various ways of terminating a state of war (treaty of peace, 
armistice etc.) and their effects on treaties see McNair & Watts, op. cit., 11-15.
144 van Eysinga, Grotius-Annuaire International, (1919-1920), 9.
145 The treaties of Neuilly and Saint-Germain contained similar provisions.
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the victorious powers and Germany upon the fulfilment of certain conditions. The arbitrary character 
of these provisions is revealed in Art. 287, which stipulates that one particular convention will be 
applied between all parties, except for France, Portugal and Romania.146 Moreover, use of the term 
‘apply’ in respect of these multilateral conventions, does not indicate what the status of these treaties 
was during the past war.
As to the category of bilateral treaties, the Allied and Associated Powers were given the right 
by Art. 289 to select bilateral treaties they wished to ‘revive’ by means of a notification addressed to 
the vanquished power(s). Use of the term ‘revive’ might suggest that these bilateral treaties had not 
been annulled during the war, but that they had at most been suspended between belligerents for the 
duration of the conflict. However, such an interpretation is far from certain since the penultimate 
paragraph of Art. 289 of the Versailles treaty stipulates that all other bilateral treaties concluded 
between the former belligerents ‘are and remain abrogated’.147 In addition, the last paragraph of 
Art. 289 gave all Allied and Associated Powers the right to ‘revive’ bilateral treaties with Germany, 
even if they had never declared war on the latter.
The peace treaties concluded after World War II differ from the Versailles model in that only 
bilateral treaties between victorious and vanquished powers were expressly dealt with. The absence of 
a regulation for multilateral treaties has subsequently been seized upon as proof that this type of treaty 
had not been abrogated between belligerents at the outbreak of World War n, but had been suspended 
at most.148
With regard to the fate of bilateral treaties, World War II peace treaties follow in the footsteps 
of the Versailles treaty.149 Hence, the victorious Powers were allowed to select those treaties which 
they wished to apply for the future.150 This allowed Great Britain and India to take control over 
Thailand’s post-war treaty relations.151 Again, there is evidence of arbitrariness in the State practice
146 This concemded the 1905 Hague Convention on Civil Procedure.
147 Case law is divided on the exact meaning of this article for the continuation of pre-war treaties during armed 
conflict: Ottoman Debt Arbitration (1925), Ann. Dig. (1925-6), 78-9; State Ex. Rel. Miner, County Attorney v. 
Reardon et al., (1926), Ann. Dig. (1919-42), 238 at 241-2; Societa Walter Kiada v. Societa Deutsche Werft (1929), 
Ann. Dig. (1929-30), 479-30.
148 See 59 Ann.IDI, (1981), T. I, 233, fn. 18; McIntyre, op. cit., 322, fh. 4; Masininport v. Scottisch Mechanical Light 
Industries Ltd. (1976), 74ILR, 559,564.
149 For a comparison between the peace treaties of World War I & II: Fitzmaurice, 73 Hague Recueil, (1948), vol. n, 
259-367.
150 See for example, The 1922 Italian-Czechoslovak Convention for the Legal Protection of the Subjects of both States, 
at issue in Koh-I-Noor Tuskama L. & Hardtmuth National Enterprise v. Fabrique de Crayons Hardmuth L & C., 
S.P.R.L. (1960), 40 ILR, \lff.
151 McIntyre, op. cit., 320.
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following World War H The US used the treaty revival procedure to notify a few ‘new’ treaties to 
defeated Powers Italy, Bulgaria and Japan, although none of these had been in force between the US 
and the defeated States prior to the conflict.152
Moreover, the language used in the peace treaty clauses after World War II reveals very little 
about the status of bilateral pre-war treaties between belligerents. Whereas World War I peace treaties 
used the term ‘revive’, most of World War II peace treaties use the formula ‘keep in force or revive’.153 
As for the status of treaties not notified, each of the peace treaties concluded after World War II 
resolved the question by providing that they shall be regarded as abrogated.154 It is interesting to note 
that whilst the victorious States chose to revive very few prewar treaties after World War I, a far 
greater number of pre-war (bilateral) treaties were revived after World War II.155
In sum, the language used in these peace treaties shows that the drafters did not wish to be 
drawn on any theory regarding the effects of the past conflicts on treaties. They were primarily 
concerned with the settling of post-war treaty and other relations with the defeated States for the 
future.
The post-war settlement of treaty relations involving Austria and Germany confirm the 
growing irrelevance of peace treaties for the question that concerns us here. The State Treaty of 
Austria signed in 1955 did not include provisions on pre-war treaties, apparently because she was not 
considered a vanquished State by the Allies.156 Professor Verosta claims that Austria ‘applied again’ 
all multilateral and bilateral pre-war treaties which she had concluded since 1918, but that some 
additional protocols were needed to meet the new circumstances.157 As for Germany, the third Reich 
was dissolved at the end of World War n, and no formal peace treaty was signed. No comprehensive 
solution was ever devised and many US courts had to deal with cases involving pre-war treaties with 
Germany.158
A further problem is that since World War n, inter-State armed conflict is only rarely 
terminated through the conclusion of formal peace treaties. No such treaties were concluded after the
152 Ibid., 330.
153 E.g., Art. 12 of the Peace Treaty with Finland: 59 Ann.IDI (1981), T. I., 232-3.
154 Whiteman, 14 Digest of International Law, 491.
155 Broms claims that all pre-war bilateral treaties were revived after World War II: 59, Ann. IDI (1981), T.I., 1981,236.
156 Rank, 38 Cornell LQ (1953), 344; see on the international legal position of Austria: In re Veit (1946), Ann. Dig. 
(1946), 330-1.
157 Broms, 59 Ann.IDI (1981), T. I., 210-211 and Verosta, ibid., 255-256.
158 Rank, 38 Cornell LQ (1953), 344,349-55; Whiteman, op. cit., 492-95; see infra, 3.4.2. B, municipal case law.
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1980/88 Iran-Iraq159 and 1990/91 Gulf Conflicts.160 In addition, the few that were concluded, lack 
provisions on pre-war relations for a variety of reasons. The 1970 Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty ends the 
state of war between the Parties by express provision,161 but it does not contain a settlement of pre-war 
treaty relations, since presumably, there were none. The same applies to the 1983 Agreement between 
Lebanon and Israel162 and to the 1994 Israel-Jordan Peace Treaty.163 The 1995 Dayton/Paris Peace 
agreements do not contain any such provisions either.164
Other Evidence o f Government Views
Shortly after World War n, a Swedish scholar sought the views of several governments on the 
effects of World War II on inter alia, multilateral treaties of a technical or non-political nature, the fate 
of which had not been expressly regulated by the peace treaties. The most representative replies 
received were as follows. The British Foreign Office replied that:
'It is not the view o f His Majesty’ s Government that multilateral conventions ipso facto should lapse 
with the outbreak ofwar, and this is particularly true in the case o f conventions to which neutral Powers 
are parties.../...) Indeed, the true legal doctrine would appear to be that it is only the suspension o f  
normal peaceful relations between belligerents which renders impossible the fulfilment o f multilateral 
conventions in so far as concerns them, and operates as a temporary suspension as between the 
belligerents o f such conventions ’.16S
Similarly, a former director of the French Foreign Ministry accepted that multilateral treaties 
may have only been suspended during the war between belligerents.166
The legal adviser of the US Department of State replied that with regard to nonpolitical 
multilateral treaties, the US took the view that these were not ipso facto abrogated by war but that 
certain provisions may, as a practical matter, have been inoperative. He added that:
'The view o f this Government is that the effect o f the wen' on such treaties was only to terminate or 
suspend their execution between opposing belligerents, and that, in the absence o f special reasons for a
159 See the exchange o f letters in Lauterpacht, et. al., The Kuwait Crisis: Basic Documents (1991), vol. 1 ,63- 69.
160 SC Res. 687 (1991) established only a cease-fire.
16118 ILM(\919), 362, Art. 1(1).
162 22 ILM(1983), 708, Art. 1(2).
163 3 4 ILM(1995), 43.
164 35 ILM(1996), 89.
165 Rank, 38 Cornell LQ (1953), 346.
166 Ibid., 347.
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contrary view, they remained in force between co-belligerents, between belligerents and neutral parties, 
and between neutral parties.’16?
During the hearings before the US Committee on Foreign Relations on the proposed Test Ban 
Treaty (1963), the question was raised whether it would prohibit the use of nuclear weapons in time of 
war. Art. 1 of this treaty (hereinafter ‘PTBT’) prohibits:
‘.. .any nuclear weapon test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion, at any place under its jurisdiction 
or control’.168
In reply, the US Department of Defense argued that it was standard practice ‘in treaties 
outlawing the use of specified weapons or actions in time of war’ for the treaties to state expressly that 
they apply in time of war, and that since the proposed treaty did not contain such language, it must, 
therefore, be presumed that no such prohibition would apply.169 Whilst the reasons given may be open 
to challenge, an analysis of the travaux preparatoires indicate that the words ‘or any other nuclear 
explosion’ were inserted originally at the request of the UK, for the purpose of banning ‘peaceful-use’ 
explosions as well as test explosions.170
This view is notable for several reasons. Although the PTBT is on its face a disarmament 
treaty, it has obvious environmental implications. Since the purpose of the treaty is ‘to end the 
contamination of man’s environment by radioactive substances’,171 Schwelb regarded it as nearer to a 
‘human rights, world health or safety at sea convention’ than a disarmament convention. Furthermore, 
he considered it significant that the treaty does not prohibit underground testing nor, in his opinion, the 
use of nuclear weapons in time of war.172 Moreover, the above US view contradicts claims made 
before the ICJ by opponents of the legality of nuclear weapons. Several States argued that the PTBT 
applies in peace and in war, and that it should hence be interpreted as prohibiting the use of nuclear 
weapons.173 Finally, it is noteworthy that the 1996 Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) 
does not contain any provision for the outbreak of armed conflict either.174
167 Ibid., 343-5; Whiteman, op. cit., vol. 14, 508-9.
168 Art. 1.
169Whiteman, op. cit., vol. 14,510.
170 Schwelb, 58 AJIL (1964), 645-5.
171 Preamble.
172 Schwelb, 58 AJIL (1964), 666.
173 E.g., Written Statements by Nauru (Memorial I), WHO Request, 37; Solomon Islands, WHO Request (June 1994), 
83# para 4.13#; UNGA Request (June 1995), 82-3, para 4.13#
174 Concluded September 10,1996.
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B. Case Law
There is considerable case law on the effect of war on treaties. But it consists predominantly 
of municipal case law dealing with situations arising from World War n, and/or with narrow issues 
regarding a formal state of war.175 There are nevertheless a few international decisions on problems 
related to armed conflict and treaties.
International Jurisprudence
There are several international cases concerning the relationship between war or armed 
conflict and treaties. Some of these deal with the fundamental question as to whether certain treaties 
can continue to apply during war or armed conflict. Others discuss principles of interpretation.
The North Atlantic Coast Fisheries case (1909-1910) concerned disagreements between the 
US and Great Britain on the effect of the War of 1812 on a treaty of 1783 which granted fishing rights 
to Americans in the North Atlantic. In its award, the Permanent Court of Arbitration noted in passing 
that:
‘International law in its modem development recognises that a great number of treaty obligations are not 
annulled by war, but at most suspended by it’.176
This statement should be contrasted with the award rendered in Dalmia Cement Ltd. V. 
National Bank o f Pakistan (1976). Appointed as sole arbitrator, Professor Lalive needed to determine 
whether the hostilities of 1965 between India and Pakistan, which lasted 17 days and involved a 
substantial number of troops, had amounted to a state of war. He decided in the negative on two main 
grounds. First, he rejected the argument that a state of war cannot exist between UN Members, holding 
that the Charter led to a mere presumption that its parties did not intend to create a state of war, in the 
absence of clear indications to the contrary.177 Second, he found it significant that neither party had 
broken off diplomatic relations nor regarded any of the bilateral treaties between themselves as 
cancelled upon the outbreak of hostilities.17* This arbitral decision is debatable on several counts.^
175 Broms 59 Ann.IDI (1981), T. 1,211.
17611 RIAA, 181.
177 67 ILR, 619-620.
178 67 ILR, 624-625; Schindler, 59 Ann.IDI ( m i ) ,  T. 1,268-9.
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Apart from Pakistan’s claim that she was at war with India,179 there was considerable evidence that j. iboth parties had attempted to exercise traditional belligerent rights, including measures of economic jf 
warfare affecting third States.180 Moreover, the arbitrator relied on the outdated theory that a state of j 
war implies the ‘complete rupture of international relations’ and the automatic cancellation of treaty; 
relations between belligerents.181
The latter part of the award is at variance with current principles of international law, reflected 
inter alia, in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.182 As was stressed by the panel of 
arbitrators in Lafico and Burundi (1991):
‘The idea that the execution of treaties should be affected by the severance of diplomatic and consular: I 
relations is even more incongruous when it is bome in mind that the most authoritative recent doctrine, |J 
emanating from the Institute of International Law, considers that even armed conflict does not suspend • 
the application of treaties. ’183 '
The ICJ has in several contemporary cases dealt either directly or incidentally, with the 
problem of the continued relevance during modem -‘non-war’- hostilities, of bilateral treaties 
concluded primarily to regulate commercial relations between States.
In its 1980 decision regarding the Hostages Case, the ICJ assumed jurisdiction inter alia on 
the basis of the Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights concluded in 1955 
between the US and Iran.184 The Court found Iran responsible towards the US for having committed 
successive and continuing breaches of the obligations laid upon it, inter alia by the 1955 Treaty. The 
import of this decision is that the Court did not regard the treaty as abrogated, suspended or not 
applicable to acts of violence committed against the US embassy and its staff, for which it held the 
Iranian government responsible.185
The same treaty lies at the basis of the claims currently pending before the Court in the Oil 
Platforms case, which includes claims concerning operation Praying Mantis}86 In its application, Iran 
contends that the attack and the destruction of three offshore oil production complexes carried out by
179 Inter alia, in a radio broadcast: 67ILR, 615-6.
180 Contraband lists were issued by both parties (Award, 67 ILR, 615, 616); Both belligerents interfered seriously with 
third State rights and applied prize law: Heintschel v. Heinegg, 30 CYIL (1992), 94-96.
181 67 ILR, 624, para 51.
182 1969 Vienna Convention, Arts. 63 & 74; see too SA des Ed. Feldman etAutin v. Rigaud (1944) Ann. Dig. (1944), 
275: ‘of itself, the severance of diplomatic relations is not of such a nature as to imply the lapse of treaties’.
183 96 ILR, 303-6.
184 Case Concerning US Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Teheran (merits), ICJ Rep. (1980), 28, paras 45-55, and 
particularly para 54.
185 Ibid., paras 90-92.
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the US Navy in 1987 and 1988 constituted a fundamental breach of various provisions of the 1955 
Treaty of Amity.187 The US raised as preliminary objection that questions concerning the use of force 
fell outside the ambit of the 1955 Treaty, since it deals with commercial and consular provisions.188
In its decision of 12 December 1996, the Court rejected the US objection. It pointed out first, 
that neither party contested that the Treaty of Amity was still in force and recalled that a similar view 
was taken in its above mentioned decision in 1980.189 It then noted that the treaty did not expressly 
exclude certain matters from frre Court’s jurisdiction, and held that a violation of the rights of one party 
under the treaty by means of the use of force was as unlawful as a violation by other means.190 The 
Court subsequently held that the contested military actions of the US had the potential of affecting the 
freedom of commerce to which Iran was entitled according to the treaty.191 ___
A similar dispute had been at issue in the decision in the Nicaragua case. In its memorial 
Nicaragua had relied as a subsidiary means, on the jurisdictional clause of the 1956 Treaty of 
Friendship, Commerce and Navigation with the US.192 Nicaragua submitted that the disputed US 
military and paramilitary activities constituted a violation of the treaty, whilst the US objected that the 
disputed activities fell outside its ambit In its 1986 judgement the ICJ held that the US had acted in 
breach of the 1956 Treaty, and had committed acts calculated to deprive the treaty of its object and 
purpose. The military and paramilitary activities specifically mentioned by the Court included a series 
of attacks directed against Nicaraguan territory and ports, the laying of mines in the internal or 
territorial waters of the claimant, and the declaration of a general embargo on trade.193
What these three decisions have in common is that the Court held that questions related to the 
use of force were not per se excluded from the scope of bilateral commercial treaties. The relevance of 
this case law for the present study is as follows: although these commercial treaties were premised on 
the existence of friendly relations between contracting parties, their object and purpose were, in the
861Supra, 3.1.3.
87 Case Concerning Oil Platforms, General List No. 90, Preliminary Objection, 12 December 1996, paras 1,9,12.
88 Ibid., paras 14,17,18.
89 Ibid., para 15.
90 Ibid., paras, 20-21.
91 Ibid., paras 38-51.
92 ICJ Rep. (1984), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, paras 77-83.
93 Merits, ICJ Rep. (1986), 14 at paras 77-83, Dispositif, 7,10,11.
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words of the Court, ‘not to regulate peaceful and friendly relations between the two States in a general 
sense’.194 In addition, none of the treaties contained specific provisions on armed conflict.
In the 1923 case of the S.S Wimbledon before the Permanent Court of International Justice 
(PCU) and in the requests by WHO and the UN General Assembly concerning the Legality o f Nuclear 
Weapons, a further principle of treaty interpretation was debated. The 1923 case concerned the 
interpretation of Art. 380 of the Treaty of Versailles, which provided that:
‘The Kiel Canal and its approaches shall be maintained free and open to the vessels of commerce and of 
war of all nations at peace with Germany on terms of entire equality’.
hi March 1921 Poland was at war with Russia, and Germany had declared herself a neutral in 
the conflict. In application of express prior neutrality orders, the Kiel canal director refused entry into 
the canal to the S.S. Wimbledon, an English vessel chartered by a French company to carry war 
materials for the Polish government to the naval port of Danzig.195 In the ensuing case before the PCU 
Germany pleaded that Art. 380 of the Versailles treaty posed no obstacle to the application of 
neutrality orders in the Kiel canal.196 Its opponents argued that Germany’s obligations under the treaty 
were supreme and that Art. 380 was a permissible infringement upon Germany’s sovereignty. The 
majority of the Court resorted primarily to a literal interpretation of Art. 380, finding that its terms 
were clear and gave rise to no doubt. They held that Germany was perfectly free to regulate her 
neutrality in the Russo-Polish war, but subject to the provisions of the article in question.197
In their joint dissenting opinion, Judges Anzilotti and Huber saw the legal question 
differently. They asked whether:
‘. . .the clauses of the Treaty of Versailles relating to h e  Kiel Canal also apply in the event of Germany’s 
neutrality, or do they contemplate normal circumstances, that is to say, a state of peace, without affecting 
the rights and duties of neutrality?’198
They found that even in the absence of an express treaty provision allowing her to do so, 
international law permitted Germany to take exceptional measures affecting the treaty, if done for the 
purpose of preserving her position of neutrality or self-defence:
194 Case Concerning Oil Platforms, General List No. 90, Preliminary Objection, 12 December 1996, para 28; 
Nicaragua Case, (merits), ICJ. Rep. (1986), 137, para. 273.
195 Case oiSS Wimbledon, Judgment, Merits, 17 August 1923, PCIJRep. Series A, No. 1,15ff.
196 Ibid., 18.
197 Ibid., 21-28.
198 Ibid., 35, para 1.
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‘The right of a State to adopt the course which it considers best suited to the exigencies of it security and
the maintenance of its integrity, is so essential a right that, in case of doubt, treaty stipulations cannot be
interpreted as limiting it, even though those stipulations do not conflict with such an interpretation.’199
Although this proposition formed part of a joint dissenting opinion, the UK argued in 1995 in 
connection with the advisory requests on the legality o f nuclear weapons, that this opinion was not at 
variance with the PCU’s majority judgement.200 She further submitted that the fundamental and 
overriding character of self-defence in international law constituted a principle of general application 
to interpretation of treaty law.201 As seen before, in its 1996 Advisory Opinion the ICJ accepted that 
environmental treaties could not be construed so as to deny a State the right to use armed force in self- 
defence or to entail obligations of total restraint in armed conflict.202
Municipal Case Law
The municipal jurisprudence is so closely linked with constitutional municipal issues and so 
diverse, that is difficult to detect common principles and rules that could be transferred easily onto the 
international plane.
In his report to the Institut de droit International (InstituI) Professor Broms argued that the 
Judiciary ought to ascertain the opinion of the Executive before trying to solve the problem of the legal 
effect of war on treaties.203 This procedure is followed in one form or another by many countries.204 
For instance, it would be usual in proceedings before the English Courts for the Executive to be asked 
to certify whether there was a state of war, indicating the precise moment of its commencement and its 
termination. The Crown is asked for guidance even if the UK is a non-contending party.205
The dominant theory applied by US courts was expressed in a letter from the Department of 
State to the Attorney-General in 1948 as follows:
199 Ibid., 37, para 3.
200 This is open to challenge since the PCIJ dismissed the argument pursuant to which Art. 380 of the Versailles Treaty 
could not deprive Germany ‘of a personal and imprescriptible right, which forms an essential part of her sovereignty 
and which she neither could or intended to renounce by anticipation’: ibid., 25 ff.
201 UK, Written Statement, UNGA Request (June 1995), 64, paras 3.96-.98.
202 Supra, 3.2 in fine.
203 See on the work of the Institut, infra, 3.4.2. D.
204 Rank, 38 Cornell LQ (1953), 342-3.
205 McNair & Watts, op. cit., 37,43-5.
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‘. . .the determinative factor is whether or not there is an incompatibility between the treaty provision in 
question and the maintenance o f a state o f war as to make it clear that the provision should not be 
enforced: 206
This theory was already earlier applied by judge Cardozo in the celebrated case of Techt v. 
Hughes (1920), in which a rather dim view was taken of academic attempts at rule-making:
‘The effect of war upon the existing treaties of belligerents is one of the unsettled problems of the 
law.. .International law today does not preserve treaties or annul them, regardless of the effects produced. 
It deals with such problems pragmatically, preserving or annulling as the necessities of war exact It 
establishes standards, but it does not fetter itself with rules. When it attempts to do more, it finds that 
there is neither unanimity of opinion nor uniformity of practice.’ 207
The study conducted by McIntyre after World War II shows that when the US Executive 
considered it in its own national security interest to suspend or abrogate a treaty during war, it would 
do so, and that the courts often deferred to whatever policy the government of that moment adhered to, 
particularly on affairs such as trading with the enemy, and on inheritance issues.208 Thus, in Clark v. 
Allen (1947) the US Supreme Court noted that the Department of State had changed its earlier 
position, no longer favouring the view that World War II had abrogated all provisions of the 1923 
Treaty of Friendship with Germany. The Court subsequently held that a clause providing inheritance 
of realty under the 1923 Treaty was not incompatible with national policy209
Particularly in commercial cases involving interpretation of contract clauses, courts have been 
reluctant to apply the traditional technical meaning of the state of war as intended by the Executive. 
English law on the effects of undeclared wars has been strongly influenced by the case of Kawasaki 
Kisen Kabushiki Kaisha o f Kobe v. Bantham Steamship Co (1939).210 This concerned a charterparty 
clause allowing cancellation ‘if war breaks out involving Japan’. In 1937 heavy fighting took place 
between the regular forces of Japan and China, even though war had not been declared and diplomatic 
relations were not broken off. A certificate obtained from the Foreign Office declared that the English 
government was not prepared to say whether a state of war existed, but that this might not necessarily 
be conclusive for the interpretation of the term ‘war’ in particular documents or statutes 211 The judge
206 Whiteman, op. cit., vol. 14,502-4.
207 Techt v. Hughes (20), Ann. Dig. (1910-22), 387 at 388, discussed in Harvard Research, 1183-84.
208 McIntyre, op. cit., chapter V on ‘economic treaties in force with enemy states at the outbreak of World War II’, 158- 
299.
209 Ann. Dig. (1947), 171,174-176; 14 Whiteman, op. cit., 495-99.
210 2 K.B. 544, 556; Confirmed by the Court of Appeal; McNair & Watts, op. cit., 35-36,47.
211 Ibid., 36, fo. 2.
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subsequently felt free to construe the term ‘war’ in the sense in which ‘an ordinary commercial man 
would use it’, and concluded that war existed for the purposes of the charterparty. This precedent was 
subsequently followed in five cases related to the 1956 Suez conflict, during which the Prime Minister 
had categorically denied that the UK was at war with Egypt. The courts recognised that there were 
hostilities involving between the UK and Egypt, albeit not involving war.212 In application of this case 
law it has been suggested that if a British court were called upon to construe the expression ‘war’ or 
similar terms in a commercial document, facts involving the ‘Desert Storm’ phase of the 1990/91 Gulf 
war would be held to constitute belligerency in a colloquial sense.213
Although general statements with respect to municipal jurisprudence are difficult to make, 
there are a few common trends. Municipal judges are generally reluctant to consider political treaties 
as unaffected by war.214 A more liberal line is followed for extradition agreements, for perpetual rights 
accorded to individuals, and in commercial matters including in particular, intellectual property rights. 
These treaties are often regarded as at most, suspended during war between belligerents 215 The above
O l/J  '71*7 ^ i o  *710principles have been confirmed by courts in Austria, Belgium, Germany, Greece, Italy, 
Luxembourg,221 the Netherlands,222 Norway,223 the US224 and the UK.225 The French Cour de
212 Ibid., 48.
213 Hudson, in Rowe, op. cit., 336.
214 Hughes v. Techt; Techt v. Hughes, (1919-20), Ann. Dig. (1910-22), 387 at 388; Loewengard v. Procureur of the 
Republic and Bonvier (Sequestrator) (1921), Ann. Dig. (1910-22), 389-10.
215 Broms, 59 Ann.IDI (1981), T. 1,237,241.
216 Ibid., 211.
217 Masquelin, Le Droit des Traites dans I 'Ordre juridique et dans la Pratique beige (1980), 604-6.
218 International Registration of Trademark (Germany) Case (1959), 28 ILR, 82, 86; Trademark Registration Case 
(1967), 59 ILR, 489,490-91; Prescott, 7 EILR (1993), 217-8.
219 Guardianship case (1919),Ann. Dig. (1910-22), 389-10.
220 Societa Fomaci di Stazzano v. Rancillo, (1957), 24 ILR, 890-2; Lanificio Branditex v. Societa Azais e Vidal (1971), 
71 ILR, 595-6.
221 Silverio v. Delli Zotti (1952), 19 ILR, 558-9.
222 Hecht Case (1941), Ann. Dig. (1919-420, 242-3; Gehrmann and Maatje van der Have v. Registrar, (1947), Ann. 
Dig., (1947), 176-77; In re Holzwarth Gasturbinen AG (1950), 17 ILR, 356-7; Gevato v. Deutsche Bank (1952), 19 
ILR, 1952, 29-31; Nederlands Rijnvaartvereeniging v. Damco Scheepvaart Maatschappij (1954), 21 ILR, 276-7; In re 
Swane (1958), 26 ILR, 557.
223 Fabrique des Crayons Koh-I-Noor, L. & C. Hardtmuth, SARL v. Koh-I-Noor Tuskama L. & C. Hardtmuth, Narodni 
Podnik (1959), 30 ILR, 33,45.
224 State Ex. Rel. Miner, County Attorney v. Reardon et al. (1926), Ann. Dig., (1919-42), 238-242; The Sophie 
Rickmers (1930), Ann. Dig., (1929-30), 477-8; In re Meyer's Estate (1951), 18 ILR, 499-06; Brownell v. City and 
County of San Francisco (1954), 21 ILR, 432; Argento v. Horn et al. (1955), 24 ILR, 883; Gallina v. Fraser, US States 
Marshal, (1959-60), 31 ILR, 356jf; In re Extradition o fD ’Amico (1959), 28 ILR, 602; but see Kamuth v. US (1928), 
Ann. Dig. (1927-28), 536-38; and In re Ronkendorfs Estate (1958), 26 ILR, 675.
225 Masininport v. Scottisch Mechanical Light Industries Ltd (1976), 74 ILR, 559, 564: Prescott, 7 EILR (1993), 215- 
19; McNair & Watts, op. cit., 37-40.
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Cassation, however, seems to adhere firmly to the theory that war annuls most (bilateral) treaties 
between belligerents.226
Unsurprisingly, courts in many countries conform to the legal standpoint of the Executive 
regarding questions as to whether a state of war exists, particularly if the country itself is involved in
777 OOfithe conflict. It is also a matter for the Executive to decide on the formal end of a state of war. 
Absent a formal declaration of war, or a firm indication by the government, judges are reluctant to 
consider treaties as automatically terminated or suspended by the outbreak of armed conflict.229
Still, a caveat needs to be added for cases involving public policy. It has been noted that 
British courts will probably refuse to enforce contracts which are considered detrimental to the 
interests of the country, even in undeclared wars. This may affect transactions considered as assisting 
opponents in modem jus ad bellwn ‘non-war’ hostilities such as UN enforcement operations and self- 
defense measures 230 Hence, municipals courts are empowered to examine whether the continuation of 
a particular treaty would be incompatible with express or implied government policy of national and 
perhaps even international security interests.
As a consequence of the above, the same hostilities may be construed differently depending 
on the circumstances and purposes of the legal assessment.231 Thus, while the Korean Conflict did not 
amount to war in the legal sense in the UK, courts in the Australia, France, New Zealand and the
7*17 7 0 - 1US, have regarded the conflict as war for purposes such as insurance policies and military 
discipline.234
226 Lovera v. Rinaldi (1949), 77 Journal de Droit International (1950), 125; apparently reversing its prior decision in 
Bussi v. Menetti (1943), Ann. Dig. (1943-45); But Lovera v. Rinaldi is not always followed by other Courts: see e.g., 
Rosso v. Marro (1945), Ann. Dig. (1943-45), 307-8; Stramazi v. Dellazoppa (1952), 19 ILR, 556-558; Broms, 59 
Ann.IDI( 1981), T. I., 238-9; Prescott, 7 EILR (1993), 216-7.
227 The Fjleld, (1950), 17 ILR, 345-9; Japanese Government v. Commercial Casualty Insurance Co (1951), 18 ILR, 
493-9; Atlee and Others v. Laird and Others (1972-3), 94 ILR, 91 jf, 121ff, Harrington and Others v. Schlesinger and 
Others (1974-5), 94 ILR, 122#; Crockett v. Reagan (1982-3), 87 ILR, 658ff, 61 Off, Lowry and Others v. Reagan, 
(1987), 87 ILR, 671; but see: End Conscription Campaign and Another v. Minister o f Defense and Another (1988), 87 
ILR, 257.
228 Industrial Commission of Ohio v. Rotor (1931), Ann. Dig. (1931-32), 437-8; Mutia v. The King (1946), Ann. Dig.
(1946), 329; Rex v. Bottril, Ex Parte Kuechenmeister (1946), Ann. Dig. (1946), 312-321; Stinson v. New York Life 
Assurance Co. (1947) Ann. Dig., (1947), 210-224; Greenville Enterprise Inc. v. Jennings (1947), Ann. Dig., (1947), 
225-227; National Savings and Trust Co. et al. v. Brownell (1955), 22 ILR, 932-5; Ladue & Co. v. Brownell (1955), 22 
ILR, 935-9; In re Grotrian, Cox v. Grotrian and Others (1955), 22 ILR, 940-3;
229 E.g., R  v. Meroni (1973), 91 ILR, 386, 390-1; Rijn-Schelde Verolme NV v. State Secretary of Justice (1976), 74 
ILR, 118.
230 Hudson, in Rowe, op. cit., 344-6; McNair & Watts, op. cit., 49.
231 Lalive (Arbitrator), Dalmia Cement Ltd. V. National Bank of Pakistan (1976), 67 ILR, 625.
232 McNair & Watts, op. cit., 51.
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However, there is little jurisprudence on the type of treaties this study is concerned with, 
although there is case law on treaties dealing with inland navigation: In The Golden River v. The 
Wilhelmina (1950), the District Court of Rotterdam needed to decide whether the Convention of 
Mannheim of 1868 concerning Navigation on the Rhine remained applicable during World War II 
between Holland and Germany. The court decided that this multilateral treaty was not concluded in 
contemplation of war, and that it was suspended as between Holland and Germany as from May 1940, 
but only in so far as and as long as its provisions had in fact become inapplicable. Applying this 
criterion of factual inapplicability to the case at hand, it furthermore held that the convention remained 
suspended after the unconditional surrender of Germany, during the period necessary to consolidate 
this surrender and to restore order in the chaos as a result of the fighting in Europe.235
In conclusion, its needs to be observed that the existing case law contributes little to the main 
questions this study is concerned with. Municipal case law does not answer the fundamental question 
as to whether multilateral environmental agreements can be said to apply at all during armed conflict. 
What it does indicate is that the views of the Executive on the effect of treaties during armed conflict 
are regarded as binding, and that failing a clear indication to that effect, courts will check whether the 
continued operation of a treaty is compatible with national policy. If the outcome of this analysis is 
positive, courts favour the view that most treaties survive the outbreak of war but that some provisions 
may be inoperative on practical or factual grounds. However, municipal case law does not reveal any 
standards to determine whether, and if so on what grounds, contracting Parties may terminate or 
suspend the operation of such agreements during armed conflict.
C. Development of Legal Doctrine
In the period between the turn of the century and World War II, the problem of the effects of 
war on international treaties attracted the attention of several scholars.236 In addition, two major 
academic studies were published. The first of these was a report written by Politis on the ‘Effects of
233 Langlas etAl. v. Iowa Life Insurance Co. (1954), 21 ILR, 416; Thomas v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co (1957), 
26 ILR, 626.
234 US v. Ayers (1954), 21 ILR, 423, and cases mentioned in fn., ibid., 430.
235 1 7 ILR, 354,355.
236 Jacomet, La Guerre et les Traites (1909); Phillipson, Termination of War and Treaties of Peace (1916); Hurst, 2 
BYIL (1921-1922), 37-47; Tobin, The Termination of Multipartite Treaties (1933).
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War on International Obligations and Private Contracts’,237 adopted by the Institut at its Christiana 
session in 1912 238 The Second major study was conducted by Professor Gamer for the ‘Harvard 
Research in International Law’ on the Law of Treaties. The proposed draft convention with comments 
on the law of treaties was published in 1935, and it contained an elaborate provision on the effect of
239war.
After World War II interest in the subject all but disappeared.240 The ILC consistently 
refrained from including the effects of war/armed conflict in its studies, including in particular treaty 
law. Nevertheless, many of the disciplines of international law which the ILC has tried to codify and 
progressively develop, are relevant for the question of the continued operation of multilateral 
environmental treaties in armed conflict.241
In the mid-1970s academic interest in the subject of the effects of armed conflict on treaty law 
was rekindled, when the Institut agreed to review the work of Politis and appointed Professor Broms 
as rapporteur. It was only ten years later, and after much discussion, that the Institut finally adopted a 
Resolution on ‘The Effects of Armed Conflict on Treaties’, at its 1985 Helsinki session.242 The most 
recent contribution of the Institut will be discussed later in more detail243
It is often said that there are two opposing doctrinal schools on the legal effect of war on 
international treaties.
• a first one according to which all treaties are annulled by war;244
• a second one according to which the outbreak of war as a rule does not affect treaties;245
However, the first ‘radical’ theory according to which the outbreak of war brings nothing but 
chaos to international relations and consequently annuls ‘ipso facto ’ all treaties, has never received
many adherents. Politis already expressed doubt about the conception that war had an annulling effect
237 ‘Effets de la Guerre sur les Obligations Internationales et les Contrats prives’.
238 24 Ann.IDI (1910-12), 24,201-202 and 207-208.
239 Harvard Research, 653ff., and specifically 1183/f
240 But see the studies done on World War II by Rank, 38 Cornell LQ, (1953), 321-355 and McIntyre, op. cit. (1958); 
McNair & Watts, op. cit. (1966).
241 Infra, 3.4.3.
242 See work and reports on this subject by the Institut’s Fifth Commission from 1976 to 1985: Dijon Session, 59 
Ann.IDI (1981), T.I, 201-84, T. II, 175-244; Helsinki Session, 61 Ann.IDI, (1985), T.I., 1-27, 201-84, and T.H, 199- 
283.
243 Infra, 3.4.2.D.
244 In application of the old Roman adagio ‘Inter arma silent leges’; Greenwood, 36ICLQ (1987), 296-7.
245 This was the position adopted by the Institut in 1912.
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on all treaties.246 On the other hand, even Gamer’s theory that there were no reasons of public policy 
why any treaty should be regarded as ipso facto annulled by war,247 was never fully accepted in State 
practice.248
Currently, the most universally accepted doctrinal premise is that war and other forms of h 
armed conflict have no automatic ('ipso facto’) cut-off effect on treaties, but that some treaties are, I 
may or may have to be suspended.
There are multiple reasons for this change of heart by legal doctrine. Some of these are related 
to the changing concept of war, others to principles of treaty law. As to the first, international armed 
conflict is no longer regarded as causing total disruption of all legal bonds between States; belligerents 
need to observe some basic rules of humanity between each other and State practice shows that 
contending States often continue to maintain legal relations with each other in several areas.249 As for  ^
treaty law, there is a modem legal presumption - favor contractus - which favours the continued j 
operation of treaties, even in such extreme circumstances as armed conflict.250 This is related with the * 
fundamental principle of pacta sunt servanda, laid down in Art. 26 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties, the importance of which the ICJ reaffirmed in its judgement in the Gabcikovo- 
Nagymaros Project case.251
Modem legal doctrine on the legal effect of armed conflict on treaties tends to adopt a [ 
pragmatic approach, taking into account the intention of the parties as well as the type of treaty j 
concerned.252 Although this does not amount to a consistent theory, it aims at reducing the impact o f ' 
armed conflict on treaty relations whilst recognising that in some areas, the continuing effectiveness of 
treaties is incompatible with a state of war or armed conflict.253 The pragmatic approach of modem 
doctrine combines the traditional technique of classification of treaties with the intention theory.
Under the classification theory, treaties are organised according to their nature and type, and 
different rules are said to apply to different classes of treaties, according to various criteria:254
246 24 Ann.IDI (1910-12), 201-2,207,208.
247 Harvard Research, 1185.
248 Delbruck, 4 EPIL, (1982), 311.
249 Ibid., 311.
250 See observations by Zourek, 59 Ann.IDI(1981), T. 1,213.
251 Judgment, 25 September 1997, ICJ General List No. 92, paras 114,142.
252 Broms, 59 Ann.IDI (1981), T. 1,228-9; see too Harvard Research, draft Art. 35 (b) and commentary thereto.
253 Delbruck, 4 EPIL (1982), 311-12; Broms, 59 Ann.IDI (\9%\), T.1,212; see too Art. 1 of the Helsinld Resolution, 61 
Ann.IDI(1985), T. II, 278.
254 Broms, 59 Ann.IDI (1981), T.I, 241-45; Delbruck, 4 EPIL (1982), 312-13; Verwey, in Grunawalt et. al., op. cit., 
569.
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• bilateral treaties are distinguished from multilateral treaties;
• treaty relations between contending (belligerent) States are distinguished from those 
involving non-contending (neutral) States;
• political treaties such as treaties of friendship and commerce, of alliance and non-aggression 
and peace treaties between belligerents are annulled (according to the older theories) or at least 
suspended (modem theories) during the conflict between belligerents;
• executed treaties such as those entailing territorial settlements and international boundaries 
remain unaffected, and by extrapolation, the same rule applies to treaties establishing international 
regimes or entailing a special status for a region;
• treaties concluded with war in mind, such as conventions of the Hague Law type, forbidding 
certain means and methods of warfare, remain in force;
• the operation of treaties that establish international organisations remain in effect between 
belligerents and neutrals, but may be suspended as between belligerents;
• non-political treaties such as those regulating commerce, navigation, and matters of private 
international law between citizens of belligerent countries, may be suspended between belligerents;
A recent addition to the classification theory is the category of humanitarian treaties, pursuant 
to a rule introduced by the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. According to Art. 60(5) of 
this convention, the right to terminate or suspend the operation of a treaty as a consequence of its 
breach - the exceptio non adimpleti contractus - does not exist for:
‘...provisions relating to the protection of the human person contained in treaties of a humanitarian
character, in particular to provisions prohibiting any form or reprisals against persons protected by such
treaties.’
It is widely accepted that the phrase ‘provisions relating to the protection of the human 
person...’ includes international humanitarian law.255 From the Namibia Advisory Opinion it can be 
inferred that the ICJ considered Art. 60 (5) an expression of a general principle of law that predated the 
1969 Vienna Convention at least by half a century 256
255 David, Principes, 90-1.
256 The treaty at issue was under consideration was a Mandate agreement under the League of Nations: ICJ Rep. 
(1971), 47.
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The classification theory has several weaknesses. First, it is obvious that not all modem 
treaties can be labelled as belonging exclusively to one or the other category. Secondly, the theory fails 
to take the complexities of international armed conflict into account. For example, it is often asserted 
that executed treaties such as those involving territorial and boundary settlements remain unaffected 
between belligerents. Yet, history shows that this rule remains valid only as long as the treaty at issue 
is not a casus belli: i.e., the reason why the Parties resorted to armed force in the first place. Indeed, 
disputes over natural resources and territorial claims are often causes of war; battles tend to take place 
along strategic ‘natural’ places such as rivers.257 The recent conflict in the former Yugoslavia is a stark 
reminder of the continuing fragility in international law of the purported principle of the ‘intangibility’ 
of State borders 258 State practice proves that several criteria and rules suggested by classification 
theorists belong to the realm of jus de lega ferenda.
Under the intention theory, first advocated by Hurst, the primary test as to whether or not a 
treaty survives the outbreak of war between parties is to be found in the intention of the parties at the 
time the treaty was concluded.259 It was this theory that inspired the Harvard Research proposal for a 
provision on the effect of war on treaties.260
However, it is clear that the intention theory will rarely lead to results that differ radically 
from the classification theory. The real contribution of the intention theory lies in its accommodation 
of those treaties which cannot be readily classified in any of the above-mentioned classes, provided 
that the parties’ intention is clear or can be inferred: for example, it will accommodate all treaties with 
a provision on the outbreak of war/armed conflict.
A major weakness of this theory is that it rests on two debatable assumptions; first, that 
drafters of treaties have a particular intention with respect to the question of armed conflict, and 
secondly, that this intention can be uncovered. In regard to the attendant problem, the theory is 
therefore of little real help. When a treaty contains a clause on armed conflict, the intention of the 
drafters is clear, and one does not need the theory to resolve the issue. The difficult cases concern 
treaties that are silent on the issue of armed conflict. In some instances it might be that the problem 
was discussed during the travaux preparatoires, but the rules of treaty interpretation do not necessarily
257 Costa, in Zacklin, et al., The Legal Regime o f International Rivers and Lakes (1981), 203-45, 407; Baxter, op. cit., 
187-244.
258 Arts. 62 (2) (a) of the 1969 Vienna Convention and Art. 62 (2) of 1986 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties; 
Art. 11 of the 1978 Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties; Hannikainen, op. cit., 350-56.
259 Hurst, 2 BYIL (1921-1922), 40.
260 Harvard Research, draft Art. 35.
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permit resort to statements that have not been formally recorded in the treaty text. The intention of the 
parties should be derived primarily from the wording of the treaty itself or from related instruments. 
Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation such as the travawc preparatoires or 
the circumstances surrounding its conclusion, in case the general rules of interpretation lead to an 
ambiguous, obscure, manifestly absurd or unreasonable meaning of the text.261
Finally, it should be noted that most of the doctrine on the subject is primarily concerned with 
the effect of (a formal state of) war on treaties, and that comparatively little attention has been paid to 
the effects of armed conflict. However, there is little doubt that the tendency in international State 
practice, case law and doctrine, to reduce the impact of war on treaty relations will apply a fortiori to 
armed conflict.262 Armed conflict does not involve a total disruption of treaty relations between States, 
and the treaty law principles of favor contractus and pacta sunt servanda should obviously apply in 
relation to armed conflict as well.
This is supported by the work of the Institut that, as will be seen immediately below, has 
equated a state of war with armed conflict for the purposes of its 1985 Helsinki Resolution.263
D. The Codification Efforts of the Institut de Droit International between 1974-85
It was seen above that Institut took more than ten years to conclude the subject. During these 
discussions, several members objected to the adoption of the resolution on the grounds that the subject 
was too political,264 that the suggested principles were too selective 265 or that some principles were not 
supported by State practice 266 Professor Brownlie questioned the utility of the entire endeavour. He 
saw it as internally contradictory insofar as it claimed to enunciate principles of positive international 
law whilst asserting that State practice in these matters was not uniform.267
261 1969 Vienna Convention, Arts. 31-32.
262 Greenwood, 36ICLQ (1987), 296-7; Delbriick, 4 EPIL, (1982), 314.
263 Broms, 59 Ann.IDI(1981), T. 1,205.
264 Briggs, 61 Ann.IDI (1985), T. 1,7-8.
265 Schindler, 59 Ann.IDI (1981), T. I., 282-3; Salmon, 61 Ann.IDI (1985), T. I., 16-7; Schindler, ibid., 17; Salmon, 
ibid., T. EL, 219-221.
266 Skubizewski, 59 Ann.IDI (1981), T. n, 191; by Lachs, ibid., 184; Bindschedler, ibid., 217; Dinstein, 61 Ann.IDI, 
(1985), T. H, 214-5.
267 59 Ann.IDI (1981), T. II, 202.
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These criticisms may explain some of the following peculiarities. For instance, in its 
preamble, the Resolution states that it shall not prejudge the application of the provisions of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. As pointed out by Professor Dinstein, this amounts to a 
‘double negative renvoV since the Vienna Convention itself contains several articles stipulating that it 
shall not prejudge questions related to the use of force.268
A second peculiarity concerns the definition of the term armed conflict for the purposes of the 
resolution. Art. 1 defines this concept as:
‘.. .a state of war or an international conflict involving armed operations which by their nature or extent 
are likely to affect the operation of treaties between States parties to the armed conflict or between States 
parties to the armed conflict and third State, regardless of a formal declaration of war or other declaration 
by any or all of the parties to the armed conflict’.269
From the travaux preparatoires it appears that the formulation served several purposes: to 
take the realities of modem warfare into account, to convey a de minimis threshold, and to exclude the 
possibility that a State which is not materially engaged in hostilities, would be entitled to affect treaty 
relations by a simple declaration of war 270 The problem though is that the definition results in a petitio 
principii for it provides a circuitous answer to the question of the effects of armed conflicts on treaties: 
One can argue indefinitely on what type of conflict ‘by their nature or extent are likely to affect the 
operation of treaties between States’.
The Institutes modest ambitions are clear from the preamble, which describes the resolution’s 
aim as affirming certain principles of international law considering the lack of uniformity in State 
practice. Furthermore, whilst aiming at reducing the effects of armed conflicts on treaties, the 
resolution was meant primarily as a residual means of interpretation.271 However, the contradiction 
between the enunciation of principles of positive international law and the admitted lack of uniformity 
in State practice, was never fully resolved.272
The operational part of the resolution affirms much of the modem legal doctrine discussed 
above. The outbreak of aimed conflict does not ipso facto terminate the operation of treaties in force 
between parties to the conflict (Art. 2); it does not ipso facto terminate nor suspend the operation of 
bilateral treaties between a party to an armed conflict and a third State, nor of the operation of
268 61 Ann.IDI, (1985), T. H, 216.
269 Art. 1 of the resolution adopted at the Helsinki Session, 61 Ann.IDI, (1985), TII, 278.
270 Broms, 59 Ann.IDI(1981), T. 1,203-4,211; 61 Ann.IDI(1985), T. II, 205-8,211-13.
271 Broms, 59 Ann.IDI (1981), T. I., 213,217-8, Draft resolution Art. 5,276.
272 Broms, 59^»w./D/(1981), T. H, 231; Marek, 61 Ann.IDI(1985), T. I., 11, para 6.
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multilateral treaties between third States or between parties to an armed conflict and third States 
(Art. 5); and it brings into operation treaties which by reason of their nature or purpose are to be 
regarded as operative during an armed conflict (Art. 3). Art. 11 urges parties to resume suspended 
treaties as soon as possible at the end of an armed conflict or to agree otherwise.
The provisions that merit special attention are the following. Art. 6 of the Resolution 
stipulates that a treaty establishing an international organisation ‘is not affected’ by the existence of an 
armed conflict between any of its parties. However, most reports by international organisations on 
their work during both World Wars contain evidence of the considerable extent to which their 
activities, income and membership were affected by the ongoing hostilities. For some of these 
organisations the implications were severe. Thus, during World War II the International Labor 
Organisation was forced into changing its headquarters from Europe to the US, whilst the Central 
Commission for the Navigation of the Rhine suspended work entirely during this conflict. Even 
organisations located in neutral countries, such as the Universal Postal Union (UPU) in Switzerland, 
were not spared.273 Another obvious example is the collapse of the League of Nations Organisation. 
Some Member States ended their participation in compliance with the Covenants’ provisions on 
denunciation, whereas others simply withdrew, with or without offering legal grounds. Following the 
establishment of the UN, the League of Nations was dissolved.
Seen against the background of the serious disruption that many international organisations 
went through during both World Wars, as well as many previous conflicts, the affirmative language of 
this provision appears, at a minimum, amount to a proposal de lege ferenda. hi mitigation one should 
add that the Institut’s travaux clarify that Art. 6 was narrowly conceived in that whilst the workings of 
international organisations may be affected by war, the treaty establishing the organisation itself 
should not be affected.274 This interpretation is supported not only by State practice of the two World 
Wars: the case studies discussed in the beginning of this study demonstrate that during the 1980/88 
and 1990/91 Gulf conflicts regional institutions continued to function.275
273 Commission Centrale pour la Navigation du Rhin, Rapport Annuel (1945), 1-11; Rapport Annuel (1949), 2-3; 
Rapport Annuel (1950), 2-5; La Commission Europeenne du Danube et son Oeuvre de 1856 a 1931 (1931), 36-53; 
Hobson, The International Institute o f Agriculture, (1931); HA, The Work o f the International Institute o f Agriculture 
during the War (1940-1945) (1945); For accounts of the effect of armed conflict on e.g., the Universal Postal Union 
and ILO see McIntyre, op. cit., 275-83, 124-134.
274 Remarks by Zourek, 59 Ann.IDI (1981), T.I., 259; revised draft resolution 7 (c), 265; remarks by Heintschel v. 
Heinegg, ibid., T. II, 236.
275 ROPME and MEMAC; supra, 3.1.2 and infra, 7.4.3.
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A further provision that merits separate discussion is Art. 4 which stipulates:
‘The existence of an armed conflict does not entitle a party unilaterally to terminate or to suspend the
operation of treaty provisions relating to the protection of the human person, unless the treaty otherwise
provides.’
This provision is noteworthy for several reasons. It was argued above that one of the crucial 
questions that needs to answered is - assuming that multilateral environmental agreements can apply 
during armed conflict - whether and under what circumstances contracting parties may invoke the 
existence of armed conflict as a ground for suspending (or terminating) their operation.
Environmentalists would argue that current international law requires every ground for treaty 
suspension to be expressly agreed. Absent a provision authorising suspension in case of war, 
contracting parties would not be allowed to invoke armed conflict as an excuse. Military lawyers 
might object that armed conflict is lex specialis, and that every State has the right to suspend treaties in 
cases of war or armed conflict, even if such a possibility is not expressly provided for in the treaty 
itself.
Both sides of the argument were, as seen above, invoked in State submissions before the ICJ 
in connection with the requests for an advisory opinion on the legality of nuclear weapons.276 The 
argument has obvious environmental significance, for few international environmental treaties deal 
expressly with armed conflict Two diametrically opposed positions have been advocated in the 
doctrine on this issue. The EC Experts report concludes that because armed conflict contingency 
clauses are rare, absent such clauses, parties are not allowed to suspend the operation of treaties on the 
ground of armed conflict.277 Others contend that the absence of a clause on armed conflict proves that 
the treaties in question cannot be applied in armed conflict, or at least that their application is 
uncertain.278 Both positions will be tested in the case studies of conventions on marine pollution and 
maritime safety that will be conducted in the next part of this study.279
The Institutes opinion on this problem may not be immediately apparent, but it is noteworthy 
that Art. 4 is the only provision (apart from Art. 6) to deny contracting Parties the right to suspend 
certain treaties on the ground of armed conflict. The travaux show that the Institut was of the opinion
276 Supra, 3.4.1.
277 EC Experts Report, para 3.
278 Verwey, in Grunawalt, et. al., op. cit., 569; see too US government opinion regarding the PTBT, supra, 3.4.2.A.
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that a blanket denial of the right to suspend or terminate any treaty as a result of armed conflict, ‘would 
not be based on the facts relating to the known practice of States’.280 They further demonstrate that 
Art. 4 was inspired by Art. 60(5) of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, and that it 
covers provisions of both human rights treaties and humanitarian law.281
Art. 4 of the Resolution is noteworthy in another respect. It was seen earlier that there is a 
school of thought according to which environmental protection should be linked with human rights.282 
This was advocated also before the ICJ in regard to the Legality o f Nuclear Weapons advisory 
opinion.283 If such a link between environmental protection and human rights is recognised, Art. 60(5) 
of the 1969 Vienna Convention offers an excellent vehicle through which States could be denied the 
right to suspend international environmental agreements in case of armed conflict.
During the 1985 Helsinki session one of its members proposed that IEL treaties should be 
treated in similar fashion as humanitarian treaties, on the ground that protection of the environment 
was in essence ‘a natural extension of the protection of the human person’. The tenor of the 
amendment was to prohibit belligerent parties to terminate or suspend environmental treaties. 
However, its proponent failed to convince the meeting. Some members thought that the subject was 
brought up too late and deserved to be studied separately, others expressed serious doubt on the 
validity of the proposed rule. The amendment was overwhelmingly rejected. Nevertheless, the meeting 
agreed to place on record a statement to the effect that humanitarian treaties may ‘to a certain extent’ 
comprise protection of the environment.284
Finally, the Helsinki Resolution is remarkable because of the importance it attaches to 
consequences of unlawful use of force under the UN Charter. The relevant provisions were highly 
controversial. The disagreement centred on whether treaty relations should be settled pursuant to the 
principle of equality of all belligerents followingy as in bello,285 or follow the modem jus ad bellum 
distinction between lawful and unlawful uses of force instead.286
279 Infra, Chapter 5.
280 Broms, 59 Ann.IDI(1981), T. 1,217; Briggs, ibid., 279; 61 Ann.IDI (1985), T. I, 8-9 and T. B, 231.
281 Salmon, 61 Ann.IDI (1985), T. 1,15; Tenekides, ibid., 23; discussion, ibid., T .11,220-21.
282 Supra, 1.3.3.
283 E.g., Written Statement Nauru (Memorial I), WHO Request, 48-50; Malaysia, WHO Request, September 1994, 10- 
11.
284 Amendment proposed by Salmon, rejected by 27 votes to 9 with 6 abstentions: 61 Ann.IDI (1985), T. II, 221-223; 
Professor Salmon was one of co-authors of the 1985 EC Experts Report mentioned above {supra, 3.1.2.), and it can be 
assumed that his proposal to IDI in 1985 was at least inspired by its conclusions.
285 Munch, 59 Ann.IDI(1981), T. II, 187-8; Briggs, 61 Ann.IDI(1985), T.I, 7-8; McDougal, ibid, T. II, 233.
286 Tunkin, 59 Ann.IDI(1981), T. II, 223.
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Some members argued that the entire issue of treaty relations as a consequence of armed 
conflict should be resolved in accordance with the UN Charter’s principles.287 Consequently, an 
aggressor State should be denied all benefits under treaty law, based on the principle ex injuria jus non 
oritur?u  Other members objected that there was no State practice to support such a distinction 
between aggressors and victims with respect to treaty relations.289 A further suggestion was that the 
Institut should restrict itself to guidelines for treaty relations durante bello on basis of the principle of 
equality of belligerents, but that it should leave open the possibility that post bellum, another 
assessment may be needed pursuant to the principles of jus ad bellum290 This debate strongly 
resembles the discussions on compensation for violation of jus in bello and jus ad bellum examined 
earlier.291
Whilst the final text of the Resolution does not take a position on all of the above issues, it is 
noteworthy that it devotes not less than three of its eleven articles to the consequences of modem jus 
ad bellum on treaty relations in armed conflict. Art. 7 allows victim States to suspend treaties in whole 
or in part if incompatible with the exercise of individual or collective self-defence. Art. 8 obligates 
States to terminate or suspend treaties to comply with resolutions of the Security Council. Art. 9 denies 
unlawful aggressor States the right to terminate or suspend treaties ‘if the effect would be to benefit 
that State’.
Far from being unrealistic, it seems that these articles have been remarkably prescient in 
anticipating the increased impact of the Charter’s collective security system following the end of the 
Cold War. The legal aftermath of the 1990/91 Gulf Conflict, Res. 687 (1991) and the work of the UN 
Compensation Commission illustrate the possible effect of Arts. 7 to 9 of the Helsinki Resolution.
Finally, Art. 10 entails again a renvoi to unsettled matters insofar as it provides that the 
Resolution does not prejudge rights and duties arising from neutrality.
287 Broms, ibid., T.1,214; Verosta, ibid., 256; Zourek, ibid., 257.
288 Tunkin, ibid., T. II, 185-7; Seyersted, ibid., 192.
289 Schindler, ibid., T.1,268-9; Skubizewski, ibid., T. U, 191; Schindler, 61 Ann.IDI {1985), T I, 17; Briggs, ibid., 8-9.
290Marek, ibid., 10-11.
291 Supra, 2.3.4., 2.3.5,2.4.2. C.
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3.4.3. Contributions Made b y  the iLC Codifications
The ILC has consistently abstained from considering the effects of war or armed conflict in its 
work. As seen before, it was excluded from its studies on the law of the sea, and on State liability 
for acts not prohibited by international law.294
However, in respect of its own 1994 draft articles on watercourse law, the ILC commented 
that ‘the present articles themselves remain in effect even in time of armed conflict’.295 In their 
statements before die ICJ on the legality of nuclear weapons the Solomon Islands relied on this 
comment, and requested the Court to apply ‘the same presumption in favour of applicability where an 
instrument was silent.’296
It should be noted firstly, that the observation was not recorded in the draft articles 
themselves, but only in the comments thereto. In any event, the ILC’s observation appears far too 
general, since past practice shows that international watercourses have strategic value and may become 
the scene of armed conflict.297 The ILC has not indicated whether its observation applies only to States 
not involved in the conflict, or includes contending parties as well. Hence, it may amount to a rule de 
lege ferenda. As seen before, during the debates in the General Assembly on the ELC draft, delegates 
were anxious to stress that the only article to deal explicitly with armed conflict - Art. 29- was not 
intended to change the status of the protection of watercourse installations under current laws of armed 
conflict.298
As for treaty law, there are several articles of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties that touch on the use of force in international relations, but they expressly leave the matter that 
concerns us here, open. Apart from Arts. 63 and 74, which stipulate that the severance of diplomatic 
and consular relations does not in principle affect treaties between parties nor their capacity to
292 For possible reasons see: Lauterpacht, 29 BYIL 1952 (1953), 160, in. 2.
293 Supra, 3.1.1.
294 Supra, 2.3.3.
295 ILC Report (1994), UN Doc. A/49/10,316, para 3.
296 Solomon Islands, Written Observations, WHO Request (June 1994), para 4.13#, 91-92; Oral Pleadings, (Mr. 
Sands), CR/95,14 November 1995,74-5, para 26.
297 Costa, in Zacklin, et al., op. cit., 203-45,407; Baxter, op. cit., 187-244.
298 UNGA, 51st session, Agenda item 144, UN Doc. A/51/869 of 11 April 1997; Supra, 2.2.5.A.
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conclude treaties, the drafters’ reluctance to be drawn any further on the matter of armed conflict is 
apparent from Art. 73:
‘The provisions of the present Convention shall not prejudge any question that may arise in regard to a 
treaty from a succession of States or from the international responsibility of a State or from the outbreak 
of hostilities between States’
and Art. 75:
‘The provisions of the present Convention are without prejudice to any obligation in relation to a treaty 
which may arise for an aggressor State in consequence of measures taken in conformity with the Charter 
of the United Nations with reference to that State’s aggression’.
This trend was confirmed by the 1978 Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect 
of Treaties,299 and by the 1986 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and 
International Organisations or between International Organisations.300
However, the fact that the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties does not ‘prejudge’ the 
effects and implications of armed conflict on treaties, does not mean that its provisions may not apply. 
Whilst the 1969 Vienna Convention by express provision does not have any retroactive effect, it is 
important to note that many of its provisions are nevertheless regarded as customary law. This includes 
the articles on suspension and termination, as emphasised by the ICJ in the 1997 Gabcikovo- 
Nagymaros Project case.301
In the latter case the ICJ also clarified the relationship between the law of treaties and State
responsibility. The Court held that those two branches of international law were different in scope and
expanded on their relationship as follows:
‘A determination of whether a convention is or is not in force, and whether it has or has not been properly 
suspended or denounced, is to be made pursuant to the law of treaties. On the other hand, an evaluation 
of the extent to which the suspension or denunciation of a convention, seen as incompatible with the law 
of treaties, involves the responsibility of the State which proceeded to it, is to be made under the law of 
State responsibility.’
Referring to its earlier case law on the issue, the Court also stressed that:
‘It is moreover well established that, when a State has committed an internationally wrongful act, its 
international responsibility is likely to be involved whatever the nature of the obligation it has failed to 
respect.’302
299 Arts. 39-40.
300 Arts 63,74(1), 75, 76.
301 Judgment, 25 September 1997, ICJ General List No. 92, para 46, which includes references to earlier case law.
302 Ibid., Para 47; See too Rainbow Warrior Arbitration (1990), 82 ILR, 499 at 550-1, para 75.
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3.4.4. Methodology Suggested
In application of the foregoing, it is submitted that no sweeping generalisation can be made 
regarding the application or non-application of multilateral environmental agreements during 
international armed conflict. Given the great differences that exist amongst the conventions in the area 
of IEL, a cautious approach is advisable. Each treaty needs to be examined separately in order to 
determine whether or not it can apply to the specific environmental problem posed.
Furthermore, since the solution involves both questions related to the application of 
international treaties and the use of force in international relations, regard must be had also to the law 
of Law of Treaties and the Law of State Responsibility:
(1) Whether environmental problems related to the use of armed force are governed by a 
particular treaty needs to be determined primarily according the terms of the treaty (the pactum) itself. 
Apart from the rules on treaty interpretation recorded in the 1969 Vienna Convention, regard must be 
had to die principles discussed in this chapter that relate specifically to questions of armed conflict. 
These include the rule that no treaty is ipso facto abrogated or suspended by armed conflict and the 
related rule that issues related to the use of force are not per se excluded from the scope of treaties; on 
the other hand, it should be kept in mind that the law of armed conflict operates as lex specicdis with 
respect to conduct of belligerent activities, and that no environmental treaty can be construed so as to 
overrule a State’s inherent right to self-defence.
If the outcome of this examination is that the treaty applies in principle to questions of armed 
conflict or if the outcome of this examination is uncertain, several further tests need to be carried out.
(2) The treaty may contain explicit provisions on its continued operation during armed 
conflict, such as a clause allowing Parties to suspend the operation of the treaty. Such a clause may 
then be resorted to by the contracting Parties. However, there may be grounds arising under the Law of 
Treaties or the Law of State Responsibility which override such provisions.
Thus, as seen earlier, pursuant to Art. 60(5) of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties, suspension or termination does not extend to provisions relating to the protection of the
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human person contained in treaties with a humanitarian character. It remains an open question, though, 
whether and to what extent this prohibition covers environmental provisions.303
A treaty clause allowing suspension or termination in armed conflict may also be in conflict 
with a new peremptory norm of general international law (jus cogens), as stipulated by Art. 64 of the 
1969 Vienna Convention. While the principle in question may reflect customary law, the procedure 
suggested by this Convention may not.304 Furthermore, it should be noted that the Vienna Convention 
cannot be applied retroactively.305
According to Art. 75 the provisions of the 1969 Vienna Convention are without prejudice to 
any obligation in relation to a treaty which may arise for an aggressor State in consequence of 
measures taken in conformity with the UN Charter with reference to that State’s aggression. This is a 
clear reference to the possible implications of Security Council decisions under Chapter VII of the 
Charter for treaty relations between UN Members and identified aggressor States. This is in 
accordance with inter alia, A rt 103 of the Charter which stipulates expressly that ‘in the event of a 
conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations.. .and their obligations under 
any other international obligation’, their Charter obligations prevail.306
The relevance of the latter hypothesis was underlined in the Lockerbie case. In its order for 
provisional measures in 1992, the ICJ gave an extensive interpretation to the powers of the Security 
Council. It held that by virtue of Arts. 25-103 of the UN Charter, a decision of the Council is able to 
prevail over treaty obligations of the parties under any international agreement.307
(3) Even if a particular treaty does not include an express provision on the occurrence of 
armed conflict, it would still need to be examined whether armed conflict can form a ground of treaty 
suspension or termination pursuant to the Law of Treaties. Space does not permit to discuss every 
hypothesis in detail, but a few remarks may nevertheless be in order.
303 Supra, 3.4.2.D.
304 Art. 71 (2); Note that the 1969 Vienna Convention also regulates the procedure to be followed should the treaty 
conflict with a pre-existing norm of jus cogens: Art. 53.
305 Art. 4.
306 Gowlland-Debbas, 43ICLQ (1994), 55, 87-90.
307 Questions of Interpretation and Application o f the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from the Aerial Incident at 
Lockerbie, Order of 14 April 1992, ICJ Rep. (1992), (Libya v. UK), 3 at para 39; (Libya v. US), 133 at para 42; See too 
Judgment on Preliminary Objections, 27 February 1998, in which the ICJ decided, inter alia, that the issue of the 
effects of Security Council Resolutions and the Montreal Convention was a defence on the merits: General List No. 88, 
(Libya v. UK), para 50; (Libya v. US), para 49.
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Even if one accepts the modem view that no treaty is suspended ipso facto on account of the 
outbreak of armed conflict,308 a belligerent can still decide to withdraw from a treaty, in full 
compliance with its provisions. In fact, belligerents may even decide to suspend or terminate bilateral 
or multilateral agreements inter se, by mutual agreement.309
General principles of treaty law may be applicable to the subject matter as well. Non­
contending States may conceivably invoke (material) impossibility of performance,310 and rebus sic 
stantibus to justify unilateral suspension of a treaty.311 However, in the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project 
case the ICJ had the occasion to stress that this type of defence to the general rule of pacta sunt 
servanda should only be exceptionally allowed to stand.312 In addition, the State and treaty practice 
that will be examined in the following chapters indicate that armed conflict in itself is not sufficient a 
ground to invoke the plea of rebus sic stantibus. Moreover, there is reason to believe that the rebus sic 
stantibus theory was developed mainly to deal with peaceful change.313
(4) The next frame of reference is the Law of State Responsibility. As the ICJ indicated in the 
Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project case, the 1969 Vienna Convention confines itself to defining - in a 
limitative manner - the conditions in which a treaty may lawfully be denounced or suspended. The 
effects of a denunciation or suspension seen as not meeting those conditions are to be judged 
according to the law of State responsibility which is expressly excluded from the scope of the Vienna 
Convention following Art. 73.
The Law of State Responsibility was among the first topics which the ILC selected as suitable 
for codification in 1949. This project is still ongoing. Chapter V of part Two of the Commission’s 
draft is titled ‘circumstances precluding wrongfulness’; it was prepared at the turn of the 1970s and the 
1980s under the responsibility of Mr. Roberto Ago, and was accepted provisionally in 1980.314 
According to the Commission, this chapter deals with exceptional circumstances which render an 
international obligation inoperative and preclude the attribution of wrongfulness to an act counter to 
that obligation- and the normally resulting responsibility.315 These special circumstances are:
308 Helsinki Resolution, 61 Ann.IDI, (1985), T. E, 280, Art. 2.
309 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Arts. 54-59.
310 1969 Vienna convention, Art. 61, which the ICJ regards as customary law: Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project case 
(merits), judgment of 25 September 1997, ICJ General List No. 92, para 99.
311 Brownlie, Principles, 616-17.
312 ICJ General List No. 92, paras 102-3.
313 See Bederman, 82 AJIL, (1988), Iff., and particularly 8, 30ff; Toth, 19 Juridical Review, (1974), 269f f ;  The 
Harvard Research clearly distinguishes rebus sic stantibus (Art. 28) from the effect of war on treaties (Art. 35).
314 ILC Report (1996), UN Doc. A/51/10, paras 51-64.
3,5 ILC Report (1979), UN Doc. A/34/10,284 and 290-91.
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(1) Consent validly given by the State whose rights are affected (Art. 29 of the draft);
(2) Countermeasures in respect of an internationally wrongful act (Art. 30); (3) Force maieure and 
fortuitous event (Art. 31); (41 Distress (Art. 32); (5) State of necessity (Art. 33); (61 Self- 
defence (Art. 34).
Many of these draft articles are regarded as reflecting customary law to varying degrees. For 
instance, in the 1997 Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project case the ICJ had no difficulty treating the articles 
on necessity and countermeasures as authoritative. However, in the 1990 Rainbow Warrior Arbitration 
the arbitral panel relied primarily on the DLC’s description offorce majeure and distress, but treated its 
proposal for ‘state of necessity’ as controversial.316
All of these special circumstances precluding wrongfulness may be of potential relevance to 
the subject at hand. Thus, Art. 34 of the ILC’s draft stipulates that:
‘The wrongfulness of an act of State not in conformity with an international obligation of that State is
precluded if the act constitutes a lawful measure of self-defence taken in conformity with the Charter of
the United Nations’.
As is clear from Art. 7 of the Institut’s Helsinki Resolution, a victim of aggression may resort 
to suspension of treaty relations as a self-defence measure.317
(5) Finally, it is submitted that there is a further possibility that needs to be examined. A rt 73 
of the 1969 Vienna Convention, as mentioned before, does not only reserve judgement with regard to 
the Law of State Responsibility, but also to questions related to the outbreak of hostilities. This is a 
renvoi to problems which have been touched on before, i.e., the implications for treaty law of the 
rights and obligations which States derive from the outbreak of hostilities. A related issue is whether 
the law on belligerent reprisals may affect the continued operation of a treaty. All these questions point 
to the need to examine if there are customary principles related to the laws of armed conflict that may 
affect the operation of international environment agreements, and more generally, whether the 
implications for treaty law should follow the jus in bello principle of equality of belligerents durante 
bello, or the jus ad bellum principle of discrimination between aggressors and victims instead.
316 82 ILR, 1990,552-555, paras 77-79.
317 Supra, 3.4.2.D.
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3.5. Conclusions and Introduction to Part II
3.5.1. Conclusions to Chapter Three
The purpose of this Chapter was to establish legal principles and a methodology to determine 
the application of IEL in general during armed conflict.
The analysis has led to the following slightly contradictory observations. First, the 1996 
Advisory Opinion of the ICJ indicates that rules devised for the conduct of belligerent activities 
operate as lex specialis for questions related to the interpretation of provisions of general international 
law, including environmental law, in armed conflict. Furthermore, whilst the Court stated that 
environmental concerns form part of the laws of armed conflict, it held that multilateral environmental 
agreements cannot be construed so as to deny a State the fundamental right to use armed force in self- 
defence.318 This conclusion is supported by the records of 1972 UNCHE and 1992 UNCED.
On the other hand, there is a strong tendency in modem international State practice, case law 
and legal theory, towards maintaining the validity of treaties insofar as compatible with national policy 
and with obligations stemming from Security Council decisions under Chapter VII.319
In 1993, the ICRC suggested that the following guidelines be included into military manuals:
‘International environmental agreements and relevant rules of customary law may continue to be 
applicable in times of armed conflict to the extent that they are not inconsistent with the applicable law of 
armed conflict
Obligations relating to the protection of the environment towards States not party to an armed conflict 
(e.g., neighbouring States) and in relation to areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction (e.g., the 
High Seas) are not affected by the existence of the armed conflict to the extent that they are not 
inconsistent with the applicable law of armed conflict’ 320
Clearly, the application of the key criterion of ‘inconsistency with the applicable law of armed 
conflict’ suggested by the ICRC, is no simple matter. The ILC has carefully avoided studying the 
problem explicitly in its various codifications of international law, whilst the Institut has come up with
Supra, 3.2.
319 Supra, 3.4.
320 General Principles of International Law (5), Annex to UN A/48/269,29 July 1993, supra, 2.1.
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some useful - albeit at times controversial - principles regarding the legal effects of armed conflict on 
treaties in general.
The State practice, case law and legal theory examined in this chapter has failed to answer 
certain pertinent questions. On the assumption that certain principles of IEL in general may continue to 
be relevant in armed conflict, and that certain multilateral environmental agreements may continue to 
apply during armed conflict, to what extent are contending Parties entitled to deviate from such 
obligations on the ground of armed conflict? More specifically, how should the rights of contending 
parties be balanced against the enjoyment of entitlements by non-contending States (and perhaps by 
international areas as well) under IEL in general and multilateral environmental agreements in 
particular?
This uncertainty may not be surprising given that use of armed force, as seen in the Second 
Chapter of this study, raises many difficult legal questions. When the failings of the collective security 
system leave the legal position of States not directly involved in the hostilities unclear, the treaty 
relations between the latter and the belligerent States will be inevitably affected by this uncertainty.
Furthermore, one would be hard pressed to generalise rights and obligations arising from the 
many environmental treaties in force. It was seen earlier that there are a great number of treaties from 
the bilateral to the global level dealing with a vast array of environmental problems in a variety of 
media. Some regimes are very detailed and put in stringent terms, others are obviously more abstract 
or exhortatoiy in character.321
Drawing further on the two main disciplines involved, i.e. the Law of Treaties and the Law of 
State responsibility, it was concluded that each multilateral treaty needs to be examined separately, in 
order to determine its application to the problem in question.
First, the pactum between contracting States needs to be examined, applying the relevant 
articles of the 1969 Vienna Convention on treaty interpretation, as well as the principles of 
interpretation related to armed conflict, examined in this chapter. Secondly, provision needs to be 
made for obligations arising from jus cogens, humanitarian provisions and binding Security Council 
decisions. Thirdly, regard must be had to the grounds of suspension and termination arising from the 
Law of Treaties, and fourth, to the ‘circumstances precluding wrongfulness’ arising under the Law of 
State Responsibility. The final possibility that needs examining is whether there are any customary
321 Supra, 1.2.1.
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rules on the fate of multilateral environmental agreements during armed conflict outside the frames of 
reference of the Law of Treaties or the Law of State Responsibility.
3.5.2. Introduction to Part II
The aim of the second part of this study is to take a closer look at the problem of the 
relationship between international armed conflict and multilateral environmental agreements, by 
examining one particular category of maritime agreements.
The reasons why this study concentrates on the marine environment, were set out in the 
introduction to this study. A series of representative treaties regarding marine safety and prevention of 
marine pollution were selected. These cover the following themes: (1) Safety Aspects and Navigation;
(2) (Civil) Liability Conventions; (3) Prevention of Oil Pollution and other forms of Marine Pollution;
(4) Maritime Emergencies.
Three types of basic clauses with a possible bearing on armed conflict will be examined: 
(1) Clauses exempting war damage from the scope of the convention; (2) Clauses dealing with the 
possibility of war/armed conflict/hostilities and (3) Clauses dealing with the exemption of warships, 
and other State craft. A chapter has been devoted to each clause and the analysis will follow the same 
basic plan. First, a short justification will be provided for why the selected clause may have a bearing 
on armed conflict. This will be followed by an analysis, treaty by treaty, of the negotiating history of 
the clause and if possible, by an examination of State practice, opinio juris and doctrine where 
relevant. Finally, for each clause, a conclusion will be formulated on the significance of the absence or 
presence of the clause for the relationship between armed conflict and the treaties in question.
Although the majority of the conventions that will be discussed were concluded under 
IMCO/EMO auspices, others have been concluded under UNEP, IAEA, the Council of Europe and the 
UN/ECE. In addition, throughout this study references will be made to similar clauses contained in 
other multilateral environmental agreements. All in all, close to 60 international treaties and 
instruments will be discussed either directly or indirectly.
□ □□
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Part II: Maritime Conventions and Naval War
Chapter Four:
The Exclusion of War Damage from the Scope of Maritime Conventions.
Chapter Five:
Contingency Clauses for Armed Conflict in Maritime Treaties.
Chapter Six:
Sovereign Immunity and the Exemption of Public Vessels from Maritime 
Conventions.
Chapter Seven:
Conclusions on the Relationship between Maritime Treaties and Naval War. 
Chapter Eight:
General Conclusions on the Legal Effect of Multilateral Environmental 
Agreements during International Armed Conflict.
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Chapter Four 
The Exclusion o f War Damage from the Scope of Maritime Conventions
4.1. General Comments
In matters of liability and reparation, a distinction is usually made between State and civil 
liability. Both are legal frameworks for settling issues of reparation. State liability refers to the duty of 
States to make reparation for damage caused by a breach of public international law; civil liability, by 
contrast, is determined primarily on the basis of private - municipal or international - law. The treaties 
reviewed in this section are usually said to regulate matters of civil liability. However, many regimes 
that will be discussed involve State participation in one form or another: States may either act as 
supervisors or guarantors of a particular compensation scheme, contribute to a particular indemnity 
fund, incur complementary or residual liability, or may even be liable as principal operators.1 Taken as 
whole, the liability regimes discussed here are therefore best described as mixed regimes.
As will be seen below, many -if not all- civil liability conventions exclude coverage for 
damage caused by war and other instances of armed conflict. From an insurance point of view this 
may not be surprising, for in commercial law, damage caused by war is a risk usually excluded from 
normal coverage by the insurer. Many contemporaiy standard forms used in the commercial trade 
exclude losses caused not only by wars in the traditional sense (classic, declared, inter-State conflicts), 
but contain expressions excluding a whole range of other types of armed conflicts: formulas as ‘act of 
war’ and ‘act of public enemies’ in the Hague Rules2 and Hague-Visby Rules; ‘war, civil war, 
revolution, rebellion, insurrection or civil strife arising therefrom, or any hostile act by or against a 
belligerent power’ as in the marine insurance clauses of the Institute Time Clauses (Hulls) and the 
Institute Cargo Clauses. The net is cast particularly wide in the Gencon Charterparty which excludes 
damage caused by:
1 Rosas, op. cit., 163.
2 On the development of the Hague Rules generally see O’Connell, D., The International Law o f the Sea, vol. II, 
(1984), 782-86.
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‘...any blockade or any action which is announced as a blockade by any Government or by any 
belligerent or by any organized body, sabotage, piracy and actual or threatened war, hostilities, warlike 
operations, civil war, civil commotion or revolution’.3
The latter formula makes it absolutely clear that hostilities other than ‘war’ in the formal legal 
sense are also intended. This avoids the problems that arose in Kawasaki Kisen Kabushi Kaisha o f 
Kobe v. Bantham Steamship Co, where the charterparty contained a clause allowing cancellation ‘if 
war breaks out involving Japan’.4 As indicated earlier, domestic courts and arbitral tribunals tend to 
construe terms as ‘war’ or ‘acts of war’ in insurance policies broadly, holding that they apply to 
undeclared wars,5 and even to actions by resistance or guerrilla forces.6 The implications of this 
flexible interpretation may be illustrated with the case of Dreyfus & Co v. Duncan (Lloyd’s 
Underwriters) and Another (1981), in which the Belgian Court of Appeal of Antwerp needed to 
construe an insurance policy which expressly excluded ‘riot, social disorder and malicious damage’ 
but not war or armed conflict as such. The Court decided that this phraseology applied to the starting 
of fires and the bomb attacks by rebel troops in the course of the conflict in East Pakistan in 1971, 
which ultimately led to the creation of the State of Bangladesh.7
The underlying idea is that war and other instances of armed conflict are considered an 
abnormal risk, akin to force majeure, which the insurer should not be required to bear - 8 unless of 
course, the client took out special war risk coverage.
3 Hudson, in Rowe, op. cit., 336/7
4 Supra, 3.4.2. B.
5 See regarding the Korean conflict: Langlas et Al., v. Iowa Life Insurance Co. (1954), 21 ILR 1954, 416; Thomas v. 
Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. (1957), 26 ILR 1955-11, 626; regarding the Suez Conflict: Navios Corporation v. The 
Ulysses II et al. (1958), 26 ILR 1958-11, 638; but see diversity of opinion as to the legal effect of the Japanese Attack 
on Pearl Harbour: New York Life Insurance Co. v. Bennion (1946), Ann. Dig. (1946), 224-7; Savage v. Sun Life 
Assurance Co. of Canada (1944), Ann. Dig. (1943-45), 283-4; West v. Palmetto State Life Insurance Co. (1943), Ann. 
Dig. (1943-45), 289-92; Rosenau et al. v. Idaho Mutual Benefit Association (1944), Ann. Dig. (1943-45), 293-300.
6 Smulders & Piccinati v. Societe Anonyme 'La Royale Beige' (1943), Ann. Dig. (1943-45), 303-4; Cie d ’Assur. La 
Nationale v. Vve Cabanel (1946), Ann. Dig., (1946), 228; Van Hoeve De Feyter v. Fire Insurance Co. o f 1859 Ltd.
(1947), Ann. Dig. (1947), 169-171; Amstel Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Van Der Wal (1950), 17 ILR 343-4; Marissal v. 
Mutuelle Generale Francaise Accidents (1950), 17 ILR, 349-50; Beccarini v. Societa La Securita (1950), 17 ILR 1950, 
352-353.
7 82 ILR, 107,109.
8 Steimel, 4 EPIL (1982), 307.
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4.2. Discussion
4.2.1. Nuclear Industry as Model
• (Paris) OECD Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nudear Energy, 1960
• Convention on the Liability of Operators of Nudear Ships, 1962
• (Vienna) Convention on Civil Liability for Nndear Damage, 1963
• Protocol to amend the 1963 Vienna Convention, 1997
• Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nudear Damage, 1997
Since the beginning of the 1960s a number of international conventions were concluded to 
regulate and channel questions of liability regarding two special risk creating industries: the nuclear 
industry and the sector of maritime carriage of oil. The impetus for a civil liability regime for the 
nuclear sector can be situated towards the end of the 1950s. It was linked with the fear for potential 
astronomical compensation claims for nuclear incidents involving land-based reactors and 
transportation of nuclear materials. The nuclear supply industry considered these risks too incalculable 
to bear or insure. Since these liability issues could jeopardise the development of a peaceful nuclear 
energy sector, the OECD governments decided to intervene.
The first convention in which this was done was the 1960 Paris Convention. It applies to 
nuclear incidents within Western European States and establishes an exclusive non-fault civil liability 
regime. It completely relieves the nuclear supply industry, and channels all liability, subject to certain 
ceilings, exclusively to the operators, who need to cover their liability by compulsory insurance. The 
1963 Vienna Convention provides similar solutions but on a more global scale.9 Again in response to 
industry demands, two more additional liability layers to the Paris Convention were subsequently 
agreed upon. The 1963 Paris Supplementary Convention establishes a second tier of residual State 
liability as well as a third one, constituted by a private insurance pool.10 A Joint Protocol agreed in 
1988 between IAEA and the OECD/NEA linked the Vienna and Paris Conventions into one system.
In 1990, the IAEA Standing Committee on Liability for Nuclear Damage was set up to revise 
the Vienna Convention and prepare a supplementary compensation scheme. On 12 September 1997 a
9 Bimie & Boyle, op. cit., 31 Iff.
10 Gehring & Jachtenfuchs, 4 EJIL (1993), 100-101.
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Protocol to amend the 1963 Vienna Convention and a Convention on Supplementary Compensation
for Nuclear Damage were adopted. The new instruments contain, inter alia, a better definition of
nuclear damage that also addresses the concept of environmental damage, and includes compensation
for preventive and remedial measures.11 In addition, the Convention on Supplementary Compensation
applies to nuclear damage suffered in or above the Exclusive Economic Zones and Continental shelves
of Contracting Parties,12 whilst the Protocol may apply to nuclear damage, ‘wherever suffered’,
including in the territory and any maritime zones established by a non-Contracting State in accordance
13with the international law of the sea. As will be seen further below, the two new instruments not only 
apply to civilian installations, but may cover (military) installations used for ‘peaceful purposes’.14
However, none of these nuclear liability instruments cover war damage. Pursuant to an 
identically worded clause, no liability shall attach to an operator for nuclear damage caused by a 
nuclear incident ‘directly due to an act of armed conflict, hostilities, civil war or insurrection’.15
The Convention on the Liability of Operators of Nuclear Ships (hereinafter ‘1962 NS 
Convention’) was adopted at a Diplomatic Conference in Brussels under the auspices of the Comite 
Maritime International and IAEA, in 1962. It deals with questions of liability in much the same way as 
the above mentioned conventions: absolute or strict liability of the operator, with ceilings on 
compensation, and compulsory insurance. Like the Paris and Vienna Conventions, the 1962 NS 
Convention was basically forward-looking, concluded mainly to provide a liability channelling and 
compensation regime for the potential incalculable claims that might follow from a nuclear incident.16 
As will be discussed below, the main interest of this Convention for this study lies is its explicit 
inclusion of incidents involving nuclear warships.17 The reasons why the latter were finally 
incorporated - after much discussion- were essentially of a pragmatic nature: nuclear propulsion on 
ships was at that time still the reserved domain of the military of a few countries ( i.e., the US and the 
USSR)18 and it was predicted that this situation would persist in the near future.19 However, at the
11 Protocol, Art. 2(2) & (4); Convention Art. 1 (f) (iv) to (vi), (g), (h); Press Release IAEA, 12 September 1997, PR 
97/21.
12 1997 Convention Art. V (1).
13 1997 Protocol, Art. 3(1) & (2).
14 1997 Protocol, Art. 3 (IB); 1997 Convention Art. II (2); Infra, 6.2.6. A.
15 Vienna Convention Art. IV 3 (a); Paris Convention Art. 9; Annex to the 1997 Supplementary Convention, Art. 3(5); 
1997 Protocol, Art. 6(1).
16 Szasz, 2 JMLC (1971), No 3,541-2.
17 Infra, 6.2.6. B.
18 Between 1959 and 1962 the USSR icebreaker Lenin and the US N.S. Savannah were making their initial voyages; 
Szasz, 2 JMLC (1971), No 3, 547.
19 Szasz, ibid., 552-3; Konz, 51AJIL (1963), 102;
205
C h a p t e r  F o u r : E x c l u s i o n  o f  W a r  D a m a g e
Brussels conference the inclusion of warships led to a heated debate on the corresponding liability 
coverage. Several countries, mainly from Eastern Europe, argued that the liability of the operators of 
warships - i.e., of the States concerned - needed to be unlimited. Limiting a State’s liability for 
incidents involving warships would in their view legalise the use of nuclear energy for purposes of 
war.20 Despite these protestations, the conference let the States off with limited liability for warships as 
well (Art. HI).
Art. VUI of the 1962 NS Convention contains a clause which resembles the exoneration 
clauses mentioned above, in that it excludes coverage for: ‘an act of war, hostilities, civil war or 
insurrection’. True, the conventions of the Paris and Vienna group use the expression ‘act of armed 
conflict’, which on its own, could be wider than ‘act of war’, used in the 1962 NS Convention. 
However, such an interpretation is not certain. Even if the terms ‘act of war’ in the latter treaty would 
have to be interpreted narrowly as referring only to a state of war in the legal-technical sense, other 
instances of use of armed force would still be excluded from the NS convention because of the term 
‘hostilities’.
It seems extraordinary though, that the NS Convention allows even the operators of nuclear 
warships, i.e. State governments, to take advantage of the exemption clause for losses caused by war or 
other forms of hostilities. It would undoubtedly have been more prudent for the negotiators to include 
a ‘savings clause’ to the effect that A rt VUI is without prejudice to the rules of general international 
law on State responsibility. The issue will probably remain of academic interest only, since the 
convention is unlikely ever to enter into force.21
4.2.2. Maritime Carriage of Oil
• International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, 1969
• International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution 
Damage, 1971
Questions of liability and compensation in relation to the sector of maritime oil transport were 
brought to the fore at the end of the 1960s. Unlike with the nuclear industry however, it was an actual 
disaster that became the catalyst for the negotiation of a special liability regime. Following the 1967
20 Konz, ibid., 102, &. 14 & 109.
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Torrey Canyon incident, IMCO adopted an programme for measures and studies in relation to marine 
pollution from maritime casualties. This included for the first time legal measures (1) on intervention 
on the high seas and (2) on questions relating to the nature and extent of the liability of the 
owner/operator of the ship or cargo. Subsequently, at a Conference organised in Brussels, two 
conventions were adopted: one on intervention, the other one on civil liability. The 1969 Civil 
Liability Convention (hereinafter CLC) was soon supplemented by the 1971IOPC Fund Convention. 
Together these conventions provide a liability and compensation scheme for maritime oil transport, 
inspired largely by the liability regimes for the nuclear industry. There are nevertheless some 
important differences. The 1969 CLC puts the burden of liability neither on the vessels’ operator, nor 
on the cargo-owner, but on the shipowner. Although the latter’s liability is strict, it is limited in most 
cases according to a formula related to the tonnage of the ship and an overall total (Art. 5). The 1971 
Fund Convention’s stated purpose is to provide additional compensation to the victims of oil pollution. 
Unlike most schemes in the nuclear energy sector however, States have been reluctant to shoulder 
even a part of this burden. The additional layer of compensation agreed in 1971 is financed by a levy 
on the oil importers and oil cargo interests (Art. 14).22
According to most commentators, the 1969 CLC already covered environmental damage 
occurring in the territorial sea of a Contracting Party, including the cost of preventive measures to 
minimise such damage.23 Nonetheless, the relevant clauses were given divergent interpretations in 
practice, both by the IOPC Fund and by national legal systems. In response to appeals for an 
internationally agreed uniform definition, the clauses were revised by two 1984 Protocols.24 The 
revised provisions not only increase the level of compensation substantially: they provide an explicit 
though narrow definition of environmental damage and extend the scope of the conventions to the 
Exclusive Economic Zone of contracting States.25
The CLC and the IOPC Convention contain in part an identically worded ‘escape’ clause for 
pollution damage ‘resulting from an act of war, hostilities, civil war and insurrection’. In both cases the 
burden of proof rests with the party to which the main liability has been channelled: either the 
shipowner or the Fund. In the case of the CLC, the clause came from an alternative proposal on strict 
liability of the shipowner, made by IMCO’s Legal Committee. It was obviously inspired by the
21 Infra, 6.2.6. B.
22 Bimie & Boyle, op. cit., 294-5; Jachtenfuchs & Gehring, 4 EJIL (1993), 97-99.
23 See ‘pollution damage’ as defined in Art. I (6), and complemented by Art. n.
24IMO Docs LEG./Conf.6/66 and LEG./Conf.6/67,25 May 1984, not yet in force.
25 Revised text of Art. 1(6) of the CLC, and of Art. 3 of the IOPC Fund Convention.
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liability conventions for the nuclear industry.26 The proposal did not elicit any substantial comments 27 
and was accepted almost unaltered, apart from cosmetic improvements relating to the proposed 
exclusion for natural disasters.28 The exemption for natural phenomena ‘of an exceptional, inevitable 
and irresistible character’ follows immediately on the exclusion for war damage. This indicates that 
the conference delegates regarded war and other types of armed conflict as extraneous circumstances, 
akin to force majeure, which totally escape the shipping industry’s control.
The basic hypothesis underlying the draft for the 1971 IOPC Convention was that the Fund 
(supported by the oil industry) should be able offer compensation in cases not hilly covered by the 
1969 CLC: i.e., either if the shipowner is not liable, or, if he was liable, but neither he nor his insurer 
were able to meet their obligations, or if the damages exceeded the owner’s liability.29 Yet, no 
agreement could be reached on the philosophy or nature of the Fund. As pointed out by one 
delegation, the conference remained divided over whether the Fund should provide additional relief to 
oil pollution victims in all cases where the 1969 CLC offered compensation or, instead, whether the 
Fund should be no more than an insurance policy.30 This ambivalence became apparent when the 
delegates clashed over two draft proposals by IMCO: one to exonerate the Fund from liability for oil 
pollution caused by war and other instances of armed conflict (as in the 1969 CLC); the other to make 
the Fund bear the risk of damage caused by natural disasters (unlike in the 1969 CLC).31
The proposal to exonerate the Fund from liability in cases where it could prove that the 
pollution damage resulted from an ‘act of war, hostilities, civil war or insurrection’, was the subject of 
protest before the conference started.32 It attracted the most passionate of debates during the 
conference. Both proponents and opponents of the provision relied on a panoply of arguments 
allegedly based on the ‘legal tradition’ in this area, equity, economic principles, philosophical 
arguments and even common sense.
26 Draft Art. n, Alternative B (2), IMCO Doc LEG/CONF/4 and IMCO Doc LEG/CONF/4/Corr. 1, September 1969, 
IMCO, Official Records of the International Legal Conference on Marine Pollution Damage Conference, 1969 (1973), 
460 [hereinafter ‘Marine Pollution Damage Conference 1969’].
27 Unlike for the proposed exclusion regarding warships: Infra, 6.2.6.C.
28 LEG/CONF/C.2/SR.18,25 November 1969, Marine Pollution Damage Conference 1969, 739-742.
29 LEG/Conf.2/C.l/SR.4, 1 December 1971, IMCO, Official Records o f the Conference on the Establishment of an 
International Compensation Fund for Oil Pollution Damage, 1971 (1978), 331 [hereinafter ‘IOPC Conference 1971’].
30 LEG/Conf.2/C. 1/SR.6,2 December 1971, IOPC Conference 1971, 349.
31 LEG/CONF.2/3, ibid., draft Art. 4 (2) (a) and footnotes 4 (i) & (ii).
32 Ibid., 49-62; the US opposed the exoneration whilst Japan, Sweden and Australia supported the exoneration; 
Australia later changed its mind and supported the US position: LEG/Conf.2/C.l/SR.6, 2 December 1971, IOPC 
Conference 1971, 344.
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The most fervent opponent of IMCO’s draft proposals was the US delegation. They proposed 
the deletion of the war damage exoneration clause arguing that the fundamental question involved was 
‘whether innocent victims of pollution damage should be denied relief under any circumstances’. 
During the debates, the US and her supporters (Australia, Canada, Lebanon, Portugal, Singapore, 
Spain), developed this argument as follows:
• pollution victims should not be made to bear the cost of war damage; this should be spread 
over all those benefiting from the oil trade; otherwise the full cost of such damage would fall 
on the individual;
• excluding war damage from coverage is particularly unfair in case the victim is not connected 
with a belligerent State;
• excluding war damage will lead to much discussion and litigation and will be subject to 
varying interpretations;
• the Fund should fill gaps left in the compensation schemes by other conventions and by 
insurance companies;
• the convention should be forward looking;33
The proponents (Belgium, Bulgaria, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, 
Netherlands, Norway, Rumania, UK, USSR) of the exclusion of war damage invoked the 
following grounds:
• war acts are excluded in other conventions; including it in the Fund Convention would lead to 
discrepancies;
• war damage is usually not compensated; most insurance companies exclude war damage for 
good reasons; there is no reason why victims of oil pollution caused by war should be placed 
in a more favourable position; The Fund should not be a charity;
• not all victims are completely innocent;
• it is up to the States - and hence to the society at large - to pay compensation in cases of war 
and armed conflict;
33 Ibid., 62-63.
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• since the Fund is to be financed by the private industry it should not and cannot be required to 
bear this burden; war risk insurance is too costly;
• in case of armed conflict, a large number of oil tankers can be destroyed simultaneously 
exceeding the Fund’s capacity to pay;
• dropping of the exoneration clause would require the Fund to deal with a host of minor 
incidents, leading to an unacceptable administrative burden;
• if the shipowners are allowed to escape liability in case of war damage, the oil 
cargo/importing industry should not be required to provide coverage either;
• common sense indicates that many States will be deterred from signing the Convention if war 
damage is covered; this will impair the financial viability of the Fund;34
The latter point of view carried the day. The US proposal was rejected by 25 votes to 10, with 
7 abstentions.35
Still, that was not to be the end of the discussion, for the conference remained in two minds 
about the ultimate purpose of the Fund. After having excluded war damage, the delegates broached the 
issue of natural disasters, which had been exempted previously from the 1969 CLC. The majority of 
the delegates now thought that natural disasters presented a different case from war altogether: it was 
said that the former did not have their origin in human activity, and the examples which were brought 
up during the discussions related to extremely rare occurrences such as ‘a meteorite hitting a ship’. 
Greece thought that including natural disasters would become too onerous. During the debates, similar 
counter-arguments as in case of war damage were heard: the IOPC Fund Convention should not put 
victims of natural disasters in a more favourable position; the conference should not cause legal 
discrepancies with other conventions, such as those relating to the nuclear industry and particularly the 
1969 CLC; if the shipowner is exonerated in case of damage by a natural disaster, it would be unjust to 
require the oil companies to bear the full weight of this. However, this time the proponents of the
34 LEG/Conf.2/C. 1/SR.5,2 December 1971, ibid., 334-5, 334-3; LEG/Conf.2/C.l/SR.6,2 December 1971, ibid., 343- 
47.
35 LEG/Conf.2/C. 1/SR.6,2 December 1971, ibid., 347.
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widest possible safety and compensation net, won the argument. The Greek position was rejected by 
19 votes to 14 with 8 abstentions.36
4.2 .3 . Maritime Carriage o f Nudear Material
•  Convention Relating to Civil Liability in the Field o f  Maritime Carriage o f N udear Material, 1971
The Convention Relating to Civil Liability in the Field of Maritime Carriage of Nuclear 
Material was adopted at an international conference co-sponsored by IMCO and the OECD.37 The 
need for the convention arose as a result of an apparent conflict between nuclear law and maritime 
carriage law. The question had been studied since 1968 by the European Nuclear Energy Agency of 
the OECD, by IAEA, IMCO and the Comite Maritime International. A comprehensive study of the 
problems followed at a Symposium held in Monaco in 1968.38
The crux of the problem seemed to be that under maritime law, the carrier could incur 
liability, whereas the nuclear conventions were based on the no-fault absolute liability of the nuclear 
industry and its insurers. Following the limitation of the liability of the operators of nuclear 
installations under the Paris Convention and the Vienna Conventions, maritime carriers of nuclear 
material began to request indemnity to cover their possible liability. The operators themselves were 
unable to get insurance for this and even governments were not normally prepared to do so. The 
OECD reported that as a result, the transport by sea of nuclear substances had come practically to a 
standstill. Unless either a warship could be made available or a government indemnity could be given, 
transport had instead to be done by air at a greater expense, and this was only possible because the air 
carriers did not consider it necessary to demand indemnities at all, and were content to rely on the 
operator's insurance.39
36 Greece’s objections can be found in LEG/CONF.2/3, ibid., 52-3; Japan (ibid., 54), Sweden (ibid., 57) and the UK 
(ibid., 61) concurred; the US advocated the inclusion of damage caused by natural disasters on the same grounds as for 
war damage (ibid., 63); for the discussions and final decisions of the Committee of the Whole on the issue of natural 
disasters see LEG/Conf.2/C.l/SR.6, of 2 December 1971, IOPC Conference 1971, 347-50.
37 IMO Doc LEG/CONF.3, International Legal Conference on Maritime Carriage of Nuclear Materials, Brussels, 
1971; LEG/CONF.3/3,15 October 1971; The Final Act was signed on 17 December 1971.
38 IMO Doc LEG/CONF.3/3,15 October 1971,3, para 4.
39 LEG/CONF/.3/3, 15 October 1971, Annex II, 2 with extracts from a document prepared for the IMCO Legal 
Committee by the Secretariat of the European NEA of the OECD.
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The 1971 Convention gives primacy to the nuclear law, and ensures that the operator of a 
nuclear installation will be exclusively liable for damage caused by a nuclear incident occurring in the 
course of maritime carriage of nuclear material,40 unless the damage is caused by a nuclear incident 
involving the nuclear fuel or radioactive products or waste produced in the ship.41
The 1971 Convention does not contain an express clause relating to damage caused by acts of 
armed conflict. But this should not to be taken as proof that exoneration for such damage would not be 
available. Indeed, from the text of the convention it is clear that its rules rely primarily on the liability 
regimes of the nuclear industry42 Moreover, according to Art. 4, the convention supersedes any 
international conventions in the field of maritime transport to the extent that such conventions would 
be in conflict with it. Any defence available under the nuclear liability regimes will therefore apply to 
the maritime carriage of nuclear material as well.
4.2 .4 . Maritime Carriage o f Hazardous and Noxious Substances
•  Convention on Liability and Compensation for Damage in connection w ith the Carriage o f  Hazardous and Noxious 
Substances by Sea (HNS), 1996
The plan for a Hazardous and Noxious Substances (‘HNS’) Convention has been with 
IMCO/IMO since the mid-1970s. It was at its 29th session in 1976 that the Legal Committee concluded 
that it would be desirable to have a new comprehensive international convention dealing with liability 
for maritime carriage of substances other than oil.43 Over the years this proposal ran into many 
difficulties. The draft was unsuccessfully placed on the agenda of the 1984 International Conference 
on Liability and Compensation for Damage in connexion with the Carriage of Certain Substances by 
Sea44 Afterwards the IMO Secretary-General reported that there remained substantial differences of 
opinion on (1) the geographical scope of the convention; (2) the scope of application in respect of the 
risks and damage to be covered; (3) the party to be held liable under the convention; (4) the limits of 
liability to be placed on the party liable; and even on (5) the necessity itself for an international
40 Arts. 1& 2.
41 Art. 3.
42 See reference to the Paris and Vienna Conventions in the preamble and in Art. 1.
43 IMO LEG, 34th session, 1978, LEG XXXiV/3, 7 December 1977, agenda item 3 (1).
44 IMO Council, 52nd session, 1984, C 52 /11/Add.l, 31 May 1984, Note by the Secretary-General, 2-3, paras 9-10.
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convention on liability and compensation of HNS.45 It is a testimony to the Legal Committee’s 
tenacity, that agreement was after reached after all. The HNS Convention was adopted on 3 May 
1996.46
The final text of the convention is based on substantially remodelled proposals discussed 
within the Legal Committee during the second half of the 1980s. It combines elements of both the 
1969 CLC and the 1971 IOPC Fund Convention.47 For instance, it takes inspiration from the 1969 
CLC in channelling liability essentially to the shipowner, adopting a strict but mostly limited liability 
approach, and requiring compulsory insurance; it also adopts many elements of the IOPC Convention, 
in that it proposes inter alia, the establishment of a special Hazardous and Noxious Substances Fund 
(HNS Fund) to provide compensation in addition to the required compulsory insurance.
The first draft articles for the Convention were prepared by an informal Working Group, 
which presented the Legal Committee at its 37* session in 1978 with several alternatives. Alternative I 
of that proposal channelled the main liability to the shipowner and followed closely die basic rules on 
liability and the various defences contained in the 1969 CLC. It copied the CLC’s war damage 
exclusion clause for verbatim.48 The only time this article elicited comments was in 1978, when a 
member of the Legal Committee questioned whether the exclusion of liability in the case of a natural 
phenomenon was not too wide. In reply, it was recalled that this had been extensively discussed at the 
1969 Brussels Conference and that it was generally agreed that the exception was much narrower that 
an ‘act of God’, since it required that the phenomenon be ‘of an exceptional, inevitable and irresistible 
character’. Nevertheless, it was suggested that this exception might be further restricted if feasible 
from an insurance standpoint.49
During the many versions the HNS proposal went through subsequently, the war damage 
exclusion clause remained unchanged and unchallenged. In similar vein, the provision to exonerate the 
HNS Fund for war damage in the last draft (Art. 14(3)), was copied directly from the IOPC Fund 
Convention’s Art. 4(2). It did not attract a single comment. In the final version of the HNS 
Convention, adopted on 3 May 1996, the exoneration clauses for the shipowner and for the Fund can
45 LEG 55/5,1 August 1985, Note by Secretary-General, 4, para 14.
46 LEG 72/4, 20 January 1995; for text of new draft: Annex 1 to that document; LEG/CONF.IO, 15 April 1996; LEG 
73/3 of 20 July 1995; final text see 35ILM(1996), 1406.
47 Supra, 4.2.2.
48 LEG XXXVH/3, 9 October 1978, Report of the Informal Working Group, 3, para 14 (LEG XXXVII/3), and 
ANNEX m, Art. 3(2) (a).
49 LEG XXXVH/7, 5 December 1978, Report, 14-22, paras 52-89, discussion of alternative I, 22, para 85, on 
subparagraph (a).
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be found in Arts. 7(2)(a) and 14(3)(a) respectively. The final HNS Convention follows the solution of 
the CLC and the IOPC Fund not only in spirit but also to the letter: the shipowner is allowed an escape 
clause not only in case of damage caused by war etc., but also in case he proves that the damage was 
caused by a natural phenomenon of an exceptional, inevitable and irresistible character. The HNS 
Fund, however, needs to provide coverage in the latter event.
4 .2 .5 . Draft Convention on Wreck Removal
•  Draft Convention on W reck Removal, 1995
At its 69* session in 1993, the IMO Legal Committee considered a request for an international 
convention to establish uniform rules on wreck removal in international waters. According to its 
promoters,50 the convention would have to be consistent with coastal States' powers under the 1982 
LOSC, but would fill the gaps in the existing international law.51 Since 1993, preliminary drafts for 
such a convention have been submitted by Germany, the Netherlands and the UK. Consideration of 
the draft was included in the Committee’s work programme for 1996-7.52
According to the 1995 draft, shipowners would be held strictly liable for the costs of locating, 
marking and removing of hazardous wrecks.53 However, under proposed Art. Vm (l)(a), shipowners 
would be able to escape their liability if they could prove inter alia, that the casualty resulted from an 
act of war, hostilities, civil war, insurrection or a natural phenomenon of an exceptional, inevitable and 
irresistible character.54 The proposed war damage exoneration clause was copied from the 1969 CLC 
Art. HI (2).
50 Belgium, Germany, Greece, the Netherlands and the UK.
51 LEG 69/10/1.
52 LEG 73/WP. 1 of 12 October 1995, Agenda item 14.
53 LEG 73/11 of 8 August 1995, Commentary with Annex on ‘Draft Convention on Wreck Removal’.
54 Ibid., Art. VIII (1) (a), Commentary, 3, para 16.
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4.3. Conclusions to Chapter Four
Recent data demonstrate that the 100 States party to the 1969 CLC represent 88.55 % of 
world tonnage. The 1971 Fund Convention has attracted 76 ratifications representing 62.03 % of 
world tonnage, whilst the 1971 Convention concerning maritime carriage of nuclear liability is 
decidedly less popular: it has only 14 parties representing 23.01 % of world tonnage.55
Regardless of whether the 1984 protocols to the 1969 CLC and the 1971 IOPC will enter into 
force one day,56 marine pollution and related damage to the environment caused by belligerents during 
armed conflict, are not covered. The exoneration clauses for war damage incorporated in both these 
conventions and the extensive debates held on the issue during the 1971 Conference, leave no doubt 
that victims of oil pollution damage in instances such as the 1983 Nowruz and the 1991 Gulf War oil 
‘spills’, will have to look elsewhere for compensation.
This will be the case, moreover, irrespective of whether the conflict is international or 
internal, or one waged by a National Liberation Movement, whether it is small-scale or large-scale, a 
declared or undeclared war, and regardless of the precise military circumstances in which the marine 
pollution was caused. Furthermore, the exoneration clause holds good irrespective of whether the 
belligerent responsible for the pollution resorted to armed force on lawful jus ad bellum grounds (e.g., 
in self-defence or in execution of a UN Security Council resolution taken under Chapter VII), or not, 
and regardless of whether the damage to the marine environment was caused as a consequence of 
actions permissible under the jus in bello or not.
The same observations apply mutatis mutandis, to the nuclear liability conventions of the 
Paris and Vienna group. It is too early to say whether the war damage exoneration clause currently 
incorporated in the draft on Wreck Removal will remain unchallenged. However, it would come as a 
surprise if this clause were dropped or even substantially modified.
There is a firm legal tradition of excluding war damage from ‘civil’ liability conventions 
dealing with various risk-creating activities. Apart from the discussed conventions on maritime 
transport of oil and nuclear liability conventions, one can find a war damage exoneration clause -
55 Source: IMO/Lloyd’s data as at 1 February 1998.
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identical to Art. II (2) of 1969 CLC - in the 1977 Convention dealing with the exploration and 
exploitation of seabed mineral resources,57 and in the 1989 UN/ECE Convention on Civil Liability for 
Damage Caused During Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Road, Rail and Inland Navigation Vessels 
(CRTD Convention).58 This defence has even been incorporated in the 1993 Council of Europe’s 
Lugano Convention, which regulates civil liability for damage resulting from all activities dangerous 
to the environment.59 Since the majority of these clauses are, moreover, worded in identical terms, one 
can truly speak of a ‘standard war damage exoneration clause’ in State and treaty practice. This 
practice was confirmed once more in the three recently adopted civil liability instruments discussed in 
this chapter: the 1996 HNS Convention concluded under IMO auspices and the two new instruments 
on civil liability concluded in 1997 under IAEA auspices.
Given this legal tradition, it is perhaps not surprising that, as noted earlier,60 the ILC has 
excluded war damage from its work on State liability for acts not prohibited by international law.61 
Special Rapporteur Mr. Julio Barboza justified this proposal on the ground that such an exoneration 
clause is often contained in civil liability conventions. The text of the suggested provision reads in 
relevant part:
‘(1) The operator shall not be liable: (a) If the harm was directly attributable to an act of war, hostilities,
civil war, insurrection or a natural phenomenon of an exceptional, inevitable and irresistible character... ’
Although not fully spelled out in the above conference records, there are fundamental reasons 
why e.g., the owners or operators of ships should not be required to bear the costs of damage resulting 
from armed conflict.
It was seen that the US argued strongly in favour of war damage coverage by the IOPC Fund. 
She pleaded that the burden of oil pollution caused in the course of armed conflict should not be borne 
by innocent victims, but that it should rest instead, with the private industry and with the countries 
profiting from maritime carriage of oil. These views were rejected by the majority, who believed that
56 According to Bimie & Boyle, op. cit., 293, the protocols are unlikely to enter into force because the solutions which 
they propose seem unsatisfactory and are now out of date.
57 Art. 3(3).
58 Art. 5(4).
59 Art. 8.
60 Supra, 2.3.3
61 ILC Report, (1994), UN Doc., A/49/10, Chapter V, 381-2, proposed Art. J (‘exceptions’) & 386, see too draft Art. 
17 (‘national security and industrial secrets’); Tomuschat, op. cit., 37$ see too Szasz, in Grunawalt, et. al., op. cit., 
286, fn. 31.
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there were good reasons for the exclusion of war damage by insurers, that the IOPC Fund was not a 
charity, and that it was up to the State to pay compensation in case of war or armed conflict.62
It is submitted that there remains a fundamental distinction between damage caused in the 
normal course of shipping operations, and damage caused by acts of warfare. Leaving the question of 
force majeitre and natural disasters aside, in the first case the ensuing damage is caused by acts not 
intended to inflict damage. In such a case there is much to be said for making the industry bear the 
brunt of the cost of risks associated with their profit-making activities, regardless of the precise cause 
of the damage.
By contrast, war damage to ships is the result of deliberate acts by belligerents who are 
determined to inflict damage on the adversary, either directly or indirectly. As seen before, general EEL 
does not cover the hypothesis of the intentional infliction of damage by States.63 It is one thing to ask 
the operators or owners of ships to act as insurer for risks associated with maritime carriage of 
environmentally hazardous materials, such as nuclear substances and oil. It is quite another to ask the 
industry to act as insurer for the entire world, including for extraneous acts by belligerents during 
armed conflict. Environmental damage caused by acts of warfare are not meant to be addressed by 
civil liability or mixed State/civil liability regimes. Under current international law, they are, however, 
addressed by the general rules of State responsibility which were discussed above, in Chapter Two.64
nnn
62 Supra, 4.2.2.
63 Supra, 3.3.2.
64 Supra, 2.4.2. C.
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Chapter Five 
Contingency Clauses for Armed Conflict in Maritime Treaties
5.1. General Comments
It was seen that to examine the possible effect of a particular multilateral environmental 
agreement in armed conflict, the exact terms of the pactum between parties need to be established first. 
If there is an express clause permitting suspension, withdrawal, modification or termination of the 
treaty in case of war or other armed conflict, it should be possible to determine the drafters’ intentions 
without difficulty. Absent such a clause, recourse must be had to the general rules of treaty 
interpretation, in addition to the principles examined above, which relate specifically to armed 
conflict.1
There exists, as seen before, broad consensus on the fact that the majority of multilateral 
environmental agreements are silent on the question of their effect during war or armed conflict. 
However, whilst some regard this as evidence that the agreements continue to apply, others believe 
that this proves that they were not designed for this purpose.2 These assertions will be critically tested 
in this chapter through an analysis of a series of maritime safety and pollution prevention conventions. 
Some of these treaties contain clauses dealing expressly with the possibility of war, armed conflict and 
other types of hostilities, whilst others do not.
1 Supra, 3.4.4.
2 Supra, 3.4.1.
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5.2. Discussion
5.2.1. The Salvage Conventions
•  Convention for the Unification o f  Certain Rules o f  Law relating to Assistance and Salvage at Sea, 1910
•  International Convention for the Unification o f  Certain Rules relating to Assistance and Salvage o f  Aircraft or by 
Aircraft at Sea, 1938
•  International Convention on Salvage, 1989
A. The 1910 Salvage Convention
The original Salvage Convention was signed on 23 September 1910. It entered into force on 1 
March 1913, on the eve of the outbreak of World War I, for the following countries: Austria, Belgium, 
France, Germany, the Netherlands, Romania, Russia, the UK and the USA.3 The provision of most 
interest to this chapter is Art. 11, according to which every shipmaster is bound to render assistance to 
everybody, even though an enemy, found at sea in danger of being lost, to the extent that he can do so 
without serious risk to his ship, crew or passengers.4 According to an American commentator, the 
nature of the treaty and particularly Art. 11 demonstrated ‘the manifest intention that it {the treaty) 
should be operative in war as well as peace’.5 In support of this interpretation, reference was made to 
two municipal cases, of 1948 and 1950 respectively, in which American courts assumed that the 
convention remained in force after the outbreak of World War n.6
However, it is unlikely that the 1910 Convention was designed to apply unabridged during 
inter-State armed conflict. The 1910 Convention was intended to regulate matters of private maritime 
law, and did not apply to warships (Art. 14). During both World War I and n, most merchant ships 
belonging to belligerent countries came under the government control.7 Presumably therefore, the 
instances in which the convention was applied during those armed conflicts must have been sharply 
reduced. Furthermore, the two US court cases dealt only with the application of the convention 
between friendly or co-belligerent countries. The 1950 case for instance, was about assistance
3 Parry, The Consolidated Treaty Series (1980), vol. 212,198-201.
4 ‘Tout capitaine est tenu, autant qu'il peut le faire sans danger serieux pour son navire, son Equipage, ses passagers, de 
preter assistance a toute personne, meme ennemie, trouvee en mer en danger de se perdre... ’
5 McIntyre, op. cit., 251.
6 Publicover v. Alcoa S.S. Co. (1948), 168 F.2d, 672, 277 in which the convention was mentioned in passing; and US 
v. James L. Richards (1950), 179 F. 2 d , 530: McIntyre, op. cit., 250.
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rendered in 1943 by a UK to a US vessel. There seems to be no case law on the application of the 1910 
Salvage Convention between countries which are enemies.
After World War I, the 1910 Salvage Convention was among the multilateral treaties of ‘an 
economic and technical nature’ enumerated in Art. 282 of the Versailles Peace Treaty ‘to be applied’ 
from the coming into force of the Treaty. But, as mentioned before, the formulation of that article does 
not permit to say anything definite about the status of the Salvage Convention during the war between 
opposing belligerents. In similar vein, after World War II the US notified Germany of its desire to have 
the convention of 1910 ‘placed in effect’ between the US and Germany. Significantly, this was 
accompanied by a statement that the notice was:
‘...without prejudice to the previous status o f  any portion o f  the convention which may have remained 
operative or may have again become operative at any time since the outbreak o f  hostilities between the United 
States and Germany \ 8
This purposely ambiguous statement proves at a minimum, that the US administration was 
uncertain about the legal status of this pre-war convention during and immediately after World War II, 
at least insofar as its relations with a (former) enemy were concerned.
It may indeed have been the case that the 1910 Salvage Convention remained in force 
between neutral and other mutually friendly countries during both world conflicts. However, it is 
submitted that is veiy unlikely that the Convention continued to apply between opposing belligerents, 
in spite of wording of A rt 11.
This is supported by the explanation given by a commentator who examined the travaioc 
prepctraioires of the above convention extensively. Wildeboer believes that the addition of ‘meme 
ennemie’ simply referred to the possibility that the contracting States might be at war with each other; 
that in that case the convention would no longer be applicable between the parties at war; but that 
since Art. 11 rested on a moral obligation not dependent upon the question who is the person in danger 
or to which state he belongs, it was intended to make an exception’.9
That this is a more likely interpretation is confirmed by the 1911 UK Maritime Conventions 
Act implementing the Salvage Convention. Article 6 of this Act obligates every shipmaster to render
7 Ibid., 250.
8 Ibid., 251.
9 Wildeboer, The Brussels Salvage Convention (1965), 268; confirmed by Rodi&re, Traite General de Droit Maritime. 
Evenements de Mer (1972), 164.
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assistance to eveiybody, even though an enemy, found at sea in danger of being lost, and stresses that 
this holds ‘ . even if such person be a subject of a foreign State at war with his Majesty’.
Finally, a further clarification of the exact meaning and scope of Art. 11 came with the 1967 
Protocol to the 1910 Convention. The purpose of this protocol was to extend the application of the 
1910 Convention to ships of war and other State-owned ships.10 However, each Party to the Protocol 
was given the right to determine for itself whether and to what extent Art. 11 of the 1910 Convention 
would apply State-owned ships.11 If nothing else, the 1967 Protocol confirms that Art. 11 has no 
bearing on the status of the 1910 Convention in times of war. Therefore, the import of ‘meme 
ennemie’ in the 1910 Convention seems to have been limited to the (moral) obligation to render 
assistance, an obligation that remained even between nationals of States at war with each other.
The above conclusions are entirely compatible with the law of naval warfare, which contains 
detailed regulations on the obligation to search for casualties after naval engagements. Hague 
Convention (X) of 1907 for the Adaptation to Maritime Warfare of the Principles of the Geneva 
Convention requires belligerents to ‘take steps to look for the shipwrecked’, after each engagement, 
‘so far as military interests permit’.12 This obligation is addressed more stringently in Geneva 
Convention (II) of 1949 for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked 
Members of Armed Forces at Sea. A rt 18 of the latter no longer refers to military interests, and 
obligates Parties to act without delay:
‘After each engagement, Parties to the conflict shall, without delay, take all possible measures to search 
for and collect the shipwrecked, wounded and sick, to protect them against pillage and ill-treatment, to 
ensure their adequate care, and to search for the dead and prevent their being despoiled.
Whenever circumstances permit, the Parties to the conflict shall conclude local arrangements for the 
removal of the wounded and sick by sea from a besieged or encircled area and for the passage of medical 
and religious personnel and equipment on their way to that area.’
The ICRC commentary to this provision refers explicitly to Art. 11 of the 1910 Salvage 
Convention, and emphasises that there is a general obligation under international law to search for and 
collect victims, whether military or civilian, of any incident occurring at sea.13 Similarly, Additional 
Protocol I of 1977 enunciates a general obligation to respect and protect the shipwrecked.14
10 Infra, 6.2.8 B.
11 Art. 1, in fine.
12 Art. 16(1).
13 Pictet, Commentary, II Geneva Convention (1960), 132-3.
14 Art. 10 (1) & (2).
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Given the above, the International Convention on Assistance and Salvage of Aircraft or by 
Aircraft at Sea of 1938, could be judged as a step back for it does not contain the addition that the 
obligation to render assistance holds good even if the person in danger belongs to an enemy country.15 
However, since that convention never entered into force, it would be futile to speculate on its wartime 
status.
B. The 1989 Salvage Convention
The 1989 Salvage Convention was concluded under IMO auspices, mainly in response to 
increasing environmental concerns. The 1910 Convention incorporates the ‘no cure, no pay’ principle, 
giving little incentive to a salvor to undertake an operation which has only a slight chance of success, 
and little reward for attempts to prevent or minimise environmental damage. The 1989 Convention 
seeks to remedy this by providing for an enhanced salvage award, taking into account efforts to 
prevent or minimise damage to the environment. A rt 1(d) defines environmental damage as:
‘. .. substantial physical damage to human health or to marine life or resources in coastal or inland waters or 
areas adjacent thereto, caused by pollution, contamination, fire, explosion or similar major incidents’.
whilst Art. 14 introduces ‘special compensation’ for salvors who fail to earn a reward in the normal 
way {i.e., by salving the ship and the cargo).
There is no clause in the 1989 Convention that deals expressly with the contingency of 
war/armed conflict. Art. 10 on the ‘Duty to render assistance’, much like the above 1938 Convention, 
does not include a reference to enemy nationals. Still, there are several other articles that have military 
implications and that may have a bearing on armed conflict: Art. 4 on State-owned vessels, Art. 25 on 
State-owned cargoes, and A rt 26 on Humanitarian cargoes. All of these will be discussed in the next 
chapter.16
15 See Art. 2.
16 Infra, 6.2.8 C.
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5.2 .2 . The Load Lines Conventions
•  International Convention respecting Load Lines, 1930
•  Internationa] Convention on Load Lines, 1966
A. The 1930 Load Lines Convention
It has long been recognised that limitations on the draught to which ships may be loaded make 
a significant contribution to the safety of life and property at sea. The first International Convention on 
Load Lines, adopted on 1 January 1930, established uniform principles and rules on the basis of 
reserve buoyancy. Its successor convention, adopted on 5 April 1966 under IMCO auspices, sets limits 
in the form of freeboards, which constitute besides external weathertight and watertight integrity, the 
main objective of the convention. Its regulations take into account the potential hazards present in 
different zones and different seasons. The technical annex contains several additional safety measures 
concerning doors, freeing ports, hatchways and other items. The main purpose of these measures is to 
ensure the watertight integrity of ships’ hulls below the freeboard deck. All assigned load lines must be 
marked amidships on each side of the ship, together with the deck line.17
The 1930 Convention contained provisions for its modification and revision (Art. 20), and 
provided for the possibility of denunciation after the expiration of a five-year period from its coming 
into force (Art. 25). It did not provide for the possibility of suspension. However, the 1966 Convention 
contains an express clause on ‘suspension in case of war or other extraordinary 
circumstances’ (Art. 31). The travaux preparatoires of the latter Convention show that this was done 
at the initiative of the US, with the express intent of legalising unilateral measures taken in 1941 
concerning the 1930 Convention.18
As is well known, in 1941, two years after the outbreak of World War II in Europe, the US 
was still formally a neutral country,19 in spite of being heavily engaged in supplying friendly 
belligerents with war materials. It was particularly the increased demand for oil that made it desirable
17 EMO Information Sheet.
18 IMCO Docs., International Conference on Load Lines, 1966, LL/CONF/1,67, proposal for a new Art. 5.
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for the US to increase the amount she was allowed to cany in her tankers, over the limits allowed by 
the 1930 Load Lines Convention.20 The US discussed the matter with other State parties to the 
Convention - including the UK - but there was disagreement on the course to follow.
The UK - which was at that time involved in World War II as a belligerent - thought that the 
convention was essentially a peacetime agreement, and that it should be regarded as ‘inoperative’ 
during war. She proposed that the convention be modified in common agreement so as to permit 
deeper loading of vessels. The US, however, argued that no modification or revision was necessary, on 
the ground that the convention could be regarded as suspended on the basis of the legal theory of rebus 
sic stantibus (‘changed circumstances’).
The American standpoint was based on a legal opinion sought from Acting Attorney General 
Biddle.21 The latter reasoned in substance that the Load Lines Convention was a peacetime agreement, 
that peacetime commerce was a basic assumption of the treaty, and that the prevailing situation with 
respect to shipping was wholly different: of the 36 parties to the treaty, 10 were at war, and 16 were 
under military occupation. Moreover, the actual destruction of merchant ships ‘however loaded’ had 
become a major war strategy. His opinion concluded as follows:
‘Under these circumstances there is no doubt in my mind that the convention has ceased to be binding upon 
the United States. I t is a well-established principle o f  international law, rebus sic stantibus, that a treaty 
ceases to be binding when the basic conditions upon which it was founded have essentially changed 
Suspension o f  the convention in such circumstances is the unquestioned right o f  a state adversely affected by 
such essential change
In a direct reference to the UK's position, he further admitted that:
‘...it may well be that ordinarily the procedure would callfor the government to inform the other parties to the 
treaty with respect to the matter and request agreementfor termination or suspension o f  the treaty. The matter 
ofprocedure, however, does not affect the right o f  termination or suspension.’22
In his opinion, it was not necessary either to denounce the treaty under Art. 25 or to have it 
otherwise abrogated. Following this advice, president Roosevelt issued a presidential proclamation on 
9 August 1941, based explicitly on the rebus sic stantibus theory. The proclamation referred inter alia, 
to the fact that the conditions envisaged by the Convention had been, for the time being, almost wholly
19 The US formally declared war on Japan on December 8, 1941; on Germany on December 11, 1941; McIntyre, op. 
cit, 3, fn. 1.
20 Ibid., 25.
21 Hackworth, V Digest o f International Law (1943), 353-55.
22 Ibid., 355.
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destroyed, that the partial and imperfect enforcement of the Convention could operate only to 
prejudice the ‘victims of aggression’, and that:
‘...under approved principles o f  international law it has become, by reason o f  such changed conditions, 
the right o f  the United States to declare the Convention suspended and inoperative ’?
The reaction of other parties to the treaty can be called one of general acquiescence. No State 
seems ever to have protested against this unilateral suspension; the eight American States which were 
parties to the Convention gave their express assent thereto, and even the UK accepted the US action in 
a diplomatic note.24
During the war, several States followed the US example and unilaterally suspended the 
convention.25 After the war, the proclamation of 9 August 1941 was revoked by presidential 
proclamation of 21 December 1945, effective 1 January 1946.26
B. The 1966 Load Lines Convention
The above event represents an important piece of State practice and opinio juris on the legal 
effect of armed conflict on multilateral treaties; not in the least since it constitutes one of the best 
documented episodes in which a (formally) neutral State, upon the outbreak of armed conflict between 
other contracting parties to a multilateral treaty, decided to suspend the operation of that treaty 
unilaterally. In the light of this, the discussions held in 1966 for the revision of the 1930 Convention 
carry particular interest. The draft suspension clause proposed by the US was identical to Art. VI of 
the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1960, which, as will be seen below, had 
itself given rise to serious controversy.27
The proposed new Art. 5 on suspension in case of war, read in substantial part as follows:
‘(a) In case o f  war or other hostilities, a contracting Government which considers that it is effected, 
whether as a  belligerent or as a neutral may suspend the operation o f  the whole or any part o f  the 
Regulations annexed hereto. The suspending Government shall immediately give notice of any 
suspension to the Organization; (b) Such suspension shall not deprive other Contracting Governments of
23 Ibid., 356.
24 Toth, 19 Juridical Review (1974), 152, fii. 8; McIntyre, op. cit., 26.
25 McIntyre, op. cit., 26.
26 Ibid., 26.
27 Infra, 5.2.3.D.
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any right of control under the present Convention over the ships of the suspending Government when 
such ships are within their ports; (c) The suspending Government may at any time terminate such 
suspension and shall immediately give notice of such termination to the Organisation; (d) The 
Organization shall notify all Contracting Governments of any suspension or termination of suspension 
under this Article, (italics added)’
The reactions of other governments to the US proposal can be summarised as follows. France 
argued that the clause should not be adopted, for three reasons: (l)The entire article appeared 
unnecessary, ‘as it is always open to a Government, in case of war, to denounce a Convention’; 
(2) The use of terms as ‘war’ and ‘hostilities’ rendered the clause too vague; (3) By granting other 
governments a right of control in subparagraph b, the entire proposal was internally contradictory.28
The USSR, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria also argued in favour of deletion of the American 
amendment, but for more legal or ideological reasons. Their delegates insisted that the draft clause was 
incompatible with the precepts and the spirit of the UN Charter, and in particular, that it was contrary 
to Art. 2(4) of the Charter.29 The US replied that its proposal:
‘...would enable governments to take such immediate measures as were necessary in case o f  hostilities 
and in the interests o f national security it would seem indispensable
This view was supported by Western States including the UK, Norway, Canada, Greece, and 
by Argentina, China (Taiwan) and Liberia.30
When the proposal for deletion of the draft provision was overwhelmingly rejected in the 
General Committee, the USSR and Poland tried another strategy. They introduced an amendment 
aimed at bringing the suspension provision more in line with what they considered to be the spirit and 
purpose of the Convention, as well as the UN Charter. They suggested to replace the expression ‘In 
case o f war or other hostilities ’ used in subparagraph (a) of the suspension clause proposed by the US, 
with the following: ‘hi case of an armed attack or in extraordinary circumstances, which affect the 
vital interests of the State of any Contracting Government...’ 31
With the US and other Governments willing to compromise, this Soviet-Polish proposal 
became the basis of the text which was finally agreed by the 1966 Conference. The text of the final
28IMO Doc. LL/CONF/1, 7 and General Committee, LL/CONF/C.1/SR.10,10 March 1966, 9.
29 General Committee, ibid., 9.
30 Ibid., 9.
31 General Committee, LL/CONF/C. 1/WP.26,26 March 1996.
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provision retained the procedural requirements of the above-mentioned US proposal, but changed the 
substantive requirement.32 Art. 31 (1) now reads:
‘In case of hostilities or other extraordinary circumstances which affect the vital interests o f a State the 
Government of which is a Contracting Government, that Government may suspend the operation of the whole 
or any part of the present Convention. The suspending Government shall immediately give notice to any such 
suspension to the Organization’ (italics added)
This end result represents a substantial update of the suspension clause initially proposed by 
the US, in several respects:
1. It no longer uses the terms ‘war’, ‘belligerent or ‘neutral’. While the USSR appears to have been 
successful in convincing other delegates that such terms would sit uncomfortably with the UN 
Charter, the conference nonetheless declined to adopt either the expression ‘armed attack’ or 
‘armed conflict’. The latter would have been more in accordance, respectively, with the jus ad 
bellum terminology employed in the Charter, and with the current jus in hello terminology.
2. The conference decided instead on the expression ‘hostilities or other extraordinary 
circumstances’, which is much less precise a definition of the circumstances in which State parties 
may decide to suspend the convention. The licence given for auto-determination of the case for 
suspension of the convention is therefore wider than would have followed from use of the term 
‘war or other hostilities’. One cannot help but doubt whether this was an outcome which the 
USSR and Poland had intended.
3. The previous observation is only partly tempered by the additional requirement that the 
circumstances must affect the ‘vital interests’ of a State. It is far from certain for instance, whether 
other contracting parties would be entitled to dispute a party’s decision to suspend. The only 
course of action open to other contracting parties under the treaty seems to lie on the diplomatic 
level. Subparagraphs (3) and (4) of Art. 31 might facilitate such diplomatic discourse, but these are 
provisions of a mere procedural nature which do not affect a State’s substantive right of decision 
to suspend.33
32 Art. 31 (2) to (4).
33 Obviously one can never exclude judicial review; The ICJ might find itself competent to decide whether the 
circumstances invoked affect the vital interests of a State; The ICJ has e.g., acknowledged that concerns expressed by 
Hungary for its natural environment in the region affected by the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project related to an "essential 
interest" of that State, within the meaning given to that expression in Art. 33 of the Draft of the ILC’s current draft on 
State Responsibility: judgment of 25 September 1997, ICJ General List No. 92, para 53.
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4. The provision of subparagrah (2) can indeed be regarded as a moderating element. Accordingly, 
suspension by one State party of its obligations under the convention does not affect the right of 
other State parties to continue to exercise control in their ports over ships registered with the 
suspending State. This provision was borrowed from the Safety Conventions and will be discussed 
below.34
Although the above events took place when the US was not yet an official belligerent in the 
War, it is difficult to deny that rebus sic stantibus was invoked in connection with international armed 
conflict between a third State and a belligerent. It was suggested before that historically, the rule of 
rebus sic stantibus was developed to deal with peaceful change.35 The Load Lines episode seems to 
contradict this. However, it is submitted that the circumstances in which the rule was invoked here 
were unique, and that the ensuing suspension clause does not meet the substantive and procedural 
requirements that current international law attaches to the rebus sic stantibus plea under the law of 
treaties.
First, Art. 62 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which represents largely 
customaiy international law,36 lays down strict substantive requirements for the plea of ‘fundamental 
change of circumstances’. Subparagraph (1) requires a heavy burden of proof: the circumstances must 
not only have been unforeseen, the original circumstances must have constituted an essential basis of 
the consent of the parties to be bound by the treaty, and the effect of the change is to radically 
transform the extent of obligations still to be performed under the treaty.37 Thus formulated, it seems 
debatable whether the circumstances which the US invoked in 1941 meet these demands. The 
Presidential proclamation did attempt to demonstrate that ‘peacetime commerce’ was a basic 
assumption of the 1930 Convention, and that the war had radically altered this assumption. 
Nevertheless, it seems that the prime purpose of the 1930 Convention was to deal with safety 
regulations of ships, which the US subsequently found burdensome or inconvenient to her activities as 
(qualified) neutral in the conflict.
Even if the US standpoint would be correct, the ICJ’s judgments in the 1973 Fisheries 
Jurisdiction and 1997 Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project cases demonstrate that the party invoking a plea
34 Infra, 5.2.3. C.
35 Supra, 3.4.4.
36 As acknowledged by the ICJ in the Fisheries Jurisdiction case, ICJ Rep. (1973), 63, para. 36.
37 Art. 62 (l)(a) & (b).
228
C h a p t e r  F iv e : C o n t i n g e n c y  C l a u s e s
of changed circumstances is not the sole judge of its merits.38 Although the 1966 Convention 
suspension clause does not exclude judicial review, the wording of the substantive requirement39 and 
the lack of substantive say 'which other treaty Parties are accorded40 do seem to imply that the 
suspending State is given a much larger measure of discretion than allowed by the modem plea. The 
latter point is confirmed by the fact that under the 1966 Convention, States are allowed to decide 
whether they shall suspend the convention as a whole, or only in part, whilst Art. 62 of the Vienna 
Convention deals with reasons for withdrawing from a treaty, terminating it or suspending its 
operation as a whole. Furthermore, Art. 31 (3) of the 1966 Convention gives States the discretion not 
only as to when to suspend, but also as to when to terminate the suspension.41
Furthermore, the modem version of the rebus sic stantibus theory attaches specific procedural 
requirements to all cases of termination and suspension: notification to the other treaty Parties, the 
right of other Parties to formulate objections, peaceful settlement of any disputes, and the expiry of a 
period of not less than three months before the suspension or termination can take place in case no 
objections are formulated.42 While it is not excluded that all these conditions could apply between 
belligerents and third Parties, the suspension clause which was included in the 1966 Convention 
indicates that the treaty Parties wished to grant each other as little substantive say as possible with 
respect to suspension based on armed conflict.
The preliminary conclusion, based on the legal history of the 1966 Load Lines Convention, is 
that the suspension clause which the treaty parties decided on, and which applies between belligerents 
and third States, does not meet the standards of the modem plea of fundamental change of 
circumstances.
Finally, it is submitted that modem requirements of the plea make it unlikely that it can ever 
be used as a ground to suspend or terminate treaties between belligerents on the basis of the existence 
of armed conflict alone. It was seen earlier that reliance on this defence in the case of armed conflict is 
not as such excluded by the 1969 Vienna Convention.43 However, the plea’s specific procedural 
requirements - notification, period for the formulation of objections etc. - are unsuitable for application
38 Respectively, ICJ Rep. (1973), 63, para. 36 and ICJ judgment of 25 September 1997, General List No. 92, para 102- 
3 ff.
39 Art. 31(1).
40 Art. 31 (2) to (4).
41 This is similar to Art. VI (c) of the 1948 Safety Convention, but different from Art. XIX (1) of the of the 1954 
OILPOL Convention: infra, 5.2.3. D & 5.2.4. A.
42 1969 Vienna Convention, Art. 65; Toth, 19 Juridical Review (1974), 276-281.
43 Supra, 3.4.3.
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between belligerents. Furthermore, Art. 62(2) of the 1969 Vienna Convention excludes the plea of 
changed circumstances in two cases that seem to bar application in armed conflict: in case (a) the 
treaty establishes a boundary; or (b) if the fundamental change is the result of a breach by the party 
invoking it either of an obligation under the treaty or of any other international obligation owed to any 
other party to the treaty. The first subparagraph means that the plea cannot be relied on by belligerents 
fighting over a boundary treaty. The second subparagraph implies that at least ‘illegal aggressors’ 
would not be allowed to take advantage of this defence.
5.2.3. The Safety Conventions
•  Convention for the Safety o f Life at Sea, 1914
•  International Convention for the Safety o f  Life at Sea, 1929
•  International Convention for the Safety o f  Life at Sea, 1948
•  International Convention for the Safety o f Life at Sea, 1960
•  Convention for the Safety o f  Life at Sea (SOLAS), 1974
The Safety Conventions in their successive forms are generally regarded as the most 
important of all international treaties concerning the safety of primarily merchant ships. The first 
version was adopted in 1914, the second in 1929 and the third in 1948. The 1960 Convention was the 
first major task for IMCO after its creation and it represented a considerable step forward in 
modernising regulations and in keeping pace with technical developments in the shipping industry. 
The intention was to keep the convention up to date by periodic amendments but in practice the 
amendments procedure proved to be too slow. A completely new convention was adopted in 1974 - 
the Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS).44
44IMO Information Sheet.
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A. The 1914 Safety Convention
The 1914 Safety Convention was concluded as a direct international response to the 1912 
Titanic Disaster, one of the worst maritime accidents in histoiy. Its provisions included safety 
precautions for ice and other derelicts floating in the sea, rules on radio-telegraph installations and 
signalling lamps, and led to the set-up of the first international ice patrol.45 The 1914 Convention was 
concluded on the eve of World War I. Although it did provide for emergency situations as ‘stress of 
weather’ and other instances offorce majeure,*6 it was meant to apply to merchant ships only47 and 
contained no provisions on war.
The global conflict of World War I, which eventually involved 32 nations, had a major effect 
on the treaty. Art. 69 of the treaty provided for its entry into force on 1 July 1915, but because of the 
1914-18 conflict, this never materialised.48 Unlike the 1910 Salvage Convention, the 1914 Safety 
Convention was consequently not fisted among the ‘multilateral treaties, conventions and agreements 
of an economic or technical character’ to be ‘applied’ between defeated Germany and the Allied and 
Associated Powers in accordance with Art. 282 of the Versailles Peace Treaty.49
B. The 1929 Safety Convention
It was only 11 years after the end of World War I that a second international conference on 
the Safety of Life at Sea could be convened. The conference produced a revised version of the 1914 
Convention, and also recommended changes to the International Collision Regulations (hereinafter 
‘COLREGS’).50 The UK Government was charged with obtaining the necessary international 
agreements to modify the latter.51 Other than that, the 1929 Conference did not entail any major
45IMCO press release, 6 May 1960.
46 Arts 2 & 4.
47 Art. 2.
48 International Conference on Safety of Life at Sea, 1948, Heads of Delegations Conference, Minutes, 2nd meeting 
May 24th, 1948, Comments by the Netherlands, 4.
49 On Art. 282: supra, 3.4.2.A.
50 ‘COLREGS’ can best be described as the ‘rules of road’ for the sea. Historically, technically and legally they are 
separate from the Safety Conventions. Yet at the 1929 Safety Conference revisions to the COLREGS were proposed 
and from there grew the tradition, followed by all other Safety Conferences up to the 1960s, of appending recommend 
changes to the COLREGS in a separate annex to the final act of the Safety conferences. It was only in 1972 that the 
COLREGS were again separated from the Safety Conferences, and revised at a separate Conference: Infra, 6.2.3.
51 Art. 40.
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innovations in the general provisions of the 1914 Convention. More in particular, no clause was 
inserted to deal with the effects of war. This may not be surprising since, after all, the 1914 
Convention never entered into force, and the issue of the legal effect of war on the execution of that 
treaty, never arose.
The 1929 Safety Convention entered into force on 1 January 1933, and was ratified by 35 
Governments.52 According to some accounts, the convention continued to remain in force during 
World War II. Thus, McIntyre refers to various domestic implementation measures taken by the US 
during the war.53 However, from the documents that will be discussed immediately below, it is clear 
that if the 1929 Safety Convention was applied during World War n, it was certainly not in 
‘unabridged’ form.
C. The 1948 Safety Convention
After World War n, a third International Safety Conference was convened in London. It led to 
a substantially revised Safety Convention and to a renewed proposal for amendments to the 
COLREGS. World War II had at least one clear negative effect on the execution of the 1929 
Convention: it prevented the UK Government from carrying out the mandate received in the 1929 
Convention regarding the revision of the COLREGS.54 The influence of World War II was also 
apparent from three further questions which the conference tackled: an explicit provision on the effect 
of war on the treaty, an exemption for humanitarian evacuations, and a resolution extending a 
temporary waiver for ‘the situation created by the second World War’.
During the 1948 Safety Conference the US proposed an elaborate new provision for the 
contingency of war. The new article would allow contracting governments in case of war, if they 
consider that they are affected, whether as belligerents or as neutrals, to suspend the convention as a 
whole or in part and also allow exemptions for humanitarian reasons.55
What is more, early on the conference delegates agreed to adopt a resolution on the ‘Situation 
created by the Second Word War’.56 In the final act the title of the proposed resolution was changed to
52IMCO press release, 6 May 1960.
53 Op. cit., 139.
54 International Conference on Safety of Life at Sea, London, 1948, SAFCON 9, Note on UK proposals, 4.
55 Final Report of the General Provisions Committee, SAFCON 50, May 28th, 1948, Annex A, Art. 3.
56 Ibid., Annex D, Draft Resolutions.
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‘Carriage of Passengers in Excess of Convention Limits’. The substantive part of the Resolution 
(No 1) itself was never challenged, and read in its final version, as follows:
‘The International Conference on Safety of Life at Sea, 1948 
RECOGNISING,
That as a consequence of the situation created by the second World War the number of passengers 
needing to be carried by sea at the present time is still considerately greater than the passenger 
accommodation available, and that a number of Governments signatory to the International Convention 
for the Safety of Life at Sea signed in London on May, 31st 1929, have accordingly been obliged to 
allow passengers to be carried in their ships in excess of the limits allowed by that Convention 
RESOLVES,
That Governments should each bring their practice into conformity with the provisions of the said 
Convention as soon as practicable, and in any event not later than the 31 st day of December, 1950.,57
What motivated these two major innovations - one permanent (suspension/exemption clause) 
and one temporary (Resolution 1) - were the problems with execution experienced by many States 
during the past war. During the 1948 Conference many governments confessed to having been unable 
to fully abide by the provisions of the 1929 Convention due to the necessities of war:
• The US admitted that it had tried in vain to obtain the agreement of other contracting Parties 
on the suspension by the US of certain provisions;58
• The UK explained that the draft resolution on the circumstances created by the second World 
War ‘.. .dealt with a situation which had been forced upon the UK government and others’;59
• France also admitted to having suspended part of the 1929 Convention for she declared being 
unable to bring the proposed waivers in relation to the situation created by the past war to an 
end before December 31st, 1950;60
By insisting on the inclusion of a suspension clause its promoters wanted the conference to 
acknowledge the reality of World War n, and thus in a sense absolve their governments post-factum  
from any blame. Another reason why the suspension clause was considered necessary is that many 
delegates wished to obtain from the conference an authorisation to do the same in the future, should 
the necessity arise again.61 Finally, many governments foresaw that they would need about two years
57 Adopted in the Final Act as Resolution 1.
58 General Provisions Committee, Draft Minutes, 9th meeting, May 20th, 1948,6.
59 Ibid., 4.
60 Ibid., 4.
61 UK declaration at Heads of Delegations Conference, Minutes, 2nd meeting, May 24th, 1948,11.
233
C h a p t e r  F iv e : C o n t i n g e n c y  C l a u s e s
before being able to return to the full implementation of the requirements of the convention- That is 
why Resolution 1 extends a waiver until the end of 1950.
Still, the proposal to include a provision in the Safety Convention to allow belligerent and 
neutral States to suspend the whole or any part of its regulations, proved extremely controversial. 
Opinion was divided on whether such a provision was needed at all, and to a lesser degree, on the 
effect of suspension on the right of (port-State) control by third Parties.62 As to the first issue, delegates 
soon split into two main camps. Countries such as the US and the UK pressed hard for the inclusion of 
such a provision, on the following grounds:
• It was common knowledge that many Parties to the 1929 Convention had been in breach of it;63
• As governments did not wish to violate the convention, some provision should be made to meet 
conditions such as those obtaining during the late war; the proposal would assure that governments 
were ‘correct internationally’;64
• Countries would, in time of war, suspend whatever provision they wished; the proposal would 
merely enable Parties to do so without violating the treaty; it would be far better to recognise the 
contingency of war and the likelihood of suspension of the convention;65
• Other conventions as the ICAO Convention and many League of Nations treaties already contained 
such a clause;66
Delegates who opposed the inclusion of the war contingency clause or who voiced doubts 
about the wisdom of doing so,
• expressed fear for possible abuse of the clause;67
• or argued mainly with the USSR, that the convention should only deal with ‘normal 
conditions’; that war was not a normal condition; that in the event of war, every country,
62 See in particular UK statement, International Conference on Safety of Life at Sea, Heads of Delegations Conference, 
Minutes, 2nd meeting, May 24th, 1948,1.
63 US statement, General Provisions Committee, Minutes, 2od Meeting, May 3rd, 1948, 2; UK declaration, Heads of 
Delegations Conference, Minutes, 2nd Meeting, May 24*, 1948,11.
64 US statement, General Provisions Committee, Minutes, 2nd Meeting, May 3rd, 1948, 2; UK declaration, Heads of 
Delegations Conference, Minutes, 2nd Meeting, May 24th, 1948,11.
65 Second Plenary Session, June 2nd, 1948, Summary by the Chairman, 7.
66 UK declaration, Heads of Delegations Conference, Minutes, 2Dd Meeting, May 24th, 1948,11.
67 General Provisions Committee, Draft Minutes, 3rd meeting, May 5th, 1948,2.
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whether belligerent or neutral, would make its own rules to deal with the situation, and that in 
any case, the provisions on emergency andforce majeure were sufficient;68
• or claimed that the entire issue was of military nature, and that the conference was not 
competent to deal with such delicate matters as obtained during war;69
It was only at a very late stage that the implications of the recently concluded UN Charter 
were brought up. Yugoslavia drew attention to the fact that because of the Charter, the Safety 
Convention would have to distinguish between the rights of victim and aggressor States with respect to 
armed conflict. However, the delegate conceded that this was a delicate and difficult matter. He 
therefore proposed that the Conference should decide not to deal with the issue at all, and leave it to 
general international law.70 This hurdle was crossed when a clear majority of delegates appeared to be 
in favour of incorporating the contingency of war in express terms.71
The second hurdle consisted of the extent of (port-State) control other contracting Parties 
would be left with in case of suspension of the convention by a Party because of war. Greece72 and the 
Netherlands took a hard-line approach, arguing that third States should not be allowed to continue the 
controls73 India wished to see the right of control limited to the extent it was intended to secure the 
safety of nationals of the country in whose port the vessels are located for the time being.74
This line of argumentation was rejected by the majority. They considered it unacceptable that 
third States would lose their right to exercise safety controls in their ports, simply because the State to 
which the ship belonged was at war and had decided to suspend part or whole of the convention. This, 
they argued, would not only be contrary third States’ sovereign authority, but it might even be taken as 
violation of the latter’ s duties of neutrality.75 It was also pointed out that in World War II suspending
68 Statements by the USSR and Poland, General Provisions Committee, Draft Minutes, 9th Meeting, May 20th’ 1948, 6; 
and at Heads of Delegations Conference, Minutes, 2nd Meeting, May 24th, 1948,11-13.
69 Statement by Greece, Annex to General Provisions Committee, Minutes, 4th Meeting, May 7th, 1948, in fine.
70 Heads of Delegations Conference, Minutes, 4th meeting, May 24th, 1948,12-3.
71 The final decision carried in the General Provisions Committee by a vote of 8-5-7: General Provisions Committee, 
Draft Minutes, 9th meeting, May 20th, 1948, p. 6; and in the Heads of Delegations Conference by a vote of 17- 3: Heads 
of Delegations Conference, Minutes, 2nd Meeting, May 24th, 1948, 13 in fine.
72 Statement by Greece in fine, Annex to General Provisions Committee, Minutes, 4th meeting, May 7th, 1948.
73 General Provisions Committee, Draft Minutes, 9th meeting, May 20th, 1948,10.
74 Heads of Delegations Conference, Minutes, 2nd Meeting May 24th, 1948, 13; Second Plenary Session, June 2nd, 1948, 
5-7; and SAFCON 59, Note by the Indian Delegation, June 1st, 1948.
75 UK statement, General Provisions Committee, Draft Minutes, 3rd meeting, 5th May 1948, 2; US statement, General 
Provisions Committee, Draft Minutes, 9th meeting, May 20th, 1948,6.
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action was taken by certain Parties and that governments which so desired had exercised control.76 The 
proposals to restrict or forbid the right of control by third States in case of suspension of the 
convention by a Contracting Party were subsequently defeated by a large majority.77
The other provision which had been undoubtedly inspired by the experience of World War n, 
was the proposal to exempt a contracting Government from complying with the convention in case it 
needed to evacuate private citizens whose life was threatened.78 True, according to its promoter, the 
proposed provision was of a pure humanitarian nature, and not intended as a special application of the 
suspension clause in case of war.79 The proposal met with little resistance during the conference.
The final text of Article VI on Suspension in case of War read in substantial part as follows:
‘(a) In case of war, Contracting Governments which consider that they are affected, whether as 
belligerents or neutrals, may suspend the whole or any part of the Regulations annexed hereto. The 
suspending Government shall immediately give notice of such suspension to the Organisation; (b) Such 
suspension shall not deprive other Contracting Governments of any right of control under the present 
Convention over the ships of the suspending Government when such ships are within their ports; (c) The 
suspending Government may at any time terminate such suspension and shall immediately give notice of 
such termination to the Organisation; (d) The Organisation shall notify all Contracting Governments of 
any suspension or termination of suspension under this Article.’
The 1948 Convention proved widely successful. It entered into force in 1950, and by the time 
of the 1960 Safety Conference, the convention and its Regulations had been accepted by 52 
Governments.80 The text of the provision which was finally agreed upon (Art. VI) apparently grants 
contracting States a fairly unfettered right to auto-determine not only when, but also what provisions to 
suspend. As discussed in relation to the 1966 Load Lines Convention,81 the requirements of 
subparagraphs (c) and (d) are only of a procedural nature and do not affect the substance of the right 
accorded to Contracting Governments in subparagraph (a). However, the leeway given to all 
contracting States has been moderated in the same article by two other factors. First, the only type of 
armed conflict which the Conference took into consideration was that of ‘war’. This reflects 
undoubtedly the type of conflict a large part of the world’s nations had just gone through: a large-scale 
international conflict affecting many States, belligerent and neutral alike. A second limit to the right of
76 US statement, ibid., 6.
77 The proposal to remove the text on the issue of control was supported in the General Provisions Committee by a 
mere two delegations; and in the Heads of Delegations Conference by a mere 4 votes: Minutes, 2nd meeting, May 24th, 
1948,1 & 13 in fine.
78 See final Art. V on Carriage of Persons in Emergency based on a proposal (Art. 3(b)) by the US.
79 US statement, General Provisions Committee, Minutes, 3rd meeting, May 3rd, 1948,2.
80IMCO press release, 6 May 1960.
81 Supra, 5.2.2. B.
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auto-appreciation accorded in subparagraph (a) follows from the preservation of the right of port-State 
control by third States in subparagraph (b): a unilateral decision taken by a Government to suspend the 
convention will therefore not imply ipso facto, that other contracting States will lose their rights (of 
control) under the convention.
Although the contingency clause of the 1948 Safety Convention clearly predates the 
formulation of the 1966 Load Lines contingency clause, the circumstances which led to the adoption 
of the respective clauses are fairly similar. During the travaux preparatoires of both conventions many 
States admitted to having unilaterally suspended part or whole of the convention during World War n, 
and declared that they wished to put this situation right for the future. Moreover, both contingency 
clauses are almost identically worded.
It is submitted that not too much significance should be attached to the different legal grounds 
invoked. It was seen above that in the Load Lines Convention case, the US officially relied on rebus 
sic stantibus. This theory was, however, not mentioned at all during the 1948 Conference, during 
which the UK delegate seemed to invoke instead, some doctrine of necessity.
'There is no doubt about it, Gentlemen, that in time o f war we shall be faced- i f  ever we have another
war, which God forbid - as we were in the last war, with the necessity offailing to carry out certain
other requirements o f this Convention We had to do it in the last war - not only my Government, but
82many other Governments had to do the same thing. ’
Although other delegates also referred to the ‘necessities of war’ it is unlikely that the above 
excerpt can be understood as a reference to the theory of necessity under international law. As seen in 
Chapter Three, the theory of necessity forms part of the general law of State Responsibility as a 
ground precluding wrongfulness under international law,83 and is technically distinct from the plea of 
rebus sic stantibus under the Law of Treaties.
Moreover, the apparent leeway which contracting parties are given in the 1948 Convention 
seems to be at odds with the substantive requirements which international law attaches to the plea of 
necessity. Art. 33 of the ILC’s current draft on State Responsibility lays down very strict substantive 
conditions for the invocation of the ‘State of necessity’, which it considers ‘deeply rooted in general 
legal thinking’84 and which the ICJ regards as reflecting customary international law. The World Court
82 International Conference on Safety of Life at Sea, Heads of Delegations Conference, May 24th, 1948, Minutes, 2nd 
meeting, Report on the work of the General Provisions Committee, 1.
83 Supra, 3.4.4.
84 Yearbook ILC (1980), vol. II, pt 2,49, para 31.
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recently stressed in the 1997 Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project case how heavy the burden of proof 
attached to these requirements is: there needs to be evidence of the existence of a ‘grave and imminent 
peril’; the act being challenged must have been the ‘only means’ of safeguarding that interest; the act 
must not have ‘seriously impaired an essential interest’ of the State towards which the obligation 
existed; the State which is the author of that act must not have ‘contributed to the occurrence of the 
state of necessity’; the party invoking this plea is not die sole judge of its merits.85 For all those 
reasons, what has been said above on the relationship between the modem version of the rebus sic 
stantibus rule and the 1966 Load Lines Convention contingency clause applies mutatis mutandis to the 
relationship between the theory of necessity and the 1948 Safety Convention contingency clause.
Finally, there remains the suggestion by Yugoslavia that the Safety Conference should pay 
heed to the new jus ad bellum following the UN Charter, distinguish between victim and aggressor 
States and therefore discriminate between legal and illegal acts of suspension. The suggestion was not 
followed up. The conference was apparently more concerned with rectifying a situation that had 
existed before the UN Charter, than with taking the new, and admittedly more complicated jus ad 
bellum into consideration. However, the statement of the Yugoslavian delegation in 1948 was a 
foreboding one. As seen previously, it touches on a debate which to date remains unresolved.86 At the 
same time, Yugoslavia also ‘pioneered’ a line of argumentation that would be more frequently heard at 
maritime conferences from 1960 onwards: namely that contingency clauses, which allow any State to 
suspend part or whole of the convention in case of war and similar circumstances, are at odds with the 
UN Charter.
D. The 1960 Safety Convention
The fourth international safety conference of 1960 was the first one to be organised under the 
auspices of IMCO. It became immediately clear that one of the major issues the conference would 
have to deal with, was the right of suspension in case of war. Once again, the main protagonists of the 
debate were the USSR and the US. While the former power proposed the deletion of the Art. VI of the 
1948 Convention,87 the latter, by contrast, wished to expand the article to encompass the handling of 
‘emergency situations occurring in international relations not culminating in war’, and proposed the 
following new subparagraph (a):
85 Judgment of 25 September 1997, ICJ General List No. 92, paras 50-58.
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‘Action in case of war or emergency:
(a) Nothing in the present Convention shall preclude a Contracting Government from taking any action 
which it considers necessary for the protection of essential security interests in time of war or other 
emergency in international relations. A Contracting Government that takes any such action, which may 
include the suspension of the whole or any part of the Regulations annexed to the Convention, shall 
immediately give notice of the action to the Organisation. 8 8
The debate on these two diametrically opposed amendments was fought on much the same 
ground as during the 1948 Conference. However, the battle lines were drawn even more sharply along 
the ideological East-West divide and the legal arguments which were invoked seemed to be more 
sharply focused than before. The US for one, denied that its amendment carried political significance, 
affirming that its purpose was simply to recognise conditions ‘as they had existed, do exist and might 
exist in the future’.89 Her views were supported by the UK, who stressed that the article was only 
concerned with practical considerations.90
The USSR, supported by other East Block countries, objected not only to the amendment 
proposed by the US, but argued even against keeping the 1948 version of the clause. Their delegates 
insisted that the entire article was in violation of the spirit of the UN Charter and that the US 
amendment, by broadening the category of circumstances in which the suspension clause could be 
invoked, would make the situation even worse. They therefore urged the conference, at a minimum, to 
stick with the 1948 version of the clause, which they saw as the lesser of two evils 91 When the clause 
was discussed in the General Provisions Committee the USSR found some support among Western 
States who considered the terms of the US proposal as being too wide.92 In reply to this criticism, the 
US agreed to temper the language of its amendment, suggesting an alternative that was in essence a 
repetition of the clause agreed for the 1954 OILPOL Convention.93
This did not satisfy the Russian delegate who asserted that the new American proposal 
increased the possibility of the suspension of the convention by extending it also to ‘certain difficulties 
situations in international relations’. That, in his opinion, was much too broad, and open to abuse. The 
delegate asserted gravely that the texts would outlast the goodwill of conference, and that he saw 
another serious defect in the US proposal in that it retained in an international text, the notion of a
8 6  Supra, 3.4.2.D.
8 7 IMCO/SAFCON/1,2.
88 Ibid., 2.
8 9  IMCO/SAFCO/Plenary S.R. 3, June 10th 1960, 5.
90 Ibid.
9 1  GEN/SR/1, 18 May 1960, and GEN/SR.l/Cor. 1, 20 May 1960, 3; IMCO/SAFCO/Plenaiy S.R. 3,10 June 1960, 5- 
6 .
9 2  GEN/SR/1,18 May 1960, as corrected by GEN/SR. 1/Cor. 1,20 May 1960,3.
239
C h a p t e r  F iv e : C o n t i n g e n c y  C l a u s e s
‘state of tension’. This, he argued, was contrary to the spirit of the convention and would be a 
distortion of international law. He added that the Universal Postal Union and the International 
Telecommunications Union Conventions no longer included any provision of that nature, and 
concluded that if need be, he would favour instead of deletion, retention of existing text.94
However, several delegates pointed out that there was now a legal tradition of this type of 
contingency clauses and that the right of suspension was tempered by the provision under which third 
States would retain their right of control pursuant to subparagraph (b). Following this exchange, the 
(USSR) proposal for deletion of the article on suspension in case of war, was heavily defeated in the 
General Committee, while the latest (US) version of the suspension clause found favour with many 
members.95 During the subsequent plenary session, both the USSR and the US restated their case. The 
US proposal for a widened set of circumstances in which suspension of the convention would be 
allowed, i.e. , not only in case of war, but also in case of ‘other hostilities’ was carried with 28 votes in 
favour, 6 against and 9 abstentions.96
One can only speculate on the type of international tension the US delegation had in mind 
when proposing an amendment to Art. VI. It is nevertheless striking that the above debate was 
conducted entirely in fairly abstract legal terms; no particular conflicts were mentioned to illustrate the 
type of ‘other hostilities’ the final version of the article was intended to cover. Furthermore, the 
travaux preparatoires of the 1960 conference do not contain any indication of whether the 
contingency clause of the 1948 Convention (or of the 1954 OILPOL article) had led to any significant 
State practice between 1948 and 1960.
/E. The 1974 SOLAS Convention
t
The 1960 Conference entered into force on 26 May 1965. Since its amendments procedure 
proved too slow in practice, it was put up for review again in 1974. The ensuing SOLAS Convention 
includes not only the amendments agreed up until that date but also an improved amendments 
procedure. The main objective of the 1974 Convention is to specify minimum standards for the 
construction, equipment and operation of ships, compatible with their safety. Flag States are
93 GEN/21 of 27 May 1960; on the 1954 Convention see infra, 5.2.4. A.
94 GEN/SR/16 of 31 May 1960, including corrections in GEN/SR. 16/Cor. 1, 8 June 1960, 2.
95 Ibid., 3: (a) Vote of 5-23-1 on deletion of Art. VI; (b) Vote of 20-8-2 on US proposal in regard to Art. VI (a).
96IMCO/SAFCO/Plenary S.R. 3,10 June 1960 and IMCO/SAFCON/Plenaiy SR. 3, 6.
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responsible for ensuring that ships under their flag comply with its requirements, and a number of 
certificates are prescribed in the Convention as proof that this has been done.97
Surprisingly, the suspension clause that had sparked many a passionate ideological and legal 
argument during the 1948 and 1960 conferences, now hardly aroused any interest. The entire clause 
was unceremoniously dropped by the Committee on General Provisions. Since the summary records of 
this committee were never published, one can only speculate on the reasons for this deletion: its 
members must have judged either that the clause was outdated, or that it was a matter of general 
international law beyond the conference’s competence. The Chairman’s report simply mentions that 
the committee decided to delete the suspension clause together with a provision on non-self-governing 
territories. Subsequently, the plenary accepted the deletion of both clauses without further ado.98
5.2.4. The Pollution Prevention Conventions
•  International Convention for the Prevention o f  Pollution o f  the Seas by Oil (OILPOL), 1954
•  Convention on the Prevention o f M arine Pollution by Dumping o f  Wastes and Other M atter (London Convention), 
1972
•  International Convention for the Prevention o f the Pollution by Ships (M ARPOL) 73/78)
A. The 1954 OILPOL Convention and the 1962 OP Conference
The 1954 OILPOL Convention constituted the first successful attempt at international 
regulation of oil pollution from tankers.99 Its original scope, however, was limited to prohibiting 
discharges within 50 miles off land. It contains a clause, Art. XIX, similar to the ones discussed above, 
according to which Parties are entitled to suspend part or whole of the convention in case of war or 
other hostilities:
97IMO Information Sheet.
9 8  International Conference on the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974, Committee I, SOLAS/CONF/C.1/4 ,25 October 1974, 3 
and SOLAS/CONF/SR.5,29 January 1975,4-6.
9 9  Bimie & Boyle, op. cit., 266.
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‘(1) In case of war or other hostilities, a Contracting Government which considers that it is affected, whether as a 
belligerent or as a neutral, may suspend the operation of the whole or any part of the present Convention in respect 
of all or any of the territories. The suspending Government shall immediately give notice of any such suspension to 
the Bureau.
(2) The suspending Government may at any time terminate such suspension and shall in any event terminate it as 
soon as it ceases to be justified under paragraph (1) of this Article. Notice of such termination shall be given 
immediately to the Bureau by the Government concerned.
(3) The Bureau shall notify all the Contracting Governments of any suspension or termination of suspension under 
this Article, (italics added)’
Although the clause was probably inspired by the 1948 Convention,100 there are two 
differences. The latter uses the term ‘war’, whilst the 1954 Convention contains the significant 
addition of ‘other hostilities’.101 Furthermore, whilst according to Art. VI (c) of the former convention, 
the suspension may at any time be terminated, Art. XIX (2) of the OILPOL Convention obligates 
Governments to end the suspension ‘when it ceases to be justified’.102
As far as can be gauged from the published preparatory documents, the proposal to include 
this contingency clause did not attract any comments. It was discussed neither at the 1954 OILPOL 
Conference,103 nor at the 1962 OP Conference104 which amended the 1954 Convention so that it 
applied to smaller gross tonnage and extended the zones where dumping was prohibited.
As will be seen below, at the 1954 OILPOL Conference most of the debate on military 
aspects was devoted to the issue of warships. The same occurred during the 1962 OP conference: the 
issue of the application of the convention to warships was heavily debated, but the armed conflict 
contingency clause of the 1954 Convention was left unchallenged.105 It may be that delegates at the 
OILPOL/OP conferences believed that the issue of the legal effect of war and other types of hostilities 
on the treaty was clearly regulated by international law, and that it had been given adequate expression 
in the proposed suspension provisions. However, this explanation seems doubtful when one considers 
that the question of the status of such treaties in times of armed conflict was broached again in 1966, 
during the International Conference to update the Load Lines Convention.106 A more plausible 
explanation for the lack of interest for the contingency clause is that the OILPOL/OP conferences took 
place shortly after the 1948 and 1960 Safety Conferences, during which similar provisions had been
100 Supra, 5.2.3. C.
1 0 1 The published travaux preparatoires do not contain any explanation for this addition.
1 0 2 A similar obligation to limit the suspension for the duration of the hostilities follows from Art. 22 of the 
Washington Naval Disarmament Treaty (Five Power Naval Treaty), concluded in 1922; see infra, 5.3.
1 0 3 International Conference on Pollution of the Sea by Oil, 1954.
1 0 4 International Conference on Pollution of the Sea by Oil, 1962.
105 Infra, 6.2.4.
106 Supra, 5.2.2. B.
242
C h a p t e r  F iv e : C o n t i n g e n c y  C l a u s e s
the subject of extensive debate. Presumably, no delegation felt the need to re-open this debate so soon 
after that, in 1954 and 1962 respectively.
B. MARPOL 73/78
The 1954 Convention and its subsequent amendments did little to reduce the amount of oil 
introduced in the oceans, and their main effect was to move oil pollution outside coastal areas. The 
1973 International Convention on Marine Pollution was intended to improve this situation 
substantially. It incorporates the requirements and standards of the 1954 OILPOL Convention, extends 
the regime to all ships operating on oceans (and not just tankers), and sets ambitious goals for the 
complete elimination of all intentional pollution of the marine environment by oil and other harmful 
substances and the minimalization of accidental discharge of such substances. Nevertheless, some 40 
States remain bound by the 1954 Convention, and its contingency clause for war and other 
hostilities.107
The 1973 International MARPOL Conference was preceded by years of preparatory work 
under the auspices of IMCO’s Maritime Safety Committee and its technical Subcommittee.108 The 
draft provisions which were submitted subsequently to Governments for comments, no longer 
contained a clause on die contingency of war or armed conflict.109 Surprisingly, however, the deletion 
of this clause was not challenged at all, and this fact foreshadowed a similar development regarding 
the Safety Conventions, discussed above. Finally, as will be seen further on, the MARPOL Conference 
continued the tradition of the OILPOL/OP conferences in that it was the provision related to warships 
that proved more controversial during the 1973 Conference.110
1 0 7  Bimie & Boyle, op. cit., 266.
1 0 8  International Conference on Marine Pollution, held in London, 1973, IMO Docs MP/CONF/ 1 ff.
1 0 9  None of the published travaux preparatoires (labelled ‘PCMP’, and distributed at the Conference as 
‘MP/CONF/...’) contains a suspension clause related to war.
1 1 0 Infra, 6.2.5.B.
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C. The 1972 London Dumping Convention
A final treaty instrument which needs to be mentioned is the Convention on the Dumping of 
Wastes at Sea. It was concluded at an intergovernmental conference in London, convened in 
November 1972 at the invitation of the UK. IMCO was made responsible for the Secretariat duties 
related to it. The Convention has a global character,111 and applies to all marine waters other than 
internal waters.112 It entered into force in 1975 and has thus far been ratified by 72 States representing 
67.64 % of world tonnage.113
‘Dumping’ is defined in the convention as the deliberate disposal at sea of wastes or other 
matter from vessels, aircraft, platforms or other man-made structures, as well as the deliberate disposal 
of these vessels or platforms themselves.114 Article IV prohibits the dumping of certain hazardous 
materials, and requires a prior special permit for the dumping of a number of other identified materials 
and a prior general permit for other wastes or matter.115 Wastes which cannot be dumped and others 
for which a special dumping permit is required are listed in the annexes. Article V(2) allows the 
issuing of permits for the dumping of even the most dangerous wastes into the sea in cases of 
emergency ‘posing unacceptable risk relating to human health and admitting no other feasible 
solution’. However, this exception - which may be waived -116 is contingent on a series of procedural 
requirements: other Parties need to be consulted, and the Organisation may recommend appropriate 
procedures.
The Convention does not contain an express clause dealing with war or armed conflict, but
includes the following exception in Art. V(l):
‘The provisions of Art. IV shall not apply when it is necessary to secure the safety of human life or of vessels, 
aircraft, platforms or other man-made structures in cases of force majeure caused by stress of weather, or in 
any case which constitutes a danger to human life or a real threat to vessels, aircraft, platforms or other man- 
made structures at sea, if dumping appears to be the only way of averting the threat and if there is every 
probability that the damage consequent upon such dumping will be less than would otherwise occur. Such 
dumping shall be so conducted as to minimise the likelihood of damage to human or marine life and shall be 
reported forthwith to the Organisation. ’ 1 1 7
111 Supra, 1.2.1. A.
1 1 2  Art. m  (3).
1 1 3 Source: IMO/Lloyd’s data as at 1 February 1998.
1 1 4  Art. DI(1)&(2).
1 1 5 Art. IV.
1 1 6 Art. V(3).
1 1 7  Art. V(l).
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The phrase ‘or in any case which constitutes a danger to human life or a real threat to vessels 
etc.' seems broad enough to justify deviation from the convention in times of armed conflict. This 
impression is reinforced by the fact that unlike for emergencies (Art V(2)), no waiver is foreseen for 
resort to Art. V (1), nor any prior consultation procedure.
This interpretation is in accordance with US domestic practice. Thus, the 1988 US Public 
Vessel Medical Waste Anti-Dumping Act prohibits the disposal of potentially infectious medical 
waste into ocean waters, unless this is done beyond 50 nautical miles from the nearest land. This 
interdiction does not apply, however, when either the health or safety of individuals on board is 
threatened, or ‘during time of war or a declared national emergency’.118
5.3. Conclusions to Chapter Five
The travaux preparatoires of some of the maritime conventions show that reference was 
made to the contingency clauses of the Convention on Air Navigation of 1919119 and the ICAO 
Convention of 1944.120 These stipulate that the treaties do not apply during war, or at least do not place 
limits on the freedom of action of belligerent and neutral States during war or other types of 
emergency. However, the tenor of the maritime clauses agreed on subsequently, was often different. 
Leaving aside the old 1910 Salvage and 1914 Safety Conventions, the contingency clauses discussed 
in this chapter indicate that the drafters intended that the conventions would, in principle, continue to 
apply during international armed conflict. But the contingency clauses permit Parties to deviate from 
the convention in whole or in part in accordance with certain substantive and/or procedural 
requirements.
It is noteworthy that most of the conventions discussed in this subchapter deai(t) with war or 
other types of armed conflict in a fairly similar manner. Whenever conference delegates were called 
upon to deal with the question, the majority agreed that armed conflict was a contingency that might 
allow a State party to suspend some or all of its obligations under the conventions. However, it is 
striking that none of the clauses under review entail any pre-determined automatic legal effects of the
1 1 8  Title El of Pub.L. 100-688, 102 Stat. 4152, 33 USC 2501 etseg., para 3104; Cumulative Digest of US Practice in 
International Law, 1981-88, vol. 2,2093.
1 1 9  Art. 38.
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outbreak of armed conflict on the treaty. Although some delegates voiced the opinion that war ‘ipso 
facto ’ meant that the treaty would be terminated or suspended between belligerents, none of the texts 
which were finally adopted supports that view.
The various conference documents discussed above and the wording of the clauses that were 
finally adopted demonstrate that the delegates’ overarching concern was to deal with the issue in as 
pragmatic a manner as possible. As a consequence, legal subtleties that follow from the new jus ad 
bellum under the UN Charter, or even the more established distinction between belligerent and neutral 
countries, were not really taken into account. Many of the provisions which were adopted after World 
War II reflect primarily experiences related to the large-scale international conflicts of the First and 
Second World Wars. The consequences of these conflicts were inevitably felt globally; they had 
affected world shipping and navigation, and had caused impacts on the commercial operations of all 
States, regardless of their formal political or legal status in these conflicts.
Another sign of the purposely pragmatic way in which the conference delegates dealt with the 
contingency of war/armed conflict is that the resulting clauses tend to treat all types of armed conflict 
as temporary emergencies, which could affect a part or the whole of the operation of the convention. 
At first glance, there seems to be little real difference in the way the treaties judge instances as force 
majeure, stress of weather, humanitarian emergencies and war or armed conflict. All of these may 
justify temporary non-application of certain provisions. Particularly striking for instance is the 
substantive and procedural similarity between the clauses on ‘carriage of persons in emergency’ and 
‘suspension in case of war’ adopted for the first time at the occasion of the 1948 Safety Conference.
There are nevertheless some differences between war/armed conflict and other types of 
emergency: (1) instances as force majeure and stress of weather do have automatic ipso facto effects 
on the execution of the treaty:121 by definition these are circumstances that leave a State party with 
little choice of action;122 by contrast, as mentioned before, the contingency clauses for war/armed 
conflict assume that a State party is still left with some freedom of choice, not only as to whether to 
suspend or not, but also as to what provisions to suspend; therefore, an armed conflict contingency
12 1 See 1948 Convention, Art. IV on cases of Force Majeure.
1 2 2  Art. 31 of the ILC’s current draft on State Responsibility describes grounds of Force majeure and fortuitous events 
as follows: (1) The wrongfulness of an act of a State not in conformity with an international obligation of that State is 
precluded if the act was due to an irresistible force or to an unforeseen external event beyond its control which made it 
materially impossible for the State to act in conformity with that obligation or to know that its conduct was not in 
conformity with that obligation; (2) Paragraph 1 shall not apply if the State in question has contributed to the
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clause usually includes a number of procedural requirements regarding the duty to inform and notify 
other contracting Parties; (2) compared to force majeure and similar emergencies, war/armed conflict 
may affect a different type and range of provisions of the treaty.
It was seen as well that the insertion of a suspension clause in the 1930 Load Lines 
Convention and the 1929 Safety Convention had been justified on different legal grounds: rebus sic 
stantibus in the former,123 the ‘necessities’ of war in the latter.124 It was argued above that these claims 
do not meet the requirements which current international law attaches to the pleas of either 
‘fundamental change of circumstances’ under the law of treaties or the ‘state of necessity’ under the 
law of State responsibility.
In addition, there is reason to believe that even before World War II, international law 
distinguished between the suspension of treaties in case of war, and suspension/termination on the 
basis of rebus sic stantibus, or on other grounds such as duress. For instance, the 1935 Harvard 
Research draft treaty on the law of treaties125 contains provisions with separate substantive and
1 * )(\ 1 0 '?  1 o f iprocedural requirements for rebus sic stantibus, duress, and effect of war. Perhaps an even 
clearer example is given by the distinction which the Washington Naval Disarmament Treaty 
concluded in 1922- i.e., eight years before the 1930 Load Lines Convention - makes between the 
procedure for revision of the treaty on the ground of rebus sic stantibus (Art 21):
‘If during the term of the present Treaty the requirements o f national security of any Contracting Power 
in respect of naval defence are, in the opinion of the Power, materially affected by any change o f 
circumstances, the Contracting Powers will, at the request of such Power, meet in conference with a view 
to the reconsideration of the provisions of the Treaty and its amendment by mutual agreement.’ (italics 
added)
and unilateral suspension of the treaty in the case of war (Art. 22):
‘Whenever any Contracting Power shall become engaged in war which in its opinion affects the naval 
defence o f its national security, such Power may after notice to the other Contracting Powers suspend for 
the period of hostilities its obligations under the present Treaty.... provided that such Power shall notify 
the other Contracting Powers that the emergency is of such a character as to require such suspension.’ 
(italics added)
occurrence of the situation of material impossibility; see in this sense also: Rainbow Warrior Arbitration (1990), 82 
ILR, 499, 553-4, para 78.
1 2 3 Supra, 5.2.2. A & B.
1 2 4 Supra, 5.2.3. C.
1 2 5 Supra, 3.4.2. C.
1 2 6 Art. 28.
1 2 7 Art. 32.
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On the basis of the above, including what has been said on this issue in Chapter Three,129 a 
clear case can be made that the discussed maritime contingency clauses point to the existence in 
international law of a separate ground allowing Parties to suspend a treaty in whole or in part in the 
case of armed conflict.
Are such contingency clauses now outdated? The analysis has shown that at least up to 1966, 
(mainly Western) States succeeded in convincing the majority of conference delegates that it was 
better not only to preserve this type of treaty clause: in 1960 and 1966 the set of circumstances under 
which a State party could decide unilaterally to suspend part or whole of the convention, was even 
expanded; to ‘other hostilities’ in the 1960 Safety Convention,130 and to ‘hostilities or other 
extraordinary circumstances’ (affecting) the ‘vital interests’ of a State, in the 1966 Load Lines 
Convention.131
Although some of these clauses are still in force today (e.g. the 1954 OILPOL Convention 
and the 1966 Load Lines Convention), it is noteworthy that none of the conventions concluded since 
the 1970s contain such a provision. Moreover, as was seen above, the contingency clause was deleted 
without much ado from the 1974 SOLAS Convention,132 and does not appear in MARPOL 73/78 
either.133 However, without a further examination of the other clauses of these treaties, any conclusion 
on their status in times of armed conflict would be premature.
nnn
1 2 9  Supra, 3.4.4.
1 3 0  Supra, 5.2.3. D.
1 3 1 Supra, 5.2.2. B.
1 3 2 Supra, 5.2.3. E.
1 3 3 Supra, 5.2.4. B.
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Chapter Six
Sovereign Immunity and the Exemption o f Public Vessels from Maritime 
Conventions
6.1. General Comments
A great number of maritime conventions do not apply to warships, a fact which is sometimes 
seized upon in the literature as proof that these treaties would not apply in times of armed conflict.1 It 
is submitted that the validity of such an inference depends on the scope of the exemption granted. The 
reasons for why warships are exempted are complex, give rise to confusion, and need to be explored in 
detail.
There are two basic interrelated principles which have led to the current situation. 
Historically, the ruler was equated with the State. Under the traditional law, laid down inter alia, in 
Tobin v. The Queen, ‘The King could do no wrong’, which meant that under no circumstances a 
sovereign could be sued in the courts, not even of his own country.2 A similar prohibition still applies 
to foreign heads of State.3 While sovereigns are no longer equated with the State, a foreign State is 
normally granted qualified immunity from the jurisdiction of another State, in respect of its conduct or 
property.4 This is based on the concept that States are co-equal on the international plane,5 and
1 Simonds, 29 Stanford JIL (1992), 194; Sands, op. cit., 232.
2 16, CBNS, 310; Matsunami, Immunity o f State Ships as a Contribution towards Unification o f the Laws on the 
Subject (1924), 37-9.
3 Malanczuk, op. cit., 119.
4 Steinberger, 10 EPIL (1987), 432 jf.
5 O ’Connell, M ., 3 Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. (1995), 59.
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regarded as an act of comity under customary international law.6 Sovereign immunity may be waived, 
but since this constitutes an exception to the general rule, a waiver should be interpreted restrictively.7
The precise limits of State immunity are controversial and constitute one of the most litigated 
aspects of international law.8 Under current international law, the principle is limited to acts of ius 
imperii, or governmental acts in official capacity, as opposed to acts of ius gestionis, or acts done in a 
private or commercial capacity.9 There is also a tendency to exempt cases of non-commercial torts 
from the principle of immunity,10 and in particular, cases of gross violations of human rights by a 
foreign government.11 The 1989 case of the Hercules demonstrates, however, that acts of warfare by 
foreign governments are covered by the principle of sovereign immunity, and do not fall under the 
non-commercial tort exception.12
Similarly in the case of Koohi and Ohters v. United States (1992), the US Court of Appeals 
needed to decide whether the shooting down of an Iranian civilian aircraft by the US cruiser 
Vincennes, as well as other instances of US intervention in the Iran-Iraq war, were justiciable. The 
Court decided in the negative, deciding that these operations fell within the ‘combatant activities 
exception’ to the waiver by the US of sovereign immunity under the Federal Tort Claims A c t13
As noted by the US Supreme Court in Alfred Dunhill Inc. v. Republic o f Cuba (1976), whilst 
discernible rules of international law have emerged with respect to the commercial dealings of 
governments in the international market, there is no consensus as to the rules of international law 
concerning exercise of governmental power, including military powers.14
6 Universal Consolidated Inc., v. Bank of China (1994), 107 ILR, 353, 355ff., where a distinction is made between 
domestic sovereign immunity, based on constitutional law and foreign sovereign immunity, based on customary 
international law.
7  Steinberger, 10 EPIL (1987), 435.
8 See the three volumes of the International Law Reports (63, 64, 65) devoted exclusively to questions of State 
Immunity; On the evolution of the State immunity theory in US law see: Stena Rederi v. Petroleos Mexicanos (1991), 
103 ILR 433,437#; USv. Moats (1992), 103 ILR 480,487#
9 E.g., Libyan Arab Socialist People’s Jamahiriya v. Actimon SA (1985), 82 LLR, 30; Janini v. Kuwait University 
(1995), 107 ILR 367-70; Gates et al. v. Victor Fine Foods et. al. (1995), 107 ILR 371-81; Malanczuk, op. cit., 119- 
21 .
1 0 Joseph v. Consulate General of Nigeria et al. (1987), 101 ILR 485,493; Saltany and Others v. Reagan et al. (1989), 
87 ILR 680; Jaffe v. Miller and Others (1990), 87 ILR 197; O’Connell, M., 3 Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. (1995), 59.
11 Letelier v. Republic o f Chile (1980), 63 ILR 378; Malanczuk, op. cit., 120-21.
1 2 Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess (1989), 81 ILR 659; Cumulative Digest of US Practice in International Law, 
1981-88, vol. 2,1619-31; see too Princz v. FRG (1992-4), 103 ILR 594#, 604#  in which the plaintiff argued in vain 
that a violation of the Hague Rules on Land Warfare was a violation of jus cogens for which no sovereign immunity 
existed.
13 99 ILR, 80; writ for certiorari denied.
1 4 6 6  ILR 212 at 225.
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Because of the legal fiction that they form part of their flag State’s territory, ships belonging 
to a foreign State have of old been entitled to immunity from jurisdiction of any State other than the 
flag State.15 The locus classicus of US and international law is that of The Schooner Exchange v. 
McFaddon, decided by the US Supreme Court in 1812.16 In this case two American citizens attempted 
to assert title to a French military vessel harboured in Philadelphia, claiming that she had been 
unlawfully seized from their custody by persons acting under orders of the Emperor Napoleon. Chief 
Justice Marshall, in denying the claim, formulated the principle that public armed vessels in the service 
of a foreign sovereign are generally exempt from the jurisdiction of any nation but the flag state.17 The 
next case which has strongly influenced international law is the UK case of The Parlement Beige 
(1879-1880). This concerned a vessel owned by the Belgian King that had rammed an English steam 
tug. Although employed primarily as a mail carrier, the vessel was also engaged in carrying passengers 
and freight. Reversing the judgement delivered in first instance, the Court of Appeal decided that a 
foreign sovereign cannot be sued in personam and that an action in rem cannot be brought against his 
ship if she is being used substantially for public purposes.18
Currently, the legal situation with respect to State-owned ships is also determined by various 
national laws and international treaties, which lack uniformity. Apart from provisions in maritime 
conventions which will be discussed below, there have been several attempts at codification of the 
issue of jurisdictional immunity. The 1926 International Convention for the Unification of Certain 
Rules relating to the Immunity of State-owned Vessels includes several exceptions to the jurisdictional 
immunity of warships and other State-owned ships. It modified the position taken by the English 
courts in The Parlement Beige by explicitly denying immunity in cases of collisions and other 
accidents of navigation.19 The 1934 Protocol thereto clarified that this convention did not affect the 
rights or obligations of belligerents and neutrals, nor the jurisdiction of prize courts.20 The 1940 Treaty 
on International Commercial Navigation Law adopts the same principles as the 1926 Brussels
15 Shearer, 11 EPIL (1989), 321; Heintschel v. Heinegg & Donner, 37 GYIL (1994), 298.
16 7 Cransch (1812), 145-46; UN, Materials on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and their Property (1982), UN 
Doc. ST/LEG /SER.B/20,100.
17 For a discussion o f  subsequent US and international case law see Rex. V Compania De Vapores, SA, (1981), 72 ILR 
93.
1 8 The Parlement Beige (1879) 4 P.D. and on appeal (1880) 5 P. D. 197; for more recent applications o f  the principles 
enunciated in the latter case see: Flota Maritima Browning de Cuba SA v. The Steamship Canadian Conqueror et al. 
and the Republic o f Cuba (1962), 42 ILR, 125-34; Swiss Israel Trade Bank v. Government o f Salta and Banco 
Provincial de Salta (1972), 55 ILR, 411; The Philippine Admiral (1975), 64 ILR, 90; I  Congreso del Partido (1979), 
64 ILR, 227; US v. Ruiz (1985), 102 ILR 122, 124-7; Holy See v. Starbright Sales (1994), 102 ILR 163- 73; Kuwait 
Airways Corporation v. Iraqi Airways Company, 103 ILR 340 at 398; KPMG v. Davison (1996), 104 ILR, 526ff.
19 Done at Brussels, April 19th, 1962; ILC Report (1991), UN Doc. A/46/10, Chapter n, Jurisdictional immunities of 
States and their Property [(hereinafter ‘ Jurisdictional Immunities'], 173, Art. 3, para 1.
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Convention regarding actions in respect of collisions involving warships and other State-owned 
ships.21
By contrast, the 1972 Council of Europe Convention on State Immunity and its Additional 
Protocol include many exceptions to the principle of jurisdictional immunity, but these do not apply to 
State-owned ships nor their cargo.22 In its 1991 Draft of Articles on Jurisdictional Immunities of States 
and their Property, the ILC adopts the latter approach, specifying that warships, naval auxiliaries and 
other ships owned or operated by a State and used exclusively on government non-commercial service 
remain covered by the sovereign immunity principle even in respect of collisions and other accidents 
of navigation.23
There is still no generally internationally recognised definition of State-owned ships, although 
there is a common understanding of the basic elements and categories.24 The most important category 
for this study is formed by warships and similar vessels;25 the second comprises ships employed for 
public, non-commercial purposes, including for example, police, customs or other patrol vessels. The 
third type of State-owned ships would be those employed for commercial purposes; however, 
according to current international legal theory and practice, the latter category of ships is probably no 
longer entitled to traditional sovereign immunity.
Many of the provisions which will be discussed in this chapter deal ostensibly with ‘sovereign 
immunity’ or with the exemption of vessels ‘entitled to sovereign immunity under international law’. It 
is important to distinguish, however, between jurisdictional immunity on the one hand, and exemption 
from substantive legal provisions on the other. State jurisdiction can theoretically cover two distinct 
types of legal authority: prescriptive and jurisdictional. The first is synonymous with the authority of a 
sovereign nation to prescribe substantive rules and regulations, primarily applicable and limited to its 
territory and its nationals.26 By contrast, the jurisdictional or enforcement authority of a State refers to 
‘the exercise of the power to adjudicate, normally assumed by the judiciary or magistrate within a legal 
system of the territorial State’, and by extension, to the exercise ‘of all other administrative and
2 0  Signed at Brussels, 24 May, 1934, Jurisdictional Immunities, 175, Art. IV.
2 1  Signed at Montevideo, 19 March 1940, Jurisdictional Immunities, 177, Arts. 35 & 36 (1).
2 2  Art. 30 of Convention, ibid., 156 at 165.
2 3  Art. 16(1), (2), (3).
2 4  Shearer, 11 EPIL (1989), 320.
2 5  For a judicial interpretation of the term warship see: Naval and Military Works or Materials, US and Germany: 
Mixed Claims Commission, Ann. Dig. (1923-24), Case No. 221, 405; For the US understanding of ‘warships’ and 
‘auxiliaries’ see: Cumulative Digest of US Practice in International Law, 1981-88, vol. 2,1382-86.
2 6  Smith, op. cit., 123-41.
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executive powers, by whatever measures or procedures and by whatever authorities of the territorial 
State in relation to a judicial proceeding’.27
Sovereign immunity is generally assumed not to entail exemption from the jurisdiction to 
prescribe, and therefore not to imply exoneration from compliance with substantive rules of law.28 It 
follows that when a maritime treaty contains a classic sovereign immunity reservation it applies fully 
to all ships, including warships and non-commercial ships, but that enforcement of applicable rules is 
reserved exclusively for the flag State.29 If the exemption of public vessels relates to jurisdictional 
matters only, it is submitted that this has no bearing on the effect of the (substantive) rules of the treaty 
during armed conflict.
However, as will be seen below, many maritime treaties extend immunity  to warships from 
matters of substance, often under the misleading title of ‘sovereign’ immunity. Such an exemption 
bears on the effect of the treaty during armed conflict. While for most of the time navies of modem 
seapowers operate at least technically in a state of peace, they may engage in some type of hostile or 
even forcible action in the pursuit of their countries’ policies. Incidents at sea may range from 
‘bumping incidents’, i.e., deliberate collisions, to open conflicts.30 When a warship or other naval 
vessel is exempted from the substantive rules of a maritime treaty under normal circumstances, it will 
a fortiori not be bound by that treaty during armed conflict In cases where the drafters did not wish to 
be drawn on this issue,31 the substantive rules laid down in the treaty may or may not be applicable to 
the ‘exempted’ category, and the answer may have to be sought in general international law. If the 
reason for the exemption is not clear from the wording of the treaty, an examination of the travaux 
preparatoires may be necessary.
2 7  Jurisdictional Immunities, Commentary on Art. 1,11-12.
2 8  Shearer, 11 EPIL (1989), 322; Treves, in Dupuy & Vignes, op. cit., vol. 1,902.
2 9  Timagenis, International Control o f Marine Pollution (1980), vol. 1,61;
3 0  Rolph, 135 Military LR (1992), Winter Issue, 137-65; Nagle, 1 VJIL (1990), 131-2.
3 1 E.g., the ILC repeatedly stressed that it would not deal with ‘the question of either State- owned or State-operated 
aircraft engaged in commercial service’, neither with ‘the question of space objects’: Jurisdictional Immunities, 10 
& 127.
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6.2. Discussion
6.2.1. Load Lines
•  International Convention respecting Load Lines, 1930
•  Internationa] Convention on Load Lines, 1966
Both the 1966 Load Lines Convention32 and the predecessor treaty of 193033 contain a clause 
exempting ‘ships of war’ from the scope of the convention. It was seen above that during the 1966 
Conference the proposal to allow suspension of the convention during armed conflict proved 
controversial.34 By contrast, the proposal to retain the exemption of warships was not challenged at all. 
The conference records show that the list of exempted ships was moved from the Regulations to the 
general provisions of the convention.35
The wording of the exemption provision of the 1966 Convention leaves little room for doubt 
about the type of immunity warships are entitled to. The exemption extends to the entire treaty, 
exonerating warships from compliance with the substantive rules of the treaty and all its regulations. In 
the literature this exemption has been justified on the grounds of security. Professor Treves for 
instance, points to the requirement of confidentiality regarding data on the construction of warships 
and their operational procedures.36
3 2  Art. 5.
3 3  Art. 2 (1) (a).
3 4  Supra, 5.2.2. B.
3 5  IMO Doc. LL/CONF/1, US proposal, 24; observations by the Netherlands and France, ibid., 24-5; 
LL/CONF/C.1/WP.21,16 March 1966; LL/ConffSR.3 of 12 October 1966; LL/CONF/C.1/SR.19,20 October 1966.
3 6  Treves, op. cit., 903.
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6.2.2. Safety Conventions
• Convention for the Safety o f  Life, 1914
•  International Convention for the Safety o f Life at Sea, 1929
•  International Convention for the Safety o f  Life at Sea, 1948
•  International Convention for the Safety o f Life at Sea, 1960
•  International Convention for the Safety o f  Life at Sea (SOLAS), 1974
The 1913 Safety Conference was held to remedy the many safety defects of passenger ships 
discovered as a result of the 1912 Titanic Disaster. As is made plain by the text of Arts. 2 and 5, the 
convention was intended to apply to merchant ships of a certain description only: ‘mechanically 
propelled, winch cany more than 12 passengers and which proceed from a port of one of the said 
States to a port situated outside that State.. As a result, warships - which were not even mentioned in 
the convention- were not expected to comply with the substantive (safety) provisions.
The Final Act of the 1929 Safety Conference comprises apart from the text of the 1929 
Convention itself, two appendices: Annex I winch contains the (Safety) Regulations and Annex II 
which contains a proposal for amending the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea 
(COLREGS). The latter are ‘rules of the road at sea’ which have of old applied to all types of ships, 
including in particular, warships.37 However, the fact that an annex on COLREGS was appended does 
not imply that these became part and parcel of the 1929 Safety Convention. On the contraiy, the text of 
several articles make clear that the COLREGS were considered to be wholly separate.38 The 1929 
Conference could do no more than propose amendments to the COLREGS, which dated back from the 
previous century, and for whose revision die agreement of parties not present at the Safety Conference 
was required.39
Finally, it transpires from Art. 2(4) of the main provisions of the 1929 Convention that the 
status of warships under the convention was unchanged from 1914:
‘The present Convention, unless expressly provided otherwise, does not apply to ships of war’.
3 7  The Rules of the Road at Sea were originally customary rules of seamanship, ascertained by the English Admiralty 
Court. They were published in 1840 in code form by Trinity House: O’Connell, D., op. cit., 770 & 831.
3 8  Arts. 2 (1), 40, 65.
3 9  Art. 40 on UK mandate.
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Although this cautious formulation leaves room for the possibility that some of the 
convention’s provisions might apply to warships, no such express provision has been adopted.
The 1948 Safety Conference led to a complete overhaul of the structure of the previous 
convention. First, with respect to the part relating to Safety, many clauses were moved from the main 
body of the convention to the regulations, including the provision on exempted ships (which became 
Regulation 3). The conference decided to keep the main body of the convention as succinct as 
possible, confine it to matters as ratification, denunciation and modification, and move all other 
‘technical provisions’ to the Regulations. Second, just like in 1929, the conference proposed a series of 
revisions to the COLREGS, which were appended to the final act. Although attempts were made to 
integrate the latter with the rest of the Safety Convention, the task proved impossible for the following 
reasons:
• The COLREGS were observed by many more countries than were parties to the 1929 Safety 
Convention, and it was realised that this might continue to be the case in the future;40
• Over 50 countries had accepted the COLREGS, but only 30 were present at this Conference: 
some 20 ratifications of those not present would be needed for new COLREGS to come into 
force;41
• There were several technical obstacles to integration, among which different dates for entry 
into force, and different procedures for amendment;42
During the 1948 Conference, the exoneration clause for warships became the subject of 
debate. However, the question at issue was not whether warships should or should not be exempted 
from the safety provisions, but what other types of military vessels might be allowed to benefit from 
the same exemption.43 Agreement was eventually reached on exempting both ‘ships of war’ and 
‘troopships’ (Regulation 3). It was noted for the record that it was the meeting’s stated intention that 
the term ‘ships of war’ should be interpreted broadly whilst ‘troopships’ narrowly. The (UK) chairman
4 0  General Provisions Committee, Minutes, 1st meeting, April 28th, 1948, 3, item 9.
4 1  General Provisions Committee, Draft Minutes, 9th meeting, May 20th, 1948,4.
4 2  Ibid.
4 3  US proposal: Section 3 (a) of Chapter I of SAFCON 4; French comments: General Provisions Committee, Draft 
Minutes, 7th meeting, May 13th, 1948,2.
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of the Working Party added that it was not the intention to exempt commercial ships carrying troops 
on a particular voyage.44
The verdict on the application of the Safety Convention and the Safety Regulations produced 
by the 1948 Safety Conference is the same as for the previous Safety Conventions. Although the 
exoneration clause for warships was moved in 1948 from the main body of the Convention to the 
Safety regulations, this was done for the technical reasons explained above. Furthermore, none of the 
delegates at the 1948 Conference challenged the exemption for warships; on the contrary, the entire 
debate related to what additional categories of ships with a military mission, might be exempted. 
Finally, Art. II of the main provisions stipulates that the 1948 Safety Convention applies (only) to 
‘ships registered in countries... From the records of the 1954 OILPOL conference it is clear that term 
‘registered’ was at that time understood as excluding warships.45
The 1960 Safety Conference retained the structure of the previous conference. Annex A to the 
Final Act contains the text of the amended Safety Convention as well as of the newly agreed Safety 
Regulations. Annex B to the final act contains the proposed new version of the COLREGS, which as 
before, were not integrated in the Safety Convention. IMCO was requested to initiate the necessaiy 
procedure for their revision.
The major innovation brought about by the 1960 Safety Conference was the incorporation of 
provisions and recommendations on the safety of nuclear ships, despite the fact that many delegates 
thought that the matter was premature.46
As for warships, the 1960 Conference decided to retain the clauses of both Art. II and of 
Regulation 3, Chapter I of the Safety Regulations of the previous convention.47 As was the case in 
1948, ships of war and troopships were hence exonerated from complying with the substance of the 
Safety Convention and its Regulations ‘unless expressly provided otherwise’. However, like in 1948, 
the 1960 Conference does not seem to have adopted any such express provisions. On the contrary, the 
express exclusion of warships is repeated in two of the Safety Regulations’ Chapters: in Chapter V on 
the Safety of Navigation, which according to Regulation 1, applies to all ships on all voyages, except
4 4  General Provisions Committee, Draft Minutes, 8 th meeting, May 19th, 1948,2.
4 5  Infra, 6.2.4.
4 6  At that time the Soviet Icebreaker Lenin and the USS Savannah were the only civilian nuclear-powered vessels in 
operation: Discussions of the Plenary, International Conference on Safety of Life at Sea, 1960, 
IMCO/SAFCON/Plenary/SR. 4,13 June 1960,6-7, item 4.
4 7  A proposal by Germany to extend the exemption to military auxiliary ships was withdrawn: IMCO/SAFCON/1, 10; 
GEN/SR.4,19 May 1960 as corrected by GEN/SR.l/Cor. 1,20 May 1960,2.
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ships o f war; and in Chapter VIII on Nuclear Ships, which according to Regulation 1, applies to all 
nuclear ships except ships o f war.
The 1974 International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) was adopted about 
nine years after the previous Safety Convention entered into force,48 and about two years after the 
COLREGS had been revised in a separate convention.49 None of the amendments tabled either before 
or during the 1974 Safety Conference pertained to the exoneration of warships and troopships. 
Consequently, there was no debate about their exclusion from the substance of the Convention. As a 
result, the relevant provisions that are still in force today are identical to the principal exemptions 
adopted by the 1948 Safety Conference. What has been said before in relation to the meaning and the 
significance of these exemptions, remains valid. According to Professor Treves, this exclusion is 
justified for reasons of confidentiality.50
6.2.3. COLREGS
•  COLREGS appended to the Final Act o f  the 1929 Safety Conference
•  COLREGS appended to the Final A ct o f  the 1948 Safety Conference
•  COLREGS appended in Annex B o f the International Convention for the Safety o f  Life at Sea, 1960
• Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (COLREGS ) 1972
As indicated before, the international ‘rules of the road’ at sea have of old applied to warships. 
The Regulations presently in force were revised by an international conference held under IMCO 
auspices in 1972.51 As of 1 February 1998,131 States representing 96.02 % of the world tonnage were 
party to this 1972 treaty.52
One of the most important innovations in the 1972 Regulations was the recognition given to 
traffic separation schemes (Rule 10). The Convention groups provisions into sections dealing with 
steering and sailing, lights and shapes and sound and light signals. There are also four Annexes 
containing technical requirements concerning lights and shapes and their positioning; sound signalling
4 8  The 1960 Convention entered into force on 26 May 1965.
4 9  Infra, 6.2.3.
5 0  Treves, op. cit., 903.
51 Conference on Revision of the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea 1972, held at IMO 
headquarters, 4-20 October 1972.
5 2  Source: IMO/Lloyd’s data as at 31 December 1994.
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appliances; additional signals for fishing vessels when operating in close proximity, and international 
distress signals. Guidance is provided in determining safe speed, the risk of collision and the conduct 
of vessels operating in or near traffic separation schemes. Other rules concern the operation of vessels 
in narrow channels, the conduct of vessels in restricted visibility, vessels restricted in their ability to 
manoeuvre, and provisions concerning vessels constrained by their draught.53
Since the adoption of the first international rules of the road, the number of provisions that 
expressly apply to warships and other naval ships has increased steadily. Several types of warships, 
amongst which minesweepers and aircraft carriers, are covered by the Rules either expressly 54 or by 
implication.55
The demands of good seamanship require that naval ships comply with these international 
‘rules of the road’. Although the total number of naval ships is small compared to merchant ships - for 
every naval vessel in 1988, there were about ten large merchant vessels56- traffic at sea would result in 
chaos if naval vessels would enjoy ‘immunity’ with respect to the substance of the COLREGS.
However, the text of the COLREGS shows that the duties of State parties with respect to 
military vessels are formulated in less stringent terms. Most conspicuously, Rule 1(e) requires that 
governments endeavour to achieve the ‘closest possible compliance’ if they ‘have determined that 
vessels of a special construction or purpose cannot fully comply with the provisions of any of the 
Rules’. The wording of Rule 1(e) suggests that governments enjoy a measure of freedom to determine 
the extent to which naval vessels should comply with some of the substantive provisions.
There remains nevertheless the question of what legal effects if any, armed conflict has on the 
COLREGS. As was explained before, none of the Safety Conferences at which both the international 
Safety Regulations and the international COLREGS were revised, managed to integrate the latter with 
the main provisions of the Safety Convention. Because of this legal and technical disunion, the 
coverage of the general provisions of the texts of these Safety Conventions does not extend to the 
international COLREGS. As a result, Art. VI of the 1960 Safety Convention on Suspension in case of 
War, could not be taken to apply to the Annex on COLREGS. Furthermore, the 1972 conference
53IMO information sheet.
5 4  Rule 1 (c ), Rule 3 (g), (iv), (v), Rule 27 (b), (f).
5 5 As in Rule 1 (e) on vessels of ‘special construction or purpose’; Warships and other military ships are furthermore 
subject to all provisions which by their wording apply to ‘all vessels’ without exception, to ‘power-driven’ vessels, to 
vessels ‘restricted in their ability to manoeuvre’, or to ‘vessels not under command’.
5 6  In 1988, it was estimated that there were about 7, 020 naval ships afloat on the world’s oceans, against an estimated 
75, 680 merchant vessels of 100 gross tons or larger: Lloyd’s Register of Shipping Statistical Tables 1988 (London 
1988); Morgan, in Van Dyke, et al., Freedom for the Seas in the 21st Century (1993), 439.
259
C h a p t e r  S ix : E x e m p t i o n  o f  W a r s h i p s
revising the COLREGS adopted a general provision on denunciation,57 but no clause on suspension in 
case of armed conflict, force majeure or any other cases of emergency.
This does not mean, however, that governments would not be entitled to resort to suspension 
of certain COLREGS when they find themselves in the circumstances mentioned, e.g., in Art. VI of 
the 1960 Safety Convention. It is submitted that even in the absence of an express provision to this 
effect, States may be entitled to resort to special measures in times of armed conflict by virtue of 
general international law. Indeed, common sense alone indicates that in times of armed conflict, States 
will in any case resort to amending or suspending certain COLREGS, at least as far as their naval 
vessels are concerned. This submission can be substantiated further with the following two elements of 
treaty practice.
First, Rule 1(e) indicates that State parties may not be in a position to have certain vessels ‘of 
a special construction or purpose’ comply with all COLREGS. The same provision urges States to 
endeavour to achieve the ‘closest possible compliance’, however, ‘without interfering with the special 
function of the vessel’. It is submitted that this provision would allow any State party to (auto- 
determine) the extent to which warships need to comply with certain COLREGS when on a special 
mission or when entrusted with such special functions as may be required in times of armed conflict.
Secondly, since the 1970s a number of naval powers have entered into bilateral so-called 
Incidents at Sea Agreements (‘INCSEA’), following the example of the Agreement on Prevention of 
Incidents at Sea, concluded between the US and the USSR in 1972.58 Similar bilateral agreements 
were subsequently concluded between the USSR and the UK, France, FRG, Italy and Canada.59
These agreements apply exclusively to naval vessels and are meant to defuse tensions caused 
by quasi-hostile encounters at sea between naval powers. They form part of the body of arms control 
measures, and are akin to confidence-building measures.60 Taking the first of these agreements as an 
example, the US and the USSR solemnly declare in Art. II that a first means for reducing the risks 
associated with their military competition at sea, consists of observing ‘strictly the letter and spirit of 
the of the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea...’. The bulk of this 1972 INCSEA 
consists of additional undertakings - or special regulations - designed specifically for military
5 7  Art. vn.
5 8 11ILM (1972), 778.
5 9  Agreement between the Government of the UK and the Government of the USSR concerning the Prevention of 
Incidents at Sea Beyond the Territorial Sea, done 15 July 1986, 37 ICLQ (1988), 420; The other agreements were 
concluded in 1988 and 1989: Nagle, 1 VJIL (1990), 143.
60 Ibid., 126.
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encounters and operations.61 There is also an article on the exchange of information between Parties on 
instances of collisions or other incidents (Art. VII).
Although not explicitly provided for, it is patent that this INSCEA agreement was not 
concluded in contemplation of hostile conflict between the Parties. This is confirmed by military 
lawyers who have stressed that in the event of the outbreak of armed conflict both Parties may decide, 
at a minimum, to suspend at least some of the INSCEA provisions, including its references to the 
COLREGS.62
This interpretation is reinforced moreover, by the more recent Agreement on the Prevention of 
Dangerous Military Activities (‘DMAA’) concluded in 1989 between the same two States.63 The 
DMAA is intended to supplement the 1972 INSCEA, and is no longer limited to naval incidents.64 
Significantly, the DMAA incorporates a special ‘savings clause’, which refers in the jus ad bellum 
language of the UN Charter, to the right of individual or collective self-defense in accordance with 
international law:
‘This Agreement shall not affect the rights and obligations of the Parties under other international 
agreements and arrangements in force between the Parties, and the rights of individual or collective self- 
defense and of navigation and overflight, in accordance with international law. Consistent with the 
foregoing, the Parties shall implement the provisions of this Agreement, taking into account the sovereign 
interests of both Parties. ’ 6 5
6.2.4. Prevention of Oil Pollution
• International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Seas by Oil (OILPOL), 1954
• International Conference on Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil, 1962 (OP Conference)
The 1954 International Conference on Pollution of the Sea by Oil had before it the proposals 
made by the UK government dated April 1954. This included an exemption for warships and naval 
auxiliaries as in the 1948 Safety Convention.66 No delegate objected to the principle of the exemption,
6 1  E.g., Arts. H (3), (6 ).
6 2  See Nagle, 1 VJIL (1990), at 131, fit. 33, quoting the American naval authority Ashley Roach and the late Australian 
military commander and lawyer Daniel O’Connell.
6 3  Done at Moscow, 12 June 1989,28 ILM(1989), 877.
6 4  Art. II, which lists four types of ‘dangerous military activities’.
6 5  Art. Vni (1).
6 6  At page 2, para 6  of the proposals by the government of the UK, dated April 1954, to be found in compilation of 
texts on the 1954 OILPOL Conference, held by IMO, London.
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but there was some disagreement about the range of excluded military vessels, and the wording of the 
clause. In addition, the idea was aired that even if Parties could not be compelled to do so, they should 
nevertheless be urged to apply the convention’s provisions on a voluntary basis to categories of vessels 
formally excluded from application.67
It was finally proposed to exclude ‘ships for the time being used as naval auxiliaries’ from the 
convention and to add a resolution in annex, on ‘The application o f the principles o f the Convention so 
far as is reasonable and practicable to the ships to which the Convention does not apply’. The 
substantive part of this Resolution (No 2) reads as follows:
‘That the governments of countries which accept the present Convention should also, by legislation or 
otherwise, apply the provisions of the Convention so far as is reasonable and practicable to all classes of 
sea-going ships registered in their territories or belonging to them to which the provisions of the 
Convention do not apply, that is to say, warships and other unregistered ships, ships used for the time 
being as naval auxiliaries' (italics added)
Delegates subsequently queried why the exclusion of warships had not been expressly 
mentioned in the main exemption clause, article II (1). The Chairman’s explanation was that no such 
explicit reference had been included:
‘...because the Convention refers only to ships registered by Contracting Governments. Warships, not 
being registered, were, therefore, excluded from the Convention, although they were referred to in 
Resolution 2...’68
Furthermore, the Italian delegate requested that it be put on the record that Resolution 2 was 
not binding on governments. This request was granted, and Resolution 2 was carried without further 
comments.69
Soon after its establishment, IMCO become the administrator and depositary of the 1954 
OILPOL Convention. In 1962, the ‘OP’ conference was convened to revise the 1954 OILPOL 
Convention and to consider, inter alia, a series of amendments in respect of warships and similar 
military vessels. A first series of proposals was aimed at refining, reformulating or updating the 
wording of the exclusion clauses, or at integrating the text of Resolution 2 in the main part of the 
Convention.70 Other proposals questioned the wisdom of continuing the exemption for warships and/or
6 7  General Committee, Minutes, 8 th Meeting, May 10th, 1954,12; Minutes, 9th Meeting, May 11th, 1954,1-2.
6 8  Ibid., 14.
6 9  Third and Final (Plenary) Session, May 12th, 1954, Report by the Chairman of the General Committee, 10.
7 0  IMCO, International Conference on Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil, Held in London, 26 March-13 April 
1962, OP/CONF/3, 7 with UK and US proposals.
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naval auxiliaries altogether.71 A third series of proposals aimed at strengthening the recommendations 
contained in Resolution 2, by using more urgent and stringent language.72
During the conference the differences between the various positions seemed at first 
irreconcilable.73 In the end preliminary agreement was reached on a formula for Art. II that would still 
exonerate warships and ships ‘for the time being used as naval auxiliaries’ from complying with the 
substance of the convention, but incorporating also a new ‘undertaking’ based on the text of the old 
Resolution 2.74 The revised text of Art. II which was finally adopted by the 1962 OP conference reads 
in relevant part as follows:
‘(1) The present Convention shall apply to ships registered in any of the territories of a Contracting 
Government and to unregistered ships having the nationality of a Contracting Party, except...(...)
(d) naval ships and ships for the time being used a naval auxiliaries 
(2) Each Contracting Government undertakes to adopt appropriate measures ensuring that requirements 
equivalent to those of the present Convention are, so far as is reasonable and practicable, applied to the 
ships referred to in subparagraph (d) of paragraph (1) of this Article.’
It is questionable whether as a result of this compromise text more pressure is brought to bear 
on Parties to apply the convention to the excluded categories of ships. There remains of course the 
decision of the 1962 Conference to reformulate the recommendations contained previously in 
Resolution 2 of 1954, and to incorporate these in the main body of the Convention. The impact of this 
change could only be appreciated by comparing domestic State practice both before and after the 1962 
amendments.
7 1 Ibid., 1-2 (France), 5 (Germany), 6  (India); see too OP/CONF/3/Add.l, 8  January 1962, Norwegian proposals, 2 & 
7.
7 2  OP/CONF/3,46-47, proposals by Greece and the UK.
7 3  E.g., the debates reproduced in OP/CONF/C.1/SR.1, 13 April 1962, Summary Record, 1st meeting, 27 March 1962, 
6-7.
7 4  CONF/C.1/SR.5,13 April 1962, Agenda item 7.
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6.2.5. Prevention of other forms of Marine Pollution
•  (Oslo) Convention for the Prevention o f Marine Pollution by Dumping from Ships and Aircraft, 1972
•  (London) Convention on the Prevention o f M arine Pollution by Dumping o f W astes and Other Matter, 1972
•  International Convention for the Prevention o f the Pollution by Ships (M ARPOL) 73/78
•  K uw ait Regional Convention, 1978
•  M ontego Bay Convention on the Law o f the Sea, 1982
• Convention for the Protection o f the M arine Environment o f  the North-East Atlantic OSPAR Convention (OSPAR), 
1992
A. The 1972 Oslo and London Dumping Conventions
The Oslo Convention, which regulates dumping in part of the northern hemisphere, and the 
London Dumping Convention, which is universal in scope, were adopted in the same year but deal 
with the issue of State-owned ships differently. The London Convention was signed at an 
intergovernmental conference in December 1972, and provides in A rt VII (4):
‘This Convention shall not apply to those vessels and aircraft entitled to sovereign immunity under 
international law. However, each party shall ensure by the adoption of appropriate measures that such 
vessels and aircraft owned or operated by it act in a manner consistent with the object and purpose of this 
Convention, and shall inform the Organization accordingly.’
During the preparation of the London Convention its application to public ships had been very 
controversial.75 Military powers and particularly the US, maintained that the convention should not 
apply to vessels and aircraft entitled to sovereign immunity under international law. Other countries 
favoured a classic sovereign immunity approach whereby a reservation would be made for 
enforcement measures only. The latter - more restrictive - solution was adopted only months earlier by 
the drafters of the Oslo Dumping Convention, Art. 15(6) of which provides that:
‘Nothing in this Convention shall abridge sovereign immunity. ’ 7 6
The formula that was finally adopted at the London Conference was intended as a 
compromise between those two approaches. Nevertheless, as Dr. Timagenis writes, the overall effect 
of this compromise text is very close to the classic sovereign immunity approach, in that only flag
75 Timagenis, op. cit., 1 7 1 #
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State enforcement can be conceived. The real difference- at least in theoiy- lies in the substantive 
obligations which the latter State should enforce. Under the classic sovereign immunity approach of 
the Oslo Convention, the flag State should enforce strictly the provisions of the convention; under the 
London Convention, the flag State is offered more flexibility and should adopt appropriate measures to 
ensure that these vessels act in a manner consistent with the object and purpose of the convention.77
It was seen earlier that the 1972 Oslo Dumping Convention was replaced in 1992 by OSPAR 
Convention.78 The negotiators of the latter chose to retain the traditional concept of sovereign 
immunity. Art. 10 (3) of Annex II provides that:
‘Nothing in this Annex shall abridge the sovereign immunity to which certain vessels are entitled under 
international law.’
B. MARPOL 73/78 and 1982 UNCLOS
The 1973 MARPOL conference was preceded, amongst others, by an officially convened 
preparatory meeting earlier that year.79 One of the outcomes of this meeting was the following 
proposal (Art. 3 (2)) for a subparagraph dealing with the exclusion of warships and similar vessels 
from the scope of the convention:
‘The present Convention shall not apply to any warship or other ship (sic) owned or operated by a State 
and used for the time being, only on government non-commercial service (Sl 8 ). However, each 
Contracting State shall ensure by the adoption of appropriate measures that such ships owned or operated 
by it act in a manner consistent with the object and purpose of the present Convention.’
As the preparatory work for MARPOL foreshadowed, the immunity clause would become 
once again, the focus of debate during the conference. The USSR suggested a formula that would 
make the wording of the exemption clause more precise, without however enlarging the number of 
exempted ships.80 Norway and Japan wanted to limit the exemptions to warships only.81 Greece
7 6  Ibid., 61,161-2.
7 7  Ibid., 176-9.
7 8  Supra, 1.2.1. A.
7 9  Preparatory Meeting for the International Conference on Marine Pollution, 1973.
8 0  MP/CONF/8 /8 , 4 July 1973,3.
8 1 MP/CONF/8/11,10 July 1973,2-3 (Norway); MP/CONF/8/17,2 August 1973,2 (Japan).
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wanted to restrict the immunity to warships, ‘or at least to state vessels only’.82 According to Spain the 
exemption should be formulated in broader terms, leaving scope for exclusion of all ships ‘entitled to 
exemption in accordance with international law’,83 while according to Mexico, the exemption clause 
should only refer to the jurisdictional aspects of sovereign immunity.84 Subsequently, the Netherlands 
tabled an amendment which combined elements of several of the above proposals.85
Unfortunately, the summary records of the committee debates have not been published. The 
text which was finally adopted (Art. 3(3)) reads as follows:
‘The present Convention shall not apply to any worship, naval auxiliary or other ship owned or operated 
by a State and used, for the time being, only on government non-commercial service. However, each 
Party shall ensure by the adoption of appropriate measures not impairing the operations or operational 
capabilities of such ships owned or operated by it, that such ships act in a manner consistent, so far as is 
reasonable and practicable, with the present Convention. ’ 8 6
At the 10th plenary session of the conference, the text of Art. 3 was adopted by 55 votes to 
none with two abstentions.87
Despite the relative parsimony of comments from the travaux preparatoires, it is nevertheless 
possible to draw conclusions on the manner in which the MARPOL conference has dealt with the 
issue of State immunity. The exemption clause adopted in Art. 3(3) by the 1973 MARPOL conference 
differs from Art. II (1) (d) of the 1954 OILPOL Conference, as amended into II (2) by the 1962 OP 
Conference, in several respects. First, the range of ships absolved from compliance with substantive 
provisions has been broadened to include all State-owned or State-operated ships as long as they are 
used on government non-commercial service. Second, by accepting the 1962 amendments State Parties 
undertook to adopt appropriate measures to ensure that requirements equivalent to those developed for 
other ships apply so far as is reasonable and practicable to the exonerated military vessels. Arguably, 
the rephrasing of this mitigation clause by the MARPOL conference has placed a heavier and more 
stringent duty on State parties, by using terminology such as ‘each Party shall ensure.. .by the adoption 
of appropriate measures.. .that such ships act... ’ in conformity with the convention.
The phrases ‘each Party shall ensure’, and ‘by the adoption of appropriate measures’ were 
most likely borrowed from Art. VII (4) of the 1972 London Dumping Convention. Unfortunately, the
8 2  MP/CONF/8 /10/Add. 1,5 October 1973,5.
8 3  MP/CONF/8/13,18 July 1973,2.
8 4  MP/CONF/C.1/WP.13,12 October 1973, Committee I, Agenda item 3, amendment to Art. 3(2).
8 5  MP/CONF/C.1/WP.13,12 October 1973, Committee I, Agenda item 3, Proposed amendment to Art. 3 (2).
8 6  MP/CONF/WP. 17, 30 October 1973,2.
8 7  MP/CONF/SR.10,4 March 1974, agenda item 7.
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MARPOL conference did not follow the latter’s example in requesting that State Parties inform the 
Organization of the measures taken. It is submitted that the incorporation of such a reporting 
requirement would significantly increase the pressure brought to bear on State Parties.
Although these differences may only be questions of degree, it is the MARPOL formula 
which has gained wide acceptance in subsequent treaty practice, and not the formula of the 1972 
London Dumping Convention. Significantly, the negotiators of the Third United Nations Law of the 
Sea Conference (UNCLOS ID) copied the MARPOL exemption/mitigation formula almost verbatim 
for inclusion in Part XII of 1982 UNCLOS on the Protection and Preservation of the Marine 
Environment. The resulting ‘sovereign’ immunity clause in Art. 236 of 1982 UNCLOS stipulates that:
‘The provisions of this Convention regarding the protection and preservation of die marine environment 
do not apply to any warship, naval auxiliary, other vessels or aircraft owned or operated by a State and 
used, for the time being, only on government non-commercial service. However, each State shall ensure 
by the adoption of appropriate measures not impairing operations or operational capabilities of such 
vessels or aircraft owner or operated by it, that such vessels or aircraft act in a manner inconsistent, so far 
as is reasonable and practicable, with this Convention’.
The origins of Art. 236 can be traced to proposals submitted by Australia in 1973 during 
UNCLOS HI. These were aimed at exempting warships from the provisions on the protection of the 
marine environment, and based explicitly on the immunity provisions of the 1954 OILPOL and 1972 
London Dumping Conventions.88 Competing proposals were lodged by Canada, the USSR and the US. 
The Canadian text stated that the Convention should not apply to:
‘... those vessels and aircraft entitled to sovereign immunity under international law’
and continued with a phrase reflecting the substance of the Australian proposal.89 The text 
submitted by the USSR was more general, and referred to the existing immunity for such vessels and 
aircraft under international law, but without a ‘mitigation’ clause,90 whilst the US proposal was akin to 
the Canadian one.91
The proposed exemption clause was subsequently discussed in depth during informal 
meetings. In 1974 the US tabled a new proposal, visibly inspired by the MARPOL formula, which
8 8  A/AC.138/SC.III/L.27 (1973, mimeo.), principle (g) (Australia): Nordquist, et. al., United Nations Convention on 
the Law o f the Sea 1982, vol. IV, (1991), 418.
89 A/AC.138/SC.m/L.28 (1973, mimeo.), Art. XE (Canada): ibid., 418.
9 0  A/AC.138/SC.IH/L.32 (1973, mimeo.), Art. 7, para 2 (USSR): ibid., 418.
91 A/AC.138/SC.m/L.40 (1973, mimeo.), Art. XXHI (US): ibid., 418.
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contained the elements of what would become Art. 236.92 The only criticism came from Tanzania, 
whose delegate pointed out that:
‘ (...) Since the issue under consideration was the prevention o f pollution and not the protection o f ships, 
the draft articles should deal with the status rather than the nature o f the vessels in question \93
Subsequent texts produced as a result of informal negotiations confirm that the issue under 
discussion was not merely immunity from jurisdiction, but a genuine exemption from the substance of 
the provisions of the prospective convention regarding the protection and preservation of the marine 
environment94
One of the main principles underlying Art. 236 can be traced back to several other articles of 
1982 UNCLOS: principally Arts. 30, 31,32,95 and 96. However, the major difference between these 
articles and the stipulations of Art. 236 is that the former deal primarily with immunity from 
jurisdiction, whereas the latter goes much further and grants immunity from substantive provisions.
Although included in Part XII on the Protection and Preservation of the Marine Environment, 
Art. 236 should be regarded as bearing on the entire Convention, for the provisions regarding the 
protection and preservation of the marine environment are scattered throughout the Convention.95 The 
end result is that warships are exempt from the material applicability of the pertinent rules.96
Apart from the all-important 1982 UNCLOS, the MARPOL formula has been borrowed often 
verbatim by a multitude of other treaties and instruments. It was included, amongst others in two 
important instruments concluded in the 1990s: the International Convention on Oil Pollution 
Preparedness, Response and Co-operation (OPRC Convention), 1990, Art. 1 (3) and the Protocol on 
Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty, 1991, Art. 11(1);
In addition, the MARPOL formula forms part of practically all regional framework maritime 
treaties, concluded under UNEP auspices over a period of more than two decades.97 A prominent
9 2  US (1974, mimeo.), Art. XHI: ibid., 418.
9 3  UNCLOS IH, Official Records, vol. IV, (1975), Summary Record, 19th Meeting, Third Committee, Third Session, 26 
March 1975, 85, para 32.
9 4  See e.g., proposals for Chapter DC entitled ‘Sovereign Immunity’ which included Art. 42; Document 
A/CONF.62/WP.8/Part HI, UNCLOS HI, Official Records, vol. IV, Documents of the Conference, 171-6.
9 5  Nordquist, et. al., op. cit., 421; Oxman, 24 VJIL (1984), 821, fn. 34; Heintshel v. Heinegg & Donner, 37 GYIL 
(1994), 298.
9 6  Heintshel v. Heinegg & Donner, ibid., 298.
9 7  1974 Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea Area (Helsinki Convention), Art. 4
(4); 1976 Protocol for the Prevention of Pollution of the Mediterranean Sea by Dumping from Ships and Aircraft, Art. 
11 (1); 1982 Regional Convention for the Conservation of the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden Environment, Art. XTV; 1986 
Protocol for the Prevention of Pollution of the South Pacific Region by Dumping, Art. 12 (4); 1990 Protocol
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example is the Kuwait Regional Convention for Co-operation on the Protection of the Marine 
Environment From Pollution, concluded in 1978 for the Persian-Arabian Gulf (‘Kuwait Regional 
Convention’). It was seen earlier,98 that the applicability of this convention became contentious during 
the 1980/88 Iran-Iraq war in connection with the 1983 Nowruz Oil Spill. Its exemption clause reads as 
follows:
‘Warships or other ships owned or operated by a State, and used only on Government non-commercial 
service, shall be exempted from the application of the provisions of the present convention Each 
Contracting State shall, as far as possible, ensure that its warships or other ships owned or operated by 
that State, and used only on government non-commercial service, shall comply with the present 
Convention in the prevention of pollution to the marine environment’ 9 9
The clause not only bears a strong resemblance to the MARPOL formula, both the Kuwait 
and MARPOL Conventions deal in principle with the same subject matter: pollution of the marine 
environment. There is consequently no reason to believe that the respective immunity clauses would 
have a substantially different meaning.
Finally, the MARPOL formula has been relied on by countries such as the US and the UK in 
‘interpretative statements’ made in respect of various instruments, including regarding environmental 
sectors other than the marine environment100
C. Environmental Implications in General
The exclusion of warships from the substantive provisions of 1982 UNCLOS has been 
justified in the literature on the following grounds: (1) Pollution regulations of a general character, 
including international regulations, may be inappropriate to the special configuration or mission of
Concerning Specially Protected Areas and Wildlife in the Wider Caribbean Region (SPAW Protocol), Art. 2 (3); 1992 
Convention on the Protection of the Black Sea Against Pollution, Art. IV; 1992 Convention on the Protection of the 
Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea Area (Helsinki Convention), Art. 4 (3).
98 Supra, 3.1.2.
"Art. XIV.
i°° 1 9 3 3  Convention for the Protection and Development of the Marine Environment of the Wider Caribbean Region: 
Interpretative Statement by the US and the UK attached to the Final Act; 22 /LA/(1983), 226, 57 BYIL 1986, (1987), 
553; Cumulative Digest of US Practice in International Law, 1981-88, vol. 2, 2096; 1986 Convention for the 
Protection of the Natural Resources and Environment of the South Pacific Region (SPREP), US Understanding Sen. 
Treaty Doc., 101-21, p. 53: Cumulative Digest o f US Practice in International Law, 1981-88, vol. 2 ,2099; 1989 Basle 
Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal, US Understanding; 
Sen. Treaty Doc., 102-5, Sen. Exec. Rep. 102-36:(2), See too Declaration made by Ecuador; 1992 Convention on 
Biological Diversity, proposed US understanding: Sen. Treaty Doc., 103-20, p. XVH.
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certain warships; (2) It was feared that coastal States, in the exercise of powers to prevent and control 
pollution from foreign ships, could thereby acquire leverage over warship passage in general, and the 
passage of nuclear warships in particular; A question regarding the compliance of a warship with a 
particular standard might require the inspection or release of data regarding the ship, which most flag 
States would be reluctant to disclose; (3) Warships were not considered a substantial source of marine 
pollution, and because the rules of sovereign immunity would have restricted the possibilities of 
enforcement against the will of the flag State in any event, there was no significant opposition to 
Art. 236; (4) Moreover, given the political mission of naval vessels that operate far from their home 
shores in peacetime, it would not be unrealistic to expect a high degree of self-imposed environmental 
diligence by major flag States.101
There is no question that the configuration and the mission of naval vessels differ 
fundamentally from commercial vessels. Still, the single most important reason why immunity clauses 
for warships are adopted centres on security issues. States are extremely averse to allowing foreign 
nations access to their military ships.102 In a position paper advocating adoption of 1982 UNCLOS, the 
US Department of Defense articulated the rationale in this way:
i[T ]o  support military operations around the globe, there must be assurance that military vessels and
their cargoes can move freely without being subject to levy or interference by coastal states. ,103
However, the amount of waste generated by such ships is far from trivial. Aircraft carriers 
may house as many as 5000 crew members.104 The US owns over 2,000 vessels, including 600 Navy 
ships, with over 300,000 crew members. Each sailor is estimated to generate approximately three 
pounds of garbage per day. Processing and storing such huge quantities of waste presents a 
considerable challenge to navies. This problem is exacerbated by the fact that military operations often 
require naval vessels to remain at sea for prolonged periods of time, often conducting operations in 
areas which lack adequate shore disposal facilities.105
Because of the implications for marine pollution, the MARPOL/UNCLOS ‘sovereign’ 
immunity clause has been the subject of severe criticism:
10 1 Oxman, 24 VJIL{1984), 820-1; Morgan, op. cit., 439-40.
1 0 2  Timagenis, op. cit., 276, fn. 352.
1 0 3 140 CONG. REC. S14,467-04,14,472 (Oct. 6,1994).
1 0 4  133 CONG. REC. 511, 896 (1987) (statement of Sen. Lautenberg).
1 0 5 Dehner, Vessel-Source Pollution and Public Vessels (1995), IV (A), p. 8  (on file with author).
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‘ This serious derogation [the sovereign immunity clause] is not only irreconcilable with the rest o f  the 
Convention, it is incompatible with the usual principles o f  immunity which provide only fo r  exemption 
from  enforcement procedures, not from applicability o f  the la w . [ TJhere is no reason why government 
ships should not be governed by marine pollution rules.’106
Although campaigns for the total abolition of the immunity of State-owned ships were not 
unknown around the turn of the century,107 national and international public sentiment is now said to 
turn against such exclusions on environmental grounds.108 Sweden spearheaded a recent effort to 
remove the immunity clause from the 1972 (London) Dumping Convention. 109 However, the new 
1996 protocol to this convention proves that this was unsuccessful.110 On the one hand, the protocol 
strengthens and updates environmental protection provisions through the introduction of principles 
such as ‘the polluter pays’, and precautionary and preventive measures.111 On the other hand, the 
clause on immunity of public vessels, far from being dropped, was replaced by the following text:
Art 10 (4): ‘This Protocol shall not apply to those vessels and aircraft entitled to sovereign immunity 
under international law. However, each Contracting Party shall ensure by the adoption of appropriate 
measures that such vessels and aircraft owned or operated by it act in a manner consistent with the object 
and purpose of this Protocol and shall inform the Organisation accordingly.’
Art. 10 (5): ‘A State may, at the time it expresses its consent to be bound by this Protocol, or at any time 
thereafter, declare that it shall apply the provisions of this Protocol to its vessels and aircraft referred to in 
paragraph 4, recognising that only that State may enforce those provisions against such vessels and 
aircraft.’
The fourth subparagraph of the new protocol introduces only cosmetic changes to the 
previous clause, but the fifth subparagraph makes it absolutely clear that even if the convention’s 
substantive provisions are made applicable to public ships, it does not entail a waiver by the flag State 
of jurisdictional immunity.
In mitigation one should add that the second sentence of the MARPOL/UNCLOS formula 
obligates Parties to use their best efforts to prevent pollution by public vessels. Yet the widespread 
adoption of this sentence in many other international instruments does not reveal the extent to which 
State Parties comply with this undertaking. Moreover, there are several built-in obstacles preventing 
such an assessment First, as noted above, unlike for the 1972 London (Dumping) Convention, there is
1 0 6  Kiss & Shelton, op. cit., 173-74.
1 0 7 Matsunami, op. cit., 91 ff.
1 0 8 Dehner, op. cit., IV (B), p. 8 .
1 0 9  1993 Draft Amendment, IMO Doc. LC/AM 1/9,30.
1 1 0 1996 Protocol, concluded 8  November 1996,36 ILM{\991), 1.
1 1 1 Art. 3.
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no requirement for States Parties to report to the administrating or depositaiy organisation on any 
implementation measures taken. The IMO has virtually no organised means of monitoring compliance 
of military vessels and has acknowledged that:
‘Since warships are outside MARPOL 73/78, we do not receive any information on the national 
legislation for these ships. Even i f  it exists, information we do receive from time to time is more in the 
form o f research and development work, and this again from more informal contacts rather than 
established procedure. ’ 1 1 2
Furthermore, the MARPOL/UNCLOS formula entitles State Parties to auto-determine what 
the ‘appropriate measures not impairing the operations or operational capabilities’ of excluded 
categories of ships are. Of course, there is much force in the argument that this consequence is an 
essential part of sovereign immunity.113 Still, the lack of international schemes for monitoring, 
reporting and control of compliance by public vessels has convinced some writers that the second 
sentence of the formula in question is of academic value.114 Others indicate that the absence of 
international control will inevitably cause potentially huge differences in implementation by State 
parties.115
On a more positive note, there is nonetheless increasing evidence of the application of 
national and international environmental standards to the military sector, especially in industrialised 
States. At a meeting organised in 1995 by UN/ECE and UNEP, many countries reported that their 
armed forces were, as a rule, subject to national environmental standards and legislation.116 World­
wide, the military have been forced to study alternatives to ozone-depleting substances which form 
part of many military applications. This is the result of the scheduled phase-out of these substances 
following the protocols and amendments to the 1985 Vienna Convention which were discussed 
earlier.117 The military response was partly motivated by a growing environmental consciousness 
within the sector, but also by the realisation that these chemicals would soon become either 
unavailable or too expensive.118 NATO has organised two International Conferences on the Role of the
1 1 2  Statement of 11 November 1994, by B. Okamura, Deputy Director, Marine Environment Division, cited by Dehner, 
op. cit., V (A) (2) (a), p. 12.
1 1 3  Oxman, 24 VJIL (1984), 820-21.
1 , 4  Treves, op. cit., 902.
1 1 5  Morgan, op. cit., 441.
1 1 6  UNEP/IUCC, Meeting on Military Activities and the Environment, Linkoping, 27-30 June 1995, UNEP/MIL/3, 7 
July 1995.
U1 Supra, 1.2.1. D.
118 Second International NATO/CCMS Conference, The Role of the Military in Protecting the Ozone Layer, January 
24-25,1994, Brussels, Belgium, vol. 1,27.
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Military in Protecting the Ozone Layer,119 and has also sponsored a Pilot Study on Defense 
Environmental Expectations to examine the impact of military activities on the environment in 
general.120
To illustrate a point of interest to this study, the US Navy is required by domestic law to 
comply with Annex V of MARPOL 73/78, which deals with different types of garbage and specifies 
the distances from land and the manner in which they may be disposed of. The requirements are much 
stricter in a number of ‘special areas’ but the most important feature of the Annex is the complete ban 
imposed on the dumping into the sea of all forms of plastic.121 As for international developments, 
NATO’s Special Working Group Twelve, a technology-sharing collection of nations, is striving to 
develop ‘The Environmentally Sound Ship of the Twenty-First Centuiy’. In addition, in October 1994, 
representatives of 14 NATO navies and of former Warsaw Pact navies met to discuss vessel-source 
pollution.122
D. Environmental Implications during Armed Conflict
The most important question in view of the present inquiry is the following: what is the fate of 
these environmental requirements, when the country at issue is engaged in armed conflict or other type 
of hostile activity?
An analysis of the environmental legislation applicable to the US Navy indicates that there are 
indeed unspecified ‘peacetime’ limits on the Navy’s Environmental Program. The Navy is subject to 
the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) which requires federal agencies to document the 
effects of their actions on the environment, including the marine environment, for any activity that 
would be considered a major federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human 
environment.123 However, NEPA provides no express war or national emergency exemption. Common 
sense indicates of course, that US commanders:
1 1 9  Viega da Cunha, ibid., 47.
120 Proceedings o f the International Symposium on The Environment and Defence, 13-15 September 1995, Pilot Study 
on Defence Environmental Expectations, CCMS Report No 211, NATO (1995).
1 2 1 Schachte, 23 ODIL (1992), 61jf.
1 2 2 Dehner, op. cit., IV B., p. 8 .
1 2 3 De Marco & Quinn, in Grunawalt, et. al., op. cit., 88-9; Quinn, comments, ibid., 156.
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'... should not be required to prepare an environmental impact statement for amphibious assault, nor 
obtain a permitfor whale harassment before conducting an attack on enemy shipping’ . 1 2 4
That NEPA does not apply to belligerent activities can be inferred from the text of its 
provisions as well. For one, the bulk of the environmental legislation applicable to the Navy - and to 
other components of the US armed forces- is limited to military activities within US jurisdiction.125 
Furthermore, the preparation of environmental documentation such as EIAs is not required for certain 
‘categorical exclusions’, including ‘maintaining law and order’. There are also special waivers related 
to ‘classified action’ and ‘emergency actions’. The regulations provide that if emergency 
circumstances make it necessary to take action without observance of NEPA requirements, the agency 
should consult the Council on Environmental Quality.126 It appears that During Operation Desert 
Storm, the US Department of Defense did in fact consult with this Council regarding pursuit of various 
emergency military requirements in the US without full NEPA compliance.127
Whilst NEPA contains only implicit peacetime limits for domestic military operations, there 
are express limits for US military activities abroad. For the latter type of activities, the major piece of 
legislation is Executive Order 12144, entitled ‘Environmental Effects Abroad of Major Federal 
Actions’.128 It applies to the ‘global commons’, defined as the geographical areas outside the 
jurisdiction of any nation, and to areas (land, water, and airspace) under the jurisdiction of one or more 
foreign governments. Its stated objective is to further foreign policy and national security interests 
‘while at the same time taking into consideration important environmental concerns.’
If a ‘major federal action’ is determined to do significant harm to the environment of a foreign 
nation, or to a protected global resource, the Executive Order requires as a general rule that a prior 
environmental study, an environmental review or an environmental impact statement be prepared and 
conducted. As with operations within US jurisdiction, some of these requirements may be waived, 
postponed or mitigated in case of ‘emergencies’ and ‘classified actions’. But in addition to this, the 
Executive Order expressly exempts a wide range of (hostile/military) operations and activities related 
to the US national security from its provisions: from actions related to armed conflict (encompassing 
officially declared wars and other types of hostilities), actions affecting the national security or the 
national interest, to intelligence activities, arms transfers etc. Additional case-by-case or class
1 2 4  De Marco & Quinn, ibid., 91.
1 2 5 US Navy, Opnavinst 5090. IB, 1 November 1994, Procedures For Implementing NEPA.
1 2 6  40 CFR para 1506.11.
1 2 7  De Marco & Quinn, op. cit., 91, fh. 14.
1 2 8  Dated January 4,1979.
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exemptions may be added to this list by the Department of Defense because of ‘emergencies, national 
security considerations, exceptional foreign policy requirements, or other special circumstances which 
preclude or are inconsistent with the preparation of environmental documentation and the taking of 
other actions prescribed’ by the Order. An example of such case - by - case exemptions are ‘actions 
that must be taken to promote the national defense or security and that cannot be delayed’. Therefore, 
the conclusion must be that there are indeed peacetime limits to the US Navy Environmental Program.
These limitations to the environmental obligations incumbent on the Navy are supported by 
the qualifying language of the MARPOL exemption clause. Accordingly, a Party may determine for 
itself which measures - comparable or equivalent to the MARPOL provisions- apply by analogy to its 
naval vessels, ‘so far as is reasonable and practicable ’ and taking into consideration the ‘ operations 
or operational capabilities o f such ships ’. ‘Operations’ in relation to naval vessels is term with a clear 
military connotation: it is barely coded language that may encompass military activities executed in a 
hostile environment, as is the case during armed conflict. Consequently, the phrase ‘operations or 
operational capabilities of such ships’ is a crucial qualifying condition which detines and limits the 
scope of the MARPOL mitigation clause to unspecified peacetime military activities. It seems 
therefore correct to state that:
‘One cannot but conclude that the second sentence leaves the protection o f  the environment legally
subordinated to operational demands in times ofpeace and military necessities in times ofnaval war’.129
As with the war suspension clauses that were examined in the previous chapter, the MARPOL 
clause does not point to any automatic - ipso facto -effects of the outbreak of armed conflict on the 
treaty. However, it does suggest that it is within a Party’s own, sovereign, judgement to decide which 
of the MARPOL (or comparable national) provisions may be affected by the outbreak of armed 
conflict. Given, however, that the integration of environmental concerns into military actions is still at 
its infancy in many States, much may depend ultimately, on the judgement of an individual 
commander. A recent study made available by the US military uncovered a real void in military 
environmental planning. The report, which was limited to an examination of environmental policy for 
operations other than war (OOTW), acknowledges that a legal basis for such a policy is currently 
lacking in the US. Its author concludes that most environmental laws affecting the US military are 
primarily designed for use at the installation level, and are closely linked with local civilian 
environmental standards. Faute de mieux, these peacetime environmental standards have been used in
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environmental annexes in the Operations Plans of US ‘peace’ military operations in Somalia, Haiti and 
the former Yugoslavia. They are nevertheless regarded as too restrictive for use across the full 
spectrum of military operations. On the other hand, the report’s author asserts that die laws of war do 
not provide an appropriate level of environmental protection during operations short of war. As a 
result, there is a grey area in which the application of environmental law is currently being left at the 
discretion of the individual commander.130
A final observation is that like the many war suspension clauses discussed before, the phrase 
‘operations or operational capabilities of such ships’ constitutes rather unsophisticated language from 
a jus ad bellum perspective. There is no distinction between e.g., legal actions taken in self-defence 
and operations conducted to pursue illegal aggression in violation of Art. 2 (4) of the UN Charter.
6.2.6. (Civil) Liability Conventions
•  (Paris) O ECD Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field o f  Nuclear Energy, 1960
•  Convention on the Liability o f  Operators o f  N udear Ships, 1962
•  (Vienna) Convention on Civil Liability for N udear Damage, 1963
•  International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, 1969
•  International Convention on the Establishment o f  an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution 
Damage, 1971
•  Convention on the Early Notification o f N udear Acddents, 1986
•  Convention on Assistance in the Case o f  a N udear A cddent or Radiological Emergency, 1986
•  Convention on Civil Liability for Damage Caused During Carriage o f Dangerous Goods by Road, Rail and Inland 
Navigation Vessels, 1989
•  Internationa] Convention on the Carriage o f  Hazardous and Noxious Substances by Sea (HNS), 1996
•  Protocol to Amend the 1963 Vienna Convention, 1997
•  Convention on Supplementary Compensation for N udear Damage, 1997
Since the maritime ‘civil liability’ conventions have been largely modelled on the schemes set 
up for the nuclear industry, it would seem appropriate to start the analysis with the latter conventions.
1 2 9  Heintschel v. Heinegg & Donner, 37 GYIL (1994), 299 in relation to Art. 236 UNCLOS.
1 3 0 Colonel David L. Carr, Considerations for the Development of a DOD Environmental Policy for Operations Other 
Than War, May 1997 (on file with author).
276
C h a p t e r  S ix : E x e m p t i o n  o f  W a r s h i p s
A. The 1960 Paris Convention and the 1963 Vienna Conventions
The 1960 Paris OECD and the 1963 Vienna IAEA Conventions apply in the first instance to 
land-based nuclear installations, broadly defined as encompassing reactors, reprocessing, 
manufacturing and storage facilities where nuclear fuel, nuclear material, and radioactive products or 
waste are used or produced.131 In addition, both conventions also apply to the transport of nuclear 
material and to the handling of nuclear waste.132
Despite the lack of express exclusion provisions to that effect, it is accepted that neither 
convention applies to military installations.133 This is supported by the tenor of the preamble of both 
conventions, which emphasises their civilian and ‘peaceful’ rationale. Furthermore, as seen earlier,134 
both conventions exonerate operators from liability for damage directly caused by armed conflict, 
hostilities, civil war and insurrection.135
As far as the Vienna Convention is concerned, the above conclusion is confirmed a contrario, 
by the discussions held from ‘90 to ‘94 within the IAEA’s Standing Committee on Liability for 
Nuclear Damage. One of the areas up for discussion was precisely the proposed extension of the 
convention to military installations.136 The result of these discussions are contained in two new 
instruments concluded in 1997. According to Art. IB of the new 1997 Protocol, the 1963 Vienna 
Convention:
‘.. .shall not apply to nuclear installations used for non-peacefiil purposes’.
A similar term is used in Art. II (2) of the new Convention on Supplementary Compensation 
for Nuclear Damage, the scope of which extends to:
‘. . .nuclear damage for which an operator of a nuclear installation used for peaceful purposes situated in
the territory of a Contracting Party is liable... ’
1 3 1 In Art. 1 a) (i) and I (1) (j) respectively.
1 3 2  Art. 4 and II respectively.
1 3 3 Bimie & Boyle, op. cit., 375.
1 3 4  Supra, 4.2.1.
1 3 5 Arts. 9 and IV 3 (a) respectively.
1 3 6  See Statement made by IAEA representative during 71st session of the IMO Legal Committee, 10-14 October 1994, 
LEG 71/13,17 October 1994, Report, 4, para 15.
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What is meant by ‘peaceful purposes’ is open to interpretation. It will be remembered that this 
expression is also used in 1982 UNCLOS. The majority understanding in regard to the latter is that the 
clause prohibits only military activities in violation of Art. 2(4) of the UN Charter.137
However, the phrase ‘(non-) peaceful purposes’ may have a different meaning in the above 
IAEA instruments. It seems that these terms were agreed early on within the Standing Committee. 
Although no official interpretation is available, there are reasons to believe that the term ‘non-peaceful 
purposes’ was used to refer to so-called dual-use facilities, and therefore has a broader meaning than 
‘military installations’.138 If this interpretation is correct, it would mean that instead of extending 
coverage to military installations as well, the new instruments will end up narrowing the field of 
application of the nuclear liability conventions by excluding dual-use (military/ civilian) installations.
The recent interest for the application of the Vienna Convention to military installations arose 
as a result of the serious difficulties experienced during the negotiation of two IAEA Conventions in 
response to the 1986 Chernobyl nuclear disaster.139 During the negotiation of the 1986 Convention on 
the Early Notification of Nuclear Accidents and the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear 
Accident or Radiological Emergency, the nuclear superpowers disagreed sharply over whether these 
should apply to accidents involving military facilities and military activities. Deadlock was only 
narrowly avoided by agreement over a text which does not expressly mention military and civilian 
installations or activities, but which distinguishes instead between accidents for which notification is 
mandatory and those for which notification is voluntary. In accordance with this compromise, Art. 1(2) 
of the Notification Convention lists facilities and activities which are subject to the mandatory 
notification provisions, which are widely understood to represent civilian facilities and applications. 
Apart from this, in accordance with Art. 3, State Parties have the opportunity to notify ‘nuclear 
accidents other than those specified in article 7.’ This compromise reportedly met the wishes of the 
nuclear powers on the division of military and civil matters. In addition, some nuclear weapon States 
have made declarations to the effect that they are prepared to use Art. 3 in order to notify releases 
caused by accidents involving nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons tests. Nonetheless, since most of 
these declarations stress the ‘voluntary’ character of such undertakings it is debated whether State 
Parties are under a positive legal duty to notify accidents related to military activities or military
1 3 7 Supra, 3.1.1.
1 3 8 Explanation given to the author by a member of IAEA’s legal service.
1 3 9 Supra, 1.2.2. D.
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installations.140 The USSR is thus far the only State to have notified two accidents involving military 
nuclear submarines.
B. The 1962 Nuclear Ships Convention
The text of the 1962 Nuclear Ships Convention (‘NS Convention’) was agreed as a result of 
negotiations conducted during the 11th session of the Diplomatic Conference on Maritime Law, held in 
Brussels from 17-29 April 1961. However, major disagreements over several points in the draft text 
prepared by the Comite Maritime International (hereinafter ‘Comite’) and the IAEA, made it 
necessary to reconvene the Conference on 14 May 1962 for the sole purpose of dealing with nuclear 
ships. The final act of the NS Convention was eventually opened for signature on 25 May, after it had 
been adopted with a mere 28 votes in favour, 10 against (amongst which the US and the USSR), four 
abstentions and with eight of the fifty participants absent at the time of the final vote.141
The incorporation of nuclear warships into the NS Convention continues to remain a divisive 
issue: it is the principal reason for why, more than 30 years after its negotiation, not a single licensing 
State has ratified the convention, thereby preventing its entry into force.142 The arguments in favour of 
the inclusion of these warships into the convention were primarily of practical nature:
• It was expected that for years to come the large majority of nuclear ships would be military ships; 
the ratio in 1960 was 30:2 and would increase to much higher levels by the end of the decade;
• It was argued that nuclear propulsion represented a real hazard and that the public needed 
protection against nuclear warships as well;143
The contrary views were of a more legal, technical and even ideological nature. The objectors 
maintained:
1 4 0  Adede, The IAEA Notification and Assistance Conventions in Case of a Nuclear Accident (1987), 126-9; Bimie & 
Boyle, op. cit., 129, 365; Cameron, in Cameron et al., Nuclear Energy Law after Chernobyl (1988), 23-24; Politi, in 
Francioni, & Scovazzi, op. cit., 479-80.
1 4 1 Szasz, 2 JMLC{ 1971), No. 3, 549-550.
1 4 2  Pursuant to Art. XIV. 1.
1 4 3  Most of the research in maritime nuclear propulsion was done with military applications in mind: Konz, 57 AJIL 
(1963), 109; Szacz, 2 JMLC (1971), No. 3,553.
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• that rules concerning warships are a matter of public international law since any accident 
involving these will engage primarily the public, international responsibility of States; that such 
rules have no place in a convention on private civil liability;
• that if warships would be covered, the resulting limitation of liability would encourage the use of 
nuclear warships;
• that coverage of warships by the Convention might presage an attempt to impose other types of 
regulations (safety, international inspection and licensing) on these military ships, which would be 
wholly unacceptable;
• that no treaty sponsored even in part by the IAEA may relate to any military use of nuclear 
energy;144
The warships question was raised relatively late during the negotiations and led to an 
extraordinary coalition between the two principal Cold War foes. During the preparatory stages of the 
Convention, the US had pushed strongly for the inclusion of warships, but at the Conference itself, the 
US delegate declared that he was no (longer) authorised to do so.145 The US and the USSR faced a 
solid block of opposition led by the UK and made up from delegations from all continents and 
ideologies.146 In an attempt to appease the two major nuclear powers, the conference agreed on two 
concessions: one on the maintenance of liability insurance, the other on the question of jurisdiction. 
First, Art. IH.3 provides that the States operating nuclear warships, as well as any other ships operated 
directly by a Contracting State or by any constituent subdivision thereof, need not maintain any 
insurance or other coverage.147 The second conciliatory gesture was that, whereas according to 
Art. X. 1 primary jurisdiction lies at the option of the claimant, either in the courts of Licensing State or 
of the Party in whose territory the damage was sustained, if the claim is in respect of a warship, resort 
must be had exclusively to the courts of the Licensing State (X.3).
Writing in the beginning of the 1970s, Professor Szasz noted that the hesitation of the US to 
ratify the convention related solely to the question of warships, presumably reflecting the views of the
1 4 4 Konz, 57 AJIL (1963), 108-9; Szacz, 2 JMLC (1971), No. 3, 553.
1 4 5  Konz, 51 AJIL (1963), 108 fa. 40,109.
1 4 6  Ibid., 108-9.
1 4 7  Since the residual liability of the licensing State is maintained, the actual effect of this exception is more symbolic 
than real: Szasz, 2 JMLC (1971), No. 3,557.
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US Navy.148 Likewise, during the negotiation of the 1969 CLC and Intervention Conventions, the 
Russian delegate warned against repeating the failed experiment of the NS Convention.149
Nevertheless, the compromise which was pioneered in the 1962 Convention - i.e. 
incorporation of a waiver of sovereign immunity related to State vessels, combined with an exemption 
for liability coverage and jurisdiction - has re-emerged in other civil liability conferences. Apart from 
those related to the maritime sector, which will be discussed below, it also inspired the negotiations for 
the 1989 UN/ECE Convention on Civil Liability for Damage Caused During Carriage of Dangerous 
Goods by Road, Rail and Inland Navigation Vessels (hereinafter ‘CRTD Convention).150 Although this 
convention does not appear applicable to military premises or installations,151 it expressly covers cases 
in which the carrier is a State Party or any constituent part of a State. In furtherance of Art. 16 (1) to
(4), however, contracting Parties may provide that State carriers shall be dispensed from the obligation 
to cover their liability by insurance or other financial security.
C. The 1969 Civil Liability Convention
The Brussels Conference at which both the 1969 Intervention Convention and the Civil 
Liability Convention (hereinafter CLC) were negotiated, had before it the draft texts prepared by the 
IMCO Secretariat. The draft articles for the CLC contained a substantive exoneration clause for 
warships or other ships owned or operated by a State and used for the time being, only on government 
non-commercial service.152
This proposal elicited several comments and amendments revealing widely different views on 
the matter. With the support of other countries, Norway argued that the CLC should contain no such 
exception, asserting that the purpose of the convention - ensuring that adequate compensation would 
be available to persons who suffer damage caused by the escape of discharge of oil from ships - 
applied as much with regard to warships and State-owned ships as to merchant ships. Nevertheless, the 
Norwegian government was willing to consider an exception to the provisions on compulsory
1 4 8  Ibid., 563, fii. 118.
1 4 9  See infra, 6.2.6. C, intervention by Mr. Zhudro at the International Legal Conference on Marine Pollution Damage, 
1969.
1 5 0  Done at Geneva on 10 October 1989, ECE/TRANS/79, UN/ECE, Inland Transport Committee.
1 5 1 Art. 4 (a) excludes places to which the public has no access.
1 5 2 LEG/CONF/C.2/1,12 November 1969, Marine Pollution Damage Conference 1969,499, Draft Art. XI.
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insurance and jurisdiction, modelled on the compromise achieved at the 1962 NS Convention.153 
Similarly, the UK government commented that there was no justification for the exoneration proposed 
by IMCO, adding that these ships might need to be exempted from the provisions on jurisdiction. In 
any case, the UK did not think that the issue was likely to affect genuine warships since they did not 
cany oil in bulk as cargo.154
Japan and the US did not object to the IMCO proposal as such, but wished to add a special 
provision by which State parties would waive jurisdictional immunities with regard to State-owned or 
State operated ships used for commercial purposes.155
However, during the discussions in the conference committee, most delegations warned that 
there had been many difficulties in the past with subjecting warships to the substantive provisions of 
conventions. The declaration made by Mr. Zhudro of the Soviet delegation was characteristic for this 
school of reluctant States. He pointed out that State-owned ships were already exempted under several 
conventions; that it should be borne in mind that the prospective convention would necessarily be 
linked with the liability provisions of the 1957 and 1924 Conventions, neither of which applied to 
warships; that attempts to extend the provisions on the Liability of Operators of Nuclear Ships to 
warships and State-owned ships had led to the failure of the 1962 NS Convention, which not a single 
State had ratified, and that this unfortunate experience should not be repeated.156
The Norwegian amendment was subsequently rejected by 19 votes to 10 with 12 
abstentions.157 By contrast, there was a much clearer majority of delegates in favour of waiving 
sovereign immunity in regard to State-owned or State-operated ships used for commercial purposes. 
An amendment to that effect was carried with 28 to 6 with 7 abstentions, over strong objections by the 
USSR.158 The text (Art. XI) finally agreed on reads as follows:
‘(1) The provisions of this Convention shall not apply to warships or other ships owned or operated by a 
State and used, for the time being, only on Government non-commercial service;
(2) With respect to ships owned by a Contracting State and used for commercial purposes, each State 
shall be subject to suit in the jurisdictions set forth in Article IX and shall waive all defences based on its 
status as sovereign State.’
1 5 3  Ibid., 499, and LEG/CONF/C.2/SR.13,20 November 1969, ibid., 696.
1 5 4  LEG/CONF/C.2/1,12 November 1969, ibid., 500.
1 5 5  Ibid., 438 & 500 respectively.
1 5 6  LEG/CONF/C.2/SR. 13,20 November 1969, ibid., 696.
1 5 7  Ibid., 697.
158 Ibid., 700-1.
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D. The 1971 IOPC Fund Convention
As had been the case for the 1969 CLC, the IMO Secretariat proposed excluding coverage for 
oil pollution damage caused by warships from the IOPC Fund Convention.159 The proposal to 
exonerate the Fund from liability for damage caused by armed conflict or natural phenomena of an 
exceptional character was hotly debated at the conference.160 By contrast, the exemption provision 
relating to warships and other State-owned ships was accepted without discussion. The final provision 
(Article 4(2)) reads as follows:
‘The Fund shall incur no obligation under the preceding paragraph if: a) it proves that the pollution 
damage resulted from an act of war, hostilities, civil war or insurrection or was caused by oil which has 
escaped or been discharged from a warship or other ship owned or operated by a State and used, at the 
time of the incident, only on Government non-commercial service.’
Use of the terms ‘escape’ and ‘discharge’ clearly indicate that both accidental and non­
accidental releases are excluded from coverage when caused by these State-owned vessels.
E. The 1971 Convention on Maritime Carriage of Nuclear Material
This 1971 Convention does not contain an express exoneration clause for warships and other 
State-operated or State-owned ships. Yet, apart from arguments derived from general international 
law, there are several legal-technical reasons implied in the treaty itself pointing to such an exemption. 
As explained previously, the convention was concluded to unlock serious problems that had arisen for 
the maritime transport of nuclear material since the conclusion of the Paris Convention and Vienna 
Conventions. According to an OECD report on the matter, commercial transport of such material had 
virtually come to a standstill because of the indemnity coverage requested by the commercial carriers. 
Nuclear operators had to rely on transport by air, or wait instead for a warship to be made available.161 
Seen against this background - reflected in the preamble of the 1971 Convention - it is clear that the
1 5 9  LEG/CONF. 2/, draft Art. 4 (2) (a), IMCO-OJficial Records IOPC Conference 1971,51.
1 6 0  Supra, 4.2.2.
1 6 1 Supra, 4.2.3.
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latter was intended to deal with private, commercial transport of nuclear material and not with 
warships. Secondly, the wording of Art. 1 demonstrates that the provisions of the 1971 Convention 
should be interpreted in conjunction inter alia, with both the Paris and Vienna Conventions:
‘Any person who by virtue of an international convention or national law applicable in the field of
maritime transport might be held liable for damage caused by a nuclear incident... ’
Therefore, any defence under the established (civil) nuclear liability regimes will by analogy 
be available under the 1971 Convention as well. As was explained above, it is commonly assumed that 
neither the Paris nor the Vienna Conventions applied to military installations and activities. The two 
new instruments concluded in 1997 appear to have confirmed this and extended the exclusion to ‘dual- 
use’ installations.162
F. The 1996 HNS Convention
Almost two decades after it was first planned, the International Convention on Liability and 
Compensation for damage in connection with the carriage of Hazardous and Noxious Substances 
(HNS) by sea, was finally adopted in 1996 under IMO auspices. It was only at a very late stage, in 
1991, that the first proposals on State-owned ships surfaced within IMO’s Legal Committee.163 It 
would soon become clear that some delegations were of the view that sovereign immunity of State- 
owned ships was satisfactorily regulated by general international law and domestic law, whereas 
others thought that the HNS Convention could usefully contribute to achieve uniformity and 
consistency in this area.
The Committee’s first draft was strongly inspired by the civil liability regimes for oil pollution 
damage, and based on the relevant provisions of the 1969 CLC and 1971 Fund Conventions.164 These 
proposals were immediately criticised on several grounds. One delegation considered the provisions 
superfluous on the ground that it was adequately regulated by Art. 96 of 1982 UNCLOS. However, 
another delegation pointed out that the paragraph might still be of use in the case of States not party to 
1982 UNCLOS. Other delegations voiced their preference for the wording of Art. 4 of the 1989
1 6 2 Supra, 6.2.6. A.
1 6 3 The first draft text can be found in LEG 64/4,25 January 1991, agenda item 4.
1 6 4  The first exoneration provision was taken from the CLC Art. XI (1) and (2), the second from the IOPC Fund 
Convention Art. 4(2): see LEG 64/4,25 January 1991.
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Salvage Convention,165 claiming that this represented a more recent formulation of the sovereign 
immunity doctrine.166 Mexico insisted that the exoneration provision should be amended so as to 
include a recommendation to States ‘when reasonably possible’, to endeavour to ensure that such ships 
do not hinder the application of this convention.167
Discussion of the issue was resumed at the Legal Committee’s 66th session in March 1992, on 
the basis of alternative proposals tabled by the US and Mexico. The new texts were based on 
provisions borrowed from Art. 4 of the 1989 Salvage Convention and Art. 236 of 1982 UNCLOS. The 
draft was thoroughly amended and discussed during subsequent sessions at which it became clear that 
some delegations still held opposite views on the matter. Some regarded a detailed regulation of the 
matter desirable to promote uniformity and consistency on the matter of sovereign immunity in the 
field of maritime law, others claimed that the issue of a possible waiver of sovereign immunity was a 
matter of domestic law.168
After still more discussions,169 agreement was eventually reached within the Legal Committee 
on a version combining elements of three previous conventions: 1969 CLC, 1989 Salvage Convention 
and 1982 UNCLOS.170 This latest proposal formed the basis of the provision finally accepted by the 
1996 Conference. Art. 4 reads in relevant part as follows:
‘(4) Except as provided in paragraph 5, the provision of this Convention shall not apply to warships, 
naval auxiliary or other ships owned or operated by a State and used, for the time being, only on 
Government non-commercial service.
(5) A State Party may decide to apply the Convention to its warships or other vessels described in 
paragraph 4, in which case it shall notify the Secretary-General thereof specifying the terms and 
conditions of such application.
(6 ) With respect to ships owned by a State Party and used for commercial purposes, each State shall be
subject to suit in the jurisdictions set forth in article 38 and shall waive all defences based on its 
status as a sovereign State.’
The exemption clause for the ‘Fund’ part of the convention was never challenged, and covers 
accidental and non-accidental releases. Final Art. 14 (3) (a) exempts the Fund when it proves that:
‘... the damage was caused by hazardous and noxious substances which had escaped or been discharged
from a warship or other ship or owned or operated by a State and used, at the time of the incident, only
on Government non-commercial service’.
1 6 5 Infra, 6.2.8. C.
1 6 6  LEG 64/10,27 March 1991, Report of the Legal Committee, 64th session, 7, paras 37-38.
1 6 7  LEG 64/4/2,6 March 1991,5-6, and LEG 64/4/2/Corr.l, 19 March 1991, submission in regard to agenda item 4.
1 6 8  LEG 66/9,26 March 1992, Report, 12-3, paras 59-61.
1 6 9  LEG 67/3/6, 4 September 1992, Submission by Mexico and the US on sovereign immunity, 1 (discussion); 2 
(proposal); LEG 67/9,13 October 1992, Report of the Legal Committee, 67th session, 14, paras 66-69.
1 7 0  LEG 72/4,20 January 1995 and LEG 73/WP. 1,12 October 1995, Draft Report, 3, para 10.
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6.2.7. Intervention Series
•  International Convention Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases o f  Oil Pollution Damage, 1969
•  Protocol Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases o f  Marine Pollution by Substances other than Oil, 1973
A. The 1969 Intervention Convention
The 1969 Intervention Convention was adopted under IMCO auspices by the International 
Legal Conference on Marine Pollution Damage, 1969. This was held in the wake of the 1967 Torrey 
Canyon Disaster, in which a Liberian registered tanker stranded outside British territorial waters near 
the Stilly Isles, seriously polluting beaches in Cornwall, Devon, the Channel and Brittany. The UK 
took unprecedented action to protect its interest: it employed military aircraft which used rockets and 
napalm to bomb and destroy the vessel and to set fire to the oil, as well as naval forces who carried out 
extensive spraying of the oil slick with chemicals and by mechanical means.171
One of the main purposes of the 1969 Conference was to clarify the measures which coastal 
States may take in similar circumstances. Without passing direct judgement on the UK actions, the 
conference parties were able reach agreement on the conditions and modalities of the right of 
intervention by coastal States with respect to certain maritime casualties occurring on the high seas. In 
the case of a maritime casualty, defined in the Convention as:
‘...a collision of ships, stranding or incident of navigation, or other occurrence on board a ship or 
external to it resulting in material damage or imminent threat of material damage to a ship or cargo’ 1 7 2
State Parties to the 1969 Convention:
‘may take such measures on the high seas as may be necessary to prevent, mitigate or eliminate grave and 
imminent danger to their coastline or related interests from pollution or threat of pollution of the sea by 
oil. . . ’ 1 7 3
1 7 1 LEG/CONF/6,13 October 1969, Marine Pollution Damage Conference 1969, 48; LEG/CONF/Conf/3*, ibid., 200, 
observations by Singapore.
1 7 2  Art. II (1).
1 7 3 Art. I (1).
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Furthermore, the terms ‘related interests’ which a coastal State may take into account, include 
conservation of living marine resources and of wildlife.174
However, before taking the measures deemed necessary, and unless extreme urgency requires 
otherwise,175 the coastal State is obligated to notify and consult other affected States, including the flag 
State as well as independent experts drawn from an IMCO list.176 Furthermore, any measures taken by 
the coastal State will need to be proportionate to the damage actual or threatened to it, and may not go 
beyond what is reasonably necessary to achieve the purpose laid down in Art. I.177 Any Party which 
causes damage by contravening the provisions of the Convention is liable to pay compensation.178
The Conference parties had before it a draft text which was the outcome of almost two years 
of discussions within IMCO’s Legal Committee The resulting draft included in Art. I an explicit but 
partial waiver with respect to State-owned ships, as follows:
‘However, no measures shall be taken under this Convention against any warship or other ship owned or 
operated by a State and used for the time being only on government non-commercial service’ 1 7 9
This draft exemption clause was objected to on several grounds:
• Since the purpose of the convention was to deal with measures in case of (oil) pollution 
casualties, no ship should be allowed to escape the convention by a virtue of its special status 
or ownership;180
• A blanket prohibition to take measures against the ships mentioned in the clause would only 
be acceptable if the coastal State had an undisputed right of recourse to the flag State {quod 
wow);181
• In a Resolution on the subject adopted by the Institut at its session at Edinburgh on 12 
September 1969, all oil tankers had been excluded from an otherwise identically worded
7 4  Art. H (4).
7 5  Art. m  (d).
76 Art. HI (a), (b), (c ).
7 7  Art. V.
7 8  Art. VI.
7 9  LEG/CONF/Cont73*, September 1969, Marine Pollution Damage Conference 1969,195.
8 0  LEG/CONF/C.1/SR.6, ibid., 309-10, interventions by Cameroon, Ghana, Venezuela, Guatemala, Indonesia.
8 1 Ibid., p. 311, intervention by Cameroon.
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warship exemption clause;182 Ghana subsequently lodged an amendment with the IMCO 
conference in this sense;183
• Some delegations were dissatisfied with IMCO’s proposal to exempt certain State-owned 
ships in addition to warships. The Italian delegation considered it arbitrary and tabled an 
alternative proposal according to which no measures would be allowed ‘against any warship 
or other ship owned by a State and used to carry oil for military purposes’;184 Other 
intervenors also thought that the IMCO proposal seemed to place the burden of proof unfairly 
on the coastal State;185
• Norway regarded the draft clause as ambiguous, and proposed a separate article to exempt 
warships and other State-owned ships - used for the time being on government non­
commercial service - from the scope of the convention altogether;186
However, after extensive debate, none of the above views carried the day. The Norwegian 
proposal was not put to the vote, because it was felt that it might imply that warships could not be used 
to prevent or eliminate pollution of the sea.187 All other proposals were rejected by substantial 
majorities.188 The views held by majority can be summarised as follows:
• The USSR and other East block countries invoked general international law, which in their 
view left no room for doubt: warships could not be made subject to the jurisdiction of another 
State; furthermore, the proposal to exempt measures against State-owned ships used on non­
commercial service was similar to Art. 9 of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas. 
The USSR added that it ‘would be a political error to grant immunity exclusively to warships, 
since the conference would give the impression of favouring warlike interests’;189
8 2  LEG/CONF/C.1/SR.6, Marine Pollution Damage Conference 1969,310, intervention by Yugoslavia.
83 Ibid., 311.
8 4  LEG/CONF/C. 1/WP.4,14 November 1969, ibid., 250; LEG/CONF/C. 1 /SR.6 , ibid., 308-9.
8 5  Intervention by the Philippines & Greece, ibid., 309; Intervention by Syria, ibid., p. 310.
8 6  LEG/CONF/Con£3*, September 1969, ibid., 197-8,223.
8 7  LEG/CONF/C. 1/SR.6, ibid., p. 309.
88 Ibid., 311-12.
89 ibid., 309-11, interventions by the USSR, Bulgaria, Ukraine.
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• Sweden, Germany and Poland appealed to ‘realism’ and pointed out that all conventions 
made exceptions for warships and State-owned ships; and that hence many countries would 
oppose the deletion of the exemption;190
• Finally, the Chairman of IMO’s Legal Committee assured delegates that the proposed 
exemption was the outcome of two long years of thorough discussion and research, during 
which all legal aspects of the problem had been considered.191
The final provision (Art. 1(2)) reads in relevant part as follows:
‘However, no measure shall be taken under the present Convention against any warship or other ship 
owned or operated by a State and used, for the time being, only on government non-commercial 
services’.
B. The 1973 Protocol
The 1973 Protocol to the 1969 Intervention Convention, as its title indicates, was concluded to 
establish a right of intervention by coastal States for marine casualties on the high seas involving 
marine pollution by substances other than oil. It was adopted by the same international conference that 
led to the 1973 MARPOL Convention.192 On the question of warships and other State-owned ships, 
IMCO proposed that the Conference adopt the same solution as agreed in 1969 for oil pollution 
casualties.193 This proposal did not encounter any opposition. The relevant article was adopted by forty 
votes to none, with six abstentions.194
C. Conclusions Regarding the Intervention Series
From the views that prevailed during the preparation of the 1969 Conference, it is clear that 
the nature of the agreed exemption clause relates only to jurisdictional immunity. What the drafters of
1 9 0  Ibid., 310-311.
1 9 1 Ibid., 311.
1 9 2  International Conference on Marine Pollution, 1973.
1 9 3  MP/CONF/6 , 10 October 1973, International Conference on Marine Pollution, 1973, Note by the Secretariat, 11.
1 9 4  MP/CONF/SR.13,4 March 1974, inter alia, agenda item 8,25.
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the convention wanted to prevent at all cost was establishing a right of intervention or interference on 
the high seas by a coastal State with regard to vessels and property owned by a foreign State. Protests 
that this would be unfair to coastal States, especially since there was no general right of recourse to the 
flag State, fell on deaf ears. Another ‘progressive’ view that was aired but quickly dismissed during the 
conference was that pollution and environmental considerations should outweigh conservative 
misgivings based on sovereign immunity. Whether these views have undergone change in later IMO 
conventions will be examined below. On the other hand, it is now accepted that the right of 
intervention by coastal States beyond their territorial sea has become part of customary international 
law.195 The 1969 Convention has been widely ratified, and similar provisions can be found in Art. 221 
of 1982 UNCLOS and, as will be seen below, in the 1989 Salvage and the 1990 OPRC Conventions.196 
Moreover, there have been no serious disputes in practice involving coastal States’ rights of 
intervention.197
Finally, since the type of immunity agreed in the 1969 Convention and the 1973 Protocol is of 
a pure jurisdictional nature, it is impossible to draw conclusions on the fate of the convention and its
protocol during war/aimed conflict on the basis of the exemption clauses alone.
6.2.8. Salvage
• Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law relating to Assistance and Salvage at Sea, 1910
•  1926 International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules relating to the Immunity of State-owned Vessels, 
1926
• International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules relating to Assistance and Salvage of Aircraft or by 
Aircraft at Sea, 1938
• Montevideo Treaty on International Commercial Navigation Law, 1940
• Protocol to Amend the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law relating to Assistance and Salvage at 
Sea, 1967
• International Convention on Salvage, 1989
A. The 1910 Salvage Convention
On September 23, 1910 two conventions were signed in Brussels at a Conference convened 
under the auspices of the Comite: one establishing uniform provisions on rules relating to collisions,
1 9 5  Birdie & Boyle, op. cit., 286.
1 9 6  Infra, 6.2.8. C & 6.2.9.
1 9 7  Birnie & Boyle, op. cit., 288.
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the other relating to salvage. The initiative for a convention on salvage rules dated back from 1885, 
and was discussed at three international conferences before the final text could be agreed on.198
Pursuant to Art. 14, the Convention does not apply to ships of war and government ships 
appropriated exclusively to a public service. While there is little trace of any substantive discussion in 
the conference records, the exemption became the subject of divergent interpretations after the 
conclusion of the treaty. Although Art. 14 does not distinguish between salvage services rendered by 
or to the exempted categories of ships, it was suggested that the article would not exclude application 
of the convention to services rendered by warships.199
Such views were firmly rejected by Dutch commentator Wildeboer, on the following two 
grounds: 1) At the time the 1910 Convention was negotiated, the question of whether warships were 
entitled to salvage remuneration at all, was heavily debated amongst scholars; 2) Art. 14 reflects a 
simple truth: the convention was intended to regulate matters of private maritime law and not matters 
of public international law. In particular, Art. 14 does not state that no salvage awards can be obtained 
for services rendered to a ship belonging to the excluded categories, but neither does it state that such 
ships would not be entitled to a salvage reward for salvage services rendered.200 Wildeboer maintained 
that all that can be derived from Art. 14 is that no salvage award could be claimed for services 
rendered to or by the excluded categories of ships on the basis o f the convention. It was up to the 
domestic law of the contracting Parties to regulate instances involving public vessels. This account 
concurs with the comments made by a French writer.201
B. The 1967 Protocol
On May 27, 1967 a protocol amending the 1910 Convention was adopted at a Diplomatic 
Conference convened in Brussels at the initiative of the Comite. Its sole purpose was to introduce a 
new provision202 completely reversing Art. 14. In furtherance of the first paragraph of Art. 1 of the 
protocol, the 1910 Convention also applies to assistance or salvage services rendered to or by ships of 
war and other State-owned or State-operated ships. The second paragraph stipulates that claims for
1 9 8  Wildeboer, op. cit., 1.
1 9 9  Ibid., 27.
2 0 0  Ibid., 26-28.
2 0 1  Le Clere, L 'Assistance aux Navires et le Sauvetage des Epaves (1954), 52-3.
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salvage awards rendered to such ships shall only be brought in the courts of the State concerned, 
whereas according to the third paragraph, State parties have the right to determine to what extent the 
duty to render assistance laid down in Art. 11 of die main convention applies to the State-owned ships 
in question.
The reason for this striking reversal is that Art. 14 of the 1910 Convention had reportedly 
become outdated; by the 1960s, salvage rewards could be obtained in most countries for services 
rendered to the previously excluded categories of ships.203 This change was reflected in various 
international instruments concluded since the beginning of the centmy. In accordance with these, State 
parties agreed to waive their jurisdictional immunity in part, in regard to claims involving assistance 
and salvage services rendered to public ships.204
It is noteworthy that the 1967 Brussels Protocol differs from these instruments in that it also 
deals with the question of salvage services rendered by warships and other State-owned ships. This 
issue was addressed at the Comite’s Rijeka Conference in 1959, at which proposals for modification of 
Art. 14 were discussed.205 Subsequently, the conference passed a resolution on the matter which 
stipulates inter alia:
'When a ship of war or any other ship owned or operated by a State or a Public Authority has rendered 
assistance or salvage services, such State or Public Authority has liberty to claim remuneration but only 
pursuant to the provisions of the Convention.’
If such is the meaning underlying Art. 14, as amended by the 1967 protocol, it involves a 
significant change in the scope of the rules on sovereign immunity for State parties to the 1967 
protocol. Indeed, in addition to a (partial) waiver of their jurisdictional immunities in regard to salvage 
services rendered to State-owned ships, parties to the Protocol would thus undertake to subject their 
ships to the substantive rules of the treaty regarding salvage services and remuneration by such ships.
The last paragraph of Art. 1 of the 1967 protocol modifying Art. 14 of the 1910 Convention 
confirms the view expressed above;206 namely that Art. 11 on the duty of shipmasters to render 
assistance to all persons in danger at sea, even if they are enemies, does not allow for any conclusions 
on the application of the 1910 Convention between opposing belligerents in time of war. Indeed, the
2 0 2  Protocol, Art. 1.
2 0 3  Wildeboer, op. cit., 31.
2 0 4  1926 International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules relating to the Immunity of State-owned vessels, 
Art. 3, paras 1 (2) & 3; 1940 Montevideo Treaty on International Commercial Navigation Law, Arts 36 & 39.
2 0 5  Comite, Conference of Rijeka, Yugoslavia, 1959, discussed by Wildeboer, op. cit., 30-31.
2 0 6  Supra, 5.2.1. A.
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meaning of the last paragraph of Art. 1, can be traced to an alinea of the above mentioned Rijeka 
resolution which reads:
‘The High Contracting Parties reserve themselves the right of fixing the conditions in which A rt 11 will 
apply to Masters of ships of war’.
This phrase demonstrates that what A rt 11 was meant to address was the universal moral duty 
incumbent on any master of a ‘civilian ship’ to render assistance to persons in need, a duty which held 
good in times of war. Finally, it should be noted that the 1967 protocol has received only a moderate 
following. It took ten years to receive the required five instruments of ratification or accession 
necessary for its entry into force207 and has at present barely 10 State parties.208
C. The 1989 Salvage Convention
Following the 1978 Amoco Cadiz disaster, the subject of the shortcomings of the international 
law on salvage was placed on IMCO’s agenda at the insistence of France.209 In March 1979 the Comite 
offered to assist IMCO in the preparation of a new draft convention. The offer was accepted and the 
Comite adopted a draft at its 32nd Conference held in Montreal in 1981. The proposal was then 
submitted for consideration by EMCOs’ Legal Committee at its 46th session held the same year.210
The 1989 Convention differs from the 1910 Convention in many respects. One of these 
differences was already highlighted, namely the explicit incorporation of financial incentives to 
minimise or reduce environmental pollution into the salvage award.211 Furthermore, the 1910 
Convention regulates matters generally considered as belonging to the sphere of private maritime law, 
and is concerned only with the contractual relationships between the salvor, the master of the ship and 
the owner of the property. In contrast, the 1989 Convention is not only concerned with these 
relationships, but adds to the international law of salvage a substantial body of rights and duties that 
belong to the sphere of public international law. The most conspicuous innovations, apart from the
2 0 7  Art. 4(1); entered into force on 15 August 1977.
2 0 8  As of February 1994; Source: The Ratification of Maritime Conventions, Lloyd’s of London Press Ltd., vol. I.
2 0 9  LEG/CONF.7/11,31 January 1989, International Conference on Salvage, 1989, Observations by France.
2 1 0  LEG XL VI/5,17 July 1981, Report of the Comite on the question of salvage, p. 1.
2 1 1  Art. 13 (1) (b), and Art. 14; Supra, 5.2.1. B.
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above mentioned financial incentives, are the explicit duty of the salvor, master and the owner to 
exercise due care to prevent or minimise damage to the environment212 and the explicit recognition of 
the rights of coastal States ‘to take measures in accordance with generally recognised principles of 
international law to protect its coastline or related interests from pollution’, including the right to give 
instructions to the salvor.213
The conference records of the 1989 Convention are of particular interest for the evolution of 
the concept of immunity and its application to maritime conventions. During the preparatory work in 
IMO’s Legal Committee the provisions touching on sovereign immunity were extensively debated by 
government delegates. The ensuing declarations and the provisions of the treaty itself constitute in 
many respects among the most recent evidence of treaty practice and opinio juris on the subject.
The 1981 draft by the Comite which served as a basis for discussion by IMCO/IMO, followed 
the 1910 Convention in exempting from the scope of the convention:
‘...warships or other vessels owned or operated by a State and being used at the time of the salvage 
operations exclusively on governmental non-commercial services’ . 2 1 4
In its commentary to this provision the Comite noted that whilst such State-owned ships had 
been excluded from the 1910 Convention, the situation was reversed by the 1967 Brussels Protocol. 
However, the Comite felt that in view of the rather limited acceptance of the latter instrument, the new 
Convention should not deal with these issues, which should instead be left for separate regulation.215
The question of the status of warships and other State-owned vessels led to divergent views 
from the very moment that IMO’s Legal Committee commenced the in-depth study of the Comite’s 
draft. During its 52nd session in 1984, and subsequent sessions up to the 56*, several delegates argued 
that they saw no reason why these ships should not be subject to the ordinary rules on salvage, while 
others wanted to allow an option for States to apply the provisions of the draft if they saw fit. Still 
other delegates wanted to broaden the exemption to include government-owned non-commercial cargo 
as well. The Comite’s draft was also criticised for failing to distinguish between instances where State- 
owned ships rendered salvage services and those where salvage services were rendered to such ships, 
and for not dealing with the question of State-owned cargoes transported on commercial ships. Finally,
2 1 2  Art. 8(1) (b) and 8  (2) (c).
2 1 3  Art. 9.
2 1 4  Art. 1-2 (2), Comite draft Annexed to LEG XL VI/5,17 July 1981
2 1 5  LEG 52/4, 3 July 1984, Note by the Secretariat, Annex 2: Comite, Report to IMO on the draft international 
convention on salvage, 13.
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some delegates thought that the matter should be left out from the convention altogether, claiming that 
the question of immunity should either be dealt with by a special convention on the subject, or by the 
laws of the individual States. Others drew attention to the fact that the matter of sovereign immunity 
was being studied by the ILC.216
The first genuine alternatives to the Comite’s draft were proposed in 1986, during the 56th 
session of IMO’s Legal Committee, during which three alternatives were proposed. According to the 
first one, a State party may stipulate in its national legislation that the convention shall not apply to 
warships and other State-owned ships either for services rendered to such ships, or for services 
rendered by such ships. The State would be required to notify the depositary of such an exemption. 
According to the second alternative, a State party wishing to apply the convention to public ships 
would be required to so notify the depositary. In furtherance of a third alternative, the convention 
would contain a provision extending the scope of its application expressis verbis to salvage services 
rendered to warships and other enumerated State-owned ships, whilst States would have to notify the 
depositary should they wish to apply the convention to State-owned ships beyond that.217
Shortly thereafter, a further proposal was submitted to the Legal Committee’s 57th session, 
according to which the convention would not apply to ‘property owned, possessed, shipped or 
controlled by a State and not in use or intended for use for commercial purposes’.218 The US in 
particular warned that failure to specifically exclude governmental non-commercial cargo would have 
a significant impact upon traditional principles of sovereign immunity. She accepted that the 
application of the convention to government-owned commercial cargo was entirely appropriate, but 
argued that application to non-commercial cargo interfered with vital government functions, and 
would be inconsistent with current international and US national law.219
The report on the Legal Committee’s 57th session shows that most delegates were concerned 
that extending the scope of the convention automatically to warships and State-owned ships might 
encroach on the principle of sovereign immunity by subjecting these ships to all of the treaty’s 
provisions. There was a clear majority for the proposal to exempt warships and other State-owned or 
State-operated ships in principle from the convention, and to add a paragraph to the effect that States
2 1 6  LEG 52/9, 21 September 1984, Report of the Legal Committee, 52nd session, 9-10, paras 37 & 42; LEG 53/8, 3 
January 1985, Report of the Legal Committee, 53rd session, 11-12, paras 44-45; LEG 54/7, 26 April 1985, Report of 
the Legal Committee, 54* session, 12-13, paras 48-52.
2 1 7  LEG 56/9,21 April 1986, Report of the Legal Committee, 56th session, 5-7, paras 15-18.
2 1 8  LEG 57/3/Add.l, 15 May 1986, Note by the Secretariat, proposal for new para 2(f), 5.
2 1 9  LEG 57 /7 ,30 September 1986, US Submission, 1.
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that elect to waive this exemption shall so notify the depositary. On the other hand, the US proposal to 
exonerate in addition State-owned non-commercial cargo, ran into opposition on practical grounds. 
Many delegates argued that it would be very difficult for a salvor rendering assistance to a vessel to 
determine which of the cargoes on board fell within the scope of the exemption.220
During the Legal Committee’s 58* session, the above views were firmed up. Agreement was 
reached on the text of a new article (code-named ‘Y’) for inclusion among the final clauses of the 
convention.221 At the same session, delegates engaged also in an in-depth discussion of a revised US 
submission to exempt from the scope of the convention:
‘...property owned or shipped by a State for governmental and non-commercial purposes whether on 
board a vessel described in subparagraph (c) or a commercial vessel’.
However, the various misgivings among the Committee’s members on this issue could not be 
ironed out. Objections were voiced on practical grounds - the impossibility for a salvor to identify the 
cargo benefiting from immunity- and on legal-technical grounds: the term ‘property’ was considered 
as being too wide and deviating from the concept of State-owned cargo in the 1926 Brussels 
Convention; on the whole the number of exemptions from the salvage treaty would become too 
numerous.222
The International Conference on Salvage was convened in London, in April 1989. Two 
countries made further special submissions for consideration by the Conference. Germany (FRG) 
claimed that the above mentioned article ‘Y’ confused two elements of generally accepted principles 
of public international law. She argued that extending the Convention’s provisions to warships should 
either be entirely up to the national legislator without any obligation to notify this act, or that there 
should be a reservation clause combined with a duty of notification. However, the delegate indicated 
that Germany would be prepared to accept a provision like Art. 1 of the 1967 Brussels Protocol 
amending the 1910 Convention.223
The US submitted proposals for two new articles to the conference. The first related to the 
status of State-owned property/cargo on commercial vessels. In the text accompanying this submission 
the US explained at length that it was not concerned with the substantive issue, for it recognised that
2 2 0  LEG 57/12 of 7 November 1986, Report of the Legal Committee, 57th session, 22-23, paras 106-111, 24-25, paras 
118-123.
2 2 1  LEG/58/12 of 28 October 1987, Report of the Legal Committee, 58th session, 4-6, paras 15-22.
2 2 2  Ibid., 9-11, paras 44-53.
2 2 3  LEG/CONF.7/10,31 January 1989, Observations by FRG, 10, para 8 .
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government owners were obligated to pay for salvage services rendered in respect of such cargo, but 
that it wanted to ensure that the Convention would not be used ‘as a basis for abridging sovereign 
immunity principles’. The following new provision was proposed:
‘Unless die State owner consents, no provision of this Convention shall be used as a basis for the seizure, 
arrest or detention of cargoes owned by a State and entitled to sovereign immunity under accepted 
principles of international law, nor shall articles 4,2,17,18,19,21 and 22 apply to such cargoes.’
hi the eyes of its promoter, the text had two main advantages: it would reconcile the Salvage 
Convention with what it regarded as the ‘evolving nature’ of sovereign immunity and would also take 
the specific treaty obligations of State Parties to the 1926 Brussels Convention on the Immunity of 
State-owned Ships into account.224
The second proposal related to a new subject, the status of humanitarian cargoes donated by 
the State to private charities and shipped world-wide. There are cases in which the donating State does 
not hold title to such cargoes as a consequence of which they would not be covered by the sovereign 
immunity exemption. The US suggested that in cases where the donor State voluntarily undertakes to 
pay for salvage services in respect of such cargoes, a way should be found to avoid subjecting such 
cargoes to unnecessary delay. Its delegation therefore proposed an additional provision to this effect.225
During the conference the sovereign immunity issue raised much less controversy than was 
presaged by the preparatory work. First, the proposed article ‘ Y’ on State-owned vessels was accepted 
after provision was made for salvage operations controlled by public authorities.226 The US proposal in 
relation to humanitarian cargoes was well received, whilst the proposal on State-owned cargoes was 
debated by an informal working group.227
The text of the final provision relating to State-owned vessels (Art. 4), reads as follows:
‘(1) Without prejudice to article 5, this Convention shall not apply to warships or to other non­
commercial vessels owned or operated by a State and entitled, at the time of the salvage operations, to 
sovereign immunity under generally recognised principles of international law unless that State decides 
otherwise.
(2) Where a State Party decides to apply the Convention to its warships or other vessels described in 
paragraph 1, it shall notify the Secretary-General thereof specifying die terms and conditions of such 
application. ’ 2 2 8
2 2 4  LEG/CONF.7/13, 8  February 1989, Submission by the United States, 1-2.
2 2 5  Ibid., 3, Proposed Art. 25 bis.
2 2 6  LEG/CONF.7/CW/WP.10,18 April 1989, Proposal submitted by Spain, amendment to Art. 25.
2 2 7  LEG/CONF.7/CW/RD/5,25 April 1989, Consideration of draft Art. 25 on State-owned vessels, p. 2.
2 2 8  See too final text of Art. 5 on Salvage operations controlled by public authorities; Art. 25 on State-owned cargoes, 
Art. 26 on Humanitarian cargoes and LEG/CONF.7/CW/RD/8, 26 April 1989, which records the formal adoption of 
the relevant provisions.
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D. Evaluation
(1) The 1989 Convention entered into force on 14 July 1996. It has thus far attracted 25 States 
representing 27.67 % of world tonnage.229 Although it does not contain an express clause to that effect, 
there can be little doubt that it is meant to replace the whole of the 1910 Brussels Convention. This 
follows from the rules of general treaty law on successive conventions on the same subject230 but can 
also be substantiated with observations made during the Comite's preparatory work.231 This is 
confirmed by the title page of the Report and Commentary prepared by Comite.232
The above issue is important because conflicts between the rights and duties of States that are 
parties to two or more of the discussed international instruments on salvage, cannot be excluded.233 
Precisely the provisions on immunity of public vessels might conceivably be a source for conflicts, for 
they were treated differently in each of the instruments discussed.
(2) A second question is that of the nature of the exemptions related to immunity that were 
incorporated into the 1989 Convention. This has taken on added importance because of the 
convention’s environmental protection provisions. Thus far not a single State has taken advantage of 
the offer contained in A rt 4(2) and notified IMO of its desire to apply the provisions of the convention 
to its warships and other state-owned ships. Presumably therefore, the convention does not apply to the 
majority of the current Parties’ public vessels. But does this mean that masters of such ships, in case 
they are involved in salvage operations, are also exempted from the duty ‘to exercise due care to 
prevent or minimise damage to the environment’? 234
It is submitted that the answer to this question cannot be derived from the treaty itself, but 
should be sought in general public international law and the domestic laws of States, for the following 
reasons:
2 2 9  Source: IMO/Lloyd’s data as at 1 February 1998.
2 3 0  1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Art. 30, (3).
2 3 1  LEG 52/9,21 September 1984, Report of the Legal Committee,52nd session, 4, para 16.
2 3 2  Report to IMO on the draft international convention on salvage (...) ‘designed to replace the International 
Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law to (sic) Assistance and Salvage at Sea made in Brussels on 23 
September 1910.’
2 3 3  E.g., the UK is a party to all three Salvage Instruments.
2 3 4  Art. 1(1) b.
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• It was submitted that the better interpretation of the warships provision in the 1910 Convention 
was that the latter regulated provisions of private maritime law, and was not intended to deal with 
matters of public international law at all. Although the 1989 Convention covers matters of public 
international law in addition to contractual ones, the discussions held within the Comite, within 
IMO’s Legal Committee and during the 1989 Conference do not permit to conclude that the tenor 
and scope of the exemption relating to State-owned vessels would have changed. Obviously, this 
consideration leaves aside the reversal of the exemption by the 1967 Protocol, for that solution 
seems to have fallen out of international favour. Thus, the 1981 draft by the Comite and the 
commentaiy in relation to the proposed exemption relied entirely on the 1910 Convention, and 
advised against adopting the solution of the 1967 protocol. It is noteworthy too that the draft 
articles on Jurisdictional immunities of States and their Property, which were presented by the ILC 
to the UN General Assembly in 1991, confirm the general direction taken by the 1989 Salvage 
Convention: draft provisions Art. 16 (1) and Art. 16 (5) explicitly exempt warships and other 
State-owned vessels used for non-commercial purposes, in addition to ditto State-owned cargoes, 
from the proposed rules on proceedings in respect of salvage and other instances of marine 
emergency.
• The 1989 Convention deals in Art. 5 with ‘salvage operations controlled by public authorities’.
This article was proposed by the Comite and has been adopted without change by IMO. In its
commentaiy to the article the Comite explained the tenor of this article as follows:
‘The draft convention does not deal directly with questions related to salvage operations by or 
under the control o f public authorities, nor does it deal with the rights o f salvors to payment in such 
cases from the authority concerned. ’ 2 3 5
Since such salvage operations may involve State-owned vessels, although admittedly not always, 
the Comite's commentaiy is indicative of the fact that much like in 1905-1910, the drafters of the 
revised convention preferred to adopt a hands-off approach for issues related to public authority.
• Whenever the question of immunity came up during the context of the preparatoiy work of the 
1989 Convention, only jurisdictional aspects of immunity were addressed. This limitation of the 
scope of the discussed exemptions is also apparent from the subject matter of the other 
international instruments to which reference was made during the discussions - e.g., the 1926 
Brussels Convention and the work of the ELC.
2 3 5  LEG 52/4, 3 July 1984, Note by the Secretariat, Annex 2, Comite, Report to IMO on the draft international 
convention on salvage, 13.
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• The text of the provisions on State-owned cargoes and humanitarian cargoes itself, leaves no 
doubt about the limitation of the breadth of the exemptions: Arts. 25 and 26 only mention 
jurisdictional or procedural issues.
• It was seen above that the problem of ‘Humanitarian cargoes’ was presented as an issue related to 
the sovereign immunity of State vessels and State-owned cargoes. Although the protection 
afforded by Art. 26 resembles jurisdictional immunity, it should not be considered an addition to 
theory and practice of ‘sovereign immunity’. This it so because the State which donates the 
cargoes - as explained by the promoter of the article - does not always retain title to the property; 
furthermore, the prohibition contained in Art. 26 is far from unconditional: the cargoes cannot be 
seized ‘if such State has agreed to pay for salvage services rendered in respect of such 
humanitarian cargoes’. In other words, the article does not exclude litigation involving such 
cargoes.
(3) The next question that arises is how the above reflects on the status of the convention 
during armed conflict. Clearly, the 1989 Salvage Convention is an example of a treaty the drafters of 
which did not wish to be drawn on the issue of die application of the substantive provisions of the 
convention to public vessels.
Consequently, the exemption of warships in Art. 4(1) cannot be taken to imply that these 
vessels would not be under a duty to take due care to protect the environment when engaged in salvage 
operations. The extent of the environmental duties incumbent on such vessels would depend (1) on the 
domestic law of the State concerned; (2) on whether this State has made a notification in accordance 
with Art. 4(2) to the effect that it shall apply the provisions of the convention to its vessels; (3) on 
general international law. With respect to the latter it should be remembered that the incorporation of 
environmental provisions into the international law of salvage is of recent vintage, and that the 
convention itself entered into force for State parties by mid-1996 only. Therefore, it is rather unlikely 
that its environmental provisions would have reached customary law status.
It is nonetheless possible to draw some conclusions on the effect of the 1989 Salvage 
Convention during naval war. This will be done in the next chapter.
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6.2.9. The 1990 OPRC Convention
• International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Co-operation (OPRC Convention), 1990
As suggested earlier, the 1990 OPRC Convention occupies a special place in the context of 
this enquiiy.236 It was resorted to by IMO to deal with the aftermath of (an) oil spill(s) caused in the 
course of the 1990/91 Gulf War. Some of its provisions were implemented on a provisional basis in 
1991, well before it formally entered into force in 1995. Furthermore, as will be seen immediately 
below, part of the preparatory work for the convention was held during the Gulf War itself. Iraq 
invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990; the diplomatic conference leading to the OPRC Convention was 
held in November 1990 when the ‘Desert Shield’ operation took place, during which troops were 
deployed in preparation for the ‘Desert Storm’ phase of the Gulf War. The latter phase started on 
January 16/17, active combat was stopped on February 27, and the terms of a cease-fire were set by 
Security Council resolution 686 of March 2,1991. The reason why this time frame is important is that 
several of the principal ‘belligerents’ participated in the preparatory work for the Convention: e.g., the 
US, the UK, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait
The catalyst for the 1990 OPRC Convention was, once again, a genuine maritime incident. 
Following the March 1989 Exxon Valdez Disaster in Prince William Sound in Alaska,237 the IMO 
Assembly requested the Marine Environment Protection Committee (hereinafter MEPC) to:
‘...develop, fo r consideration at a corference, a draft international convention on oil pollution 
preparedness and response which would provide a framework fo r international co-operation for 
combating major oil pollution incidents taking into account the experience gained within existing 
regional arrangements on combating marine pollution . . . , 2 3 8
Subsequently, the MEPC established a Working Group which was instructed to prepare a 
draft for a convention.239 This was based on a proposal made earlier by the US, developed in informal 
consultations with experts from several IMO Member States, the EEC and the IMO Secretariat.240
2 3 6  Supra, 3.1.4.
2 3 7  Other disasters mentioned during the preparatory sessions were: Khark 5 (an accident with an Iranian Tanker near 
Morocco, 1989/90) and Porto Santo Island (1990): OPPR/PM/10,19 April 1990, Agenda item 3,2, para 5.
2 3 8  Res. A.674(16), 19 October 1989 on International Co-operation on Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response, 
adopted unanimously.
2 3 9  OPPR/PM/3, 19 March 1990, Agenda items 2, 3 and 4, with attached report of the Working Group on Preparations 
for the Conference, (MEPC 29/WP.17).
2 4 0  OPPR/PM/5, 23 March 1990, agenda items 2, 3, and 4; Extract from the Report of the MEPC 29th session, Note by 
the Secretariat, 2, para 13.3.
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The next stage was the convening of a Preparatory Meeting for the Conference on 
International Co-operation on Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response, which was held at IMO 
headquarters from 14-18 May 1990.241 This Preparatory Meeting reviewed the text of the draft 
convention, as well as the report prepared by the MEPC Working Group.242 The outcome of this 
meeting was a new draft for an ‘ International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness and 
Response’, as well as seven draft resolutions dealing inter alia, with an appeal for the early 
implementation of the Convention, and with the expansion of the scope of the Convention to 
Hazardous and Noxious Substances.243 During none of these preparatory stages, questions related to 
warships and other State-owned ships arose.
The Conference on International Co-operation on Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response 
was convened in London from 19 to 30 November 1990. It is worth observing that it was attended by 
the Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, the UK, the US, and many other countries that would form part of the Gulf 
War Coalition, in addition to Iran (but not Iraq).244 Only at this fairly advanced stage was the status of 
warships and other State-owned ships under the prospective convention brought up. As has been the 
case with so many other treaties, the initiative came again from the US delegation. She explained that 
her proposal was borrowed from MARPOL 73/78, giving the following justification:
‘The draft Convention calls upon Parties to impose certain requirements upon ships flying their 
respective flags. Such regulatory requirements are appropriately applied, pursuant to international 
agreements, to ships engaged in commercial service. However, it would be inconsistent with long­
standing international practice for an international convention to require the application o f such 
requirements to warships, naval auxiliaries, or other ships owned or operated by a State and used, for 
the time being, only on government non-commercial service. ’ 2 4 5
Apart from ‘long-standing international practice’, it might be that the impetus for the US 
proposal was inspired by the then on-going military build-up in the Persian/Arabian Gulf. But this is 
only an assumption, since there is no written evidence that the Persian Gulf situation was discussed 
during the November conference. In any event, the US proposal for the insertion of an immunity
241 OPPR/PM/15, 11 June 1990, Report of the Preparatory Meeting, held from 14-18 May 1990; The meeting was 
attended inter alia, by delegations of the following countries: (Iran, nor Iraq) but Bahrain, China, France, India, 
Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, USSR, US, UK, Sweden, Denmark.. .(ibid., 2).
242 Documents distributed as OPPR/PM/2 and OPPR/PM/3 respectively.
243 See Annexes 2 and 3 attached to OPPR/PM/15.
244 OPPR/CONF/INF. 1 of 26 November 1990.
245 OPPR/CONF/21 of 19 November 1990, Conference, Agenda item 6, Submission by the US, Annex.
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clause modelled on MARPOL 73/78, was adopted without much discussion.246 The final text can be 
found in Art. 1(3) of the Convention.
As for the scope of the immunity clause of the OPRC Convention, it is manifest that the State- 
owned ships in question are formally exempted from the substantive provisions of the Convention; this 
follows not only from the fact that the clause was borrowed in its entirety from MARPOL 73/78, but 
also from the commentaiy provided by its initiator, the US delegation. Consequently, what has been 
said above on the environmental implications of the MARPOL formula in general and during armed 
conflict in particular,247 applies mutatis mutandis to the OPRC Convention as well.
6.2.10. Wreck Removal
• Draft Convention on W reck Removal 1995
In the view of its advocates, the proposed international convention on wreck removal would 
enhance and complement the international law relating to maritime casualties by clarifying the duties 
of shipowners and States with respect to hazardous wrecks. Shipowners would not only be responsible 
for making a full report on casualties involving their ships in accordance with IMO guidelines, but 
would also be financially liable for locating, marking and removing the hazardous wrecks.248 The 
States whose interests are the most directly threatened by the wreck would be responsible for 
determining whether a hazard exists. Furthermore, the prospective convention would provide guidance 
for this determination through a non-exhaustive list of criteria encompassing considerations relating to 
the marine environment, public health and the economic interests of the coastal States.249
The 1995 draft submitted to IMO’s Legal Committee contains a proposal for an exoneration 
clause, identical to Art. 4(1) and (2) of the 1989 Salvage Convention.250 Its promoters have justified 
this provision citing grounds of general international law:
‘In accordance with customary international law (as reflected in Arts. 32, 95 and 96 of UNCLOS) the 
Convention would not apply to warships and other ships owned or operated by a State and used for non­
commercial purposes.’251
2 4 6  The only change was the substitution of the term ‘Convention’ for ‘Article’: OPPR/CONF/CW/RD/2,20 November 
1990.
2 4 7  Supra, 6.2.5. C, D.
2 4 8  Draft Arts. IV, VI, VH, V m .
2 4 9  Draft Art. V.
2 5 0  Proposed Art. HI (1) and (2), submitted by Germany, the Netherlands and the UK in 1995: see Draft text in Annex 
to LEG 73/11, 8  August 1995, Legal Committee, 73rd session, agenda item 11.
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One may conclude therefore that in accordance with this comment, Art. 4 of the 1989 
Convention and proposed Art. HI of the draft Convention on Wreck Removal constitute either a 
reflection or a special application of the general rule of international law on the substantive aspects of 
immunity of public vessels.
6.3. Conclusions to Chapter Six
1. The above examination has bome out that there exists a great diversity of exemption clauses for 
State property in maritime and other treaties. The differences relate not only to the wording of the 
clauses, but also to their meaning and scope, and in particular to the question of whether they offer 
only jurisdictional immunity or, in addition, immunity from the material provisions of the 
instruments. It would be impossible to formulate general conclusions, in particular regarding the 
relationship between armed conflict and these treaties. Nonetheless, the following trends can be 
discerned.
2. During the preparatory work for many maritime conventions, it was often argued that exempting 
warships and other State-owned ships was a sensible solution, in view of the principle of sovereign 
immunity. There can be little doubt that sovereign (jurisdictional) immunity of public vessels forms 
part of customary international law. However, whether this should be broadened to cover 
exemption from substantive provisions of maritime conventions is the subject of continuous debate. 
In addition, the above analysis has shown that international law on jurisdictional immunity itself is 
not immutable. Some of the treaty clauses discussed here have made a substantial contribution to 
general public international law by either confirming the accepted wisdom, or by producing a 
refined version of the pre-existing rules.
3. The above examination has also demonstrated that especially in the 1960s, many countries started 
to question the traditional wisdom that warships should be exempted automatically from 
compliance with maritime conventions. Most conspicuous in this regard were the discussions held 
during the following conferences: the 1962 ‘OP’ Conference to amend the 1954 OILPOL
2 5 1  LEG 73/11,2, para 10.
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Convention, the Brussels Conference leading to the 1962 NS Convention, the 1967 Brussels 
Conference of the Comite leading to the 1967 Protocol to the 1910 Salvage Convention, and the 
1969 Brussels IMCO Conference leading to the 1969 Intervention Convention and the 1969 CLC.
4. Although the principle of the exemption of warships was not seriously challenged as such, the 1973 
MARPOL Conference constitutes in a sense a watershed. It was seen that the compromise formula 
which was agreed during that conference has been widely copied by an impressive range of treaties 
and other international instruments, both within and outside IMCO/IMO context, and is used even 
in interpretative statements in regard to treaties dealing with other media than the marine 
environment. Crucially, the MARPOL formula was included in 1982 UNCLOS. As a result, one 
may conclude that it is now a rule of general public international law that States should apply 
appropriate rules and standards for the protection and preservation of the marine environment to 
public vessels ‘in so far as reasonable and practicable’, and ‘without impairing their operations or 
operational capabilities’. It was seen too that the entire military sector is increasingly required to 
comply with domestic environmental legislation, at least in peacetime.
5. When the groundwork was laid for the 1989 Salvage Convention, the issue of immunity of 
warships, of other State-owned ships and ditto cargo was again subjected to a thorough review by 
delegations of various countries. The outcome of this was, at a minimum, the addition of a nuance 
to and a change of tone of the classic exemption clause. Whereas under the MARPOL formula, 
Parties undertake to apply equivalent standards to State-owned ships, they are not required to report 
such measures to the depositary or other State parties. Under the formula of the 1989 Salvage 
Convention, States are explicitly offered the opportunity to apply the Convention to ships which 
are normally exempted. In addition, States that wish to take this course need to inform the 
depositary of this fact. Since the new Salvage Convention entered into force in 1996, it is too early 
to tell whether the new formula represents not only a development of the doctrine, but whether it 
will be widely accepted as a new (treaty) norm. Already, the record seems mixed. It is true that the 
1989 ‘Salvage formula’ has been used in the texts of two other IMO conventions: in the HNS 
Convention, adopted in 1996, and in the recently tabled draft convention on Wreck Removal. On 
the other hand, none of the States that have thus far ratified the 1989 Salvage Convention, have 
made use of the offer to apply its provisions to the State-owned ships in question. Furthermore, the 
immunity clause incorporated into the 1990 OPRC Convention follows the MARPOL Convention 
and not the Salvage Convention. The 1992 OSPAR Convention, replacing the 1972 Oslo Regional
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Dumping Convention, includes a reference to mere jurisdictional immunity. Finally, it was seen 
above that in response to criticism on the exemption of public vessels, the most recent protocol to 
the London (Dumping) Convention, concluded in 1996, clarifies that States may in derogation of 
the general principle, elect to apply the substantive provisions of the protocol to public vessels 
without, however, waiving their right to jurisdictional immunity in this regard. Although not 
entirely identical, this resembles the solution chosen in the 1989 Salvage Convention.
6. The effect of the exoneration clauses on the status of the treaty during war/armed conflict and other 
types of hostilities was discussed above for each of the conventions under consideration. The first 
general rule that can be distilled is that an exoneration clause - e.g., the 1989 Salvage Convention 
or the 1992 OSPAR Convention - which deals only with jurisdictional immunities, is not in itself a 
good indicator of the status of the convention during war, armed conflict or other types of 
hostilities. On the other hand, there are exoneration clauses that genuinely affect the substantive 
obligations under the convention. If the wording of the exoneration clause exempts warships and 
similar vessels or objects from the substantive provisions of the treaty altogether - e.g., the 1969 
CLC - the logical conclusion is that this exemption remains valid in the event of the outbreak of 
war, armed conflict, or other types of hostilities. However, if the exoneration clause is tempered in 
the treaty itself by a mitigation clause, the conclusion might be different. The upshot of the relevant 
provisions of MARPOL 73/78 is that State parties would not be justified in exempting warships 
ipso facto from complying with the substance of the provisions of the convention or of comparable 
domestic provisions; this is a fortiori the case with the international COLREGS, which States are 
required to apply to the maximum extent possible, to warships and other public vessels. The above 
analysis has shown that while the vessels at issue are normally subject to the substance of the 
provisions of these conventions, State parties may decide to suspend some of these in the event of 
war, armed conflict or other types of hostilities. Still, as was the case with the contingency clauses 
that were discussed in the previous chapter, the drafters of these immunity clauses intended to 
provide pragmatic solutions, and were evidently unconcerned by the intricacies of the new jus ad 
bellum under the Charter.
□ □□
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Chapter Seven 
Conclusions on the Relationship between Maritime Treaties and Naval 
War
The aim of this chapter is to make a final assessment of the relationship between armed 
conflict and the treaties reviewed in this study. To this end, the conclusions reached in the previous 
chapters will be collated and evaluated together with other relevant information. The conventions that 
will be examined in this chapter have been grouped around the following themes: 1) Conventions 
dealing with Safety Aspects and Navigation; 2) (Civil) Liability Conventions; 3) Conventions on 
Prevention of Oil Pollution and other forms of Marine Pollution; 4) Conventions dealing with 
Maritime Emergencies.
7.1. Conventions dealing with Safety Aspects and Navigation
7.1.1. The 1966 Load Lines Convention
The 1966 International Convention on Load Lines has proven of special interest to this study. 
It was in response to past State practice that its drafters agreed on an express provision (Art. 31) 
dealing with armed conflict. Pursuant to this clause, any contracting Party, irrespective of its position 
in the armed conflict may unilaterally decide to suspend the operation of the whole of the convention 
or a part of it. As discussed earlier, armed conflict has been broadly defined by the convention as 
‘hostilities’ or other ‘extraordinary circumstances’ affecting the ‘vital interests’ of the State party 
contemplating suspension.1 In addition, the means of recourse or protest of other Parties under the 
convention are limited: apart from a mere procedural right to be informed of the suspension and its
1 Supra, 5.2.2. B.
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termination, third Parties cannot be deprived of their right of control granted by the convention to port 
States. Any disagreement on the application of Art. 31 will need to be solved via diplomatic channels, 
although one can never exclude judicial review.
Furthermore, following Art. 5(1), warships are exempted from complying with the substantive 
rules established by the treaty; but unlike the exoneration clause of MARPOL 73/78, the 1966 Load 
Lines Convention does not require State parties to apply equivalent domestic provisions to their public 
vessels. Evidently, this exemption of warships in peacetime will stand should the emergency 
conditions defined in Art. 31 materialise.
7.1.2. The 1972 International Collision Regulations
The International Collision Regulations (‘COLREGS’) were singled out in the previous 
chapter because of their explicit incorporation of provisions applicable to State ships, including 
warships and minesweepers. However, the wording of Rule 1(e) of the 1972 Convention, as well as 
the complementary treaty practice of the Incidents at Sea (‘INSCEA’) agreements demonstrate that the 
application of COLREGS to State ships may be less straightforward in conditions other than times of 
peace. It was argued on the basis of the two elements just mentioned, that States are entitled to suspend 
part of the COLREGS applicable to warships, in case of armed conflict, at least in so far as relations 
with opposing belligerents are concerned.
One may venture to suggest that since the COLREGS are an expression of the rules of good 
seamanship, belligerent States would not be justified in ignoring these ‘rules of the road’ in their 
relations with States not involved in the conflict. Ignoring such widely accepted standards would be a 
self-defeating attitude: it would raise questions of State responsibility and might possibly lead to a 
broadening of the geographical scope of the hostilities.
In similar vein, there would normally be no reason why genuine merchant vessels would not 
continue to be bound by the COLREGS in the event of the outbreak of armed conflict. Usually, 
merchant vessels steer well clear of war zones at sea, and furthermore, the 1972 COLREGS 
Convention provides for special circumstances at sea: Rule 2 (a) on Responsibility refers to the 
requirements of ‘the ordinary practice of seamen’, and of the ‘special circumstances of the case’. This
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wording is flexible enough to include emergencies such as war, armed conflict or other type of 
hostilities.
7.1.3. The 1974 Safety o f Life a t Sea Convention (SOLAS)
In Chapter Five, much attention has been paid to the Safety Conferences of 1948 and 1960, 
during which contingency clauses on armed conflict were accepted after thorough debates among State 
delegates.2 First, there is unequivocal evidence that several Parties had unilaterally suspended (parts 
of) the 1929 Safety Convention during the second World War. This was acknowledged by the 1948 
Conference in two ways. According to a special contingency clause - Art. VI - any Party would in case 
of war, irrespective of its position in the conflict, be allowed to suspend part or whole of the Safety 
Regulations. As with the 1966 Load Lines Convention, the right of recourse or protest of other Parties 
under the convention was limited to a procedural right to be informed of the suspension and its 
termination, and to the preservation of their rights of control under the convention. The second 
element pointing to the effect of war on the Safety Convention and its Regulations, came with the 
adoption of Resolution 1, according to which State parties were granted a temporary waiver to deal 
with ‘the situation created by the second World War’.
After much debate, the 1960 Safety Conference accepted a proposal not only to retain the 
suspension clause in the main part of the Convention, but to broaden the circumstances in which 
suspension might be justified from ‘ war’ to ‘war or other hostilities’.
In view of this legacy, the move to drop the contingency clause from the 1974 SOLAS 
Convention comes as a surprise, the more so since the deletion aroused apparently very little official 
comment. It was submitted that the deletion of the special suspension clause should not be equated 
with an abrogation of the right for State parties to resort to suspension. As demonstrated by the travaux 
preparatoires of many of the conventions discussed in Chapter Five, there is evidence of State practice 
and opinio juris pointing to the existence of such a right under general international law: i.e., States 
may under certain emergency conditions as the outbreak of war, armed conflict, or other types of 
hostilities, suspend part or whole of the operation of maritime conventions by virtue of general 
international law, irrespective of whether this has been explicitly recorded in the convention or not. 
The incorporation of the contingency clauses into the 1948 and 1960 Safety Conventions had been
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preceded each time by extensive and often passionate debates. Hence, if it had been the intention of 
the 1974 SOLAS Conference to abohsh the right to resort to suspension in such circumstances, one 
would expect that this would have been reported in a much more explicit way.
Finally, according to Regulation 3 of the General Provisions, the 1974 SOLAS Regulations do 
not apply to ships of war nor to troopships, ‘unless expressly provided otherwise’. No such explicit 
provision has been adopted. Since this clause affects the substance of the Regulations, there can be no 
doubt that warships and troopships are a fortiori, exempted from the 1974 SOLAS Convention in case 
of war, armed conflict or other type of hostilities.
7.2. Maritime (Civil) Liability Conventions
•  The 1962 Nuclear Ships Convention (NS Convention)
•  The 1969 Civil Liability Convention (CLC)
•  The 1971 Fund Convention
•  The 1971 Convention on M aritime Carriage o f Nuclear Material
•  The 1996 Hazardous and Noxious Substances Convention (HNS Convention)
It was seen in Chapter Four that exclusion of war damage has become a standard clause in all 
civil liability conventions,3 and that it is implied in the 1971 Convention on Maritime Carriage of 
Nuclear Material. The wording of each of the reviewed war damage clauses unambiguously excludes 
coverage of marine pollution caused by practically all types of armed conflicts: acts of war, hostilities, 
civil war, insurrection. This is barely mitigated by the fact that the burden of proof of such 
circumstances lies with the person, the company or the fund to which the main liability has been 
channelled.
All of the reviewed civil liability conventions contain, in addition, an express provision 
excluding application of the substantive rules to warships or other naval vessels. The only exception is 
the 1962 NS Convention, but it was seen that it is precisely because of the explicit inclusion of 
warships that this treaty is not yet in force. In addition, the discussions held during the preparation of
2 Supra, 5.2.3. C & D.
3 Supra, 4.3 and 4.2.3.
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the 1969 CLC for example, clarify that it was the drafters’ intention to exclude claims for war damage 
regardless of the status of the victim (belligerent or neutral).
The inevitable conclusion is that the reviewed liability conventions do not apply to 
circumstance of war, armed conflict or other types of hostilities, such as civil war and insurrection.
7.3. Prevention of Oil Pollution and other Forms of Marine Pollution
•  The 1954 OILPOL Convention
•  The 1972 Oslo Dumping Convention
•  The 1972 London Dumping Convention
•  The M ARPOL 73/78 Convention
The 1954 Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Seas by Oil, as amended by the 
1962 ‘OP’ Conference, contains an explicit provision (Art. XIX) that allows any State party, 
regardless of its status in relation to the conflict, to suspend any part or even the whole of the treaty, if 
it ‘considers that it is affected’ by ‘war or other hostilities’. As was the case under the 1948 and 1960 
Safety Conventions, and still is the case under the 1966 Load Lines Convention, the suspending 
Government is under a procedural duty to notify the depositary of the Convention of its actions under 
Art. XIX. Unlike the other conventions just mentioned, the wording of 1954 OILPOL suspension 
clause, however, does not include a reference to any rights retained by other Contracting Parties in 
case suspension is resorted to under these circumstances.
As discussed earlier,4 while this suspension clause was not challenged at all during the 1962 
OP conference, it has not been incorporated into MARPOL 73/78, which was intended to supersede 
the 1954 OILPOL Convention. What has been said above in relation to the deletion of the suspension 
clause by the 1974 SOLAS Convention applies mutatis mutandis in this case. It was submitted that the 
non-incorporation of the suspension clause in MARPOL 73/78 cannot be interpreted as an abolition of 
the right to suspend part or whole of the operation of its provisions in circumstances of war, armed 
conflict, or other types of hostilities. There is no indication that the 1973 MARPOL Conference
4  Supra, 5.2.4. A.
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intended to restrict or abolish the customary right of States parties to resort to suspension of some or 
all of the provisions in case of armed conflict
Finally, warships and other State ships are in principle exempted from complying with the 
substantive provisions of both the OILPOL and the MARPOL Conventions, although State parties are 
to varying degrees expected to apply equivalent measures ‘in so far as reasonable and practicable’, to 
the exempted categories. In the case of MARPOL 73/78, however, this application should not impair 
‘the operations or operational capabilities’ of such ships. Apart from the limitations inherent in this 
qualifying terminology itself, an analysis of the implementing legislation for the US military sector 
confirms that the application of the mitigating factors is subject to conditions of peace.
It was shown earlier that whilst the Oslo and London Dumping Conventions contain different 
immunity clauses, the MARPOL formula for the exoneration of State ships has been widely copied not 
only in other maritime conventions but also in conventions dealing with other media.5 The latter can 
therefore be considered reflective of customary international law. In addition, some commentators 
believe that there are strong grounds for treating MARPOL 73/78 as a customary standard to be 
complied with by the vessels of all states, whether or not they have chosen to ratify.6
7.4. Conventions dealing with Maritime Emergencies
7.4.1. The 1969 Intervention Convention and the 1989 Salvage Convention
It was submitted in the previous chapter that it proves impossible to determine the legal effect 
of either treaty during armed conflict.7 One reason is that the only treaty clauses with a bearing on 
armed conflict deal with classic sovereign immunity and hence concern only jurisdictional aspects: 
Art. 1(2) of the 1969 Convention and Arts. 4, 25 and 26 of the 1989 Salvage Convention. Another 
reason is that there is no trace in the travaux preparatoires of any discussion of the effect of armed 
conflict on the treaties in question.
5 Supra, 6.2.5. B.
6  Bimie & Boyle, op. cit., 267.
7  Supra, 6.2.7,6.2.8.
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Despite the foregoing, one may venture to suggest the following regarding the status of the 
1989 Salvage Convention in times of armed conflict. It will be remembered that there is case law 
indicating that the 1910 Salvage Convention was applied or at least considered to be applicable 
between mutually friendly countries during the second World War.8 It was also seen that Art. 14 of the 
1910 Convention refers explicitly to a duty incumbent on the shipmaster to render assistance to 
persons in need, even to enemy nationals. It was submitted that this article indicates that the 
Convention as a whole, apart from the preceding moral duty, was not applicable between opposing 
belligerent States. Building on the foregoing, one could make the following - admittedly obvious and 
‘soft’ law - deductions with respect to the effect of armed conflict on the execution of the 1989 
Convention:
(1) Presumably, between opposing belligerents that are at the same time party to the 1989 treaty, 
the latter may become inoperative or irrelevant for the duration of the armed conflict;
(2) However, nothing prevents the treaty from being applied between State parties not involved in 
the armed conflict;
(3) The treaty may even be applicable between a State party to a conflict and a Party not involved 
in the conflict;
(4) The incorporation of a provision on Humanitarian cargoes in Art. 26 of the Salvage 
Convention demonstrates at the very least that the drafters of the treaty did not assume that the 
outbreak of armed conflict would engender any automatic ‘cut-off1 effects on the execution of 
the treaty.9
As for the 1969 Intervention Convention, it will be remembered that the main pre-occupation 
of the drafters of the immunity clause was to avoid at all cost acknowledging a right of interference by 
coastal States on the high seas vis-a-vis warships and other vessels owned or operated by a foreign 
State.10
While circumstances of both international and internal armed conflict were discussed at 
length in the context of the 1969 CLC’s ‘war damage exclusion clause’,11 the matter was not touched 
on at all in relation to the draft articles on Intervention. Still, it could be argued that the fact that both
8 Supra, 5.2.1. A.
9  For the adjective ‘Humanitarian’ has a definite connotation with die term ‘armed conflict’.
1 0 Supra, 6.2.7.
11 Supra, 4.2.2.
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conventions were adopted by the same conference indicates that if circumstances of armed conflict 
were excluded from the scope of the CLC, the same should hold true for the Intervention Convention. 
However, such an inference is open to challenge on several grounds. A major objection is that the 
1969 CLC and the 1969 Intervention Convention deal with two entirely distinct matters. During the 
1969 Brussels Convention, the draft for the civil liability convention was thought of as dealing with 
the question of (private) civil liability of shipowners, whereas the draft Convention on Intervention 
was meant to deal with matters of public international law. A second problem is that any 
contemporaneous interpretation based on observations made during the travaux preparatoires is of 
doubtful value in view of the plain meaning of the texts: the fact remains that war damage is explicitly 
excluded from the 1969 CLC, but that circumstances of war or armed conflict are not mentioned at all 
in the 1969 Intervention Convention.
Building on the foregoing, it cannot be ruled out that the definition of maritime casualty, 
defined in Art. II (1) of the latter convention as:
‘. . . a  collision of ships, stranding or incident of navigation, or other occurrence on board a ship or
external to it resulting in material damage or imminent threat of material damage to a ship or cargo’
could encompass incidents caused by belligerents in the course of armed conflict Indeed, the purpose 
of this convention is to establish and regulate the right of coastal States to intervene on the high seas in 
order (Art. 1(1)):
‘... to prevent mitigate or eliminate grave and imminent dangers to their coastline or related interests’
caused by maritime casualties. From the point of view of the threatened coastal State the exact 
circumstances in which such casualties occur make little difference. Yet, in spite of its common-sense 
appeal, the validity of this deduction remains uncertain. The negotiating history of many maritime 
conventions shows that advocates of common-sense arguments favouring the interests of the victims, 
invariably lost out to proponents of conservative views on issues such as armed conflict and the 
immunity of warships. For instance, it will be recalled that during the 1969 Brussels Conference a 
proposal to exclude all oil tankers from the exemption provisions, irrespective of their status or 
ownership, was rejected on grounds of ‘sovereign’ immunity.12
On the whole, the effect of armed conflict on the 1969 Intervention Convention remains 
uncertain. If one considers the 1969 Intervention Convention on its own, one might conclude that the
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taking of measures by a coastal State against a foreign nation’s warships under the convention remains 
forbidden, regardless of whether the nations involved are at peace or whether one or more is involved 
in armed conflict On the other hand, there is no recorded evidence pointing either to the application or 
the non-application of the convention with respect to ‘civilian’ ships between State parties during the 
course of an armed conflict. Any conclusions to that effect remain purely speculative.
7.4.2. The 1990 OPRC Convention
At first sight, the 1990 OPRC Convention poses the same dilemma as the 1969 Intervention 
and 1989 Salvage Conventions: the only clause that might have an apparent bearing on armed conflict 
is Art. 1(3), under which warships and other State-owned ships are exempted from the scope of the 
Convention. Yet, the 1990 OPRC Convention presents a different case altogether. First, the 
exoneration clause of Art. 1(3) deals with the substance of the provisions of the convention, and goes 
beyond preserving mere jurisdictional immunities. This means for instance, that warships are not 
under as strict an obligation as civilian ships to carry the shipboard oil pollution emergency plans 
described in Art. 3 of the Convention. Furthermore, warships are not under the same firm obligation to 
comply with the oil pollution reporting procedures dealt with in Art. 4 of the Convention.
As was mentioned earlier, the immunity clause of Art. 1(3) was inserted at the request of the 
US delegation, who borrowed the text from MARPOL 73/78.13 Hence the conclusions that were 
reached for the MARPOL formula, apply mutatis mutandis to the OPRC Convention: i.e., during 
armed conflict the obligation of States to apply equivalent provisions to the exempted categories of 
ships, is probably non-existent.
Secondly, a more striking difference between the other conventions on maritime casualties 
and the OPRC Convention is that the latter was applied even prior to its entry into force, in connection 
with the oil spill(s) that occurred during the 1990/91 Gulf conflict. The genesis of the Gulf War oil 
spill(s)14 and the negotiating history of the OPRC Convention15 were described earlier. An indication 
was also given of the chronology of the events of the 1990/91 Gw/fconflict, putting the salient steps in
1 2 Supra, 6.2.7. A; Bimie & Boyle, op. cit., 287 argue that the prohibition to take measures against warships under the 
convention would nevertheless have to cede in case of ‘necessity’.
13 Supra, 6.2.9.
1 4 Supra, 2.1,3.1.4.
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the preparation of the OPRC Convention in historic relief. It was noted that the final diplomatic 
conference was held in November 1990, during the ‘Desert Shield’ phase of the conflict, and that 
many of the Governments represented were either already involved in the conflict or would shortly 
form part of the ‘Desert Storm’ coalition.16 Yet, there is no recorded evidence in the conference 
records that circumstances such as war and armed conflict were taken into consideration by the 
drafters.
Considered in isolation, the definition of ‘oil pollution incident’ adopted by the OPRC 
Conference could technically cover both accidental - non-war related - disasters as well as spills 
deliberately caused during armed conflict:
Art. 2(2): ‘Oil pollution incident’ means an occurrence or series of occurrences having the same origin, 
which results or may result in a discharge of oil, and which poses or may pose a threat to the marine 
environment, or to the coastline or related interests of one or more States, and which requires emergency 
action or other immediate response.’
Yet, there are plenty of indications that during the preparatory stages of the OPRC 
Convention only peaceful and not deliberate wartime spills were thought of:
• The impetus and catalyst for drafting of the convention was the 1989 Exxon Valdez disaster that 
occurred entirely in peacetime;
• During the preparatory stages of the OPRC Convention reference was often made to the 1969 CLC 
and the 1971 IOPC Fund Convention. The possibility of pre-financing or coverage by the latter 
fund of the cost of actions dealing with pollution or threat of pollution was thoroughly examined,17 
and it was decided eventually, to include references to both conventions in the preamble to the 
OPRC Convention. The point here is that the 1969 CLC and the 1971 IOPC Fund Conventions 
explicitly exclude coverage for damage caused during armed conflicts;
• Similarly, the question whether only ‘oil pollution’ incidents should be covered or whether the 
prospective convention should also deal with ‘hazardous and noxious substances’ (hereinafter 
‘HNS’), was contentious during the preparatory stages of the OPRC Convention.18 Eventually, a 
compromise was reached under which HNS substances would be left out from the convention,
15 Supra, 6.2.9.
1 6 Amongst others: Kuwait, US, UK, Saudi Arabia.
1 7  OPPR/PM/14,30 April 1990, Prep. Meeting, Agenda item 2.
1 8 OPPR/PM/3, 19 March 1990, Agenda items 2, 3 and 4, with attached Report of the Working Group on Preparations 
for the Conference, (MEPC 29/WP.17), Annex 1,2, para 8 ,4, para 15 and Annex 2 with compromise resolution.
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whilst a special resolution would be adopted on the subject (Resolution 10) urging IMO and State 
parties to expand the scope of the convention to HNS.19 It is noteworthy that the 1996 HNS 
Convention excludes war damage;20
• What is more, the resolution adopted by the OPRC conference on the HNS question mentions only 
accidental discharges. Its third preambular paragraph reads:
‘Recognising that pollution of the sea by accidental discharge of hazardous and noxious substances into
the waters may threaten the marine environment and the interests of coastal States.. (italics added)
The latter point needs to be addressed in more detail. The HNS resolution was proposed early 
on by a Working Group. In the accompanying commentaiy, it was noted that some delegations were of 
the view that the Convention should apply to HNS substances and that the proposed resolution was a 
compromise intended to form ‘a package with the Convention’, to be considered ‘by the Conference in 
conjunction therewith’21
In view of the foregoing one can only conclude that the OPRC Convention was intended for 
non-accidental oil spills such as the 1991 Gulf War oil spill. This was confirmed later by the Secretary- 
General of IMO:
‘Delegates to the November Conference had been thinking o f  an accidental disaster, such as spillage 
22from  a tanker. . . ’
Because of this negotiating history, the resort to its mechanisms in connection with the 
1990/91 Gulf War appears all the more remarkable. Nonetheless, it would be wrong to conclude on the 
basis of this single precedent, that the OPRC Convention could be applied unreservedly during aimed 
conflict in the future. A close scrutiny reveals that there are serious constraints on the application of 
the convention machineiy during armed conflict.
• It is noteworthy that the early implementation of the OPRC machineiy was already envisaged 
before the oil spill became known. Indeed, the November Conference adopted a resolution (No. 2) 
calling for the early implementation of the Convention pending its entry into force,23 and another
19 Conference Resolution 10,30ILM (1991), 760.
20 Supra, 4.2.4.
21 OPPR/PM/3,19 March 1990, Annex 2,2.
22 IMO News (1991), No 1., 1
23 Conference Resolution 2, 30 ILM(1991), 753.
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resolution (No. 3) on the early implementation of Art. 12 of the Convention.24 The latter article 
deals with institutional arrangements and outlines the tasks and responsibilities given to IMO, 
whilst resolution 3 calls upon the Secretaiy-General of IMO to initiate the early implementation of 
the article in question.
• Unlike in the 1983 Nowruz oil spill, the 1991 oil slick had affected regions largely outside the 
zones of active combat. Even if the opposing belligerent (Iraq) would have wished to, she would 
probably have been unable to prevent the initial relief and remediation efforts undertaken by other 
States.
• Nevertheless, it is important to note that most of the international relief effort could only take place 
after the cessation of hostilities, and that the activities of IMO under the OPRC Convention were 
no exception to this. Operation Desert Storm commenced on 16/17 January 1991 with large-scale 
air and missile attacks, and the Coalition ground offensive was started on 24 February 1991. 
Kuwait was liberated and all fighting was ceased on 27 February 1991. The first reports of the Gulf 
War oil spill reached the outside world by the end of January 1991, and shortly thereafter, IMO 
began receiving offers of assistance to the country that was seemingly worst affected, Saudi 
Arabia.25 As mentioned earlier, the impacts of the oil spill(s) on the coastal and marine 
environments were most severe along the Saudi Arabian coast, with lesser effects for the Kuwaiti, 
Iraqi and Iranian coasts.26 During the hostilities, local teams in Saudi Arabia managed to save 
strategic installations from impending disaster. The IMO dispatched its first civilian co-ordinator to 
Saudi Arabia some 10 days after the cease-fire, and IMO Secretary-general O’Neill called for the 
establishment of a special trust Fund and the setting up of an international co-ordination centre in 
the month of March 1991.27 The first money from the Fund was disbursed in early April 1991.
• A further observation is that IMO concentrated its relief efforts on Saudi Arabia, the country that 
was most severely affected by the oil slick. However, it should be noted that this was in response to 
an explicit request for assistance by this victim State, and that IMO depended for its operations not 
only on the co-operation but also on the initiative of the latter. Although it was the IMO Secretary- 
General himself who concluded at an early stage that the oil spill was of the ‘severity’ envisaged by 
Art. 7 of the OPRC Convention, the text of this provision places the right of initiative for co-
2 4  Conference Resolution 3, ibid., 754.
2 5  IMO News (1991), No. 1,1.
26 Supra, 3.1.4.
2 7  IMO News (1991), No. 1,3.
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operation and assistance squarely with State parties. In view of the Nowruz experience - which will 
be further discussed below - it is unlikely that the OPRC Convention could be relied on when State 
parties disagree, or when a belligerent has the power to block relief efforts.
• Finally, now that the OPRC Convention has entered into force, State parties are obliged to give 
effect to Arts. 4 and 5 of the Convention. These deal with oil pollution reporting procedures and 
actions subsequent to receiving an oil pollution report. While the 1991 Gulf War oil spill was 
publicised world-wide soon after its occurrence, it should be recalled that pursuant to the 
exemption clause of Art. 1(3) of the OPRC Convention, warships, naval auxiliaries or other ships 
owned or operated by State parties for non-commercial purposes, are under no duty to report oil 
spills encountered during armed conflict.
7.4.3. The 1978 Kuwait Regional Convention
The 1990/91 Gulf War precedent stands in sharp contrast to the situation surrounding the 
1983 Nowruz oil spill. As mentioned earlier, although the origin of this spill was probably accidental, 
Iraq soon aggravated it by regularly bombing the oil field.28 During the entire incident co-operation 
between the belligerent States was lacking, and the various meetings held under the auspices of the 
Regional Organisation established under the Convention (Ropme), failed even to lead to a partial 
cease-fire in order to allow capping of the burning wells.29 As a consequence, international as well as 
unilateral relief efforts were effectively ruled out since it would have required entering an active war 
zone.30 In addition, most of the unilateral remediation efforts planned or undertaken by Iran proved 
futile since Iraq resumed bombing of the fields feeding the spill.31
On the basis of the conclusions reached above regarding, inter alia, the MARPOL and the 
OPRC Conventions, the various claims made during the Iran-Iraq war regarding the 1978 Kuwait 
Regional Convention can now be evaluated.
28 Supra, 3.1.2.
29 Mann-Borgese, op. cit., 106; VI OSIR, No 10 (18 March 1983), 1; No 14 (15 April 1983), 1; No. 16 (29 April 
1983), 1; No 21 (3 June 1983), 1; No 44 (11 November 1983), 2.
30 See on the conditions set by two private companies, Norpol and Red Adair: V I OSIR, No 20 (27 M ay 1983), 1; No 
25 (1 July 1983), 1.
31 Ibid., No 38 (30 September 1983), 1; No 44 (7 October 1983), 1.
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It will be remembered that this Convention contains no express clause on armed conflict. It 
does, however, contain a provision (Art. IX (a)) on ‘pollution emergencies’, which obligates all Parties 
to take individually and/or jointly:
*.. .all necessary m easures... to  deal w ith pollution em ergencies in  the Sea A rea, whatever the cause o f  
such emergencies, and  to  reduce o r elim inate dam age resulting therefrom ’ (italics added).
Furthermore, it contains an exemption clause, Art. XIV, providing that:
‘W arships o r other ships ow ned o r operated by  a  State, and used  only on  G overnm ent non-com m ercial 
service, shall b e  exem pted from  the application o f  the provisions o f  the present convention. E ach 
C ontracting State shall, as far as possible, ensure that its w arships o r other ships ow ned o r operated  by  
that State, and  used only on  governm ent non-com m ercial service, shall com ply w ith  the present 
C onvention in  the prevention o f  pollution to  the m arine env ironm ent’
It was seen that Iraq justified its behaviour during the Nowruz incident by asserting in a letter 
to the UN Secretary- General that:
‘...the provisions o f  the Kuwait Regional convention on Cooperation fo r  the Protection o f  the Marine
Environment from  Pollution and the protocol annexed thereto have no effect in cases o f  armed
conflict.62
Whilst there is no record of any official reaction from other States, the Iraqi position was 
rejected explicitly by five experts convened by the EC Commission. They argued that since the 
Kuwait Regional Convention was negotiated for a region where tensions were known to exist, the 
terms ‘whatever the cause of such emergencies’ in Art. IX (a) must be taken to include instances such 
as the Nowruz oil spill. They further suggested that since the convention contained no express 
provision that effect, State parties would not be entitled to suspend the operation of the convention, or 
at least not in their relations with neutral States.33
To assess these claims, two main questions have to be distinguished. Can the Kuwait 
Regional Convention be said to apply at all during armed conflict? If so, would Iraq be entitled to 
suspend part or whole of the operation of the treaty on the ground of armed conflict?
First, there is incontrovertible evidence that the multilateral institution established by the 
Kuwait Regional Convention,34 although no doubt ‘affected’ by the 1980/88 Iran-Iraq conflict, and
32 Letter o f  23 December 1983, UN Doc. S / 16238, D e Guttry & Ronzitti, op. cit., 89-90.
33 Supra, 3.1.2.
34 It is noteworthy that the Organisation itself was a recent one, having been established only on 1 January 1981: Amin, 
in Malek, op. cit., 139.
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despite the fact that it failed to reach any meaningful result, continued to function. The sources 
consulted for this work indicate that both belligerents continued to participate in the meetings of the 
Regional Organisation established under the 1978 Convention. Therefore, and despite Iraq’s statement 
to the UN, the Kuwait Convention continued to operate, at least in part, during the Iran-Iraq conflict.
It is an entirely different issue, however, whether the 1978 Convention could be construed so 
as to deny Iraq the right to attack the Nowruz oil field. As discussed in Chapter Two, under current jus 
in bello, oil fields and oil installations are not as such, immune from attacks by belligerents.35 Could a 
belligerent such as Iraq nevertheless be denied the right to attack the Nowruz oil field on the basis of its 
adherence to a maritime treaty which obligates Parties to prevent incidents of marine pollution and to 
co-operate in their resolution? Insofar as the relationships between contending States are concerned, it 
is submitted that this question has to be answered in the negative, for two principal reasons.
In its advisory opinion on the Legality o f the Threat or Use o f Nuclear Weapons the ICJ 
indicated that for questions related to the conduct of belligerent activities, the law of armed conflict 
operates as lex specialis with respect to multilateral environmental treaties.36 Insofar as the attacks by 
Iraq on the Nowruz oil field conformed to the requirements of the law of armed conflict, any rights 
derived by Iran from the Kuwait Regional Convention were overridden by the law of armed conflict
This conclusion is supported by a close examination of the convention itself. As argued in the 
previous chapter,37 the exemption clause of Art. XIV of the Kuwait Regional Convention means that 
Iraqi warships are not required to comply with the substance of the treaty, nor with any possible 
equivalent domestic provisions, in time of armed conflict. This suggests that the Convention was not 
intended to regulate questions of armed conflict.
Moreover, contrary to what was claimed by the EC experts, there is reason to believe that the 
Kuwait Convention was concluded only with accidental, non-war related emergencies in mind. This is 
supported by a protocol concluded on the same day as the main framework convention and which 
forms an integral part of Convention.38 The Protocol Concerning Regional Co-Operation in Combating 
Oil and Other Harmful Substances in Cases of Emergency, defines ‘marine emergency’ as:
35 Supra, 2 .1 ,2.2.5.A.
36 Supra, 3.2.
37 Supra, 6.2.5. C & D.
38 Following Art. XXI (a).
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‘...any casualty, incident, occurrence or situation, however caused, resulting in substantial pollution or 
imminent threat of substantial pollution to die marine environment by oil or other harmful 
substances...’39
However broad and all-encompassing this phrase may seem, the provision cites only non- 
intentional and non-war related accidents:
‘...inter alia, ...collisions, strandings and other incidents involving ships, including tankers, blow-outs 
arising from petroleum drilling and production activities, and the presence of oil or other harmful 
substances arising from the Mure of industrial installations... ’
Whether the above analysis is equally valid for the relationships between Iraq and third States 
that were affected by the Nowruz oil spill, is more difficult to answer. First, in case the affected third 
State was not a party to the Kuwait Regional Convention, the latter could derive no rights vis-a-vis Iraq 
on the basis of the latter agreement.
Secondly, if the affected State was a party to the Convention, several further variables 
complicate the analysis. The first question to be asked is whether the affected State was truly neutral in 
the conflict, or instead a co-belligerent siding with one of the parties involved. If the latter, it is 
submitted that the affected State’s claim to immunity from the effects of the conflict would be in any 
event tenuous, regardless of whether this claim is based on the law of armed conflict or on any 
purported rights arising from the Kuwait Convention. If the affected State was genuinely neutral in the 
conflict, current international law, as seen in Chapters Two and Three, offers no clear answer to the 
question of whether such a State may invoke the right to be immune from the effects of armed conflict 
between other States, and if so, to what extent.40
However, even if the law of armed conflict and the law of neutrality offer no clear guidelines, 
the analysis of the Kuwait Regional Convention does seem to indicate that, on balance, it did not 
outlaw the Iraqi belligerent conduct in question, even if this affected third States. The reason for this 
suggestion is twofold. First, Art. XIV, as seen above, exempts Iraqi warships from the duty to comply 
with the substance of the convention, and leaves the protection of the environment legally 
subordinated to operational demands in times of peace and military necessities in times of naval war. 
Secondly, Iraq would in any event be entitled to suspend the operation of the entire convention 
because of the ongoing conflict.
39 Art. I (1).
40 Supra, 2 .4 .2 ,2 .4 .3 , 3.3.3.
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The view that suspension of the convention could not be allowed failing an express provision 
to that effect, however attractive from an environmental point of view, could only be accepted if the 
Kuwait Convention were to be considered in isolation. The latter premise is, however, open to 
challenge. The examination conducted in the previous chapters indicate that the Kuwait Convention is 
but one treaty in a long list of treaties on the marine environment that point to the existence of rules of 
customary international law on the subject of the legal effect of this type of multilateral treaty during 
international armed conflict. It was argued in Chapter Five that the rule according to which State 
Parties - regardless of their status in the conflict - are allowed to suspend maritime treaty provisions in 
armed conflict, is still current international law, despite the fact that most treaties concluded since the 
1970s no longer contain such an express contingency clause.
Finally, it should be noted that these conclusions are advanced as a matter of principle. They 
do not entail approval neither of the Iraqi conduct in general nor of the continued bombing of the oil 
field in particular. Procedural questions have been left aside in this assessment, whilst perhaps more 
importantly, the implications of the prohibition to use armed force in international relations were not 
considered. The main import of the above analysis is twofold. First, it was not the intention of the 
drafters of the Kuwait Regional Convention to regulate activities and consequences related to armed 
conflict. Secondly, in abstractor Iraq would be justified in claiming that she could not be denied the 
right to bomb the Nowruz oil field on the ground of any contractual obligations under the Kuwait 
Regional Convention.
nnn
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Chapter Eight 
General Conclusions on the Legal Effect o f Multilateral Environmental 
Agreements during International Armed Conflict
1. It was seen in the First Chapter that the most clearly established principle of general BEL is 
that no State may conduct activities, or permit the conduct of activities, on its territory or in 
international areas that cause harm to the territory of another State, if that harm is of serious 
consequence and is established by clear and convincing evidence. It was demonstrated also, that 
modem IEL is predominantly treaty-based and that it encompasses detailed regimes for various 
environmental sectors, such as the marine environment, freshwater resources, biodiversity and the 
atmosphere.
2. It is now well accepted that States need to take environmental considerations into account 
in the pursuit of military activities, including during armed conflict. The analysis of the lex specialis of 
the laws of armed conflict in Chapter Two has demonstrated not only the environment-protective 
potential, but also the limitations of current jus in bellojus ad bellum and neutrality law. It was seen 
too that the generally accepted principles of environmental protection during military operations, 
remain at a very high level of abstraction. The main purpose of this study, as set out in the 
introduction, was to examine the extent to which international law has developed more detailed rules 
to protect the environment in armed conflict.
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3. Li Chapter Three the author has examined the main legal principles involved and suggested 
a methodology to determine the legal effect of general IEL during armed conflict.
Following inter alia, the 1996 Advisory Opinion of the ICJ on the Legality o f the Threat or 
Use o f Nuclear Weapons, and the conference records of 1972 UNCHE and 1992 UNCED, it was 
submitted that the laws of armed conflict operate as lex specialis for questions related to the conduct of 
armed conflict. This means that whilst certain State obligations towards the environment continue to 
apply during armed conflict, IEL cannot be construed as overriding a State’s right to use armed force 
in self-defence.
To determine the legal effect of multilateral environmental agreements in general during 
armed conflict, two doctrinal questions were distinguished. First, can these agreements be said to apply 
at all to belligerent activities during international armed conflict? If so, do contracting Parties have the 
legal right to terminate or suspend the operation of such agreements during the conflict?
It was noted that modem international State practice, case law and legal theory, led to two | 
main principles of interpretation. First, as mentioned before, the laws of armed conflict operate as lex | 
specialis vis-a-vis IEL. Second, there is a strong tendency towards maintaining the validity of treaties j 
insofar as compatible with national policy and with obligations stemming from Security Council «\ 
decisions under Chapter VH.
Drawing further on the two main disciplines involved, the Law of Treaties and the Law of 
State Responsibility, it was suggested that each multilateral treaty needs to be examined separately, in 
order to determine its application to the problem in question. First, the pactum between contracting 
States needs to be examined, applying the relevant articles of the 1969 Vienna Convention on treaty 
interpretation as well as those principles related to armed conflict. Second, provision needs to be made 
for obligations arising from jus cogens, humanitarian provisions and binding Security Council 
decisions. Third, regard must be had to the grounds of suspension and termination arising from the 
Law of Treaties, and fourth, to the ‘circumstances precluding wrongfulness’ arising under the Law of 
State Responsibility. The final possibility which needs examining is whether there are any customary 
rules on the fate of multilateral environmental agreements during armed conflict, outside the frames of 
reference of the Law of Treaties or the Law of State Responsibility.
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4. For the reasons explained in the introduction, the second part of this study focused on the 
marine environment, examining the legal relationship between naval warfare and a series of 
representative treaties dealing with maritime safety and marine pollution.
The analysis conducted in Part II confirms that each treaty needs to be examined separately to 
determine its possible effect during armed conflict. For instance, there is sufficient evidence to support 
the conclusion that none of the reviewed civil liability conventions applies to questions of armed 
conflict. By contrast, the analysis of the pactum agreed in MARPOL 73/78 and the 1972 COLREGS J  
Convention indicates that these agreements could, in principle, apply in their entirety during armed j 
conflict. As for the 1989 Salvage Convention, it was submitted that it does not apply between 
contending States, but that it may continue to be relevant for relationships involving non-contending 
States.
Nevertheless, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that a great number of the reviewed 
maritime treaties are unlikely to apply during armed conflict, either because war damage is expressly 
excluded, or because the treaties do not apply to warships.
It was seen that the drafters of the majority of the reviewed treaties tended to adopt a 
categorical ‘hands-off approach to the subject of international armed conflict. The overriding concern 
of the negotiators of the maritime treaties reviewed in this study was to provide pragmatic solutions to 
certain problems encountered at sea, not to solve questions related to armed conflict. Whenever 
pressed to take an official stand on the issue, drafters opted either for excluding the matter from the 
convention altogether (e.g., through war damage exoneration clauses and warship exemption clauses), 
or for leaving it up to the discretion of the State parties (e.g., through armed conflict contingency 
clauses, and warship exemption clauses). However unsatisfactory from an environmental and jus ad 
helium point of view, it is difficult not to conclude that the majority of the reviewed treaties were not 
intended to deal with belligerent activities nor with the consequences of armed conflict.
5. As for the treaties that are in principle applicable during armed conflict, the analysis shows j 
that, under international law, all contracting Parties, regardless of their status, have the legal right to j 
suspend those treaties, either wholly or partially. This conclusion has wider implications, since it I 
supports the existence of a customary rule of law according to which all contracting Parties have the 
legal right to suspend (certain) multilateral treaties in whole or in part during circumstances of war, 
armed conflict and other types of hostilities. Because of the discretion which the discussed
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contingency clauses accord to State parties, it was argued that this constitutes a separate ground on 
which treaties may be suspended, which differs inter alia, from the rebus sic stantibus ground arising 
under the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, and the ‘state of necessity’ defence under 
the general Law of State Responsibility.
6. There is no support in the treaty practice examined in Part II of this study, for any 
mechanical consequences linked to the ‘outbreak’ of armed conflict: none of the reviewed treaties 
becomes automatically ‘inoperative’. Moreover, contracting Parties would only be allowed to suspend 
part or whole of the operation of a treaty on the ground of international armed conflict, but would not 
be entitled to withdraw permanently from a treaty.
7. This study confirms also that it would be difficult to formulate an all-purpose single rule on 
the legal effect of the reviewed treaties during international armed conflict. One may even venture to 
suggest that there is little prospect of any such rule developing in the future. There is probably no 
single rule capable of satisfying the many divergent interests of States in regard to multilateral treaties 
during armed conflict Resort to armed force in international relations is per definition a breakdown of 
international diplomacy. In these circumstances, States involved or affected by the conflict, naturally 
wish to recapture their freedom as much as possible, in respect of treaties they have entered into 
previously.
8. This study also reveals that there have been many instances in which attempts to adapt the 
old contingency rules to the new jus ad bellum failed. As a result, most of the current armed conflict 
contingency clauses may be regarded as defective or even out of date. No distinction is made between 
aggressors and victims, and all contracting Parties, regardless of their status in the conflict, enjoy broad 
discretion not only as to when to suspend the operation of a treaty in whole or in part, but in addition, 
as to when to terminate the suspension.
Because the prohibition to use armed force in international relations is jus cogens, and 
because of the primacy of the UN Charter law, it was submitted in Chapter Three that measures taken 
pursuant to Chapter VII of the UN Charter may override certain treaty rights and obligations. 
Therefore, the rights or wrongs of hostile military activity under UN Charter law may affect the 
operation of the contingency clauses of maritime treaties.
Nevertheless, it was seen in Chapter Two that under the current UN collective security 
system, authoritative judgements on the legality or illegality of belligerent activity are rare and that the 
status of non-contending States is unsettled and complicated, to say the least.
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9. The question that arises is then, whether one should expect every jus ad bellum contingency 
to be provided for in treaties on technical matters such as maritime safety and prevention of marine 
pollution- The treaty practice and the travaux preparatoires discussed in this study suggest that this 
would not be realistic. Failing widespread agreement internationally on the legality of particular 
instances of use of aimed force, it would be too much to ask - if not futile to expect - that Parties to a 
treaty such as MARPOL 73/78, agree on which belligerent is waging a bellum illegale and should 
henceforth not be allowed to resort to the suspension of the convention, or its equivalent domestic 
provisions. If, on the other hand, there is consensus within the international community as to the 
identity of the illegal aggressors), the ensuing international sanctions may include binding decisions 
on matters of treaty law, as illustrated by Res. 687 (1991) on the cease-fire conditions imposed against 
Iraq, and particularly by the ongoing work of the UN Compensation Commission.
10. It may nevertheless be useful to provide expressly for the contingency of armed conflict in 
multilateral environmental treaties. This would counter the customary presumption that where an 
instrument is silent, any Party may decide to suspend the treaty or some of its provisions during armed 
conflict.
A first requirement would be that the possibility of the occurrence of armed conflict be 
discussed at the negotiating stage of a treaty. To reduce the negative effects of auto-determination by 
any Party, the contingency clause should be restrictive, and leave the treaty rights of other Parties 
unaffected to the maximum extent possible. To bring future international environmental treaties at 
least formally in line with the current jus ad bellum precepts, the right to suspend a treaty should be 
reserved strictly for non-aggressor States. Finally, the resort to suspension should be subject to 
continuous review by the other Parties to the treaty - provided of course, that they are also non-victim 
States.
11. There seems little justification for the unqualified substantive exemptions which many 
maritime treaties continue to grant to warships and other State-owned craft. This study has indicated 
that military forces are by virtue of the domestic laws of several States already under the obligation to 
comply with the environmental duties imposed on other sectors of society, at least in times of peace. In 
this day and age, when military roles are changing, one may require that the latter comply with current 
environmental standards to the maximum extent possible. Therefore, a case can be made that 
exemption clauses in maritime treaties need to be adapted so as to better reflect these national 
practices.
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12. Filially, this study has signalled that there is m ajor w ork to be done regarding the 
incorporation o f environm ental standards in  the full spectrum  o f contem porary m ilitary operations. 
M ilitary com m anders need to be given appropriate guidance on environm ental standards for all types 
o f m ilitary operations, including for the so-called operations other than w ar (OOTW ), w hich have 
taken on added significance since the end o f the Cold W ar. This is required to implement the 
adm onition o f the ICJ in  its advisory opinion on the Legality o f  the Threat or Use o f  N uclear Weapons:
‘...States must take environmental considerations into account when assessing what is necessary and 
proportionate in the pursuit of legitimate military objectives. Respect for the environment is one of the 
elements that go to assessing whether an action is in conformity with the principles of necessity and 
proportionality.’ 1
□ □□
1 ICJ Rep. (1996), 226 at 242, para 30, in fine.
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